Final Hazard Categorization for the Remediation of Six 300-FF-2 Operable Unit Solid Waste Burial Grounds by Ludowise, J. D. & Vialetti, K. L.

TRADEMARK DISCLAIMER 
Reference herein to any specific commercial product, process, or 
service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, 
does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, 
recommendation, or favoring by the United States Government or 
any agency thereof or its contractors or subcontractors. 
This report has been reproduced from the best available copy. 
Available in paper copy. 
Available for a processing fee to U.S. Department of Energy 
and its contractors in paper from: 
U.S. Department of Energy 
Office of Scientific and Technical Information 
P.O. Box 62 
Oak Ridge, TN 37831 -0062 
Telephone: (865) 576-8401 
Facsimile: (865) 576-5728 
E-mail: reports@osti.gov 
Available for sale to the public from: 
US.  Department of Commerce 
National Technical Information Service 
5285 Port Royal Road 
Springfield, VA 221 61 
Telephone: (800) 553-6847 
Facsimile: (703) 605.6900 
E-mail: orders@ntis.fedworld.qov 
Online ordering: h~p://~.ntis.gov/ordering.htm 
Printed in the United States of America 
e: 
WCH-137 
Rev. 1 
Final Hazard Categorization for the Remediation of Six 300-FF-2 Operable Unit 
Solid Waste Burial Grounds 
Or es: J. D. Ludowise, K. L. Vitaletti 
J. VV. Darby, Field Remediation Manager 
Date 
The approval signature on this page indicates that this document has been authorized 
for information release to the public through appropriate channels. No other forms or 
signatures are required to document this information release. 

uthors: 

VVCH-137 
Rev. 1 
This report provides the final hazard categorization (FHC) for the remediation of six 
300-FF-2 Operable Unit burial grounds. The burial grounds are located in the southeast corner 
of the Hanford Site. Some of the waste sites located within the 300-FF-2 Operable Unit were 
each given an initial hazard categorization of BeZow Cutegory 3, radiological, and consequently 
their remediation will not receive further analysis within this document. The remediation of six 
sites (the 618-1,618-2,618-3,618-7,618-8, and 618-13 Burial Grounds) are the subject of this 
analysis. These six sites will be referred to from this point forward as the “300-FF-2 Burial 
Grounds .” 
Revision 1 of this document includes new information for the 618-1,618-7, and 618-13 Burial 
Grounds. At the time of Revision 1, the 618-2,618-3, and 618-8 Burial Grounds have been 
remediated. The information for the remediated burial grounds is retained here for historical 
purposes. 
In December 2004, during remediation of the 6 18-2 Burial Ground, a deteriorated combination 
safe was discovered. The safe was damaged during excavation and was found to contain several 
containers of liquids and dry residues. It was later determined that plutonium-239 was the 
predominant radionuclide present in each of the containers. Unrelated to the discovery of the 
safe, two radiological control technicians were exposed to airborne plutonium-239. As a result 
of this new information, an interoffice memorandum (BHI 2005c) was written to cease activities 
at several 300-FF-2 Remedial Action waste sites, including the 61 8-2 Burial Ground waste site. 
A management of change (BHI 2005b) discusses the discovered condition of liquids and 
pureheparated plutonium and the proposed change to commence work specifically in the 
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618-2 Burial Ground waste site using a work-segmented approa . The 61 8-2 waste site was 
segmented into five segments, as follows: 
Segment 1,618-2 Staging Pile Materials 
Segment 2, Remainder of the Southern Trench 
Segment 3, Middle Trench 
Segment 4, Northern Trench 
Segment 5 ,  Existing exhumed “safe” in a shipping box, overpacked “safe” contents, and 
“cups” from the staging pile area. 
Segment 3 bounds all of the segments in the 618-2 Burial Ground. New special controls were 
added to allow segments to be worked simultaneously in compliance with the inventory limits 
evaluated in the FHC and nuclear criticality safety requirements from the revised criticality 
evaluation to control spacing between items. 
Site-specific characterization data are limited for the 6 18-7 and 6 18- 1 Burial Grounds. 
condition of liquids and pureheparated plutonium that were discovered in the 6 18-2 Burial 
Ground could potentially occur in the 6 18-7 and 6 18- 1 Burial Grounds as well. The work at the 
618-7 and 618-1 Burial Grounds will be performed using a work-segmented approach and 
special controls as was done at the 618-2 Burial Ground. The special controls added to stay 
within the inventory limits evaluated in the FHC are similar to those in place for the 618-2 Burial 
Ground. 
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The 618-7 Burial Ground will be segmented into two segments, as follows: 
Segment 1, Northern Trenches (two trenches) 
Segment 2, Thoria Pit. 
The 618-1 Burial Ground is composed of four work segments, including three trenches laid out 
north-south and one burial area located on the south end of the burial ground, as follows: 
Segment 1, West Trench 
Segment 2, Middle Trench 
Segment 3, East Trench 
Segment 4, Southern Trenches (there are two east-west disturbances that are short trenches 
or a series of pits). 
The analyses in this documentation include the following: 
A description of the remediation activities to be performed at the 300-FF-2 Burial Grounds 
An assessment of the inventories of radioactive and other hazardous materials within the 
300-FF-2 Burial Grounds 
Identification of the hazards associated with the remediation activities performed within the 
300-FF-2 Burial Grounds 
Identification of internally and externally initiated accident scenarios with the potential to 
produce significant local consequences during remediation of the 300-FF-2 Burial Grounds 
An FHC, based on the physical and chemical form of the radionuclides and the available 
dispersive energy sources for the burial grounds and their hazardous materials 
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Identification of the controls necessary to manage the identified hazards and to ensure that 
the FHC remains valid. 
For hazardous chemicals, the sum of the ratios did not exceed 1 (one) for either 29 Code of 
Federal Regulations (CFR) 1910.1 19 or 40 CFR 68.130 thresholds. The FHC for the 300-FF-2 
Burial Grounds Remediation Project was determined based on a comparison of the radiological 
material at risk with adjusted DO -STD-1027 (DOE 1997) Category 3 threshold quantities. The 
Category 3 threshold quantities were adjusted based on the credible release fractions in 
accordance with Nuclear Safety Technical Position, NSTP 2002-2 (DOE 2002). This analysis 
has determined that the FHC for the 300-FF-2 Burial Grounds Remediation Project is below 
Category 3 (sometimes referred to as “radiological”). To ensure that the conditions assumed in 
the hazard analysis are maintained, the controls, commitments, and conditions of approval in the 
safety evaluation report shall be incorporated into the project’s readiness assessment to be 
completed prior to commencement of the work. 
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evision 
0 
Date 
12/2006 
Reason for revision 
This document supersedes WCH-01683, Rev. 2. 
This revision incorporates the following changes that 
were evaluated in HCE-2006-0005 and approved via 
CCN 130564: 
Executive Summary: Changed to reflect the 
segmentation of the 6 18-7 into the Thoria Pit and the 
Northern Trenches and the institution of special 
controls used in the 618-2 Burial Ground. The verb 
tense was changed to past tense to show that the 
618-2 Burial Ground already had been segmented. 
Introduction: Updated the references to the material- 
at-risk (MAR) and the final hazard categorization 
(FHC) calculations. 
Section 1 .4: Changed the section title and contents 
from “Management of Change Process” to “Initial 
Hazard Categorization and Final Hazard 
Categorization Evaluation Process” to reflect the new 
screening and evaluation process for changes and 
discoveries described in procedure NS- 1-2.1. 
Terminology was change throughout the document. 
: Removed the controls for the 61 8-3 
Burial Ground because the 6 18-3 Burial Ground has 
been remediated; updated the controls in this section 
to reflect the new controls from Section 5.1; and 
added the discussion regarding segmentation of the 
6 18-7 Burial Ground. 
Section 4.0: Updated the references to the MAR and 
the FHC calculations. 
Section 4.1.2.1 : Added discussion regarding drums 
containing thorium oxide and thorium nitrate. 
Table 4.1 : Added thorium nitrate/oxide drums 
located in the 6 18-7 Burial Ground. 
Section 4.3: Updated the FHC calculation reference 
and the bounding sum-of-ratio values. 
Section 5.1 : Updated the 61 8-2 special controls so 
they can be applied to all segmented operations in the 
300-FF-2; added information about the segmentation 
of the 6 18-7 Burial Ground. 
Section 6.0: Updated and added references. 
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Reason for revision 
Appendix A was updated to reflect the correct 
inventory as evaluated in HCE-2006-0007. 
Eliminated “and Auditable Safety Analysis” from the 
title of the document, consistent with NS-1-2.1. 
Revision is performed to include new information for 
the 6 18- 1 Burial Ground including the 6 18- 1 IHE 
(WCH 2007c), the 618-1 MAR (WCH 2007a), and the 
6 18- 1 FHC Calculation (TQ Adjustment) 
(WCH 2007b). 
Revision incorporates outstanding changes1evaluations 
as follows: 
HCE-2006-0006,6 18-2 Burial Ground Boreholes 
(WCH 2006e) 
HCE-2007-0002, Discovery of Documentation About 
the Material Disposed in the 6 18-7 Burial Ground 
(WCH 2007c) 
HCE-2007-0005, Use of the PINS System with a 
Cf-252 Neutron Source (WCH 2007d). 
HCE-2008-0002, Update of 6 18-7 field verification 
requirements per the revised criticality screening 
(WCH 2008). 
0300F-CA-N0003, Rev. 9, MAR calculation for the 
300-FF-2 OU sites (WCH 2006b) 
0300X-CA-NOOl l, Rev. 5,  FHC calculation for the 
300-FF-2 OU sites (WCH 2006a) 
[Note: Rev. 9 of the MAR calculation and Rev. 5 of 
the FHC calculation were performed to include 
additional radioisotopes in 6 18-7 soil/debris and drum 
inventories due to creation of daughter isotopes from 
decay of Th-232. The change is bounded by the 
previously calculated sum of the ratios for the 6 18-7 
bounding segment (8.55E-01) as shown in Section 4.3.1 
Clarification was provided throughout document as 
required to address DOE review of WCH-137, Rev. 0 
as detailed in CCN 13 1808 (DOE-RL 2007). 
Incorporated comments from DOE review of decisional 
draft as documented in the Safety Evaluation Report for 
the 300-FF-2 Burial Grounds Final Hazard 
Categorization (DOE-RL 2008) 
The following is a summary of changes by section 
number: 
Executive Summary: 
Added note that 6 18-2,6 18-3, and 6 18-8 are 
evision initiator 
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Revision Date Reason for revision 
remediated. Information on these sites is retained in 
the FHC for historical purposes. 
Added description of segmentation to be used at 
Added note to clarify use of term “high-level waste” 
in supporting reference documentation. 
618-1. 
Section 1 .O, Introduction: 
Added note that 618-2,618-3, and 618-8 are 
remediated. 
Updated references for FHC calculations. The FHC 
calculation for 6 18- 1 is added as new APPENDIX E. 
Section 2.0, Background and Information: 
Section 2.1, site description is revised to reflect 
expanded inventory based on site data from 
remediated sites (618-2,618-3, and 618-8). 
Section 2.1.2, description of 300 area disposal 
practices is revised to reflect laboratory activities 
consistent with the 618-1 IHE (WCH 2007e). 
Section 2.2.1, description of 61 8- 1 is revised 
consistent with the 618-1 IHE (WCH 2007e). 
Section 2.2.4, description of 61 8-7 is updated to 
reflect Zircaloy drums may be filled with water or oil 
Section 2.4 is revised to describe bounding segment 
per the condition of approval in 3OOFF2-08-SED- 
0134 SER (DOE-RL 2008) for the 618-1 Burial 
Ground. A new Figure 2-2 is included to show the 
work segments. 
Section 2.6 is updated to reflect references for 
300-FF-2 meteorological characteristics consistent 
with Appendix A. 
(HCE-2007-0002). 
-3.0,: 
Section 3.3 is revised to include a bullet for general 
work site operations involving application of fixatives. 
Two project-specific controls detailing requirements 
for application of fixatives were relocated to Section 
5.2. The bullet on borehole drilling is revised 
consistent with activities described in HCE-2006-0006 
(WCH 2006e). 
sk (MAR) calculations 
are corrected and a reference is provided for the new 
61 8-1 MAR calculation (WCH 2007a). 
Sections 4.1.1 and 4.1.2.1 are updated to reflect the 
use of data from remediated sites (618-2,618-3, and 
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6 1 8-8) during development of estimated inventories 
for the remaining sites. 
Section 4.1.2.2 and 4.1.2.3, description of 
noncombustible and combustible debris is updated to 
include information from 618-1 FHC (WCH 2007b). 
Section 4.1.2 last paragraph (bottom of page 4-6), is 
revised to describe inventory tracking and field 
verification requirements for handling anomalous 
waste. 
Section 4.3 is updated to include 618-1 FHC 
reference and new APPENDIX E. The sum of ratios 
for 618-1 is changed from 2.78E-01 to 6.15E-01 (for 
each segment). 
Section 5.0, Controls and Commitments: 
Section 5.1 includes new controls for segmentation in 
6 1 8- 1 per requirements of condition of approval from 
DOE (DOE-RL 2008) and revised Field Verification 
Requirements for approaching, handling, and staging 
anomalous waste (WCH 2008). Controls specific to 
site 61 8-2 (remediated) were removed and some 
controls were rewordedre-organized for clarity. 
Section 5.2 includes two project-specific controls for 
application of fixatives that were previously located 
in Section 3.3. Two project-specific controls for 
6 1 8- 1 were added that were included as “Conditions 
of Approval” in DOE SER (CCN 108932), dated 
0712003. 
Section 5.3 is updated to throughout to reflect current 
WCH programs and procedures. 
References in Section 6.0 have been updated. 
Appendix A. Hazard Identification Worksheets: 
A- 1, A-4, and A-6 are updated to reflect current 
inventory description and reference information from 
current MAR Calculations and Criticality Safety 
Reviews. The revision also includes updated 
information for site infrastructure (equipment and 
materials) and updated information for site 
meteorological conditions, as applicable. Table A- 1 
was corrected to reflect the radiological inventory for 
the 61 8- 1 Burial Ground consistent with that listed in 
Table C-1, per condition of approval from 
RL 2008). 
Appendix B, Hazard Evaluation Table: 
Updated to reflect revised consequence and risk 
ranking consistent with NS- 1-3.2. 
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Appendix C. Inventory Basis Documents: 
Table C-1 for 618-1 is updated consistent with 
Appendix C, Table A-1 . 
Appendix D, 300-FF-2 FHC Calculation (TQ 
Adjustment): 
The appendix is revised for 0300X-CA-NOOl l change 
from Rev. 4 to Rev. 5. 
Appendix E. 61 8-1 FHC Calculation (TO Adjustment): 
The appendix was replaced in its entirety reflecting the 
corrected values for Th-230 and Th-232 inventories 
found in Table 2, per condition of approval from DOE 
(DOE-RL 2008). 
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AB 
ALARA 
AOC 
BHI 
CFR 
DOE 
ERDF 
ESHTSSA 
FHC 
GPR 
HASP 
HCE 
HMS 
IHC 
H E  
MAR 
MOC 
ou 
PMF 
PUREX 
RadCon 
RCC 
RCT 
REDOX 
RL 
ss HASP 
TQ 
Tri-Party Agreement 
UBC 
WCH 
WIDS 
authorization basis 
as low as reasonably achievable 
area of Contamination 
Bechtel Hanford, Inc. 
Code of Federal Regulations 
U.S. Department of Energy 
Environmental Restoration Disposal Facility 
East Side Heat Treat Salt Storage Area 
final hazard categorization 
ground - p enetr at ing radar 
health and safety plan 
initial hazard categorizatiodfinal hazard categorization evaluation 
Hanford Meteorological Station 
initial hazard categorization 
integrated hazards evaluation 
material at risk 
management of change 
operable unit 
probable maximum flood 
P l u t o n i u ~ r a n ~ u m  Extraction (Facility) 
Radiological Control 
River Corridor Closure 
radiological control technician 
Reduction-Oxidation (Facility) 
ROE, Richland Operations Office 
site-specific health and safety plan 
threshold quantity 
Hanford Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order 
Uniform Building Code 
Washington Closure Hanford 
Waste Information Data System 
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sq. feet 
sq. yards 
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ounces 
pounds 
ton 
Volume 
teaspoons 
tablespoons 
fluid ounces 
cups 
pints 
quarts 
gallons 
cubic feet 
cubic yards 
empera ture 
Fahrenheit 
adioactivity 
picocuries 
Into Metric Units 
Multiply By 
25.4 
2.54 
0.305 
0.914 
1.609 
6.452 
0.093 
0.836 
2.6 
0.405 
28.35 
0.454 
0.907 
5 
15 
30 
0.24 
0.47 
0.95 
3.8 
0.028 
0.765 
subtract 32, 
then 
multiply by 
5/9 
37 
To Get 
millimeters 
centimeters 
meters 
meters 
kilometers 
sq. centimeters 
sq. meters 
sq. meters 
sq. kilometers 
hectares 
grams 
kilograms 
metric ton 
milliliters 
milliliters 
milliliters 
liters 
liters 
liters 
liters 
cubic meters 
cubic meters 
Celsius 
millibecquerel 
If You Know 
Length 
millimeters 
centimeters 
meters 
meters 
kilometers 
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sq. centimeters 
sq. meters 
sq. meters 
sq. kilometers 
hectares 
grams 
kilograms 
metric ton 
Volume 
milliliters 
liters 
liters 
liters 
cubic meters 
cubic meters 
Temperature 
Gels ius 
adioactivity 
millibecquerels 
Multiply By To Get 
0.039 
0.394 
3.28 1 
1.094 
0.62 1 
0.155 
10.76 
1.196 
0.4 
2.47 
0.035 
2.205 
1.102 
0.033 
2.1 
1.057 
0.264 
35.3 15 
1.308 
inches 
inches 
feet 
yards 
miles 
sq. inches 
sq. feet 
sq. yards 
sq. miles 
acres 
ounces 
pounds 
ton 
fluid ounces 
pints 
quarts 
gallons 
cubic feet 
cubic yards 
multiply by Fahrenheit 
9/5, then add 
32 
0.027 picocuries 
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This report provides the final hazard categorization (FHC) for the remediation of six solid waste 
disposal sites (referred to as burial grounds) located in the 300-FF-2 Operable Unit (OU) on the 
Hanford Site, which is located within Grant, Benton, and Frankli Counties in southeast 
Washington (Figure 1-1). These six sites (the 618-1,618-2,618-3,618-7,618-8, and 
618-13 Burial Grounds) were determined to have a total radionuc ide inventory (WCH 2005e, 
2005f, 2006b, and 2007a) that exceeds the DOE-STD-1027 Category 3 threshold quantity (TQ) 
(DOE 1997) and are the subject of this analysis. These six sites will hereinafter be referred to as 
the “300-W-2 Burial Grounds.” Three of the sites, 618-2,618-3, and 618-8, have been 
remediated. All the information for the remediated sites is retained in this document to provide 
detailed background information supporting final hazard categorization of the remaining sites. 
This FHC document examines the hazards, identifies appropriate controls to manage the hazards, 
and documents the FHC and commitments for the 300-FF-2 Buri 1 Grounds Remediation 
Project. The FHC is based on an evaluation of a full range of potential hazards associated with 
natural phenomena and remediation activities. The remediation activities analyzed in this FHC 
document are those described in the Record of Decision for the 300-FF-2 Operable Units 
(EPA 2001). 
This report accomplishes the following: 
Describes the activities to be performed during remediation of the waste site addressed by 
this FHC document 
Assesses the inventory of radioactive and other hazardous materials associated with the 
300-FF-2 Burial Grounds 
Identifies internally and externally initiated accident scenarios and natural phenomena with 
the potential to produce significant local consequences during remediation of the 300-FF-2 
Burial Grounds 
Determines an FHC based on a comparison of the material at risk (MAR) to DOE-STD- 
1027 Category 3 TQs (DOE 1997) adjusted to reflect the credible release fractions in 
accordance with NSTP 2002-2 (DOE 2002) 
Identifies the necessary controls to manage the hazards and to ensure that the FHC remains 
valid. 
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Section 1.3 describes the project activities that will be authorized by approval of this document. 
Section 1.4 describes how configuration and change control will be managed to maintain the 
requirements based on this document. Section 1.5 summarizes the conclusions and project- 
specific controls. Section 1.6 describes the overall approach used in the FHC process. 
Section 2.0 provides the background information necessary to un erstand the hazards that have 
potential consequences to workers, the public, or the environment. Section 3.0 provides the basis 
of operations that are analyzed and authorized under the FHC. Section 4.0 identifies the hazards 
present, analyzes the identified hazards, and provides the FHC. Section 5.0 describes special, 
project-specific, and programmatic controls needed to ensure the FHC remains valid. 
The scope of this document involves evaluating hazards associated with the remediation 
activities at the 300-FF-2 Burial Grounds. The Record of Decision (EPA 2001) specifies 
cleanup to industrial standards and identifies the following remediation activities: 
Excavation of soils/sedirnents, debris, and waste materials 
Material handling and transport, including sorting, size reduction, treatment, stockpiling of 
soils and debris, and packaging 
SoiVdebris and waste drum characterization and analysis (includes field surveys) 
Decontamination 
Placement of backfill. 
These activities are discussed in detail in Section 3.0. 
Established configuratiordchange control processes ensure that proposed changes and discovered 
conditions are reviewed in relation to the authorized activities, identified and evaluated hazards, 
and specified commitments. 
If new characterization data become available that are indicative of increased inventories of 
either radiological contaminants or hazardous materials, the initial hazard categorization (IHC) 
and final hazard categorization evaluation (HCE) process (see NS- 1, Nuclear Safety, procedure 
NS-1-2.1) will be used to evaluate the impacts to the FHC. 
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Figure 1-1. 300-FF-2 Operable Unit. 
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The HCE process is similar to the unreviewed safety question process for hazard category 1,2, 
and 3 nuclear facilities. The purpose of the HCE process is not to determine the safety of a 
change or discovery, but to establish the proper approval authority for specific situations. The 
safety of a proposed change is to be addressed by the contractor (before using the HCE process) 
by analyzing the hazards associated with the change. 
The HCE ensures that hazard categorizations are maintained. Discoveries or new information that 
could affect the inventory basis, segmentation (if applicable), or preservation controls (if 
applicable), as delineated below, need to be promptly evaluated. 
A discovery or new information about the radiological inventory having the potential to 
increase the total activity evaluated in an IHC or FHC. 
A discovery or new information that indicates a change in isotopic mixture that has the 
potential to increase the sum of ratios used to determine an IHC or FHC. 
A discovery or new information indicating the potential for increased release rates that 
could reduce the threshold quantities used for IHC or FHC. When material form changes 
(e.g., solid to semivolatile), and/or when new energy sources could be introduced, the 
hazard category could change. 
An FHC could be affected by changes that affect the assumptions or basis for segmentation. 
An example is segmentation of separate trenches within a burial ground. A discovery that 
the separation distance between two significant trenches has deteriorated could negatively 
affect the FHC. 
A preservation control of an FHC, if found inadequate, has the potential to affect an FHC. 
If a control device, such as a radiation monitor, is relied upon to implement a preservation 
control and that control was found not effective, then the conditions of approval and 
could be affected. 
The HCE determines the effect of the discovered condition or change situation relative to the 
accident scenario evaluations in the authorization basis (AB). The HCE is used to determine if 
U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) approval of the change is required. 
Following a detailed analysis of the potential hazards that could be encountered while 
remediating the 300-FF-2 Burial Grounds, it was determined that no activity/process authorized 
by this FHC document could credibly result in undue risk to workers, the public, or the 
environment (see Section 4.0). Controls that are special in regard to the assumptions made in the 
FHC are detailed in Section 5.1. Project-specific controls are detailed in Section 5.2, and 
programmatic controls are detailed in Section 5.3. 
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The FHC for the remediation of the 300-FF-2 Burial Grounds was determined to be below 
Category 3 (sometimes referred to as radiological). The FHC for the 300-IT-2 Burial Grounds 
Remediation Project was determined using sum of the ratios of the total radionuclide inventories 
and the Category 3 TQs from DOE-STD-1027 (DOE 1997) adjusted to reflect the credible 
release fractions in accordance with NSTP 2002-2 (DOE 2002). The FHC calculation for the 
618-7 and 618-13 sites are included in Appendix D (WCH 2006a), and the FHC for the 
618-1 site is included in Appendix E (WCH 2007b). 
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The 300 Area is located along the Columbia River, north of the Richland City limits. It was 
constructed during the 1940s and was operated as a fuel fabrication, test reactor, and laboratory 
complex. These activities released contaminants to the soil surface, the vadose zone, and 
groundwater. Waste from 300 Area operations was also deposited in designated burial grounds 
and discharged to unlined ponds and trenches. 
The burial grounds to be remediated have been described as “general content burial grounds” 
(DOE-RL 2000) and are representative of the type of burial ground within this OU that operated 
from the mid- 1940s through the mid- 1970s. The primary contaminant in the 300 Area is 
uranium from the fuel fabrication processes. However, numerous other chemical and 
radiological hazardous wastes are found throughout the 300 Area. Attributes of general content 
burial grounds, and these 300-FF-2 sites in particular, include the following: 
ave an existing cover of soil, with vegetation or asphalt. 
The 300-FF-2 Burial Grounds are adjacent to several 300-FF-1 OU waste sites that have 
been remediated or are currently undergoing remediation. 
The sites contain uranium-contaminated trash, equipment, and soil. Some of the sites could 
also contain soil and debris contaminated with plutonium and fission products, and other 
contaminated liquids and discrete items. 
The six 300 Area solid waste burial grounds addressed in this FHC document operated at various 
times during a 30-year span. During this period, the 300 Area facilities were involved in both 
defense and nondefense missions that involved the following: 
Development and fabrication of Hanford production reactor fuels, poisons, and targets 
(including modifications to fuel geometry, cladding, material, inspection, and uranium 
recovery operations) 
Development and fabrication of reactor fuels containing plutonium 
Development, improvement, and pilot-scale testing of chemical separations processes 
(including the bismuth phosphate, metal recovery, Reduction-Oxidation Facility [REDO 
PlutoniumPUraniurn Extraction [PUREX], and others) 
Radiochemical, metallurgical, and physics testing to support production reactor operation 
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Research and development of processes to extract and/or encapsulate high-heat isotopes 
(e.g., strontium, cesium, cerium, promethium, neptunium) from high-activity wastes 
Early development of waste calcification and vitrification processes 
Biological and botanical research, biophysics, and bioassay techniques 
Operation of various test reactors 
Other research and development activities. 
hough 300 Area activities changed in response 3 both national needs and the state of nuclear 
technology during this 30-year span, the types of waste (contaminated equipment and materials) 
and the family of contaminants (Le., radionuclides associated with both irradiated and 
unirradiated nuclear fuels and chemicals associated with their separatiodextraction processes) 
produced in the 300 Area remained relatively constant. 
2. 
From 1943 to 1973, each of the six burial grounds addressed in th s FHC document had the 
potential to receive wastes from any of the 300 Area activities being conducted at the time each 
burial ground was open (see separate burial ground sections for specific time frames). Three 
significant changes to 300 Area waste disposal practices during this time span that should be 
noted are as follows: 
Prior to 1954, fairly small quantities of radioactive wastes related to hot work were disposed 
of in the 300 Area solid waste burial grounds. The two major 300 Area laboratories (the 
32 1 and 3706 Buildings) performed limited radiochemical and radiometallurgical activities, 
and it was not until the 327 Building was constructed in 1953 that hot work on intermediate- 
activity (i.e., 0.1 to 30 Ci) and high-activity (30 to 1,000 Ci) materials was performed in the 
300 Area (WCH 2007e). 
Because of high radiation levels in and near the 618-2 Burial Ground, generated by the 325 
and 327 Buildings’ wastes, the 618-10 Burial Ground, known as “300 North,” opened in 
1954 about 7 km (4.3 mi) northwest of the 300 Area (WHC 1993). 
The disposal of nearly all 300 Area laboratory wastes was diverted to the 200 Area burial 
grounds by 1968. 
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The 300-FF-2 Burial Grounds (Figure 2-1) are adjacent to (within 200 m of) the Columbia River 
and approximately 3.0 km north of the southern Hanford Site boundary. The 300-FF-2 OU 
includes radioactively and/or chemically contaminated soil, buried waste, and below-ground 
structures (e.g., pipelines and concrete) within and also in close proximity to the 300 Area. 
The following sections provide a brief description of each of the burial grounds. Specific 
information about the contents of each of the burial grounds is included in Appendix A. 
Appendix C documents the results of the research conducted to determine the hazardous 
materials inventory for these sites. 
ria 
The 61 8- 1 Burial Ground (also known as Solid Waste Burial Ground No. 1, 3 18- 1) is located in 
the northeast comer of the 300 Area, adjacent to the east side of the former 333 Building. The 
burial ground was active from 1945 through 195 1 and received waste from several of the 
300 Area laboratories and buildings that were operational during that time. More recent waste 
contributions to this site have occurred as a result of co-located waste sites and from unplanned 
releases from facilities that were constructed over the burial ground. 
Most of the burial ground is marked with yellow concrete AC-540 markers and a radiation area 
chain. There are five other “Buried Radioactive Material” medal1 ons inserted flush with the 
asphalt pavement along the east side of the former 333 Building to mark the western extent of 
the burial ground. Most of the burial ground is covered with gravel, but portions on the south 
and west sides of the burial ground have been paved over with asphalt and portions are located 
under concrete pads that were associated with the former 333 and 303-M Buildings. 
The 333,303-M, and 334 facilities were all associated with this burial ground and were 
positioned, at least partially, over this burial ground and subseque ly removed. The 303- 
facility was built over the top of the north end of the west trench ( rial Trench 1). The 
334 Building, the 334-A Building, and the 334 Waste Acid Tanks (above-ground tank farm) are 
also over a portion of the west side of the burial ground. The small sheet metal 303-M Oxide 
Burner Building, 5 by 7 m (16 by 24 ft), was placed on a concrete slab in 1961 over the 
618-1 Burial Ground. In the 303-L Building, pyrophoric uranium scraps were burned to an 
oxide state that would be safe for shipment. However, unconventional burning vessels (two 
cement mixers lined with concrete) and poor ventilation soon combined to produce airborne 
contamination readings that frequently exceeded the maximum permissible concentrations for 
both unrestricted and restricted areas. Burning was stopped in 197 1, and the building was 
removed in 1976. In 1983, the 303-M Uranium Oxide Facility was constructed on the same site. 
This burial ground is also associated with two acid releases: Waste Information Data System 
(WIDS) Site UPR-300-13 and WIDS Site UPR-300-14. WIDS Site 300-259 (Contaminated Soil 
East of 618-1 Burial Ground) is likely associated with this site as well. 
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Figure 2-1. 300-FF-2 Burial Grounds Location. 
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Other facilities associated with this burial ground include the WLDS Subsite 618-1:l (333 East 
Side Heat Treat Salt Storage Area [ESH SA ]), being immediately adjacent to the 
burial ground. A waste acid neutralizat box (61 8- 1 :2, Limestone Neutralization Pit) is also 
located near the south end of the burial d (see WIDS Site 300-226). The upper wooden 
covers for the Limestone Neutralizatio ave been removed, and the pit has been backfilled 
with soil. It is no longer visible at the surface. The concrete pipe trench branch to the pit is 
visible. The drain line from the concrete pipe trench to the pit was sealed and the neutralization 
pit shut down in 1975 following a large acid spill (WIDS Site UPR-300-14). 
A 1995 ground-penetrating radar (GPR) survey (BHI 1995’0) identified two or three burial 
trenches running north-south and two east-west disturbances in the south end of the burial 
ground. Surface obstacles (e.g., fences and buildings) prevented the clear delineation of all 
trenches, but the north-south-running trenches appear to measure approximately 5 to 9 m (16 to 
30 ft) wide by 61 to 76 m (200 to 250 ft) long and 2.4 m (8 ft) deep. The disturbances in the 
south end of the burial ground could be a series of pits, estimated to be 6.1 m (20 ft) deep), or a 
combination of pits and short trenches. Older waste site references indicate a series of pits was 
located in the south end of this burial ground. 
No detailed records were kept on the material that was deposited in the 6 18- 1 Burial Ground. 
The site reportedly contains large quantities of uranium (-14,500 kg [ 16 tons]) from the fuel 
fabrication activities and small quantities of plutonium and fission products from laboratory 
operations. It also received some highly contaminated wastes from early 3741 Building 
operations and from the initial cleanout of the 3706 Building during 1946 to 1947. Specific 
items include contaminated gloves, miscellaneous equipment, bronze crucibles, and solid 
laboratory waste. 
Historical records were further researched to develop the 6 18- 1 integrated hazards evaluation 
(IHE) (WCH 2007e). As described in the IHE, the key waste contributors at the 618-1 Burial 
Ground were the 313/314 and 3741 fabrication buildings, the 3706 laboratory, the 321 semi- 
works building, and the 334 Waste Acid Tanks. The 618-1 site generally contains miscellaneous 
equipment contaminated with uranium, plutonium, and fission products. The site could also 
contain drums of uranium chips in oil and drums of uranium oxide based on waste forms found 
in analogous waste site 618-4. Because the 3706 and 321 facilities were involved in the 
development of separations processes (primarily bismuth phosph e and REDOX), the 61 8-1 site 
could also contain laboratory wastes such as separated plutonium and p1utoniu~-contaminated 
discrete items. An inventory for these wastes has been included based on liquid waste 
(laboratory bottles) and discrete items found in the 618-2 and 618-3 sites. 
B 0th the Final Environmental Impact Statement, Disposal of Hanford Defense High-Level, 
Transuranic and Tank Wastes (DOE 1987) and a letter titled “Amount of Plutonium in Waste 
Sites 618-1,618-2,618-10,618-11~~ (UNC 1986) list the plutonium inventory of the 
618-1 Burial Ground as 1 g. However, based on data from the analogous sites, an increased 
plutonium inventory (approximately 20 g) was developed for the site in the MAR calculation 
(WCH 2007a) and was retained for conservatism. 
~~ 
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2. 
The 618-2 Burial Ground is located just north of 618-1 and was active from 1951 through 1954. 
It consists of three east-west trenches. Most of the contents in this burial ground were destroyed 
by fire on February 17, 1954 (Ecology et al. 1998). 
Before 1954, small quantities of unsegregated radioactive solid wastes, generated mostly by 
radiochemical and radiometallurgical tests in the 321 and 3706 Buildings, were placed in 
300 Area burial grounds. The startup of “hot cell” operations in the 325 and 327 Buildings in 
1953 significantly changed the volume and radioactive material content of 300 Area waste, and 
hence the radiation levels at the 300 Area burial grounds being used for disposal. Hot cell wastes 
included glassware, swipes, equipment parts, and pieces of piping and other structural materials 
Contaminated with plutonium, irradiated uranium, and fission products as a result of analytical 
laboratory activities. Engineering judgment and process knowledge estimates that 25% of the 
radiological inventory of the hot cell waste was associated with combustible waste and 75% was 
in the forrn of contaminated, noncombustible solids. By early 1954, transfers of solid waste 
“chips” from the 327 Buildings hot cells routinely produced readings of several rads per hour 
both during the transfer operation and on the load luggers used for transport to the 6 18-2 and 
618-4 Burial Grounds. During the fire that destroyed an estimated 75% of the combustible 
material contents of the 618-2 site, a dose rate of 30 rnr/hr was observed at 3 m (10 ft) from 
327 Building waste, in the southeast corner of this burial ground. According to 300Area 
Radioactive Liquid Waste Streams Disposal (GE 1954), disposal of high-activity wastes from 
300 Area laboratory facilities transitioned from the 300 Area trenches (including 618-2) to a new 
trench (Le., 618-10 Burial Ground) at the 300-N Area in March 1954. This transition was driven 
by the increasing volume and radioactive material content of 300 Area waste and, in all 
likelihood, was hastened by the February 1954 fire within 618-2. 
Other deposited forrns of waste included uranium-contaminated equipment and solid metallic 
uranium oxides in the form of metal cuttings from reactor fuel fabrication facilities. This burial 
ground also contains “tons” of tin from the triple dip canning process and lead from the lead dip 
process. This site is fenced and posted as an Underground Radioactive Materials site. 
The unit was interim stabilized in 1989 with 0.6 m (2 ft) of clean soil. During interim 
stabilization, two dump truck loads of automotive batteries were discovered. It was decided to 
leave the batteries in place. 
Surface radiological surveys are done annually. In 1994, contaminated Russian thistle was found 
growing in two places on the burial ground. The contamination levels ranged from 20,000 to 
25,000 dpm. The contaminated material was removed. This was the first evidence of a 
contamination “breakthrough” since the area was stabilized in 19 
A 1995 GPR survey (BHI 1995b) shows the northernmost trench to be 49 m (160 ft) long and 
9 m (30 ft) wide. The southernmost trench is 55 m (180 ft) long and 15 m (50 ft) wide. The 
center trench is 54 m (175 ft) long and 18 m (60 ft) wide. This geophysical survey also noted 
~~ ~ 
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three high-concentration areas of buried waste in the southern half of the landfill. No major 
concentrations of buried debris were detected in the northern part. 
In December 2004, during remediation of the 618-2 Burial Ground (south trench), a deteriorated 
combination safe was discovered and brought to the surface. The safe was damaged during 
excavation and was found to contain several containers of liquids and dry powders. It was later 
determined that (purekeparated) plutonium-239 was the predominant radionuclide present in 
each of the containers. Unrelated to the discovery of the safe two days later, two radiological 
control technicians (RCTs) were exposed to airborne plutonium-239 while performing surveys in 
the 6 18-2 Burial Ground staging pile area to locate the source of airborne contamination by two 
laborers that were working in the area two days earlier. These events caused the DOE, Richland 
Operations Office (RL) to assess the planning and execution of remedial action activities 
conducted by Bechtel Hanford, Inc. (BHI) at the 618-2 Burial Ground. In parallel with the RL 
assessment activities, BHI performed self-assessments, root cause analyses, and developed 
corrective action plans in response to the RL assessment findings. The 300-FF-2 Remedial 
Action 61 8-2 Self-Assessment Report (BHI 2005d) presents the results of the BHI investigation 
and a detailed response to the RL assessment. The document presents the detailed events and 
specifics about what was found in the burial ground. At the time work stopped, it was estimated 
that 90% of the volume contained in the southern trench had been excavated and staged for 
sorting. The remaining 10% of the volume in the south trench, along with the entire volume of 
the middle and north trenches, remained unexcavated at that time. The document also presents a 
comprehensive evaluation of the 6 18-2 Burial Ground inventory centered around the presence of 
separated plutonium, based upon a reevaluation of historical summary and historical source 
documents. The inventory descriptions provided therein generally supplement previous 
inventory descriptions, but supersede previous inventory descriptions as related to the presence 
of plutonium in the 618-2 Burial Ground. 
.3 as 
The 618-3 Burial Ground was active from 1954 to 1955. The site was primarily used for the 
disposal of uranium waste in the form of contaminated building material derived from several 
300 Area buildings. It is immediately west of, and adjacent to, the 618-2 Burial Ground, and is 
an expansion of that site. The original surface dimensions were 107 m (350 ft) long by 50 m 
(165 ft) wide. In 1954, the 313 Building underwent a major remodeling and expansion. At that 
time, much contaminated equipment and other solid wastes from this building and its immediate 
surrounding area and from the 303 warehouses were placed in the 618-3 Burial Ground. 
deposited there included demolition and construction debris, large equipment parts, and 
structural materials resulting from the remodeling of the 313, 303-J, and 303-K Buildings and 
from the construction of the 3 11 facilities (Ecology et al. 1998). 
During an annual survey in 1983, spotty surface contamination was found in the northwest 
corner of the site. No corrective action was taken at that time. A 15-m (49-ft) extension to the 
north end of the burial ground has been added to the site. A notation is included on one site 
drawing stating “Extension of Burial Ground, Contaminated material unearthed in vicinity.” 
~ 
FHC for the Remediation of Six 300-FF-2 Operable Unit Solid Waste Burial Grounds 
May 2008 2-7 
WCH- 137 
Rev. 1 
The unit was interim stabilized in 1989 with 0.6 m (2 ft) of clean soil. The 618-3 site currently 
appears as a vegetation-covered area surrounded by a wire fence and 2-m (8-ft) wooden posts. 
The 300 Area perimeter fence bounds its south side. Geophysical investigations (BHI 1995b) 
indicate one continuous, north-south-trending trench, approximately 30 m (100 ft) wide, 
spanning the length of the enclosed area with continuous areas of debris. 
2. 
The 618-7 Burial Ground is a vegetation-covered area, with patches of cobbles, surrounded by 
wooden poles and a 2.4-m (8-ft) wire fence. This burial ground operated from 1960 to 1973. A 
locked gate is located on the east side of the fenced area and is posted with Underground 
Radioactive Material signs. The burial ground consists of two east-west-oriented trenches and 
one “V-shaped” pit. Results from the 1995 geophysical investigation (BHI 1995c) provide 
fui-ther detailed information. The most southern trench, because of its V-shaped geometry, is 
most likely the V-shaped trench referred to in BHI (1994) (Ecology et al. 1998). 
The dimensions of this trench are roughly 9 m (30 ft) wide across the top and 137 m (450 ft) 
long. The thickness of fill overlying the buried waste varies from 0.6 to 3 m (2 to 9 ft). The 
middle trench has four square cement monuments that were apparently used to mark its south 
and north boundaries. This trench is the only trench that has such markers. The trench is 
approximately 30 m (100 ft) wide and 158 m (520 ft) long. It contains high concentrations of 
buried waste throughout. The thickness of fill overlying the buried waste varies from 0.6 to 3 m 
(2 to 9 ft). The most northern trench is very similar in character to the middle trench. It is 
roughly 27 m (90 ft) wide and 162 m (530 ft) long, and also has high concentrations of buried 
debris throughout. The thickness of fill overlying the buried waste varies from 0.6 to 3 m 
(2 to 9 ft). 
Materials buried at this site were primarily from the 321,313, 333, 3722, and 3732 Buildings. 
Between 1962 and 1973, hundreds of 114-L (30-gal) drums of Zircaloy-2 chips contaminated 
with beryllium and uranium were buried in the trenches. No records were kept to identify the 
exact quantities and locations of these drums. The Zircaloy-2 chips were waste from the process 
of machining the ends of Zircaloy-2 clad fuel elements. They vary in size, but are generally 4 to 
5 mils (0.004 to 0.005 in.) thick and 0.64 cm (0.25 in.) wide. Because the Zircaloy-2 was 
considered pyrophoric, the drums were filled with water or oil to avoid spontaneous combustion. 
If the drums were packed in water it is highly possible the water has leaked out of the drums. 
Other low-activity material, contaminated with uranium and thorium, was also buried in the 
trenches. 
Historical records were researched to prepare the 618-7 IHEi (WCH 2005~). The IHE indicates 
that the 300 Area processed approximately 137 metric tons (150 tons) of thoria in each of two 
campaigns, giving a total of 272 metric tons (300 tons) of thoria. It is anticipated that several 
drums of waste contaminated with thorium oxide (thoria) from the thorium program will be 
unearthed at the 618-7 Burial Ground based on the information found during the development of 
the IHEi. Thorium nitrate in liquid form was used in experiments in the 300 Area. The liquid 
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thorium nitrate may have evaporated leaving behind dried thorium nitrate crystals. The IHE 
indicates that up to four drums of thorium may have been disposed in the 618-7 Burial Ground. 
It is assumed that no more than 0.1% (270 kg) of the total amount processed (272 metric tons 
[300 tons]) would have been disposed of as waste. Consequently, in addition to the drummed 
thorium oxide and nitrate, the MAR calculation (WCH 2006b) assumed that 0.1% (270 kg) of 
thorium oxide may be present in the 618-7 Thoria Pit (243 kg) and trenches (27 kg) in the form 
of contaminated soil and process equipment. 
The historical research also shows that 3,016 kg (5,648 lbs) of depleted uranium were buried in 
the 618-7 Burial Ground in 1970 (DUN 1968). 
A surface radiological survey is done annually. The radiological survey conducted with tractor- 
mounted survey equipment during the limited field investigation (DOE-RL 1997) did not 
identify any surface contamination. 
2. 6 oli ria 
The 618-8 Burial Ground is reported to be 183 m (600 ft) long and 30 m (100 ft) wide. It 
reportedly contains uranium and uranium-contaminated solid waste derived from reactor fuel 
manufacturing (Ecology et al. 1998). 
It appears that this burial ground came into being at about the same time (approximately 1954) 
that the 313 Building was expanded to its present size and that it could have been created to 
receive construction debris. This is further confirmed by GPR surveys (BHI 1995a) conducted 
in the area that indicate that construction-type debris is buried here. These surveys did not 
identify a traditional trench configuration for this site. 
The identification of contamination outside the posted boundaries of 618-8 led to an 
investigation to determine the nature and extent of contamination in this area. The 1980 
investigation included drilling several test holes, in situ and sample-to-detector measurements, 
radiation surveys, and analysis of soil samples. Seven more test pits were dug in June 1987 in 
the area north of the established waste site. Contaminated material with levels from 300 to 
1,500 cpm was found in two of the seven holes. 
A parking lot was constructed over the majority of the site. Subsequently, the radiation 
monuments were cut down to grade. Medallions embedded in the asphalt mark the location of 
the burial ground. The original footprint of the burial ground was expanded to the north in 1980. 
Post and chain delineate this area. The site is posted as Underground Radioactive Material. 
Nonintrusive investigations were done as part of the 300-FF-2 OU limited field investigations 
(DOE-RL 1997). A surface radiological survey did not identify any Contamination. 
A geophysical investigation (BHI 2002) was done as part of remedial action design activities to 
finalize the dimensions for contract documents. The results confirmed the results of earlier 
~~ 
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investigations that there is no trench or substantial amounts of buried material within the 
documented area as outlined by the surface monuments. However, there are substantial 
anomalies with the characteristics of buried debris and material in and around the north end of 
the documented trench. The most dominant anomalous zone is a northwest-southeast-trending 
zone immediately north of the pavement that has large amounts of buried metallic debris within 
it that could include storage drums. 
2. 
This site consists of a mound of soil approximately 4.6 to 6.1 m (15 to 20 ft) high by 38 m 
(125 ft) long by 15 m (50 ft) wide, covered with 0.6 m (2 ft) of clean soil. It is located west of 
the 300 Area, across Route 4 South, adjacent to the excavated 618-9 Burial Ground. 
The site was originally a single-use disposal site for contaminated soil removed from the 
303 Building perimeter in 1950 (Paas 1955). It is believed that this mound of soil later served as 
a safety shield for drums of hexone stored in buildings on the west side of the berrn, prior to the 
drums being buried in the 618-9 Burial Trench in 1954. A concre e building foundation is still 
present directly west of the mound (Ecology et al. 1998). 
There are railroad tie berms at each of the site’s four comers and along the east side. These 
wooden berm walls are in very poor condition, especially on the east side. The site is posted 
with a “Do Not Disturb, Environmental Test Site” warning sign. Carbon steel angle irons 
protrude from the mound on the north side and appear to have once .been used as sign posts. 
the northwest corner, a small, red-handled valve protrudes from the mound just inside the 
wooden berm. Adjacent to the west side of the mound is a concrete pad and loading dock. The 
pad and dock were reportedly used for the storage of depleted solvents that were subsequently 
buried in the nearby 618-9 Burial Ground. 
Nonintizlsive investigations were done as part of the 300-FF-2 OU limited field investigations 
(DOE-RL 1997). A surface radiological survey did not identify any contamination. An 
electromagnetic induction scan (BHI 1995a) done in May 1995 concluded that there were no 
anomalies detected in the mound, suggesting that no debris was present. 
2. 
The remediation objective for the 300-FF-2 Burial Grounds is to remove, treat, and dispose 
hazardous materials .to achieve the remedial action goals (EPA 2001). As remediation is 
completed, verification samples will be collected to verify that remedial action goals are met. 
After this verification is complete, the site will be backfilled with clean material. 
2. 
The six waste sites were previously considered to be five separate facilities for final hazard 
categorization purposes. The distances between the waste sites, except for 618-2 and 618-3, 
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precludes the interaction of the materials in one site from affecting materials in another site. 
Given the proximity of 6 8-2 to 618-3, these two sites were considered to be a single facility for 
final hazard categorization purposes. As discussed in BHI (2005c), the 618-2 Burial Ground 
waste site has been divided into five segments. Rationalization for the segmentation of the 618-2 
waste site includes the following: 
Geophysical data show horizontal separation between the trenches, approximately 3 m (10 
ft) at the surface and increases with depth 
Geophysical data and historical process knowledge of the Radiation Area Remedial Action 
program indicates at least 0.6 m (2 ft) of previously placed stabilization fill over the trenches 
and up to approximately 1.2 to 2.4 m (4 to 8 ft) in certain locations 
The discrete items found in the excavated safe have been stabilized in overpackshpecial 
waste shipping boxes and separated by a minimum of 0.9 m (3 ft) per the criticality 
evaluation 
The 618-2 staging pile material has been stabilized with at least 0.6 m (2 ft) of fill material. 
The 618-7 Burial Ground will be segmented into two segments, the Northern Trenches and the 
Thoria Pit. Each segment of the 61 8-7 Burial Ground has an FHC of less than hazard category 3. 
Geophysical data show a separation of more than 30 m (100 ft) between the northern trenches 
and the thoria pit, allowing for the separation of inventories to preclude bringing the hazardous 
materials together from the two segments. 
The 618-1 Burial Ground will be segmented into four work segments, including three trenches 
laid out north-south and one burial area located on the south of the burial ground, as listed below 
and shown in Figure 2-2: 
Segment 1, West Trench 
Segment 2, Middle Trench 
Segment 3, East Trench 
Segment 4, Southern Trenches (there are two east-west disturbances that are short trenches 
or a series of pits). 
Geophysical data from the 618-1 GPR survey (BHI 1995b) indicate a separation distance of 3 rn 
(10 ft) or more between the segments and approximately 0.3 to 1.5 m (1 to 5 ft) of previously 
placed fill over the trenches. For simplification, the waste is assumed to be equally distributed 
among the trenches. 
Process knowledge and historical documents indicate that radioactivity levels associated with 
fuel fabrication and laboratory activities, and the resultant waste, in the 300 Area remained 
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relatively low and relatively constant from January 1945 to mid- 1949, which corresponds to 
most ( S O % )  of the time 618-1 was open. This is consistent with reactor power levels remaining 
nearly the same from 1945 (250 MW) to June 1950 (about 310 MW) and with the low irradiated 
metal discharge exposure of about 200 megawatt-days per ton (MMrDlt) during this time period. 
In order to increase the concentration of plutonium, the irradiated metal discharge exposure was 
steadily increased throughout 1949 from about 200 MWD/t to about 400 MWD/t (AEC 1949). 
The discharge exposure was further increased to 600 MWD/t in early 195 1. Increased discharge 
exposures also resulted in an increase in the activity levels in process samples analyzed in the 
300 Area laboratories. The first reported concern (GE 1949) regarding high dose rates and 
activity levels associated with 300 Area laboratory waste was in April 1949 by the organization 
responsible for radiation protection. GE (1949) reported that “a review of all waste disposal 
procedures was instigated as a result of the high activity levels encountered.” Increasing 
radiation dose rates on samples from the 200 Area requiring “revision of laboratory procedures 
and shielding” were also reported in August 1950 (GE 1950a). Eight new high-activity 
plutonium and fission product laboratories were added to the 3706 Building in 1950 to allow 
processing of “gram quantities of Pu an straight dissolver solution” (GE 195 1). 
A new burial ground located in the northeast corner of the 300 Area perimeter fence was 
reported to be completed and placed in operation in April 1950 (GE 1950b). The location and 
time correspond to 618-2, which replaced 618-1 as the solid waste burial ground in the 300 Area. 
The radioactivity of laboratory samples (and associated waste) increased significantly during the 
lifetime of 618-2, as the average reactor power level increased from about 310 MW in June 1950 
to about 830 M W  by January 1954. 
Historical documents show that both 6 18- 1 and 6 18-2 received Pu-contaminated laboratory 
waste throughout their operational periods. However, based on the above discussion, it is 
expected that most of the laboratory waste disposed in 618-1 was significantly less Contaminated 
and less radioactive than the laboratory waste disposed in 618-2. The primary (about 80%) 
contributors to the sum-of-ratios value for 6 18- 1 are the discrete, Pu-contaminated items that are 
included in the inventory based on items found at 6 18-2. These items have an inventory of about 
0.43 Ci (6.9 grams) of Pu-239 in the form of contaminated combustible solids, non-combustible 
solids, and combustible liquids. It is believed that application of 618-2 data to all of 618-1, 
rather than to only the part that received waste from mid-1949 to mid-1950, significantly 
overestimates the Pu inventory of 6 18- 1. Division of the inventory equally among the four 
segments recognizes that the operation period of each part of 618-1 is unknown, and 
conservatively treats each segment as the bounding segment. 
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2. 
Approximately 35 to 50 individuals will work on the 300-FF-2 Burial Grounds Remediation 
Project. Approximately 30 of these individuals are manual workers and 20 are nomanual support 
personnel. As of 1999, approximately 1,500 prime contractor employees work in the 300 Area. 
An additional 350 enterprise company employees and subcontractors also work in the 300 Area 
(Christensen 1999). 
2. 
This section contains information on the meteorological and geological characteristics of the 
area. 
e 
Temperature extremes vary from -29°C to 46°C (-20°F to 115°F) on the Hanford Site 
(Hoitink et al. 2005). Climatological data are available from the Hanford Meteorological 
Station (HMS) (which is located between the 200 East and 200 West Areas on the Hanford Site) 
and historical data from the former 300 Area meteorological station. The HMS has collected 
data since 1945. Appendix A states the hazards related to heatkold extremes. 
The mean annual precipitation at the HMS is 16 cm (6.3 in.). Historical data indicate that over a 
period of roughly 80 years, the majority of precipitation has fallen. during November, December, 
and January. January is the wettest month, with an average of nearly 100 hours of precipitation, 
producing just over 2.3 cm (0.9 in.) of water. Days with greater than 1.3 cm (0.5 in.) of 
precipitation occur less than 1% of the year (DOE 1989). Appendix A evaluates water intrusion 
during remediation project activities. Topography within the 300 Area is generally flat, gently 
sloping to the east, with no obvious drainage channels. The flat topography, the lack of well- 
defined drainages, and the arid to semi-arid climate suggest that little (if any) surface water 
would accumulate within the OU (DOE-RL 1995). Most precipitation is lost through 
evapotranspiration. In addition, the transmissive nature of the surface soils allows rapid 
infiltration of precipitation. Consequent y, little water remains to generate surface run-off. 
2. S 
Historical meteorological data collected from the former 300 Area Monitoring Station indicate 
that the prevailing winds align themselves with the Columbia River, traveling predominantly 
from the north and northwest. The wind speed averages 10 to 12 krn/hr (6 to 8 mph) in winter 
and 13 to 17 krn/hr (8 to 11 mph) in summer. The strongest winds are generally southwesterly, 
s up to 130 km/hr. More than 90% of the southwesterly winds exceed 30 km/hr (19 
mph). The daily average wind speed at the 300 Area ranges from 8 to 16 km/hr (5  to 10 mph). 
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High winds are likely to occur during site remediation activities. In the summer, high-speed 
winds from the southwest cause most of the dust storms. There is a remote possibility that high 
winds may also cause airborne missiles (e.g., scrap wood and miscellaneous items at the site). 
Blowing dust occurs at wind speeds higher than 30 km/hr (19mph) in areas with limited ground 
cover and low moisture content. An average of eight dust storms er year are recorded at the 
HMS. A storm generally lasts just over 3 hours; however; durations of 18 hours have been 
documented. The maximum wind gust recorded at 15 m (49 ft) above ground surface at the 
HMS was 128 k d r  (80 mph) (Hoitink et al. 2005). Apeak gust of 138 km/hr (86 mph) was 
calculated with a 100-year return period. The return period for gusts of 113 krn/hr (70 mph) is 
10 years (Stone et al. 1983). 
At the Hanford Site, dust storms are a severe weather phenomenon that occur most frequently 
and have the greatest potential effect. 
A severe toinado of the Midwestern type is highly unlikely because of the Pacific Northwest's 
climatologic and orographic conditions. Only three tornado funnel clouds and one small tornado 
(June 1948) have been observed at the Hanford Site in the 34-year period between 1945 and 
2004. On average, Washington State experiences just over one tornado each year. The 
probability of a tornado striking a point at the Hanford Site is estimated to be 9.6 by per 
year. As stated in the environmental impact statement (DOE 1989), tornadoes are infrequent and 
generally small in the northwest portion of the United States. 
Washington State has an annual mean number of thunderstorm days of 10, which is considered to 
be relatively low (IEEE 1991). Thunderstorms occur most frequently from April to September. 
Lightning strikes in the summer occasionally have ignited range fires in the Hanford Site region. 
The 300-FF-2 OU is situated within the Columbia River drainage basin. Two major rivers within 
the Columbia River drainage basin border the Hanford Site: the Columbia and Yakima 
The 300-FF-2 OU is approximately 120 m above mean sea level (ERDA 1976). 
The maximum historical flood recorded on the unregulated Columbia River occurred on June 7, 
1894. The peak discharge at the Hanfor Site was about 22,653 m3/s (29,629 yd3/s), which is the 
best available estimate for the 100-year flood (i.e., the maximum flood event during a 100-year 
period is 21,238 m3/s (27,778 yd3/s) for unregulated flow below Priest Rapids Dam). The largest 
recent flood occurred in 1948 and had an observed peak of 19,595 m3/s (25,629 yd3/s) at the 
Hanford Site. The Grand Coulee Dam and other upstream dams may reduce major flood flows at 
the Hanford Site by as much as 19% to 43%. 
As discussed in the Phase 111 Feasibility Study Report for the 300-FF-1 Operable Unit 
(DOE-RL 1995), a scenario was evaluated that represented flood discharge that may be expected 
from the most severe combination of meteorological and hydrological conditions that are 
reasonably possible for the region. The scenario evaluated a flow of 40,776 m3/s (53,333 yd3/s) 
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(ERDA 1976). The water level from this scenario at the 300 Area would be 116 m (381 ft) above 
mean sea level, which is located outside the probable maximum flood (PMF) plain. Figure 2-3 
shows what areas of the southeastern portion of the Hanford Site this scenario would affect and 
represents the PMF. 
Various studies were published during the 1950s to 1970s documenting engineering analyses of 
the dams upriver from the Hanford Site and the consequences from Uniform Building Code 
(UBC) Zone I1 (ICBO 1997) and postulated design basis earthquakes (ERDA 1976). Studies 
were conducted to determine the effects of damage to the Grand Coulee Dam. Results showed 
that the consequences would not be sufficient to cause flow greater than the PMF. The 
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers has evaluated other flooding scenarios, specifically a flood caused 
by a catastrophic 25% and 50% failure of the Grand Coulee Dam. In the case of a 25% breach of 
the Grand Coulee Dam, several facilities at the Hanford Site could be affected, including most of 
the 300 Area. 
At the 300 Area, the flood level would be approximately 125 m (410 ft) above mean sea level, 
leaving the 300 Area under approximately 6 m (20 ft) of water (ERDA 1976). 
2. 
The Hanford Site lies within the Columbia Intermontane Province, which is bordered on the 
north and east by the Rocky Mountains, on the west by the Cascade Range, and on the south by 
the Basin and Range Province. The dominant geological characteristics of the Columbia 
Intermontane Province have resulted from flood basalt volcanism and deformation processes. 
The Hanford Site is in a Zone 2b, as defined by the UBC (ICBO 1997). Earthquake records for 
the Pacific Northwest extend to the 1850s. A network of seismographs was installed on the 
Columbia Plateau in 1969 (DOE 1989). Seismic activity and related phenomena are not 
anticipated to result in significant radiological consequences to workers and the public from the 
300-FF-2 Burial Grounds Remediation Project because of the low energy of anticipated seismic 
activity and the form and distribution of the hazardous substances. 
The stratigraphic record in the Pasco Basin suggests that tephra is the only primary product of 
Cascade Range volcanism that may reach the Pasco Basin during the next 10,000 years. During 
the May 18, 1980, eruption of Mount St. Helens, about 7.6 mm (0.3 in.) of ash was deposited at 
the HMS tower. In the first 9 hours following the eruption, about 1 mm (0.04 in.) of 
uncompacted ash was recorded at the Columbia Generating Station meteorological station. The 
Hanford Site was not in the main path of the ash cloud. 
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LEGEND 
Flood Prone Areas 
Source: (BHI 1999) 
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2. 
It is unlikely that any accidents specific to facilities outside of the 300-FF-2 (e.g., explosions and 
spills) will impact the 300-FF-2 Burial Grounds MAR due to significant distances between this 
OU and surrounding facilities. The most probable impacts would be a release of inventory 
from a nearby facility due to an accident or a fire. No activities are being carried out at the 
300-FF-2 Burial Grounds that would be adversely impacted if an evacuation were required. 
A release of inventory from a nearby facility would not interact with the MAR at the remediation 
site to result in new accident scenarios. 
impacts on the remediation site would occur from other projects within the Hanford Site. 
ased on the above discussion, no significant adverse 
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The following sections describe the project activities that will be needed to remediate the burial 
grounds. These activities are potential sources of energy that cou d interact with the hazardous 
substances at the burial grounds. 
The remediation of the 300-FF-2 Burial round waste sites involves removal, treatment (as 
necessary), and disposal (at the Environmental Restoration Disposal ility [ERDF], as 
baseline) of residual contamination that does not meet established remedial action goals. 
Remediation projects include three distinct phases: mobilization, operations, and 
demobilizatiodcloseout. Although this FHC document is primarily concerned with the 
identification and evaluation of radiological and chemical hazards associated with the operations 
phase, the mobilization phase introduces potential energy sources that impact the operations 
phase. 
Prior to commencement of the remediation work, Washington Closure Hanford’s (WC 
includes the following: 
Complete necessary authorizations and permits 
Provide design and subcontract documents as basis for competitive bidding and 
performance of the remediation work, incorporating requirements of authorizations and 
permits 
Manage the awarded subcontractor and work during remedi ion, to include evaluation of 
specific means and methods proposed by the subcontractor, and manage change. 
Previous characterization and process and historical knowledge associated with the individual 
waste sites are adequate for purposes of bounding inventory and hazard categorization. As 
materials are excavated, the observational approach, in-process field screening, and laboratory 
testing will be performed for purposes of worker health and safety, verifying waste designation, 
and planning for site closeouts. By procedure and program requirements, WCH is obligated to 
the HCE process relative to AB and hazard categorization in the event of changed conditions 
during remediation. 
Existing programs, procedures, and qualified representatives in the areas of Radiological 
remediation work to ensure worker and public health and safety and protection of the 
environment. 
ealth and Safety will be assigned to the project in current planning and future 
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The following description is provided to assist the reader in understanding the overall project and 
the construction of the hazard identification and evaluation presented in this document. 
3, 
Mobilization typically includes the establishment of infrastructure that is needed to support the 
conduct of remediation, such as the following: 
Construction of access or haul roads 
Installation or relocation of electrical utilities (may include diesel- or gasoline-fueled 
electrical generators) 
Installation of personnel changing/shower/personal protective equipment, lunchroom, and 
administrative facilities (typically portable trailers), and weigh station 
Siting of radiological survey tent (possibly including propane heaters and small propane 
storage tanks), decontamination facility, container transport area, area of contamination 
(AOC) boundary, contaminated material staging pile area (including run-on/run-off control), 
and clean overburden storage pile areas 
Staging of earthmoving or other heavy equipment (including water trucks) and diesel, and 
gasoline fuel storage tankshefueling area 
Staging of maintenance equipment, including lubricating oils, hydraulic fluids, flarnmable 
material storage aredcabinets, and welding and cutting torch cylinder storage areas 
Establishing radiologicalflnygiene monitoring areas (air monitors, portal monitors, step-off 
pads, boundaries, posting) 
Establishing sample storage areas 
Obtaining excavation permit in accordance with Hanford Site procedures. 
Operations typically include the following activities: 
Removal and stockpiling of noncontaminated overburden. 
Excavation of burial ground debris and contaminated soils, gravel, cobbles. 
~~ 
FHC for the Remediation of Sljc 300-FF-2 Operable Unit Solid Waste Burial Grounds 
May 2008 
I 
3-2 
=6 at ions 
WCH-137 
Rev. 1 
Active excavation (generally conducted on one trench or one pit at any given time). Under 
normal conditions, the remediation of a particular area (such as trench or pit) is completed 
prior to commencing excavation of another trench or pit. If excavation activities are 
suspended in a given area due to unknown drumslcontainers, excavation work may be 
initiated at another location. 
Segregation of debris from soils/gravel/cobbles (through use of mechanical manipulators, 
screens, hand sorting, magnetic sorting, conveyor belt/screening, or dump pile methods). 
Segregation and temporary stockpiling/staging of different waste streams, such as different 
colored soils (that may indicate presence of hazardous materials), construction debris (e.g., 
wood, concrete, roofing, structural materials), contaminated metal (such as equipment), soil 
mixed with soft waste (e.g., paper, plastic) in centralized or discrete areas. 
Treatment or stabilization of waste as required using low-energy methods such as adding 
grout, sand, oil, or water. 
Sampling of waste stream materials; sampling, handling, packaging, and transporting 
samples conducted under existing environmental, sampling, and transportation programs. 
Application of water or fixatives to stockpiles and excavation areas (including clean 
overburden and gravel roadways) to prevent dust emissions and spread of contamination. 
Size reduction of wastes (Le., by use of hydraulic shears, cutting torches, grinders, snippers, 
wire saws, mechanical disassembly). 
Volume reduction of wastes (is., compaction or crushing). 
Periodic or continuous health and safety monitoring activities as required (health and safety 
plan, radiological protection program), posting, labeling. 
Installation of barricades or radiological shielding, as required. 
Loading waste materials into ERDF containers or other approved packaging for 
transportation and disposal of waste. 
Designating, classifying waste for U.S. Department of Transportation, placarding for 
transport in accordance with waste management and transportation programs. 
Staging of empty and full ERDF containers in the container transfer area. 
Performing radiological surveys and decontamination of ERDF containers (and remediation 
equipment) as needed. 
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Perfoiming geophysical surveys (Le., GPR, conductivity), potholing, or slit trenching to 
determinelconfirm presence or absence of debris or contamination. 
Performing evaluations of remediation activities (i.e., potential impacts to proximate 
structureslstructural evaluations). 
Location and inactivation of underground utilities, sealing, plugging, or rerouting of piping. 
Post-remediation borehole drilling as necessary to perform groundwater sampling and/or 
gather data, as required, to determine compliance with remedial action goals. 
Periodic maintenance and repair of remediation equipment and facilities (generally outside 
AOC, but may be required in AOC [including welding]). 
Backfilling remediated waste sites, regradinghecontouring, revegetation (or other 
appropriate cover such as gravel for future industrial use). 
Typical remediation operations are anticipated to fill 25 or more ERDF containers per day. 
Applying fixatives to contaminated soil and debris that is not actively being worked. 
Use of High-Efficiency Particulate Air (HEPA) Vacuums and Exhausters. 
Use of radioactivity monitoring instrumentation for performing non-intrusive radionuclide 
characterization of drum contents. 
Use of miniPINS instrumentation and Cf-252 Source for performing non-intrusive element 
identification of drum contents. 
Operation of Drum Punch Facility ( PF) for remotely breac 
Intrusive inspection, sampling, and stabilization of drums in the DPF. 
This activity essentially involves the reverse of the mobilization phase of the project, and the 
hazards associated with the activity are comparable to the hazards of the mobilization phase. 
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Based on the results of WCH (2006b) and WCH (2007a), the total radionuclide inventory of each 
of these sites exceeds the DOE-STD-1027 Category 3 TQ and was assigned an IHC of 
Category 3. Consequently, hazard analyses and FHCs were performed to determine if an FHC of 
below Category 3 could be established based on the credible release fractions in accordance with 
NSTP 2002-2 (DOE 2002). Based on the results of WCH (2006b) and WCH (2007a), there were 
chemicals that exceeded the reportable quantities; however, there were no chemicals that 
exceeded the TQs. This section presents the hazard identification, hazard evaluation, and FHC 
for the remediation of six burial grounds. 
The objective of the hazard identification process is to provide a basis from which to analyze the 
hazards associated with a facility. To achieve this objective, the hazard identification process 
must address the following: 
Characteristics of the inventory of hazardous substances in the facility 
Sources of energy inside the facility capable of interacting with those inventories 
Sources of energy outside the facility capable of interacting with those inventories 
Nonroutine hazards unique to the facility. 
esearc 
A number of historical records were obtained and reviewed to identify specific qualitative and 
quantitative information regarding the contents of the burial grounds. Relevant information 
resulting from this review was documented in the individual burial ground hazard identification 
tables presented in Appendix A. Because records indicated the presence of Zircaloy-2 metal 
chips at the 618-7 Burial Ground, additional research was done regarding the machining 
processes that created these wastes, which is also reflected in Appendix A. 
Subsequent to the approval of Rev. 0 of the predecessor of this FHC document (BHI 2003a), 
additional research and analysis was completed for the 618-2 Burial Ground in order to provide 
sufficient basis to discount an inventory record identifying 2,000 Ci of beta radioactivity within 
the 618-2 site in 1986. The inventory record in question reported 2,000 Ci of beta without a 
corresponding inventory of other fission products (e.g., cesium- 137) or nuclear materials (e.g., 
irradiated uranium, plutonium). This is inconsistent with wastes disposed from uranium fuel 
fabrication and/or irradiated uranium fuel wastes from analytical laboratories in the 300 Area 
between 1951 and 1954. Most of the additional research and analysis is documented in 618-2 
Burial Ground Spent Fuel Inventory Calculation Based on Waste Disposal Data (B HI 2004a) 
and 618-2 Exposure Rate per Mass of Fuel Calculation (BHI 2004b). 
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BHI (2004a) documents the review of waste disposal radiation survey records and special work 
permit records found for the 300 Area covering the period from 1951 to 1954. These records 
document the shipment of waste from 300 Area facilities to the 300 Area burial grounds and 
include dose rate information for the items being disposed. BHI (2004a) also estimates the beta 
inventory for the 618-2 Burial Ground circa 1986 assuming the beta radioactivity is due to long- 
lived fission products associated with irradiated (spent) uranium fuel residues from analytical 
laboratory waste disposed in the burial ground. The beta inventory was estimated using dose rate 
information collected from the radiation survey recordshpecial work permits and the results of 
BHI (2004b), which determined the exposure rate per gram of spent fuel based on previously run 
ORIGEN2 model results. The 0 IGEN2 model calculates the activity (Le., curies) present 
within typical spent fuel produced at the Hanford Site during the 1951-1954 time period as a 
function of decay time. 
Research of declassified historical documents also produced several documents addressing 
300 Area radioactive liquid waste disposal activities that provide additional insight into the 
magnitude (Le., curie quantity) of laboratory waste in the 300 Area in the 1953-1954 time period. 
The document providing the most insight is 300 Area Radioactive Liquid Waste Streams 
Disposal (GE 1954). While this document specifically addresses liquid waste, it is understood 
from process knowledge that the liquid waste originated primarily from analytical laboratory 
activities involving radioactive metals (e.g., irradiated fuel elements). Consequently, 
information about the magnitude of solid waste in the 300 Area can be directly correlated to the 
magnitude of liquid waste. It is important to note again, as was done in Section 2.2.2, that 
GE (1954) indicates that the 300 Area “trenches” did not receive high-activity wastes after 
March 1954. A new “trench” at the 300-N Area (i.e., the 618-10 Burial Ground) was opened in 
March 1954 to receive this waste, while the 300 Area “trenches” received only uranium. 
Table 4 of GE (1954) summarizes the volume and radioactive content of moderately 
contaminated liquid waste from the 300 Area laboratories for the time period of July 1953 to 
July 1954. The data in Table 4 show that total beta activity associated with this waste stream in 
1953 was about 7.2 x lo-’ Ci. In March 1954, the last month that the 618-2 Burial Ground was 
used for disposal of high radioactive content waste, about 7.8 x 10‘’ Ci of beta activity was 
associated with this waste stream. In April 1954 the beta activity associated with this waste 
stream was about 3.2 Ci, an increase of greater than a factor of 400 compared to March. The 
average concentration of beta activity in this waste stream increased from 6.2 by lo-* pCi/mL in 
March 1954 to 3.4 x pCi/mL in April 1954. Table 4 reports beta concentration and total 
activity values for May, June, and July 1954 similar to those of April 1954. Additional data 
provided by Disposal of Radioactive Liquid Wastes from 300 Area Laboratory Facilities 
(GE 1960) indicate that by late 1958 the beta activity associated with this liquid waste stream 
had increased to a level of about 100 Ci per month. These data reflect the increased laboratory 
activity in the 300 Area in the mid- to late 1950s, well after the 618-2 Burial Ground stopped 
receiving wastes. 
Considering the above information and analyses, it is apparent that the beta activity associated 
with 300 Area waste was relatively small while the 618-2 Burial Ground was receiving high- 
activity waste. The radioactive material content of the 300 Area waste increased by orders of 
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magnitude after the 61 8-2 Burial Ground stopped receiving waste. This provides additional 
support for concluding that the inventory record reporting 2,000 Ci of beta within 6 18-2 circa 
1986 is incorrect. 
300 Area operations and solid waste disposal practices were reviewed for the approximate 
30-year period during which the six burial grounds were receiving wastes to identify waste 
streams that could be encountered during remediation. 
Historical document reviews identified inventories of hazardous substances that may be 
encountered in contaminated soils, solids, or drumslcontainers to a limited extent. Data were 
available from the remediation of the 6 18-4 Burial Ground, which also received 300 Area wastes 
in this time frame. The use of 618-4 data was evaluated for application to these six burial 
grounds and was judged appropriate based on the discussion provided in Section 4.1.2. The 
estimated inventories of contaminated soils, debris, and drumskontainers for each of the 
300-FF-2 sites were developed based on 618-4 data. As data have become available from 
remediation of some the 300-FF-2 sites, the estimated inventories for contaminated soils and 
debris in the remaining sites have been revised to incorporate lessons learned. The estimated 
inventories and associated basis are documented in the hazard identification tables. 
Interviews were also conducted with remediation personnel to identify hazards (e.g., 
~ai~mablelcombustible liquids) and equipment that would be introduced to conduct remediation. 
This information was also captured in the hazard identification tables. 
nven tory 
The inventories of hazardous materials (based on historical records; estimates from 61 8-4,618-3, 
61 8-8, and 6 18-2 data; and discussions with remediation personnel as described above) are 
presented in Appendix A. 618-13 is considered to contain only contaminated soil. Four of the 
other waste sites (618-1,618-3,618-7, and 618-8) are assumed to have a mixture of soil, drums, 
and debris. For 6 18-2 there is a supplemental inventory associated with hot cell waste. (Note: 
The hot cell waste refeired to is irradiated uranium fuel waste resulting from analytical 
laboratory work in the 300 Area.) This is in addition to the other calculated inventories 
associated with soilldrums. The activity associated with hot cell waste was initially estimated 
based on dose rate data reported for the February 1954 fire that destroyed a major portion of the 
618-2 site contents. This estimate is documented in BHI (2003b). BHI (2004a), using the results 
from BHI (2004b), also estimated part o the inventory (i.e., uranium, plutonium, and total beta) 
associated with this waste stream based on dose rate information on items disposed in the burial 
ground. The estimated inventories using these two approaches are in close agreement, with both 
estimating a current total beta inventory of less than 2 Ci. For 618-2 there is no other calculated 
debris inventory (see Appendix D for details). 
Small volumes of contaminated, noncombustible liquids have been discovered in two (618-2 and 
618-3) of the burial grounds during remediation. As a result, MOC-2005-0002 and 
MOC-2005-0011 (BHI 2005a, 2005b) have been completed to evaluate the presence of liquids at 
618-2, 618-3,618-7,618-8, and 618-13. The contaminated liqui inventory developed as a 
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result of the MOCs is also included in the inventory for the 618-1 site as documented in 
WCH (2007a). 
ta. In 1997, action was taken to remediate the 
618-4 Burial Ground (which was operational from 1955 to 1961). During its remediation, 
contaminated soils, debris, and drums were excavated, sampled, and subsequently disposed. As 
noted above, both the waste types and the family of contaminants produced in the 300 Area 
remained relatively constant during the 30-year span that the 300 Area solid waste burial grounds 
were in operation. As discussed in Section 4.1.1, this FHC document uses analogous site data 
from 6 18-4,6 18-3, 6 18-8, and 6 18-2 to estimate the inventories of contaminated soils and 
drumdcontainers for the burial grounds of this FHC document. The use of the data is judged 
appropriate for the reasons explained below. 
: Site-specific soil concentrations were used for 618-8. Soil concentration data for the 
remaining sites were developed based on concentrations of chemicals and radionuclides found in 
soils at the 6 18-4 site. To develop a bounding contamination profile, peak concentrations 
determined by laboratory analysis were increased by a factor of 2.5. Additionally, as data have 
become available from remediation of 300-FF-2 sites @e., 618-2 and 618-3), the estimated 
inventories for contaminated soils and debris in the remaining sites have been evaluated and 
revised to incorporate lessons learned. The bounding concentrations were used to estimate the 
inventories of contaminated soils that would be present at the six burial grounds, based on 
volume of materials to be remediated. The use of a profile based on 6 18-4 data (which operated 
from 1955 to 1961) for estimating inventories at the six burial grounds (which operated at 
various periods between 1943 and 1973) is appropriate for the following reasons: 
The 618-4 Burial Ground received wastes during a period of significant defense mission 
activity in the 300 Area. 
All of the above-noted missions were being conducted durin 6 18-4 operation, producing 
solid wastes for disposal at 618-4. 
General descriptions of the waste materials received at the six burial grounds addressed in 
this FHC document are consistent with the description of materials disposed at 618-4. 
WHC-MR-03 88 (WHC 1992) reflects ongoing activities to modify, replace, or maintain 
process equipment, indicating each burial ground would receive contaminated equipment 
and materials. 
Use of peak concentrations to establish a bounding concentration profile is conservative. 
The 61 8-4 uranium oxide powder and uranium metal drum inventories used in this FHC 
document were the maximum concentrations identified from laboratory analysis for the 
618-4 drums. The total number of drums assumed at the 618-4 Burial Ground exceeded the 
actual excavated number of drums by about a factor of two. However, the higher assumed 
number was used to develop the estimates for these six burial grounds. 
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For 618-2 it is assumed that 100% of the waste site volume is contaminated soil. The hot cell 
solid waste is conservatively assumed to not decrease the volume of contaminated soil. 
Approximately 19% of the hot cell inventory is associated with the soil. This is a calculated 
value from the assumption that 25% of the initial inventory was associated with contaminated 
combustibles, of which 75% was consumed during the burial ground fire and became part of the 
soil matrix (BHI 2003b). This inventory is added to the soil inventory. 
ms: Although historical records do not indicate the presence of uranium powder or uranium 
metal chips at any of the six burial grounds, records do indicate that drums of Zircaloy-2 chips 
were buried at 618-7, and WHC-MR-0388 (WHC 1992) does mention transfer of solid waste 
“chips” to the 6 18-2 Burial Ground. 
The 6 18-7 Burial Ground IHE (WCH 2005c) indicates that experiments were done in the 
300 Area with a thorium nitrate-tetra hydrate (Th(N03)4-4H20) solution to calcine the thorium 
nitrate into thorium oxide. The thorium nitrate solution was shipped to the Hanford Site in 
208-L (55-gal) drums. The I € E  indicates that up to four 208-L (55-gal) drums were left over 
from the experiments in the 321 Building and that these drums may have been buried in the 
6 18-7 Burial Ground. It is probable that by now the nitrate solution has corroded through the 
sealed drums and leaked into the soil. If the solution has not corroded through the drums, there 
is a possibility of finding liquid thorium nitrate solution. Some of the buried drums may contain 
thorium oxide. 
For five of the six waste sites, it was assumed that drums would 
and 6 18-8 were assumed to contain a number of drums having u 
oxide powder, and yellow uranium oxide powder in proportion to the area of the 618-4 Burial 
Ground. The actual number found during remediation may be significantly lower than this 
bounding estimate. For the 618-7 waste site, 90% of the drums were assumed to contain 
Zircaloy-2 chips, and 10% of the drums were assumed to contain uranium powders or chips 
(Appendix D) with an additional four drums of thorium. 
ium chips, black uranium 
For the 618-13 Burial Ground, no drums were assumed. The 618-13 waste site does not have the 
same physical configuration as the other sites that were assumed to contain drums. The 
618-13 site consists of a large mound of soil. 
Use of the estimated number of uranium powder and uranium metal chip drums and the 
inventory of these drums, based on actual numbers excavated from 6 18-4, is appropriate because 
the uranium enrichments used in the fabrication of production reactor fuels did not significantly 
change during the 1943 to 1973 time frame. Uranium powder drum contents may consist of 
black or yellow oxides. The black uranium oxide values are higher than the yellow oxide; 
therefore, all uranium powder values use the inventory for the black uranium oxide form. Use of 
the estimated number of Zircaloy-2 drums is consistent with records regarding the numbers of 
drums (i.e., “hundreds”) that were burie in 618-7. Assuming the radionuclide inventory of the 
Zircaloy-2 drums is negligible is consistent with historical records indicating the presence of 
“slight contamination.’’ A summary of the four drum types, and their assumed contents, is 
presented in Table 4-1. 
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~~ 
Solid Waste Burial Ground No. 2 1 70a 41 131 0 0 
Solid Waste Burial Ground No. 3 228a 52 176 0 0 
able e an . 
618-7 
618-8 
618-13 
Solid Waste Burial Ground No. 7 863 20 66 773 4 
Solid Waste Burial Ground No. 8 118 27 91 0 0 
Solid Waste Burial Ground No. 13 0 0 0 0 0 
~~ 
Drum Type 1 = black uranium oxide powder 
Drum Type 2 = yellow uranium oxide powder 
Drum Type 3 = uranium metal chips in oil 
Drum Type 4 = Zircaloy-2 metal chips 
Drum Type 5 = thorium drums 
'Actual number of drums found during remediation was a factor of approximately 10 less. 
onco~busti  ventory. Debris will be managed in accordance with the 
programmatic controls discussed in Section 5.3. For waste sites other than 618-13 and 618-1, it 
was generally assumed there was 33 % debris (by volume). The 18- 13 site is composed of soil, 
and there is no debris by volume. For 618-1, an increased amou of debris, 67% (by volume), is 
assumed based on experience at the 618-2 site and evaluation of the type of expected waste form 
(e.g., building cleanout debris). 
nventory. Other than 618-13, all of the waste sites may have 
received combustible materials associated with laboratory waste, packaging, or personal 
protective equipment. Therefore, 10% of the debris is assumed to be combustible, which equates 
to approximately 3 % of the total inventory, except for in 6 18- 1, which equates to approximately 
7% combustible debris. 
zar enti 
The hazard types that could affect the inventory of hazardous substances associated with the 
300-FF-2 sites are tabulated by individual burial ground in Appendix A. The 618-7 hazard 
identification table was reviewed during the hazard evaluation workshop that was attended by 
DOE and contractor personnel. The workshop participants agreed that the 618-7 hazard 
identification table was representative of the other five burial grounds. 
Ammonia is the only nonradioactive hazardous substance identified for the burial grounds that 
has listed threshold quantities in either 29 Code of Federul Regulations (CFR) 1910.1 19, 
Appendix A, or 40 CFR 68.130, Table 1. The maximum inventory of ammonia in any of the 
burial grounds is more than two orders of magnitude below either of the threshold quantities. In 
addition, the ammonia (and other nonradionuclide hazardous substances) is dispersed, throughout 
the soil matrix. Consequently, no further evaluation of the hazards associated with 
nonradionuclide hazardous substances is necessary. 
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This section presents the evaluation of hazards associated with the remediation of the burial 
grounds and the internal, external, and natural phenomenon hazard events that could lead to a 
potential release. The hazard evaluation process involved the identification of initiating events; 
development of a description of event; and assignment of unmitigated frequency, consequence, 
and risk rankings in accordance with the guidance of Engineering Guide 0000X-EG-NO004 (BHI 
1998). The hazards evaluation also identified structures, systems, and components and 
administrative controls that would prevent or mitigate releases of hazardous substances. 
The hazard evaluation was reviewed by a multi-disciplinary team of DOE and contractor 
personnel at a meeting on February 19,2003. The minutes of that meeting are documented in 
BHI (2003~). Appendix B reflects the hazard evaluation with these changes incorporated. Based 
on the assigned risk rankings (all were ranked IV) and the guidance of the Engineering Guide 
(BHI 1998), none of the events merited additional hazards evaluation from a risk perspective. In 
addition, all of the events identified were assessed as having negligible consequences to the 
public and the workers. 
The team identified the high wind, drops, and fire events as the in tiating events that were likely 
to result in the most significant consequences to the public, workers, or environment. The 
unmitigated releases that would result from these events were assessed to bound potential 
unmitigated releases from all other types of events. The FHC is based on comparison of the 
facility inventory to TQs adjusted to reflect the airborne release fractions due to the stresses 
associated with entrainment, shock-impact, and combustion. 
The FHC for the remediation of the burial grounds was established based on an evaluation of the 
unmitigated consequences of three events: high wind, drops, and fire. 
The FHC was established using the adjusted TQ approach described in the DOE’S Office of 
Nuclear and Facility Safety Policy, Nuclear Safety Technical Position (NSTP 2002-2) titled 
Methodology for Fitgal Hazard Categorization for Nuclear Facilities from Category 3 to 
Radiological (DOE 2002). The basis for adjusting the TQs and the FHC calculation is 
documented in WCH (2007b) for the 618-1 Burial Ground; WCH (2006a) for the 618-3,618-7, 
618-8, and 618-13 Burial Grounds; and BHI (2005e) and BHI (20050 for the 618-2 Burial 
Ground. The FHC calculation for the 618-7 and 618-13 sites is included in Appendix D, and the 
FHC calculation for the 6 18- 1 site is included in Appendix E. The sum of the ratios value for 
each of the facilities is as follows: 
618-1 
6 18-216 18-3 
6 18-7 
6.15 E-01 (for each segment) 
9.60 E-01 (for the bounding segment) 
8.55 E-01 (for the bounding segment) 
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618-8 1.94 E-01 
618-13 3.87 E-03 
Therefore, the FHC for each facility addressed in this FHC document is “Below Category 3.” 
Note: Rev. 9 of the MAR calculation (0300F-CA-N0003) and Rev. 5 of the FHC calculation 
(0300X-CA-NOOl l) were performed to include additional radioisotopes in 6 18-7 soil/debris and 
drum inventories due to creation of daughter isotopes from decay of Th-232. The change is 
bounded by the previously calculated sum of the ratios for the 61 8-7 bounding segment 
(8.55E-0 1). 
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0.6 15 
5. S 
0.855 0.00387 
Special controls are derived from the assumptions made in the FHC that are required to ensure 
the FHC remains valid. The adjusted TQ approach used to establ sh the FHC depends on the 
material forms considered, the inventory of each material form assumed in the analysis, and the 
defined facility segments. Accordingly, the following special controls are established: 
The waste forms, the bounding sum-of-ratios value, and segments for each waste site are 
listed in Table 5-1. The waste forrns encountered at these sites are limited to those specified 
in Table 5- 1. 
able e 
618-1 I 618-7 I 
1. Contaminated soil 
2. Miscellaneous contaminated 
combustible and 
noncombustible solids, 
including depleted uranium 
scrap or slugs 
3. Miscellaneous liquids 
4. Drums of uranium oxide 
5.  Drums containing uranium 
tailings and oil 
Waste Forms 
1. Contaminated soil 
2. Miscellaneous liquids 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
Contaminated soil 
Miscellaneous contaminated 
combustible and 
noncombustible solids, 
including depleted uranium 
scrap or slugs 
Miscellaneous 1 i quids 
Drums of uranium oxide 
Drums containing uranium 
tailings and oil 
Drums containing thorium 
nitrate 
Drums containing thorium oxide 
Drums of depleted uranium 
scrap 
Drums containing Zircalo y-2 
Segments 
~~~ ~ 
1. West trench 
2. Middle trench 
3. East trench 
4. South trench 
(two east-west disturbances 
1. Northern trenches (north and 
2. Thoria pit 
middle trenches) 
None. 
that are short trenches or a 
series of pits) 
Bounding Sum of Ratios 
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The inventory of each waste form is less than the inventory assumed by the FHC. 
Work being conducted in any 300-FF-2 segment will meet the following requirements: 
- There is no specific order in which segments need to be remediated. 
- More than one segment may be worked simultaneously provided that: 
(a) Each segment is kept separate by physical barriers, and the material from each 
segment is kept segregated during excavation and sorting. Adjacent segments may 
not undergo active remediation at the same time unless a 15 m (50 ft) separation,can 
be maintained. 
AND 
(b) The exposed material from all segments have a sum of ratios (using adjusted 
threshold quantities) less than that of the site’s bounding segment in Table 5-1. 
AND 
(c) Exposed material is the material within a segment or removed from the excavation 
site that has not been stabilized (e.g., by the application of 0.3 m [ 1 ft] of overburden, 
a soil fixative, containerized, or an equivalent method) or taken off site. Segments 
are considered to be in active remediation if they have an exposed face. 
- Containerized (e.g., drummed, in B-25 containers) anomalies that are from intact 
containers (e.g., non-corroded) from a segmented waste site that have been characterized 
can be stored together, regardless of their segment of origin. 
- Discrete items associated with a segment may be stabilized by placing the item in a 
covered nonflammable storage container (e.g., steel drum overpack special waste box, 
B-25 box) and placed in a storage area away from other work activities (e.g., excavation 
of a waste site, sorting and loading activities in the staging areas). 
- Initiation of work on individual segments or switching work activities between segments 
will be performed only upon authorization by WCH via subcontract limited notice(s) to 
proceed, with concurrence from the WCH Field Remediation Project, 300-W-2 Project 
Engineer, or delegate. 
- During remediation, tbe radiological inventory of a site will be tracked and compared to 
that site’s bounding segment inventory. Changes will be managed/evaluated through the 
HCE process, and self-authorized up to the bounding segment’s limit for the adjusted T 
sum of the ratios. 
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- Multiple waste sites can be remediated simultaneously. However, material from different 
waste sites shall not be mixed and will be maintained in separated stockpiles marked by 
physical boundaries such as rope or temporary fencing. 
The following field verification requirements are required as containers or suspect fuel rods or 
scrap are discovered: 
Each grouping of fuel rods or scrap, containerized or loose, that is discovered packed 
together and that might exceed 1,080 cm (425 in.) in total length may be approached, 
handled, and individually staged (apart from other such groupings) in a temporary area(s) 
relatively free of other fissionable materials in a manner that tries not to increase the amount 
of soil or other debris mixed between individual loose pieces. Loose pieces of the same 
grouping may be arranged in close contact lying on the ground in the temporary area(s), but 
visually their thickness should not exceed the smallest estimated dimension of the originally 
discovered grouping. After determining what the probable enrichment is, the rods or scrap 
can be handled without further criticality safety concern if they contain less than or equal to 
0.93 wt% uranium-235. 
Single containers with potential fissionable materials, or multiple containers in a single 
handling event whose contents do not exceed a total of 4.5 L in volume, may be approached, 
handled, and if elected or required to do so by the project, crushed remotely and the 
absorbent material sampled, or soli ified for stabilization and subsequent disposition. After 
characterization, the crushed containers and absorbent may be handled without further 
criticality safety concern if they contain less than 15 g of total fissionable material. 
Single containers with potential fissionable materials whose contents may exceed 4.5 L or 
multiple containers whose contents may exceed 4.5 L in a single handling event should be 
relocated to an area relatively free of other fissionable materials during any intrusive 
analysis. However, a nonintrusive analysis (e.g., nondestructive assay) may be performed 
while the container(s) is still in the excavation, while in the excavator bucket, or after 
separation. If the results of the nonintrusive analysis determine that the contents of the 
container(s) are less than 15 g of total fissionable material, it (they) may be handled without 
further criticality safety concern. Otherwise, review and consult with the Criticality Safety 
Engineer to provide recommendations for handling the segregated container(s). 
If conditions are encountered that do not meet any of these criteria, they shall be treated as 
discoveries under the HC process described in Section 5.3.5. 
Project-specific controls are established for the protection of workers that apply specifically to 
the activity under consideration. These controls are derived from the hazard evaluation and 
engineering judgment. I3 ased on the hazard evaluation, the following proj ect-specific controls 
have been identified: 
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Noncombustible overpacks will be used for deteriorated drumskontainers of liquids or 
pyrophoric solids. 
Overpacks used for drums of pyrophoric material will be filled with blanketing or 
stabilizing material (e.g., sand, water, grout) to prevent exposure to air. 
Noncombustible materials (e.g., steel pallets) will be used for staging drumskontainers of 
liquids or pyrophoric solids. 
Staging areas for drumskontainers of flammable liquids will e protected on all sides by 
dikes or berms with a minimum height sized to contain at least the total volume of 
drums/containers staged in the area. The number of drums staged in the area shall be as 
determined by the fire protection program. A section of the berm or dike may be removed 
for handling drums provided that section is reconstructed at the end of the work shift. 
Staging areas will be separated from each other by a minimum distance determined by the 
fire protection program. Staging areas will be kept clear of combustible vegetation. 
Nonsparking tools will be used to open sealed drums or containers. 
Size reduction, decontamination operations, and electrical supply lines will be placed away 
from heavy traffic areas. 
Preventive maintenance consistent with vendor recommendations will be performed on 
portable generators and portable exhausters. 
Drums, containers, overpacks, tanks, and vent relief valves will be periodically inspected for 
deterioration or degradation. 
Flammable liquid storage tanks will be grounded, as required, and periodically inspected. 
Waste streams will be separated, as necessary, to prevent the contact of incompatible 
materials. 
Remediation will be suspended during high winds. 
Excavation laybacks will be used to prevent slope shifts. 
Graded and graveled roadways will be used. oadways will be kept free of obstructions. 
Roadways will be separated from the area being actively remediated and separated from 
staging areas. 
Storage tanks, cylinders, or cabinets containing flammable material will be located away 
from heavy traffic areas, away from the area being actively remediated, in unconfined 
outdoor areas, and in areas cleared of vegetation. 
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Staged drums shall not be stacked. 
Dust suppressants or fixatives will be used on contaminated soils and debris. 
Air monitoring will be performed, as required, by the approved air monitoring plan for the 
project. 
Fixatives will be applied to Contaminated soils and debris that will be inactive more than 
24 hours. 
Fixatives will be applied to contaminated soils and debris that will be inactive less than 
24 hours at the end of work operations, if the sustained wind speed is predicted overnight to 
be greater than 32 krn/hr (20 mph). 
Prior to commencing remediation of the 618-1 site, the work area shall be surveyed to 
determine if any natural gas piping is buried. If such piping exists, the piping will either be 
shut down and depressurize prior to remediation activities, or rerouted outside of the work 
area. 
Prior to commencing remediation of the 618-1 site, discussions will be held with 
surrounding facilities, if present at 
activities within them cpuld affect remediation, or remediation could affect the facilities’ 
operations. Appropriate precautions and controls will be implemented as required. 
e time of 618-1 remediation, to deterrnine if any 
5. 
The Conduct of Operations Program provides a formal and disciplined method for safely 
performing work and operating site facilities. Conduct of Operations is based on the concept that 
workers are provided with adequate knowledge of requirements a d are disciplined in observing 
these requirements. It is founded on training, qualification, and use of procedures. It promotes 
implementation of a set of standards that establishes safe operations. Provisions of the program 
specify that all work is performed by appropriately trained personnel using adequate and 
controlled procedures; work is properly supervised; prior approval is obtained for all work; and 
accountability exists for work performance. Conduct of operations is integrated with all other 
SMPs. The VVCH Conduct of Operations Program is defined in CONOPS-1, WCH Conduct of 
Operations. 
Conduct of operations is imposed to ensure that facility operations are managed, organized, and 
conducted in a manner that results in a high level of performance and therefore contributes to 
safe and reliable operations. The elements of this program are fundamental to the manner in 
which operations are conducted to comply with DOE requirements. This procedure implements 
applicable portions of CRD 0 5480.19, Conduct of Operations Requirements for DOE Facilities. 
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WCH-155, WCH Conduct of Operations Matrix (WCH 2007g), presents a graded approach to 
DOE 0 5480.19, Conduct of Operations Requirements for DOE Facilities. A graded approach 
has been used to ensure that the depth of detail required and the magnitude of resources 
expended to implement a guideline are commensurate with the programmatic importance and 
potential environmental, cultural, safety and/or health impacts of the River Corridor Closure 
(RCC) Contract work scope. 
Tasks that have high potential impact on the success of the organization, personnel, public 
safety, cultural resources, or the environment are generally performed using a higher expenditure 
of resources and documentation rigor than those that have lesser or no potential impact. Other 
factors that may enter into this aspect of the graded approach are task complexity and previous 
history and experience. A graded approach permits the Project Director or Responsible Manager 
to tailor the specific details of implementation for each project, facility or activity to 
appropriately address these considerations, as long as the require ents of the applicability 
determinations (as documented in WCH-98, WCH Conduct of Operations AppZicability Matrix 
[WCH 2007fl) and the referenced implementing procedures are not compromised. 
5. adiologica ectio 
The radiological controls and protection program is defined in DOE-approved programs and 
WCH-approved procedures. This program implements RCC Contract policy to maintain 
radiological exposures to levels that are as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA) and to ensure 
adequate protection of workers. The WCH Radiological Protection Program meets the 
requirements of 10 CFR 835. Appropriate dosimetry, radiological work permits, personal 
protective equipment, ALARA planning, periodic surveys, and Radiological Control (RadCon) 
technical support will be provided. 
Standard WCH controls for work in radiological areas are assessed as being adequate to control 
Remedial Action project activities. These controls support the planning that identifies the 
specific conditions and govern the specific requirements for an activity, periodic radiation and 
contamination surveys of the work area, radiological material handling, and periodic or 
continuous observation of the work by RadCon. The ALARA planning process will identify 
shielding requirements, contamination control requirements (including local ventilation 
controls), radiation monitoring requirements, and other RadCon requirements for the individual 
tasks conducted during the course of the 300-FF-2 Burial Grounds Remediation Project. 
Measures are also taken to minimize the possibility of releases to the environment. Near-field air 
monitoring and commitments with the Washington State Department of Health will address the 
radionuclide inventory and activities that could cause potential release of this inventory, but not 
to the exclusion of 10 CF'R 835 requirements. 
Remediation activities at the 300-FF-2 Burial Grounds will be controlled by the site-specific 
health and safety plan (SS HASP), as required by established WCH/RCC procedures. 
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A SS HASP will be written for the 300-FF-2 Burial Grounds Remediation Project to address the 
health and safety hazards of each phase of site operation and will include the requirements of a 
site HASP for hazardous waste operations and/or construction activities, as specified in 
29 CFR 1910.120 and 10 CFR 851. 
Before work begins, a pre-job briefing is held with the affected workers. This briefing will include 
reviews of the hazards that may be encountered and the associated mitigation measures. 
Throughout an activity, daily briefings will also be held, as well as special briefings before major 
evolutions. 
Operations during the 300-FF-2 Burial Grounds Remediation Project that involve potentially 
significant nonradiological hazards include the following: 
Asbestos cleanup 
Hot work 
Lead cleanup 
Cleanup of polychlorinated biphenyls 
Biological (insect bites and snakes) 
Temperature extremes 
Working in close proximity to moving equipment 
Possible exposure to organic and inorganic chemicals 
Uneven working surfaces 
Excavation 
Noise. 
5. equireIn~~ts and 
The experience and capabilities of the operating staff are extreme y important in maintaining 
worker and environmental safety. The 300-FF-2 Burial Grounds remediation requires the 
employment of workers dedicated to the project for the duration of the radiological efforts. 
Day-to-day knowledge of ongoing operations, month-to-month understanding of conditions 
encountered, and ongoing understanding of lessons learned is vital to continued safe operation. 
Training requirements will ensure that personnel have been instructed in the technologies to 
work safely in and around radiological areas and to maintain their individual radiation exposure 
and the radiation exposures of others ALARA. Standardized core courses and training material 
will be presented, and site-specific information and technologies will be added to adequately 
train workers. 
RCTs must complete and be current in qualification training. Non-RCT radiological workers 
must meet the training (Le., General Employee Radiological Training, RadWorker I, 
RadWorker 11) requirements stipulated in applicable RadCon procedures; this is based on areas 
to be entered and the types of activities performed. These training courses require the successful 
completion of examinations to demonstrate understanding of theoretical and classroom material. 
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Safety of crane operations is enhanced by operator training (only trained and qualified operators 
that meet the subcontractor’s safety plan and training requirements are allowed to operate the 
cranes) and periodic maintenance and inspection of the cranes in accordance with the site safety 
plan and procedures. 
Specialized training will be provided, as needed, to instruct workers in the use of nonstandard 
equipment, in the performance of abnormal operations, and in the hazards of specific activities. 
Specialized training may be provided by on-the-job training activities, by classroom instruction 
and testing, or by pre-job briefings. The depth of training in any discipline will be 
commensurate with the degree of hazard involved and the knowledge required for task 
performance. 
Some site remediation project activities will require the acquisition of expert services, as 
opposed to project staff training. The assaying of waste packages by specialized methods are 
examples of activities requiring expert assistance. 
The WCH Environmental Safety and Health Training Program provides workers with the 
knowledge and skills necessary to safely execute assigned duties. A graded approach is used to 
ensure that workers receive a level of training commensurate with their responsibilities that 
complies with applicable requirements. 
ratio 
Established configurationkhange control processes ensure that proposed changes are reviewed in 
relation to the specified commitments. Discovered conditions wi 1 be evaluated under the HCE 
process so that stabilization and/or recovery actions may be ident fied and implemented, as 
appropriate. WCH off-normal event procedures describe the reporting process and protocol 
applicable to such a discovery. 
The WCH Quality Assurance Program Plan consolidates the quality program requirements of the 
WCH prime contract and applicable regulation and DOE orders. It also describes how the 
quality program requirements are implemented through a system of manuals and procedures. 
The Quality Assurance Program Plan has been reviewed and approved by DOE as meeting the 
requirements of 10 CFR 830.120, Subpart A, and DOE 0 414.1C. 
The WCH Fire Protection Program complies with the appropriate requirements of applicable 
CFR and National Fire Protection Association criteria, as well as the additional requirements of 
DOE Headquarters and the RL directives included in the WCH contract. The WCH Fire 
Protection Program was developed to the guidance of the DOE Fire Protection Handbook (DOE 
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1996). The fire protection implementing procedures are grouped into the following major areas: 
management and administration, fire protection design, fire protection systems, fire prevention 
procedures, and special hazard protection procedures. 
Each major area contains individual implementing procedures tha address the full range of 
hazards and controls in accordance with the appropriate guidance of the DOE Fire Protection 
Handbook. 
The WCH Emergency Management Program (including preparedness, planning, and response) 
contains the administrative responsibilities for compliance with the Hanford Emergency 
Management Plan (DOE-RL 1998). The plan sets forth the requirements for emergency 
planning and preparedness for site contractors, including WCH-managed projects. Appropriate 
hazardous materials screening and emergency planning will be conducted for the 300-FF-2 
Burial Grounds. The site-specific emergency response actions will be included in site-specific 
emergency response procedures that are normally contained in the SS HASP. These site-specific 
emergency procedures will be provided to help recognize incidents or abnormal conditions, 
initiate initial protective actions, and make the proper notifications. Emergency action levels (if 
required) are derived from an emergency preparedness hazards assessment (if required) and 
maintained in DOE-0223, Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures. The emergency 
preparedness hazards assessment and emergency action levels (if required) will be consistent 
with Hanford Site DOE-0223 procedures. 
All emergency planning and preparedness activities for the 300-FF-2 OU project will be 
consistent with planning and preparedness actions undertaken by other Hanford Site contractors 
and similar projects. Activities will be in a manner that ensures the health and safety of workers 
emergency at the 300-FF-2 OU. 
lic and the protection of the environment in the event of an abnormal incident or 
Project response to any emergencies (project or neighboring project incident) will be to evacuate 
personnel to a safe location and initiate the required responsibilities of the Building Emergency 
Director and other project personnel in support of the Incident Command System. 
The WCH Emergency Management Program is based on a graded approach and is 
commensurate with the hazards and consequences associated with the projects/facilities and 
activities managed by WCH (involving radioactive and chemical hazardous materials) and/or 
neighboring facilities. 
5.3. 
Because of the nature of activities conducted at the 300-FF-2 OU, various administrative controls 
will be implemented to ensure public health and safety. Personnel who have unescorted access 
to the 300-FF-2 Burial Grounds remediation site must meet special training requirements 
( e g  ,24-Hour Hazardous Worker Training, Radiological Worker I1 training, pre-job briefing, 
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and required site and activity-specific reading). These training requirements provide adequate 
assurance of worker safety. 
Drums containing uranium and thorium will be staged within a controlled and posted area. It is 
anticipated that the material contained within the drums will not be classified as accountable 
special nuclear material or as classified material. 
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Hazard Type 
tadiological 
Form 
Jontaminated soil and debris 
ncluding uranium contaminated 
:quipment and materials, 
Autonium and fission products, 
md other contaminated liquids 
md discrete items. 
Waste is present as soil, non- 
:ombustible solids, combustible 
;olids, and combustible liquids. 
Quantity 
4111-241: 1.23E-01 Ci 
20-60: 4.39E-03 Ci 
3-137: 2.21E-01 Ci 
3u-155: 1.OOE-05 Ci 
Pu-238: 8.09E-03 Ci 
Pu-239: 1.34E+00 Ci 
Pu-241: 9.07E-01 Ci 
Ra-226: 1.88E-02 Ci 
3r-90: 2.03E-01 Ci 
Th-228: 4.16E-02 Ci 
Th-230: 1.48E-02 Ci 
Th-232: 1.55E-02 Ci 
U-234: 1.56E+01 Ci 
U-235: 5.83E+OO Ci 
U-238: 1.92E+01 Ci 
Zn-65: 8.77E-03 Ci 
Total curies from all waste forms. 
Uranium: approx. 14,500 kg (-16 tons). 
1 bronze crucible measured 5.5 m r h  @ 
10 cm (August 1946). 
Lead sink traps measured 6,000 dpm 
alpha, 15 m r h  - betdgamma (1946). 
Remarksa 
Radiological concentrations for 
soil contamination are based 
on the maximum 
concentrations from the 6 18-4, 
618-3,618-8, and 618-2 burial 
grounds. Total inventory is 
based on concentration data 
times contaminated soil 
volumes for the 618-1 burial 
ground and associated waste 
sites (303-M SA, 303-M UOF, 
and 333 ESHWSA). 
The total inventory also 
includes a contaminated 
liquids inventory and a discrete 
waste item inventory. The 
contaminated liquids inventory 
is based on general lab bottles 
found in the 6 18-3 burial 
ground. The discrete waste 
item inventory is based on 
discrete items found in the 
6 18-2 burial ground including 
the 6 18-2 safe. 
Referencesb 
WCH 2007a, Determination 
7f MAR for the 618-1 
Complex, 4.20. 
WIDS, General Summary 
Report, p. 4 
Hazard Type 
tadiological 
continued) 
Criticality 
Toxic material 
Form 
soil and debris. 
continued) 
179 drums of the following: 
Black oxide powder (Type 1), 
Yellow oxide powder (Type 2), 
railings, fines, and oils (Type 3). 
Contaminated soil and debris, 
including discrete items and 
liquids, and depleted uranium in 
drums. 
Lead sink traps. 
uantity 
3 lb (0.0005 Ci) of uranium. 
Pu-239: 0.06 Ci 
Pu-240: 0.0 17 Ci 
U-234: 7.38E-01 Ci 
U-235: 3.46E-02 Ci 
U-238: 4.35E+00 Ci 
Total curies from all waste forms (black 
oxide powder, yellow oxide powder, 
metal chips, and contaminated oil). 
No. of Type 1 & 2 drums: 41 
No. of Type 3 drums: 138 
Am-241: 1.23E-01 Ci 
Pu-238: 8.09E-03 Ci 
Pu-239: 1.34E+00 Ci 
Pu-241: 9.07E-01 Ci 
U-235: 5.83Et-00 Ci 
Total Curies from all waste forms. 
Unknown. 
Remarksa 
Uranium contained in spent 
process acid was leaked to this 
burial ground on July 3 1, 1973 
(UPR-300- 13). Extent of 
spread of contamination 
unknown. 
Drum concentration data is 
based on analogous site data 
for drums from the 61 8-4 
burial grounds. Total 
inventory is based on the 
concentration data times the 
mass or volume of material in 
the drums. 
For conservatism, total 
inventory in the FHC 
calculation uses the maximum 
uranium oxide concentration 
(black) for determining the 
inventory of Type 1 & 2 
drums. 
Criticality Safety Review 
concluded that criticality safety 
controls are not required. Field 
Verification Requirements 
should be used as safes or 
containers are discovered. 
From the 321 Laboratory. 
Lead in a monolithic form is 
not readily dispersible. 
Lead in sink traps has been 
known to contain mercury. 
References” 
$tenner et al., 1988, Hazard 
?anking System Evaluation 
f CERCLA Inactive Waste 
iites at Hanford, PNL-6456, 
I. 255 
NIDS, General Summary 
Zeport 
NCH 2007a, Table 4- 13. 
JVCH 2007b, 618-1 Burial 
3round Final Hazard 
Tategorization Calculation 
‘TQ Adjustment), Table 21. 
NCH 2007c, Remediation 
#the 618-1 Complex, 
Xticality Safety Review 
1300X-CE-N0004, Sections 
3and 19. 
WIDS, Waste Information 
section 
Hazard Type 
3arcinogens 
Form 
;oil and debris. 
Drums of uranium: 
Black oxide powder (Type 1 
Yellow oxide powder (Type 
Tailings and fines (Type 3), 
Oils (Type 3). 
uantity 
As: 6.09E+01 kg (3.48E+00 m a g ) .  
e: 5.69E+00 kg (3.25E-01 mgkg). 
Cd: 2.63E+01 kg (1.50E+00 mg/kg). 
Cr: 1.09Et-04 kg (6.23E+02 mgkg). 
i: 6.51E+03 kg (3.72E+02 mgkg). 
Pb: 5.81E+03 kg (3.33E+02 mgkg). 
s: 1.62E+O1 kg (9.23E-01 mg/kg). 
As, 7.4OE-03 kg total, distributed as 
follows: 
-- 
7.4OE-03 kg (8.38E-01 m a )  
Remarksa 
KHC (if present in its 
elemental or soluble forms). 
W C  (if present as chloride, 
fluoride, hydroxide, oxide, 
phosphate, sulfate, 
tetrahydrate, zinc silicate, or 
beryllium-aluminum alloy). 
RAHC (if present as chloride, 
oxide, sulfate, or sulfide). 
KHC (if present in hexavalent 
state). 
RAHC (if present as acetate, 
carbonate, carbonyl, 
hydroxide, nickelocene, oxide, 
or subsulfide). 
M C  (if present as lead 
acetate or phosphate). 
KHC (if present as chromate). 
M C  
KHC (if present in its 
elemental or soluble forms). 
Referencesb 
NCH 2007a, Tables 4- 14, 
1-16, and 4-18. 
IHHS, 2001 
NCH 2007a, Tables 4-4,4- 
5,4-8,4-10, and 4-14. 
IHHS, 2001 
Hazard Type 
hrcinogens 
continued) 
Form 
Drums of uranium: 
Black oxide powder (Type 1), 
Yellow oxide powder (Type 2), 
Tailings and fines (Type 3), 
Oils (Type 3). 
Drums of uranium: 
Black oxide powder (Type l), 
Yellow oxide powder (Type 2), 
Tailings and fines (Type 3), 
Oils (Type 3). 
Drums of uranium: 
Black oxide powder (Type 1), 
Yellow oxide powder (Type 2), 
Tailings and fines (Type 3), 
Oils (Type 3). 
Drums of uranium: 
Black oxide powder (Type 1), 
Yellow oxide powder (Type 2), 
Tailings and fines (Type 3), 
Oils (Type 3). 
uantity 
Cd, 4.95E+01 kg total, distributed as 
follows: 
4.8 1E+01 kg (4.62Et-03 mg/kg) 
7.34E-03 kg (6.80Et-01 mg/kg) 
1.38E+OOkg (3.56E+02 m a g )  
2.24E-03 kg (2.54E-01 m a )  
Cr, 1.28E+01 kg total, distributed as 
follows: 
-- 
-- 
1.28E+O1 kg (3.30E+03 mg/kg) 
7.08E-03 kg (8.02E-01 m a )  
Se, 1.1 lE+01 kg total, distributed as 
follows: 
-- 
-- 
1.1 1E+01 kg (2.88E+03 m a g )  
-- 
b, 1.10E+04 kg total, distributed as 
follows: 
1.09E+04 kg (1.05E+06 mg/kg) 
7.99E-02 kg (7.40E+02 mg/kg) 
8.27E+01 kg (2.14E+04 m a g )  
2.45E+00 kg (2.77E+02mgL) 
Remarksa 
W C  (if present as chloride, 
oxide, sulfate, or sulfide). 
KHC (if present in hexavalent 
state). 
RAHC (if present as sulfide). 
RAHC (if present as lead 
acetate or phosphate). 
KHC (if present as lead 
chromate). 
Referencesb 
continued) 
Remarksa Referencesb Hazard Type Form uantity , 
3 arcino gens 
continued) 
Drums of uranium: Aroclor-1254,4.20E+OO kg total, 
distributed as follows: 
-- 
-- 
-- 
4.2OE+OO kg (5.4.OEt-02 mg/kg) 
:continued) 
3lack oxide powder (Type l) ,  
fellow oxide powder (Type 2), 
railings and fines (Type 3), 
Xls (Type 3). 
>rums of uranium: Benzene, 6.62E-01 kg total, distributed 
as follows: 
-- 
-- 
-- 
6.62E-01 kg (7.50E+Ol m a )  
(HC 
3lack oxide powder (Type I), 
Yellow oxide powder (Type 2), 
railings and fines (Type 3), 
3ils (Type 3). 
3iohazards [nsecthodent bites and dust 
kom excrement. 
Undefined quanti ties. rhese hazards are routinely 
mcountered in industry. 
4sphyxiates Heavier-than-air gasses. Estimated maximum quantities: 
Acetylene: 45 kg ( 100 lb) 
Propane: 380 L (100 gal). 
rhese hazards are routinely 
mcountered in industry. 
4ctivities will be carried out in 
mtdoor, well-ventilated areas. 
Zhemical Inventory 
Database for 100-B/C, 
100-N, and 100-F RA 
projects 
Surface of burial ground essentially 
devoid of vegetation. 
4 range fire would not cause a 
;ignificant release of 
lazardous substances due to 
:he lack of combustibles, 
:specially vegetation, within 
he remediation site. Minimal 
%mounts of vegetation have 
3een encountered at other 
iearby burial grounds (618-4 
%nd 618-5). 
’lammable materials Vegetation. 
Hazard Type 
jlammable materials 
continued) 
Form 
i4iscellaneous combustibles, 
;enera1 construction waste 
Tuels and oils. 
Drums of uranium tailings, 
fines, and oil (Type 3 drums). 
Quantity 
Unknown quantity of combustible waste, 
:xpected to be relatively small, given 
:xistence of “burning pits” in other 
300 Area sites. 
Quantities of such materials will be kept 
to the minimum needed to support 
project. Estimated quantities (total): 
Gasoline: 190 L 
Diesel: 2,000 L 
Lubricating oil: 570 L 
Paints, cleaners, solvents, adhesives: 380 L 
Acetylene: 45 kg 
Antifreeze: 450 L 
Brake fluid: 19 L 
Hydraulic/transmission fluid: 760 L 
Propane: 380 L 
Mineral Oil: 400 L. 
Benzene, 6.62E-01 kg, distributed over 
138 Type 3 drums gives 
4.80E40 g/drum. 
Remarks’ 
3uried miscellaneous 
:ombustible materials include 
iieces of plastic, cardboard, 
Nood, cloth, and other types 
Zenerated during remediation. 
Zontainers with oil, paint 
:hips, and waxy material. 
?owder/salts, batteries, 
isbestos, fabric belting 
naterial, and used rags may 
ilso be found during site 
-emeditition activities. 
Fuels and oils are found in 
vehicles, spare drums and 
:arks, connex boxes, and 
flammable storage cabinets. 
Mineral oil is staged for 
stabilization of the drums. 
Class IB Flammable Liquid: 
flash point below 73°F and 
boiling point at or above 
100°F. 
Referencesb 
BHI, 1994 
Estimated quantities based 
3n ERC Chemical Inventory 
Database for lOO-B/C, 
100-N, and 100-IC RA 
projects, and, Envirocon 
Chemical Inventory, dated 
6/20/07, for Hanford 300 
Area Project #14678. 
WCH 2007a, Table 4- 10 and 
NIOSH, 2000, Online 
NIOSH Pocket Guide to 
Chemical Hazards, 
Publication No. 2000- 130 
4-14. 
azard Type 
'lammable materials 
continued) 
zorrosives 
)rums of uranium tailings, 
ines, and oil (Type 3 drums). 
continued) 
Jranium metal. 
Contaminated soil. 
uantity 
!-butanone, 1.68E+O 1 kg, distributed 
wer 138 Type 3 drums gives 1.22E+02 
ddrum. 
I'etrachloroethene, 8.74E-0 1 kg, 
listributed over 138 Type 3 drums gives 
5.33E+00 g/drum. 
I'richloroethene, 1.77E+O 1 kg, 
htributed over 138 Type 3 drums gives 
1.28E+02 g/drum. 
4pproximately 14,500 kg 
:16 tons) 
2,010 kg (4,432 lb) of nitric acid. 
44 kg (96 lb) of fluoride. 
870 kg (1,910 lb) of caustic (chemical 
species of caustic not specified), 
intentionally allowed to leak into the soil 
to neutralize the nitric acid. 
Remarks' 
Zlass IB Flammable Liquid: 
flash point below 73°F and 
boiling point at or above 
100°F. 
Noncombustible but 
decomposes in a fire to 
hydrogen chloride and 
phosgene gas. 
Combustible, burns with 
difficulty. 
From fuel fabrication 
activities. Uranium metal is a 
combustible solid, especially 
as turnings or powder. Size of 
uranium pieces not docu- 
mented. As a contaminant 
mixed with soil, it would not 
be expected to pose a signifi- 
cant flammability hazard. 
This release was to an open- 
bottomed limestone pit (Waste 
Acid Neutralization Box) that 
was positioned over the 6 18- 1 
Burial Ground. 
eferencesb 
:continued) 
BHI, 1994,300-FF-2 
9perable Unit Technical 
Qaseline Report, 
BHI-00012, Rev. 0 
WIDS, Waste Information 
section 
Operable Unit Technical 
Baseline Report, 
BHI-00012, Rev. 0, 
Section 5.9, "'UPR-300- 13," 
md Section 5.10, 
BHI, 1994,300-FF-2 
"UPR-300- 14" 
) and 
Hazard Type 
5xplosive materials 
Reactive hazards 
Form 
;oil and debris. 
Zanisters and bottles of 
icetylene, propane, oxygen, 
Zasoline in equipment fuel tanks 
ind in other approved storage 
2ontainers. 
Uranium metal. 
uantity 
2,010 kg (4,432 lb) of NO3 and 216 kg 
:477 lb) of copper, both in solution as 
mrt of UPR-300- 13. 
Quantities of such materials will be kept 
to the minimum needed to support the 
project. 
Estimated total quantities: 
Gasoline: 190 L 
Diesel: 2000 L 
Lubricating oil: 570 L 
Paints, cleaners, solvents, adhes 
Acetylene: 45 kg 
Oxygen: 45 kg 
Propane: 380 L. 
380 L 
ves: 
Approximately 14,500 kg (- 16 tons). 
Remarks' 
Nitrates can react severely with 
sulfuric acid. Copper can react 
severely with acetylene and 
hydrogen peroxide, if copper is 
present as metal dusts/mists. 
As a soil Contaminant, it is not 
expected to be an explosive 
hazard. Addition of caustic 
was intended to neutralize 
nitric acid. 
Bottles of acetylene and 
oxygen may be brought to the 
site. Gasoline and diesel is 
present in various vehicles on 
site (e.g., heavy machinery 
used for excavation or 
transport). 
An explosion could initiate a 
fire, or cause some amount of 
contaminated soil to be 
suspended in air, becoming 
readily breathable to a 
downwind receptor. 
From fuel fabrication 
activities. Size of uranium 
pieces not documented. As a 
contaminant in soil it would 
not be expected to be a reactive 
hazard. 
References 
Stenner et al., 1988, Hazard 
Ranking System Evaluation 
9f CERCLA Inactive Waste 
Sites at Hanford, PNL-6456, 
3.255 
WIDS, Waste Information 
section 
Estimated quantities based 
3n ERC Chemical Inventory 
Database for 1 00-B/C, 
100-N, and 100-K RA 
projects, and, Envirocon 
Chemical Inventory, dated 
6/20/07, for Hanford 300 
Area Project #14678. 
BHI, 1994,300-FF-2 
Operable Unit Technical 
Baseline Report, 
BHI-00012, Rev. 0 
ee 
eS 
Hazard Type 
teactive hazards 
continued) 
Form 
;oil and debris. 
Quantity 
ig: 1.69Et-03 kg (9.6OE+Ol mgkg). 
4s: 6.09E+O1 kg (3.48E+00 mgkg). 
Ba: 6.57E+02 kg (3.75Et-01 mgkg). 
e: 5.69E+00 kg (3.25E-Olmgkg). 
Remarksa 
Dust and soluble compounds 
incompatible with oxy- 
3cetylene, ammonia, hydrogen 
?eroxide, bromoazide, chlorine 
trifluoride, ethyleneimine, 
Dxalic acid, tartaric acid. As a 
soil contaminant, it would not 
be expected to be a reactive 
hazard. 
[ncompatible with strong 
3xidizers and bromine azide. 
Note: Hydrogen gas can react 
with inorganic arsenic to form 
the highly toxic gas arsine. As 
a soil Contaminant, it would 
not be expected to be a reactive 
hazard. 
Barium chloride incompatible 
with acids and oxidizers; 
barium nitrate incompatible 
with acids, oxidizers, and 
aluminum-magnesium alloys. 
As a soil contaminant, it would 
not be expected to be a reactive 
hazard. 
Incompatible with acids, 
caustics, chlorinated 
hydrocarbons, oxidizers. As a 
soil contaminant, it would not 
be expected to be a reactive 
hazard. 
Referencesb 
WCH 2007a, Tables 4- 14, 
i-16, and 4-18. 
VIOSH, 2000, Online 
VIOSH Pocket Guide to 
Zhernical Hazards, and 
3the r Databases, 
?ublication No. 2000- 130 
Hazard Type 
Xeactive hazards 
:continued) 
Form 
Soil and debris 
:continued) 
Quantity 
Cd: 2.63E+01 kg (1.50E+OO m a g ) .  
Co: 6.3 1E+02 kg (3.6OE+Ol mgkg). 
Cr: 1.09E-t-04 kg (6.23E-t-02 mgkg). 
Cu: 3.36E-t-03 kg (1.92E+OO mgkg). 
Remarks’ 
Incompatible with strong 
oxidizers; elemental sulfur, 
selenium and tellurium. As a 
soil contaminant, it would not 
be expected to be a reactive 
hazard. 
Incompatible with strong 
oxidizers, ammonium nitrate. 
As a soil contaminant, it would 
not be expected to be a reactive 
hazard. 
Varies with ionic species. 
Metal incompatible with 
strong oxidizers (e.g., 
hydrogen peroxide) or alkalis. 
As a soil contaminant, it would 
not be expected to be a reactive 
hazard. 
Incompatible with acetylene 
and hydrogen peroxide 
(assume copper is in metallic 
form). As a soil contaminant, 
it would not be expected to be 
a reactive hazard. 
References’ 
:continued) 
le 
Hazard Type 
teactive hazards 
continued) 
Form 
;oil and debris. 
continued) 
Quantity 
3g: 7.80E+01 kg (4.45E+00 m a g ) .  
Vi: 6.5 1E+03 kg (3.72Et-02 mg/kg). 
Pb: 5.81E+03 kg (3.33Et-02 m a g ) .  
Zn: 4.91E+03 kg (2.80E+02 m a g ) .  
Remarksa 
Varies with chemical form, 
incompatible with acetylene, 
ammonia, chlorine dioxide, 
azides, calcium (amalgam 
formation), sodium carbide, 
lithium, rubidium, copper. 
Mercury alkyl compounds 
incompatible with strong 
oxidizers (e.g., chlorine). As a 
soil contaminant, it would not 
be expected to be a reactive 
hazard. 
Nickel metal incompatible 
with strong acids, sulfur, 
selenium, wood and other 
combustibles, nickel nitrate. 
As a soil contaminant, it would 
not be expected to be a reactive 
hazard. 
Incompatible with strong 
oxidizers, hydrogen peroxide, 
acids. As a soil contaminant, it 
would not be expected to be a 
reactive hazard. 
Combustible, but solid form is 
difficult to ignite; however, 
powder form may ignite 
spontaneously and can 
continue burning under water. 
As a soil contaminant, it would 
not be expected to be a reactive 
hazard. 
Referencesb 
:continued) 
aste ) and 
and 
Hazard Type 
teactive hazards 
continued) 
Form 
Soil and debris. 
:continued) 
179 Drums of uranium: 
Black oxide powder (Type l), 
Yellow oxide powder (Type 2), 
Tailings and fines (Type 3), 
Oils (Type 3). 
179 drums of uranium as: 
Black oxide powder (Type 1), 
Yellow oxide powder (Type 2), 
Tailings and fines (Type 3), 
Oils (Type 3). 
uantity 
4pproximately 4,92 1 L of spent process 
icid was spilled (UPR-300- 13). The acid 
-eleased included the following: 
Zopper: 217 kg (477 lb) 
Zaustic: 866 kg (1,910 lb) 
En: 2.9E+03 kg. 
YO3: 2,010 kg (4,432 lb) 
Ag, 2.34E+Ol kg (total for all drums) 
distributed as follows: 
1.56E+O1 kg (1.50E+03 mg/kg) 
1.85E-01 kg (1.7 1E+03 mg/kg) 
7.57E+OO kg (1 .%E+03 mg/kg) 
2.50E-03 kg (2.83E-01 m a )  
As, 7.40E-03 kg (total for all drums) 
distributed as follows: 
-- 
-- 
-- 
7.4OE-03 kg (8.38E-01 m a )  
Remarks’ 
Nitrates can react severely with 
sulfuric acid. Copper can react 
severely with acetylene and 
hydrogen peroxide. 
Combustible, but solid form is 
difficult to ignite; however, 
powder form may ignite 
spontaneously and can 
continue burning under water. 
Acid was neutralized with 
caustic at time of spill. As soil 
contaminants, these chemical 
species would not be expected 
to be highly reactive. 
Dust and soluble compounds 
incompatible with ace t y 1 ene, 
ammonia, hydrogen peroxide, 
bromoazide, chlorine 
trifluoride, ethyleneimine, 
oxalic acid, and tartaric acid. 
Incompatible with strong 
oxidizers and bromine azide. 
Note: Hydrogen gas can react 
with inorganic arsenic to form 
the highly toxic gas arsine. 
Referencesb 
BHI, 1994,300-FF-2 
9perable Unit Technical 
Baseline Report, BHI- 
I00 12, Rev. 0, Section 5.9, 
‘UPR-300- 13,” and 
Section 5.10, “UPR-300-14” 
Stenner et al., 1988, Hazard 
Ranking System Evaluation 
Yf CERCU Inactive Waste 
Sites at Hanford, PNL-6456, 
3.255 
WIDS, Waste Information 
section 
WCH 2007a, Tables 4-4,4- 
5,4-8,4- 10, and 4- 14. 
Hazard Type 
teactive hazards 
continued) 
Form 
179 drums of uranium as: 
3lack oxide powder (Type l), 
Yellow oxide powder (Type 2), 
railings and fines (Type 3), 
33s (Type 3). 
179 drums of uranium as: 
Black oxide powder (Type l), 
Yellow oxide powder (Type 2), 
railings and fines (Type 3), 
3ils (Type 3). 
179 drums of uranium as: 
Black oxide powder (Type l), 
Yellow oxide powder (Type 2), 
Tailings and fines (Type 3), 
Oils (Type 3). 
179 drums of uranium as: 
Black oxide powder (Type l), 
Yellow oxide powder (Type 2), 
Tailings and fines (Type 3), 
Oils (Type 3). 
Quantity 
2-Butanone, 1.68E1-0 1 kg (total for all 
hums) distributed as follows: 
_- 
_- 
1.68E+Ol kg (1.90E+03 mgL) 
Cd, 4.95E+01 kg (total for all drums) 
distributed as follows: 
4.81E+O1 kg (4.62E+03 mg/kg) 
7.34E-03 kg (6.8OE+Ol mg/kg) 
1.38E+00 kg (3.56E+02 mg/kg) 
2.24E-03 kg (2.54E-01 m a )  
Cr, 1.28E+O 1 kg (total for all drums) 
distributed as follows: 
-- 
1.28E+O1 kg (3.30E+03 mg/kg) 
7.083s-03 kg (8.02E-01 m 
g, 6.09E-01 kg (total for all drums) 
distributed as follows: 
1.25E-03 kg (1.16Et-01 mg/kg) 
5.95E-0 1 kg (1.54Et-02 mg/kg) 
1.25E-02 kg (1.41E+OO mgL) 
Remarksa 
Incompatible with strong 
oxidizers; elemental sulfur, 
selenium, and tellurium. 
Incompatibility varies with 
compound, includes strong 
oxidizers or alkalis. 
Reactivity varies with 
chemical form, incompatible 
with acetylene, ammonia, 
chlorine dioxide, azides, 
calcium (amalgam formation), 
sodium carbide, lithium, 
rubidium, copper. Mercury 
alkyl compounds incompatible 
with strong oxidizers (e.g., 
chlorine). 
Referencesb 
continued) 
Hazard Type 
teactive hazards 
continued) 
Zlectrical energy 
Cinetic and potential 
:nergy 
Form 
179 drums of uranium as: 
Black oxide powder (Type l), 
Yellow oxide powder (Type 2), 
railings and fines (Type 3), 
Oils (Type 3). 
Supply lines outside of the 
excavation fence for office 
trailers and analytical needs. 
Heavy equipment/machinery/ 
vehicle impacting the 
contaminated soil, combustible 
or noncombustible solids, or 
drums of waste materials. 
Quantity 
Pb, 1.1Et-04 kg (total for all drums) 
distributed as follows: 
1.09Et-04 kg (1.05E+06 rng/kg) 
7.99E-02 kg (7.40E+02 mg/kg) 
8.27E+O 1 kg (2.14E+04 mg/kg) 
2.45E+00 kg (2.77Et-02 mgL) 
Electrical service is estimated at 13.8 Kv, 
400 amp service. 
Estimated heavy equipment quantities: 
Dozer: 1 
Hydraulic excavators: 2 
Grader: 1 
Water truck: 1 
Roll-Off trucks: 2 
Loaders: 2 
Backhoe: 1 
Forklift: 1 
Fuel truck: 1 
Pickup trucks: 5 
Van: 1 
Remarksa 
Incompatible with strong 
oxidizers, hydrogen peroxide, 
acids. 
High-voltage lines shorting to 
ground could result in sparks 
that could initiate a brush fire 
in adjacent areas. See remarks 
for flammability and 
kinetic/potential energy hazard 
types. 
Heavy machinery may collide 
with contaminated soil causing 
a “puff’ release of 
contaminated material. Heavy 
machinery may collide with 
drums containing retrieved 
wastes, rupturing the drums 
and causing particles to 
become airborne. 
Referencesb 
:continued) 
Based on 300-FF-1 and 
100-NR- 1 designs 
Based on STRs for 100-B/C, 
100-N, and 100-F RA 
projects, and, on Envirocon 
Equipment Rates, dated 
2/ 112007, for 300-FF-2 Field 
Remediation. 
able 
A falling drum could strike 
contaminated soil, or another 
filled drum, resulting in a 
“Duff’ release. 
Hazard Type 
-- 
h e t i c  and potential 
nergy (continued) 
%lling loads/equipment used 
luring remediation activities. 
Voise 
179 drums total (estimated) during the 
course of the project. 
Form 
It is assumed that a drop would 
be of sufficient velocity to 
rupture the drum causing a 
“puff-type” airborne release. 
encountered in industry. 
These hazards are routinely 
Quantity 
-- 
-- 
:ompressed gas bottles. 
4 drum being dropped a vertical 
iistance. 
Machinery/equipment . 
Such materials will be kept to the 
minimum needed to support the project. 
Compressed gasses, estimated quantities: 
Acetylene: 45 kg (100 lb in seven 
cylinders) 
Propane: 380 L (100 gal in ten 10-gal 
tanks) 
Oxygen: 45 kg (100 lb in four 
cylinders). 
179 drums. 
Undefined quantities. 
4ircraft collision. Traffic as defined in DOE-STD-3014-96 
(DOE 1996). 
I 
Remarksa References 
A pressurized missile could 
strike a patch of contaminated 
soil or drums, resulting in a 
“puff’ release of contaminated 
soils. 
ERC Chemical Inventory 
Database for lOO-B/C, 
100-N, and 100-F RA 
projects, and, Envirocon 
Chemical Inventory, dated 
6/20/07, for Hanford 300 
Area Project #14678. 
The probability of this type of 
event is extremely low (per 
DOE-STD-3014-96, the 
frequency would be below 
1 .OE-06). The Hanford Site is 
subject to very limited aircraft 
traffic due to relative location 
of airports and normal air 
traffic patterns. 
Hazard Type 
Jatural phenomena 
Form 
2sh fall resulting from volcanic 
ictivity . 
'looding from the Columbia 
3iver. 
Lightning. 
Seismic event resulting in 
ground motion. 
Extreme temperatures. 
Quantity 
Undefined quantities. During the 
May 18, 1980 eruption of Mount St. 
Helens, about 7.6 mm (0.3 in.) of ash 
was deposited at the Hanford Site. This 
resulted in a wet ash loading of only 
20.4 kg/m2 (4.2 Ib/ft2). 
The probable maximum flood (PMF) is 
Estimated to produce a Columbia River 
elevation at the 300 Area of 116.5 m 
(382 ft) above mean sea level. 
Mean thunderstorm frequency is low, 
averaging 10/yr, with the highest 
likelihood of occurrence during the 
months of June, July, and August. 
For the 300 Area, peak ground 
accelerations range from 0.1 to 0.3 g, 
have a corresponding annual mean 
frequency from 4.OE-03 to 2.OE-04. 
Undefined quantities. 
Remarksa 
Historically, only minimal 
amounts of ash accumulation 
resulting from volcanic activity 
have occurred at the Hanford 
Site. This could result in 
coating of exposed surfaces at 
the excavation site; however, it 
would not result in a release of 
material. 
As discussed in the feasibility 
study, the probable maximum 
flood of either the Columbia 
River (more so for the 
Columbia) is not anticipated to 
inundate the 300-FF-2 
Operable Unit. 
Lightning could initiate a brush 
fire. See remarks for 
flammability and kinetic/ 
potential energy hazard types. 
Temperature extremes range 
from -29 to 46°C 
(-20 to 115" F). 
Referencesb 
DOE-RL, 2000, Focused 
Feasibility Study for the 
300-FF-2 Operable Unit, 
DOE/RL-99-40, Rev. 0 
Hoitink et al., 2005, 
Hanford Site Climatological 
Data Summary 2004 With 
Historical Data, 
PNNL- 15 160 
Hanford Generic Interim 
Safety Basis, WHC-SD-GN- 
[SB-30001, Rev. 0 (WHC 
1994) 
Eloitink et al., 2005, 
Elanford Site Climatological 
Data Summary 2004 With 
Historical Data, 
PNNL- 15 160 
Hazard Type 
Jatural phenomena 
continued) 
Form 
ligh winds. 
iainwater/snow and ice. 
uantity 
n the 300 Area, the annual average wind 
;peed is 12.2 km/hr (7.6 mph). 
’eak gusts have occurred as high as 
129 km/hr (80 mph). 
ginds in excess of 40 kmhr (25 mph) 
)ccur slightly more than 1% of the time, 
)n an annual basis. 
4verage annual precipitation at the HMS 
s 17 cm (6.8 in.). The wettest season on 
-ecord was the winter of 1996- 1997 with 
14.1 cm (5.4 in.) of precipitation. Days 
ivith greater than 1.3 cm (0.50 in.) 
xecipitation occur on average less than 
me time each year. The 25 year 24-hour 
isopluvial (storm) is 4.1 cm (1.6 in.). 
4verage monthly snowfall in winter 
-anges from 0.25 cm (0.1 in.) to 13.2 cm 
:5.2 in.). The record monthly snowfall ol 
59.4 cm (23.4 in.) occurred during 
January 1950. The seasonal record 
snowfall of 142.5 cm (56.1 in.) occurred 
juring the winter of 1992-1993. 
Remarksa 
Drums that are staged or are 
exposed during excavation are 
considered at risk. Drums 
would have to be open for 
dispersion of the drum contents 
to occur. 
Some fraction of the dry, 
contaminated soils will be 
suspended in air. 
High winds could cause debris 
to be thrown (a missile), 
causing a kinetic energy 
hazard, or causing a “puff’ 
release if this material strikes 
contaminated soil. 
Spread of contamination could 
occur. The arid-to-semiarid 
climate suggests that little, if 
any, surface water will 
accumulate within the 
excavation. Most precipitation 
is lost through 
evapotranspiration. In 
addition, the transmissive 
nature of the surface soils 
allows rapid infiltration of 
precipitation. Consequently, 
little water remains to generate 
surface runoff. 
Referencesb 
[continued) 
Neitzel et al., 2005, Hanford 
Site National Environmental 
Policy Act (NEPA) 
Characterization Report, 
PNNL-64 15. 
WDOE, 2004, Stormwater 
Management Manual for 
Eastern Washington, Pub. 
Number 04- 10-076. 
Hazard Type 
Jatural phenomena 
continued) 
Form 
Seismic event resulting in 
Found motion. 
Quantity 
lanford Site is located in Zone 2B, a 
;one of moderate seismicity. 
Remarksa 
The Environmental Impact 
Statement for the inactive 
reactors determined that the 
radiological impacts from an 
earthquake are insignificant 
(DOE 1989). 
During a seismic event, a 
heavy load could be dropped 
onto the staged or exposed 
drums causing an airborne 
(puff) release. Shifting of 
drums would have a minimal 
impact. 
It is assumed that the energy of 
a seismic event would be 
insufficient to directly rupture 
drums. Drums that are staged, 
or are exposed during 
excavation, are considered at 
risk. Drums holding powder 
would have to be open for 
dispersion of the drum contents 
to occur. 
a A key to the Remarks column is as follows: 
KHC = Known to be a Human Carcinogen, as defined in the Report on Carcinogens, Ninth Edition (DHHS 2001). 
RAHC = Reasonably Anticipated to be a Human Carcinogen, as defined in the Report on Carcinogens, Ninth Edition (DHHS 2001). 
NC = Not classified as either KHC or RAHC in the Report on Carcinogens, Ninth Edition (DHHS 2001). 
Complete reference citations are provided in the reference section located at the end of this appendix. 
RA = Remedial Action (project) 
STR = subcontract technical representative 
WIDS = Waste Information Data System 
References 
DOE, 1989, Environmental 
rmpact Statement; 
Oecommissioning of Eight 
9urplus Production 
rieactors at the Hanford 
Site, Richland, Washington, 
DOE/EIS-0 1 19D 
orksheet for Solid 0 . 2  (618-2)a. (2 
Hazard Type 
tadiological 
Form 
Zontaminated soil and debris 
ncluding uranium-contaminated 
:quipment and materials, plutonium 
md fission products, and uranium 
jxide metal cuttings 
Quantity 
~~ 
Am-241: 1.42E-02 Ci 
C- 14: 1.02E-04 Ci 
CO-60: 2.81E-03 Ci 
Cs-137: 8.24E-01 Ci 
Eu-152: 6.12E-06 Ci 
Eu-154: 2.28E-04 Ci 
Eu-155: 5.93E-05 Ci 
H-3: 4.95E-03 Ci 
Ni-59: 2.04E-05 Ci 
Ni-63: 1.43E-03 Ci 
Pa-234m: 5.96E-05 Ci 
Pu-238: 1.89E-03 Ci 
Pu-239: 5.10E-02 Ci 
Pu-240: 1.07E-02 Ci 
Pu-24 1 : 4.73E-02 Ci 
Ra-226: 1.20E-02 Ci 
Sr-90 /Y-90: 7.43E-01 Ci 
Tc-99: 3.57E-04 Ci 
Th-228: 2.66E-02 Ci 
U-234: 1.02E-tO1 Ci 
U-235: 9.09E-01 Ci 
U-238: 1.38E+01 Ci 
Zn-65: 5.60E-03 Ci 
Total curies from all waste forms. 
ernarksb 
Soil data from 61 8-4 ASA/FHC 
MOC are used here as analogous 
site data for the 618-2 site soil. 
The 6 18-4 data were taken from 
Appendix A of DOE-RL (1995). 
Soil inventory based on 
concentration from 6 18-4 times 
the soil volume. Justification of 
use of this inventory is provided 
in Section 4.1.2 of the ASA. 
Referencesc 
Page 65. 
BHI, 200 1,618-4 Burial Ground 
3. 65 
BHI, 2003 
DOE-RL, 1995 
4SA/FHC, MOC-2001-00 1 1 ,  
DOE-RL, 1995 
orksheet for Soli 
HazardType I Form 
iadiological 
continued) 
The original waste form was 
assumed to be from hot cell 
(Le., analytical laboratory) 
activities with 75% 
combustibles and 25% non- 
combustibles. A fire destroyed 
an estimated 75% of the 
combustible material. 
Quantity 
H-3: 4.95E-3 Ci 
C- 14: 1.02E-4 Ci 
Ni-59: 2.04E-5 Ci 
CO-60: 4.1 1 E-6 Ci 
Ni-63: 1.43E-3 Ci 
Sr-90: 6.82E-1 Ci 
Tc-99: 3.57E-4 Ci 
Cs-137: 8.11E-1 Ci 
Eu-152: 6.12E-6 Ci 
Eu- 154: 2.28E-4 Ci 
Eu-155: 5.93E-5 Ci 
Pa-234m: 5.96E-5 Ci 
U-234: 3.57E-4 Ci 
U-235: 1.53E-5 Ci 
U-238: 3.57E-4 Ci 
Pu-238: 1.89E-3 Ci 
Pu-239: 5.10E-2 Ci 
Pu-240: 1.07E-2 Ci 
Pu-24 1 : 4.73E-2 Ci 
Am-24 1 : 1.42E-2 Ci 
Remarksb 
Hot cell debris (Le,, 
analytical laboratory spent 
fuel waste) is assumed to 
have had up to 25% of its 
radiological inventory 
associated with combustible 
materials. A fire reduced this 
to 6.25% of the inventory 
assuming 75% of the 
combustibles were 
consumed. 
References' 
BHI, 2001,618-4 Burial 
Ground A SA/FH C, 
BHI, 2003a, 618-2 
Supplemental Radionuclide 
Inventory Estimate, Calc. No. 
Page 5 of 5 
MOC-200 1-00 1 1, p. 65 
0300X-CA-NO0 16 
orksheet for 
Hazard Type 
tadiological 
continued) 
Form 
Jranium-contaminated 
:quipment and materials, 
)lutonium and fission products. 
Jranium waste typically solid 
netallic uranium oxides in the 
orm of metal cuttings from 
beactor fuel fabrication facilities 
n the 300 Area. 
Quantity 
!,OOO Ci of “beta” activity reported 
nventory in April 1986 according to 
Stenner et al. Stenner et a1 indicates the 
nventory of all other radionuclides is 0 
3, including Sr-90, Cs- 137, Pu-239 and 
J-238. 
Remarksb 
Process knowledge of 300 
Area operations in the time- 
period that 6 18-2 was active 
( 195 1-54) indicates that large 
amounts of long-lived beta 
activity would not have been 
disposed in 6 18-2. Any long- 
lived beta radioactivity 
would have been associated 
with analytical laboratory 
wastes containing sample 
residues of irradiated (spent) 
uranium fuel. 
Dose rate information from 
(1) the 1954 fire and (2) 
radiological survey records 
and special work permit 
records for waste shipments 
to 300 Area burial grounds in 
195 1-54 has been used (BHI 
2003a, BHI 2004a and BHI 
2004b) to show that the 
current beta inventory 
estimate for 618-2 is 1 to 2 
Ci. Therefore, it is believed 
that the inventory estimate in 
Stenner et a1 is incorrect and 
can be dismissed. 
Referencesc 
Stenner et al., 1988, Hazard 
Ranking System Evaluation of 
CERCLA Inactive Waste Sites 
zt Hanford, PNL-6456, Voi. 
[I, p. 667 
WIDS, General Summary 
Report 
BHI, 2003a, 618-2 
Supplemental Radionuclide 
Inventory Estimate, Calc. No. 
3300X-CA-NO0 16 
BHI, 2004a, 618-2 Burial 
Ground Spent Fuel Inventory 
Calculation Based on Waste 
Disposal Data, Calc. No. 
3300X-CA-NO0 19 
BH& 2004b, 618-2 Exposure 
Rate per Mass of Fuel 
Calculation, Calc. No. 0300X- 
CA-NO0 18 
HazardType I Form 
170 drums of uranium as: 
Black oxide powder (Type 1) 
Yellow oxide powder (Type 2) 
tailings, fines and oils (Type 3). 
Xadiological 
continued) 
U-235: 5.55E+00 Ci in soil plus 
1.28E-05 Ci in bottles and from hot cells 
Initial Criticality Evaluation WCH, 2006b, Remediation of 
concluded “The average the 618-2 Burial Ground, 
concentration in soil is below Criticality Safety Review 
the threshold concentration 0300X-CE-NO005 
for U-235 .” 
Jriticality 
RAHC (if present as 
chloride, fluoride, hydroxide, 
oxide, phosphate, sulfate, 
tetrahydrate, zinc silicate, or 
~ beryllium- aluminum alloy). 
Soil, drums, and contaminated 
debris, including contaminated 
gloves, miscellaneous 
equ i pmen t , bronze cruc i b I es , 
lead sink traps, and solid 
laboratory wastes. 
: 1.7 E+01 kg (1.5E+00 mgkg). 
roxic material 
RAHC (if present as 
chloride, oxide, sulfate, or 
sulfide). 
Lead-acid automotive batteries, 
lead from “lead-dip” process, 
and tin from “triple-dip” 
process. 
Carcinogens Contaminated soil and debris 
including contaminated gloves, 
miscellaneous equipment, 
bronze crucibles, lead sink 
traps, and solid laboratory 
wastes. 
Quantity I Remarksb I References‘ 
U-234: 7.23E-01 Ci 
U-235: 3.37E-02 Ci 
U-238: 4.26E+00 Ci 
No. of Type 1 & 2 drums: 39 
No. of Type 3 drums: 131 
Drum inventory data from 
61 8-4 used as analogous site 
data for drums. 
The maximum uranium oxide 
concentration (black) was 
used for all uranium oxide 
drums. 
BHI, 2003b, Hazard 
Categorization of the 61 8-2 
and 618-13 Waste Sites, Calc. 
No. 0300X-CA-N0015, Rev. 1 
BHI, 2003 
”Two dump-truck loads” (of batteries). 
Unknown quantities of lead and tin from 
the lead-dip and triple dip processes. 
WIDS, Environmental 
Monitoring Description 
section, p. 1 
Operable Unit Technical 
Baseline Report, BHI-000 12, 
Rev. 0 
BHI, 1994,300-FF-2 
AS: 3.9 E+01 kg (3.5E+00 m a g ) .  M C  (if present in its 
elemental or soluble forms). 
Be: 3.60 E+OO kg (3.3E-01 mgkg). 
BHI, 2004c 
DHHS, 2001, Report on 
Carcinogens, Ninth Edition 
Hazard Type 
zarcino gens 
continued) 
Form 
zontaminated soil and debris 
ncluding contaminated gloves, 
niscellaneous equipment, 
xonze crucibles, lead sink 
raps, and solid laboratory 
wastes. 
170 drums of uranium as: 
Black oxide powder (Type 1), 
Yellow oxide powder (Type 2), 
railings and fines (Type 3), 
3ils (Type 3). 
Quantity 
Cr: 7.0 E+03 kg (6.2E+02 mgkg). 
i: 4.2 E+03 kg (3.7E+02 mgkg). 
Pb: 3.9 E+03 kg (3.3E+02 mgkg). 
PCBs: l.OE+Ol kg (9.2E-01 mgkg). 
As, 7.OE-03 kg, distributed as follows: 
-- 
-- 
7.4E-03 kg (8.4E-01 mg/L). 
Remarksb 
W C  (if present in 
hexavalent state). 
W C  (if present as acetate, 
carbonate, carbonyl, 
hydroxide, nickelocene, 
oxide, or subsulfide). 
W C  (if present as lead 
acetate or phosphate). 
KHC (if present as chromate). 
W C  
KlE[C (if present in its 
elemental or soluble forms). 
Referencesc 
BHI, 2004c 
DHHS, 200 1, Report on 
Carcinogens, Ninth Edition 
Drum data from 618-4 Burial 
Ground ASNFHC, 
MOC-2001-0011, Table 3, 
p. 67 (BHI 2001), are used as 
analogous site data for these 
drums 
BHI, 2004c 
DHHS, 2001, Report on 
Carcinogens, Ninth Edition 
Hazard Type 
Jarcino gens 
:continued) 
Form 
170 drums of uranium as: 
3lack oxide powder (Type l), 
Yellow oxide powder (Type 2), 
railings and fines (Type 3), 
3ils (Type 3). 
170 drums of uranium as: 
Black oxide powder (Type l), 
Yellow oxide powder (Type 2), 
railings and fines (Type 3), 
Oils (Type 3). 
170 drums of uranium as: 
Black oxide powder (Type l), 
Yellow oxide powder (Type 2), 
Tailings and fines (Type 3), 
Oils (Type 3). 
Quantity 
Cd, 4.7Et-01 kg, distributed as follows: 
4.6E+O1 kg (4.6E+03 mg/kg) 
7.3E-03 kg (6.8E+Ol mg/kg) 
1.3E+OOkg (3.6E+02 mg/kg) 
2.1E-03 kg (2.5E-01 mg/L). 
Cr, 1.2E+O1 kg, distributed as follows: 
-- 
-- 
1.3E1-01 kg (3.3E+03 (mg/kg) 
7.1E-03 kg (8.OE-01 mg/L). 
Se, 1.1Et-01 kg, distributed as follows: 
-- 
-- 
l.lE+Ol kg (2.9E+03 mg/kg) 
-- 
Remarksb 
R M C  (if present as 
:hloride, oxide, sulfate, or 
sulfide). 
m C  (if present in 
hexavalent state). 
M C  (if present as sulfide). 
Referencesc 
Drum data from 618-4 Burial 
G ro und A SA/FH C, 
MOC-2001-0011, Table 3, 
p. 67 (BHI 2001), are used as 
analogous site data for these 
drums 
BHI, 2004c 
DHHS, 2001, Report on 
Carcinogens, Ninth Edition 
Drum data from 618-4 Burial 
Ground ASMFHC, 
MOC-200 1 -00 1 1, Table 3, 
p. 67 (BHI 2001), are used as 
analogous site data for these 
drums 
BHI, 2004c 
DHHS, 2001, Report on 
Carcinogens, Ninth Edition 
BHI, 2004c 
DHHS, 2001, Report on 
Carcinogens, Ninth Edition 
eet 
Hazard Type 
hcinogens 
continued) 
Biohazards 
4sphyxiates 
Form 
170 drums of uranium as: 
Black oxide powder (Type l) ,  
Yellow oxide powder (Type 2), 
Tailings and fines (Type 3), 
Oils (Type 3). 
170 drums of uranium as: 
Black oxide powder (Type 1), 
Yellow oxide powder (Type 2), 
Tailings and fines (Type 3), 
Oils (Type 3). 
170 drums of uranium as: 
Black oxide powder (Type l), 
Yellow oxide powder (Type 2), 
Tailings and fines (Type 3), 
Oils (Type 3). 
Insecthodent bites and dust 
from excrement. 
Heavier-than-air gasses. 
Quantity 
Pb, 1.1E+04 kg, distributed as follows: 
1 .OE+04 kg ( 1 .OE+04 mg/kg) 
8.OE-02 kg (7.4E+02 mg/kg) 
7.8E+O1 kg (2.1E+04 mg/kg) 
2.4E+00 kg (2.8Et-02 mg/L). 
Arochlor-1254,4.OE+OO kg, distributed 
as follows: 
-- 
-- 
-- 
4.OE+00 kg (5.4E+02 m a ) .  
Benzene, 6.3E-01 kg, distributed as 
follows: 
-- 
6.3E-01 kg (7.5E+01 m a ) .  
Undefined quantities. 
Estimated quantities: 
Acetylene: 45 kg (100 Ib) 
Propane: 380 L (100 gal). 
Remarksb 
3 M C  (if present as lead 
tcetate or phosphate). 
CHC (if present as lead 
:bromate). 
RAIHC 
KHC 
rhese hazards are routinely 
mountered in industry. 
rhese hazards are routinely 
3ncountered in industry. 
4ctivities will be carried out 
in outdoor, well-ventilated 
xeas. 
Referencesc 
3HI,2004c 
3HEIS, 2001, Report on 
17arcinogens, Ninth Edition, 
Hazard Type 
ilammable materials 
Form 
Vegetation. 
Miscellaneous combustibles, 
general construction waste, 
including pieces of plastic, 
cardboard, wood, cloth, and 
other types generated during 
remediation. Containers with 
oil, paint chips, and waxy 
material. Po wderlsal ts, 
batteries, asbestos, fabric 
belting material, and used rags 
may also be found during site 
remediation activities. 
Quantity 
Surface of burial ground essentially 
ievoid of vegetation. 
Unknown quantity of combustible waste, 
jxpected to be relatively small, given the 
Fire that destroyed a “major portion” of 
the contents of this burial ground in 
February of 1954. 
Approximately 75% or more of the 
hot cell waste volume was in the form 
of combustible, soft waste. 
The remaining 25% consists of 
noncombustible solids such as 
irradiated fines and equipment parts. 
75% of the total radionuclide 
inventory is attributable to the 
noncombustible solids. 
The fire destroyed 75% of the burial 
ground combustible contents, 
dispersing the contamination to 
surrounding soils. 
Remarksb 
4 range fire would not cause 
i significant release of 
iazardous substances due to 
he lack of combustibles, 
:specially vegetation, within 
he remediation site (the site 
will have been cleared of 
:ombustibles prior to 
nitiation of remediation 
tctivities). Minimal amounts 
lave been encountered at 
ither burial ground 
*emediation sites (6 18-4 and 
518-5). 
References‘ 
BHI, 1994,300-FF-2 
Operable Unit Technical 
Baseline Report, BHI-00012, 
Rev. 0 
BHI, 2003a, 618-2 
Supplemental Radionuclide 
Inventory Estimate, Calc. No. 
0300X-CA-N0016, Rev. 0 
t ~ ~ c a t ~ o  eet 
Hazard Type 
ilammable materials 
continued) 
Form 
>rums of uranium tailings, 
ines, and oil (Type 3 drums). 
Fuels and oils used by project. 
Quantity 
3enzene, 6.3E-0 1 kg, distributed over 13 1 
rype 3 drums gives 4.8E+00 g/drum. 
&butanone, 7.OE-03 kg, distributed over 
13 1 Type 3 drums gives 5.3E-02 g/drum. 
I'etrachloroethene, 8.3E-01 kg, distributed 
wer 13 1 Type 3 drums gives 
S.OE+OO g/drum. 
I'richloroethene, 1.7E+O 1 kg, distributed 
wer 13 1 Type 3 drums gives 
1.2E+02 g/drum. 
Quantities of such materials will be kept 
to the minimum needed to support the 
project. Estimated quantities (per 
vehicle): 
Gasoline: 190 L 
Diesel: 7,600 L 
Lubricating oil: 570 L 
Paints, cleaners, solvents, adhesives: 380 L 
Acetylene: 45 kg 
Antifreeze: 450 L 
Brake fluid: 19 L 
Hydraulic/transmission fluid: 760 L 
Propane: 380 L. 
Remarksb 
Jlass IB Flammable Liquid: 
lash point below 73°F and 
)oiling point at or above 
100°F. 
Jlass IB Flammable Liquid: 
lash point below 73°F and 
>oiling point at or above 
I 00°F. 
Voncombustible but 
lecomposes in a fire to 
iydrogen chloride and 
ihosgene gas. 
Zombustible, burns with 
lifficul ty . 
5uels and oils are found in 
dehicles, spare drums, and 
nineral oil staged for 
;tabilization of the drums. 
Referencesc 
3H1,2004c 
VIOSH, 2000, Pocket Guide 
'0 Chemical Hazards, and 
3ther Databases, Publication 
VO. 2000-130 
Zstimated quantities based on 
5RC Chemical Inventory 
Database for 100-B/C, 1 00-N, 
ind 100-K RA projects 
Hazard Type 
;lammable materials 
continued) 
zorrosives 
3xplosive materials 
Form 
Jranium oxide metal cuttings. 
Zontaminated soil. 
Soil and debris. 
Canisters and bottles of 
acetylene, propane, oxygen, 
gasoline in equipment fuel tanks 
and in other approved storage 
zontainers. 
Quantity 
See Radiological Hazard Type. 
Fluoride: 3.6E+O 1 kg. 
NO31 9.4E+02 kg 
Copper: 2.1E+03 kg. 
Quantities of such materials will be kept 
to the minimum needed to support the 
project . 
Estimated quantities: 
Gasoline: 190 L 
Lubricating oil: 570 L 
Grease, paints, cleaners, solvents, 
adhesives: 380 L 
Acetylene: 45 kg 
Oxygen: 45 kg 
ProDane: 380 L. 
Remarksb 
From fuel fabrication 
activities. Uranium metal is 
a combustible solid, 
especially as turnings or 
powder. Size of uranium 
pieces not documented. As a 
contaminant mixed with soil, 
it would not be expected to 
pose a significant 
flammability hazard. 
Corrosive nature assumed 
mitigated by mixing with 
soil. 
Nitrates can react severely 
with sulfuric acid. Copper 
can react severely with 
acetylene and hydrogen 
peroxide if present as metal 
dust/mist. If mixed with soil, 
explosive potential negated. 
Bottles of acetylene and 
oxygen may be brought to 
the site. Gasoline and diesel 
is present in various vehicles 
on site (e.g., heavy 
machinery used for 
excavation, or transport). 
An explosion could initiate a 
fire, or cause some amount of 
contaminated soil to be 
suspended in air. 
Referencesc 
WIDS, Waste Information 
section 
Stenner et al., 1988, Hazard 
Ranking System Evaluation of 
CERCLA Inactive Waste Sites 
at Hanfo rd, PNL-645 6, 
Vols. 1, 2, and 3 
BHI, 2004c 
BHI, 2004c 
Estimated quantities based on 
ERC Chemical Inventory 
Database for lOO-B/C, 100-N, 
and 100-K RA projects 
eet for 0.2 ( 
Hazard Type 
teactive hazards 
Form 
Jranium metal cuttings. 
3attery acid. 
Soil and debris. 
Quantity 
Jnkno wn. 
'Two dump-truck loads" of automotive 
batteries. 
lg: 1.1Et-03 kg (9.6E+O1 mgkg). 
4s: 3.9Et-01 kg (3.5E+00 mg/kg). 
Remarksb 
From fuel fabrication 
sctivities. Size of uranium 
pieces not documented. As a 
;ontaminant in soil it would 
not be expected to be a 
reactive hazard. 
Battery acid reacts violently 
with water. Incompatible 
with organic materials, 
chlorides, carbides, 
fulminates, and powdered 
metals. 
Dust and soluble compounds 
incompatible with oxy- 
acetylene, ammonia, 
hydrogen peroxide, 
bromoazide, chlorine 
trifluoride, ethyleneimine, 
oxalic acid, tartaric acid. In 
the form of a soil 
contaminant, it would not be 
expected to be a reactive 
hazard. 
Incompatible with strong 
oxidizers, bromine azide 
Note: Hydrogen gas can 
react with inorganic arsenic 
to form the highly toxic gas 
arsine. In the form of a soil 
contaminant, it would not be 
expected to be a reactive 
hazard. 
References' 
@IDS, Site Comment section 
3perable Unit Technical 
3aseline Report, BHI-00012, 
Xev. 0 
3H1, 1994,300-FF-2 
WIDS, Site Comment section. 
VIOSH, 2000, Online NIOSH 
Docket Guide to Chemical 
Yazards, and Other 
Patabases, Publication No. 
3HI,2004c 
1000- 130 
i ~ c a t i o ~  eet for 
Hazard Type 
teac t i ve hazards 
continued) 
Form 
;oil and debris. 
continued) 
Quantity 
3a: 4.2E+02 kg (3.8E+Ol mgkg). 
Be: 3.6E+OO kg (3.3E-01 mg/kg). 
Cd: 1.76E+O 1 kg ( 1 .SE+OO mgkg). 
Go: 3.74E+02 kg (3.6Et-01 mg/kg). 
Remarksb 
Barium chloride 
incompatible with acids and 
oxidizers; barium nitrate 
incompatible with acids, 
oxidizers, and aluminum- 
magnesium alloys. In the 
form of a soil contaminant, it 
would not be expected to be a 
reactive hazard. 
Incompatible with acids, 
caustics, chlorinated 
hydrocarbons, oxidizers. In 
the form of a soil 
contaminant, it would not be 
expected to be a reactive 
hazard. 
Incompatible with strong 
oxidizers; elemental sulfur, 
selenium and tellurium. In 
the form of a soil 
contaminant, it would not be 
expected to be a reactive 
hazard. 
Incompatible with strong 
oxidizers, ammonium nitrate. 
In the form of a soil 
contaminant, it would not be 
expected to be a reactive 
hazard. 
Referencesc 
3HI,2004c 
VIOSH, 2000, Online NIOSH 
Pocket Guide to Chemical 
Fiazards, and Other 
Databases, Publication No. 
2000- 1 30 
able azar 
Hazard Type 
Leactive hazards 
zontinued) 
Form 
-~ 
oil and debris. 
:ontinued) 
Quantity 
Jr: 7.0E+03 kg (3.6E+O1 mg/kg). 
CU: 2.1E+03 kg (3.6E+O1 m a g ) .  
Hg: S.OE+Ol kg (3.6E+O1 mg/kg). 
Ni: 4.2E+03 kg (3.6E+Ol mg/kg). 
Remarksb 
Varies with ionic species. 
Metal incompatible with 
;trong oxidizers (e.g., 
iydrogen peroxide) or 
dkalis. In the form of a soil 
zontaminant, it would not be 
zxpected to be a reactive 
hazard. 
Incompatible with acetylene 
and hydrogen peroxide 
(assume copper is in metallic 
form). In the form of a soil 
contaminant, it would not be 
expected to be a reactive 
hazard. 
Varies with chemical form. 
Incompatible with acetylene, 
ammonia, azides, calcium, 
chlorine dioxide, lithium, 
rubidium, copper, sodium 
carbide. 
Mercury alkyl compounds 
incompatible with strong 
oxidizers (e.g., chlorine). 
Nickel metal incompatible 
with strong acids, sulfur, 
selenium, wood and other 
combustibles, nickel nitrate. 
In the form of a soil 
Contaminant, it would not be 
expected to be a reactive 
hazard. 
References' 
3HI, 2004c 
(IOSH, 2000, Online NZOSH 
Yazards, and Other 
3atabases, Publication No. 
Guide to Chemical 
!OOO- 130 
Hazard Type 
Leactive hazards 
Zontinued) 
Form 
;oil and debris. 
continued) 
170 drums of uranium as: 
Black oxide powder (Type l), 
Yellow oxide powder (Type 2), 
Tailings and fines (Type 3), 
Oils (Type 3). 
170 drums of uranium as: 
Black oxide powder (Type l), 
Yellow oxide powder (Type 2), 
Tailings and fines (Type 3) 
Oils (Type 3). 
Quantity 
’b: 3.7E-t-03 kg (3.6Et-01 mgkg). 
?h: 3.1E+03 kg (3.6E+OI mgkg). 
‘403: 9.4E+02 kg (2.1E+03 lb). 
4g, 2.2E+O1 kg (total for all drums) 
jistributed as follows: 
1 .SE+Ol kg (lSE+03 mg/kg) 
1.7E+03 kg (1.7E+03 mg/kg) 
2.0E+03 kg (2.0E+03 mg/kg) 
2.4E-03 kg (2.8E-01 mg/L. 
s, 7.OE-03 kg (total for all drums) 
distributed as follows: 
-- 
7.OE-03 kg (8.4E-01 m a g ) .  
Remarks 
.ncompatible with strong 
Ixidizers, hydrogen peroxide, 
icids. In the form of a soil 
:ontaminant, it would not be 
:xpected to be a reactive 
iazard. 
3ombustible, but solid form 
s difficult to ignite; however, 
lowder form may ignite 
;pontaneously and can 
:ontinue burning under 
water. In the form of a soil 
:ontaminant, it would not be 
:xpected to be a reactive 
iazard. 
Nitrates can react severely 
with sulfuric acid. As a soil 
;ontaminant, this chemical 
species would not be 
zxpected to be highly 
reactive. 
Dust and soluble compounds 
incompatible with acetylene, 
ammonia, hydrogen 
peroxide, bromoazide, 
chlorine trifluoride, 
ethyleneimine, oxalic acid, 
tartaric acid. 
Incompatible with strong 
oxidizers, bromine azide 
Note: Hydrogen gas can 
react with inorganic arsenic 
to form the highly toxic gas 
arsine . 
Referencesc 
3H1,2004c 
6IOSH, 2000, Online NIOSH 
Docket Guide to Chemical 
Yazards, and Other 
Patabases, Publication No. 
!OOO- 130 
0.2 (618-2)’. (2 
Ba, 2.7Et-02 kg (total for all drums) 
distributed as follows: 
1.5E+O1 kg ( 1.6E+03 mg/kg) 
3.8E-02 kg (3.5E+02 mg/kg) 
2.5E+02 kg (6.9E+04 mg/kg) 
9.8Et-00 kg (1.2E+03 mg/kg). 
Hazard Type 
2-Butanone, 7.OE-03 kg (total for all 
drums) distributed as follows: 
-- 
-- 
-- 
7.OE-03 kg (8.4E-01 mg/kg). 
teactive hazards 
continued) 
Form 
170 drums of uranium as: 
Black oxide powder (Type 1), 
Yellow oxide powder (Type 2), 
railings and fines (Type 3), 
Oils (Type 3). 
170 drums of uranium as: 
Black oxide powder (Type l), 
Yellow oxide powder (Type 2), 
railings and fines (Type 3), 
31s (Type 3). 
170 drums of uranium as: 
Black oxide powder (Type l), 
Yellow oxide powder (Type 2), 
Tailings and fines (Type 31, 
Oils (Type 3). 
170 drums of uranium as: 
Black oxide powder (Type l) ,  
Yellow oxide powder (Type 2), 
Tailings and fines (Type 3), 
Oils (Type 3). 
Quantity 
Cd, 4.7E+O1 kg (total for all drums) 
distributed as follows: 
4.6E+01 kg (4.6E+03 mg/kg) 
3.8E-02 kg (3.5E+02 mg/kg) 
1.3E+ocI kg (3.6E+02 mg/kg) 
2.1E-03 kg (2.5E-01 m&). 
Cr, 1.2E+O1 kg (total for all drums) 
distributed as follows: 
4.6E+O1 kg (4.6E+03 mg/kg) 
7.3E-03 kg (6.8E+O1 mg/kg) 
1.3E+00 kg (3.6Et-02 mg/kg) 
2.1E-03 kg (2.5E-01 m a g ) .  
Remarksb 
Barium chloride 
incompatible with acids and 
ixidizers; barium nitrate 
incompatible with acids, 
Dxidizers, and aluminum- 
magnesium alloys. 
tncompatible with strong 
oxidizers, amines, ammonia, 
inorganic acids, caustics, 
socyanates and pyridines. In 
:he form of a soil 
;ontaminant, it would not be 
=xpected to be a reactive 
iazard. 
[ncompatible with strong 
3xidizers; elemental sulfur, 
selenium, and tellurium. 
Incompatibility varies with 
compound, includes strong 
oxidizers or alkalis. 
Referencesc 
BHI, 2004c 
NIOSH, 2000, Online NIOSH 
Pocket Guide to Chemical 
Flazards, and Other 
Databases, Publication No. 
2000- 1 30 
Hazard Type 
ieactive hazards 
continued) 
Electrical energy 
Natural phenomena 
Form 
170 drums of uranium as: 
3lack oxide powder (Type I), 
fellow oxide powder (Type 2), 
railings and fines (Type 3), 
3ils (Type 3). 
170 drums of uranium as: 
Black oxide powder (Type 1), 
Yellow oxide powder (Type 2), 
railings and fines (Type 3), 
3ils (Type 3). 
Supply lines outside of the 
zxcavation fence for office 
trailers and analytical needs. 
Lightning. 
Quantity 
Hg, 5.7E-01 kg (total for all drums) 
distributed as follows: 
1.3E-03 kg (1.2E+O1 mg/kg) 
5.6E-01 kg (1 .5E+02 mg/kg) 
1.2E-02 kg (1.4E+00 m a ) .  
Pb, 1.OE+O4 kg (total for all drums) 
distributed as follows: 
1 .OE+04 kg (1 .) 1Et-06 mg/kg) 
8.OE-02 kg (7.4Et-02 mg/kg) 
7.8Et-01 kg (2.1E+04 mg/kg) 
2.3E+00 kg (2.8E+02 mg/L). 
Electrical service is estimated at 13.8 kV, 
400 amp service. 
Mean thunderstorm frequency is low, 
averaging 10/yr, with the highest 
likelihood of occurrence during the 
months of June, July, and August. 
Remarksb 
Varies with chemical form, 
incompatible with acetylene, 
ammonia, chlorine dioxide, 
azides, calcium (amalgam 
formation), sodium carbide, 
lithium, rubidium, copper. 
Mercury alkyl compounds 
incompatible with strong 
oxidizers (e.g., chlorine). 
Incompatible with strong 
oxidizers, hydrogen peroxide, 
acids. 
High-voltage lines shorting 
to ground could result in 
sparks which could initiate a 
brush fire in adjacent areas. 
See remarks for flammability 
and kinetic/potential energy 
hazard types. 
Lightning could initiate a 
brush fire. See remarks for 
flammability and 
kinetic/potential energy 
hazard types. 
References‘ 
3HI,2004c 
VIOSH, 2000, Online NIOSH 
pocket Guide to Chemical 
Yazards, and Other 
gatabases, Publication No. 
2000- 130 
Based on 300-FF-1 and 
1 OO-NR- 1 designs 
Hoitink et al., 2002, Hanford 
Site Climatological Data 
Summary 2001 With Historicar 
Data, PNNL-13859 
ble catio eet fo ria 0. 
Hazard Type 
Wural phenomena 
continued) 
Form 
Seismic event resulting in 
yound motion. 
Extreme temperatures. 
High winds. 
Ash fall resulting from volcanic 
activity. 
Quantity 
The Hanford Site is located in Zone 2B, a 
tone of moderate seismicity. For the 
300 Area, peak ground accelerations 
-anges from 0.1 to 0.3 g, have a 
zorresponding annual mean frequency 
from 4.OE-03 to 2.OE-04. 
Undefined quantities. 
tn the 300 Area, the annual average wind 
speed is 12.1 km/hr (7.5 mph). 
The maximum peak gust wind speed at 
Hanford was 129 km/hr (80 mph) (1972). 
The annual average for number of days 
with peak gusts in excess of 80 km/hr 
(50 mph) is 4.7 days. 
Winds in excess of 40 km/hr (25 mph) 
occur slightly more than 1% of the time, 
on an annual basis. 
Undefined quantities. During the May 18, 
1980 eruption of Mount St. Helens, about 
7.6 mm (0.3 in.) of ash was deposited at 
the Hanford Site this resulted in a wet ash 
loading of only 20.4 kg/m2 (4.2 Ib/ft2). 
Remarksb 
The Environmental Impact 
Statement for the inactive 
reactors determined that the 
radiological impacts from an 
earthquake are insignificant. 
During a seismic event, a 
heavy load could be dropped 
onto contaminated soil 
causing an airborne (puff) 
release. 
Temperature extremes range 
from -29 to 46°C 
(-20 to 115" F). 
Some fraction of the dry, 
contaminated soils will be 
suspended in air. 
High winds could cause 
debris to be thrown (a 
missile), causing a kinetic 
energy hazard, or causing a 
"puff" release if this material 
strikes contaminated soil. 
Historically, only minimal 
amounts of ash accumulation 
resulting from volcanic 
activity have occurred at the 
Hanford Site. This could 
result in coating of exposed 
surfaces at the excavation 
site; however, it would not 
result in a release of material. 
Referencesc 
DOE, 1989, DraJt 
Fnvironmental Impact 
Ytatement, Decommissioning 
7f Eight Surplus Production 
'ieactors at the Hanford Site, 
'iichland, Washington, 
DOEEIS-0 1 19D 
Hoitink et al., 2002, Hanford 
rite Climatological Data 
~ummury 2001 With Historical 
Data, PNNL- 13859 
Hazard Type 
Jatural phenomena 
continued) 
Cinetic and potential 
:nergy 
Form 
;looding from the Columbia 
Xiver. 
Rainwater/snow and ice. 
i 
Heavy equipment/machinery/ 
vehicle impacting the 
contaminated soil, 
cornbustiblelnoncombustible 
solids or drums of waste 
materials. 
uantity 
The probable maximum flood (PW) is 
stimated to produce a Columbia River 
:levation at the 300 Area of 116.5 m 
382 ft) above mean sea level. 
vlaximum amount of precipitation over a 
12-hour period is 2.72 cm (1.07 in.), with 
1 return period of 25 years (design basis). 
4 similar project (1 18-I(-1 Burial Ground 
remediation) estimate includes the 
Following heavy equipment allocation: 
Dozer: 1 
Hydraulic excavators: 2 
Grader: 1 
Water truck: 1 
Shuttle truck: 3 
Scrapers: 3 
Backhoe: 1 
Fuel truck: 1 
Pickup trucks: 5. 
Remarksb 
As discussed in the feasibility 
study, the probable maximum 
flood of either the Columbia 
or Yakima Rivers (more so 
for the Columbia) is not 
anticipated to inundate the 
300-W-2 Operable Unit. 
Spread of contamination 
could occur. The arid-to- 
semi-arid climate suggests 
that little, if any, surface 
water will accumulate within 
the excavation. Most 
precipitation is lost through 
evapotranspiration. In 
addition, the transmissive 
nature of the surface soils 
allows rapid infiltration of 
precipitation. Consequently, 
little water remains to 
generate surface runoff. 
Heavy machinery may 
collide with contaminated 
soil causing a "puff" release 
of contaminated material, 
Heavy machinery may 
collide with drums 
containing retrieved wastes, 
rupturing the drums and 
causing particles to become 
airborne. Heavy machinery 
may collide with 
contaminated combustible/ 
noncombustible solids 
causing particles to become 
airborne. 
References' 
DOE-RL, 2000, Focused 
Feasibility Study for the 
300-FF-2 Operable Unit, 
DOEM.,-99-40, Rev. 0 
DOE-RL, 2000, Focused 
Feasibility Study for the 
300-FF-2 Operable Unit, 
Section 2.2.3, DOEM.,-99-40, 
Rev. 0 
Hloitink et al., 2002, Hanford 
rite Climatological Data 
Yummary 2001 With Historicai 
Data, PNNL- 13859 
Based on STRs for lOO-B/C, 
100-N, and 100-F RA projects 
orksheet for Soli 
Hazard Type 
Cinetic and potential 
:nergy (continued) 
Form 
zompressed gas bottles. 
Falling loads/combustible/ 
noncombustible waste items, 
hmdequipment used during 
remediation activities. 
Quantity 
such materials will be kept to the 
ninimum needed to support the project. 
gompressed gasses, estimated quantities: 
ketylene: 45 kg (100 lb in seven 
:ylinders) 
’ropane: 380 L (100 gal in ten 10-gal 
anks) 
lxygen: 45 kg ( I  00 Ib in four cylinders). 
170 drums (estimated). 
Remarks 
A pressurized missile could 
strike a patch of 
contaminated soil or drums, 
resulting in a “puff’ release 
of contaminated soils. Heavy 
machinery could collide with 
the tanks causing rupture and 
potential struck-by hazard 
(missile), as well as “puff’ 
release of contaminated soil. 
It is assumed that a drop 
would be of sufficient 
velocity to rupture the drum 
causing a “puff-type” 
airborne release. 
A falling combustible/ 
noncombustible item could 
cause an airborne release due 
to impaction stress. 
A falling drum could strike 
contaminated soil, or another 
filled drum, resulting in a 
“puff’ release. 
Referencesc 
2RC Chemical Inventory 
Database for 100-B/C, 1 00-N, 
md 100-F RA projects 
BHI, 2003 
able zar 
Hazard Type 
Kinetic and potential 
energy (continued) 
Form 
Aircraft collision. 
Quantity I Remarks' 
Traffic as defined in DOE-STD-30 14-96 
(DOE 1996). 
The probability of this type 
of event is extremely low 
(per DOE-STD-3014-96, the 
frequency would be below 
1 .OE-06). The Hanford Site 
is subject to very limited 
aircraft traffic due to relative 
location of airports and 
normal air traffic patterns. 
a The 61 8-2 Site has been remediated. Hazard Identification information for the site is retained here for historical information. 
A key to the Remarks column is as follows: 
KHC = Known to be a Human Carcinogen, as defined in Report on Carcinogens, Ninth Edition (DHHS 2001). 
RAHC = Reasonably Anticipated to be a Human Carcinogen, as defined in Report on Carcinogens, Ninth Edition (DHHS 2001) 
NC = Not classified as either KHC or RAHC in the Report on Carcinogens, Ninth Edition (DHHS 2001). 
Complete reference citations are provided in the reference section located at the end of this appendix. 
RA = Remedial Action (project) 
STR = subcontract technical representative 
WIDS = Waste Information Data System 
References' 
DOE, 1996, 
DOE-STD-30 14-96 
Hazard Type 
Xadiological 
Criticality 
Form 
zontaminated soil and debris 
ncluding uranium- 
:ontamhated equipment and 
naterials, plutonium and fission 
iroducts, and uranium oxide 
netal cuttings. 
228 drums of uranium as: 
Black oxide powder (Type 1), 
Yellow oxide powder (Type 2), 
cailings, fines, and oils (Type 3). 
Soil, drums, and contaminated 
debris, including contaminated 
gloves, miscellaneous 
2quipment, bronze crucibles, 
lead sink traps, and solid 
laboratory wastes. 
Quantity 
20-60: 4.31E-03 Ci 
2s- 137: 1.98E-02 Ci 
<a-226: 1.85E-02 Ci 
5r-90 : 9.3 1E-02 Ci 
Th-228: 4.1OE-02 Ci 
5-234: 1.56E+01 Ci 
5-235: 1.39E+00 Ci 
5-238: 2.03E+01 Ci 
Zn-65: 8.62E-03 Ci 
rota1 curies from all waste forms 
U-234: 9.66E-01 Ci 
U-235: 4.52E-02 Ci 
U-238: 5.70Et-00 Ci 
No. of Type 1 & 2 drums: 52 
No. of Type 3 drums: 176. 
U-235: 1.33E+OO Ci total inventory 
Remarksb 
Soil data from 618-4 
ASA/FHC MOC are used 
here as analogous site data 
for the 6 18-3site soil. The 
6 18-4 data were taken from 
Appendix A of DOE-RL 
( 1995). Soil inventory based 
on concentration from 6 18-4 
times the soil volume. 
Justification of use of this 
inventory is provided in 
Section 4.1.2 of the ASA. 
Contaminated Russian thistle 
was found in two locations at 
this site in 1994. 
Drum inventory data from 
6 18-4 used as analogous site 
data for drums. 
The maximum uranium oxide 
concentration (black) was 
used for all uranium oxide 
drums. 
Initial Criticality Evaluation 
concluded that the average 
concentration in soil is below 
the threshold concentration 
for U-235. 
References' 
DOE-RL, 1995, Phase 111 
Feasibility Study Report for 
'he 300-FF-1 Operable Unit, 
DOE-94-49, Rev. 0 
BHI, 200 1,618-4 Burial 
Sround ASMFHC, 
BHI, 2003 
WIDS, Environmental 
Monitoring Description 
section 
MOC-200 1-00 1 1, p.65 
BHI, 2003 
BHI, 2005a, Remediation: 
51 8-3 Burial Ground, 
Criticality Safety Review 
3300X-CE-NO006 
tific 
Hazard Type 
roxic material 
3arcinogens 
Form 
Jontaminated soil. 
Zontaminated soil, and debris 
including contaminated gloves, 
niscellaneous equipment, 
xonze crucibles, lead sink 
saps, and solid laboratory 
wastes. 
Quantity 
As: 3.9Et-01 kg 
Benzene: 6.3E-01 kg 
Pb: 3.9 E+03 kg 
Tetrachloroethene: 8.3E- 
Trichloroethene: 1.7E+O 
As: 8.7 E+01 kg (3.5E+00 mg/kg). 
e: 8.20 E+OO kg (3.3E-01 mg/kg). 
Cd: 3.8 E+01 kg (1.5E+OO mgkg). 
Cr: 1.6 E+04 kg (6.2E+02 mg/kg). 
Ni: 9.3 E+03 kg (3.7E+02 mgkg). 
Remarks 
KHC (if present in its 
:lementa1 or soluble forms. 
RAHC (if present as 
Zhloride, fluoride, hydroxide, 
Ixide, phosphate, sulfate, 
Letrahydrate, zinc silicate, or 
3eryllium-aluminum alloy). 
RAHC (if present as 
;hloride, oxide, sulfate, or 
wlfide). 
W C  (if present in 
iexavalent state). 
RAHC (if present as acetate, 
:arbonate, carbonyl, 
nydroxide, nickelocene, 
Dxide, or subsulfide). 
Referencesc 
WIDS, Environmental 
Monitoring Description 
section, p. 1 
Operable Unit Technical 
Baseline Report, BHI-00012, 
Rev. 0 
BHI, 1994,300-FF-2 
BHI, 2004c 
DHHS, 2001, Report on 
Carcinogens, Ninth Edition 
tific eet for 
Hazard Type 
larcinogens (continued) 
Form 
Zontaminated soil and debris 
ncluding contaminated gloves, 
niscellaneous equipment, 
xonze crucibles, lead sink 
raps, and solid laboratory 
wastes. 
228 drums of uranium as: 
Black oxide powder (Type 1), 
Yellow oxide powder (Type 2), 
railings and fines (Type 3), 
Oils (Type 3). 
228 drums of uranium as: 
Black oxide powder (Type l), 
Yellow oxide powder (Type 2), 
Tailings and fines (Type 3), 
Oils (Type 3). 
228 drums of uranium as: 
Black oxide powder (Type I), 
Yellow oxide powder (Type 2), 
Tailings and fines (Type 3), 
Oils (Type 3). 
228 drums of uranium as: 
Black oxide powder (Type 1), 
Yellow oxide powder (Type 2), 
Tailings and fines (Type 3), 
Oils (Type 3). 
uantity 
Pb: 8.4 E+03 kg (3.3E+02 mgkg). 
s: 2.3E+Ol kg (9.2E-01 mgkg). 
As, 7.OE-03 kg, distributed as follows: 
-- 
9.4E-03 kg (8.4E-01 m a ) .  
Cd, 4.7E+01 kg, distributed as follows: 
6.2E+Ol kg (4.6E+03 mg/kg) 
7.3E-03 kg (6.8E+Ol mgkg) 
1.8E+OOkg (3.6E+02 mg/kg) 
2.9E-03 kg (2.5E-01 mg/L). 
Cr, 1.6E+Ol kg, distributed as follows: 
-- 
-- 
1.6E+01 kg (3.3E+03 (mg/kg) 
9.OE-03 kg (8,OE-01 m a ) .  
Se, 1.4E+01 kg, distributed as follows: 
-- 
-- 
1.4E+Ol kg (2.9E+03 mg/kg) 
-- 
Remarksb 
RAHC (if present as lead 
acetate or phosphate). 
KHC (if present as 
chromate). 
RAHC 
KHC (if present in its 
elemental or soluble forms). 
RAHC (if present as 
chloride, oxide, sulfate, or 
sulfide). 
KHC (if present in 
hexavalent state). 
R M C  (if present as sulfide). 
Referencesc 
>rum data from 618-4 Burial 
3-0 und A SMFHC, 
VIOC-2001-0011, Table 3, 
3.67 (BHI 2001), are used as 
malogous site data for these 
hums 
3HI,2004c 
>HHS, 200 1, Report on 
Clarcinogens, Ninth Edition 
Hazard Type 
Zarcinogens (continued) 
Biohazards 
Asphyxiates 
Form 
228 drums of uranium as: 
Black oxide powder (Type l), 
Yellow oxide powder (Type 2), 
Tailings and fines (Type 3), 
Oils (Type 3). 
228 drums of uranium as: 
Black oxide powder (Type 1), 
Yellow oxide powder (Type 2), 
Tailings and fines (Type 3), 
Oils (Type 3). 
228 drums of uranium as: 
Black oxide powder (Type 1), 
Yellow oxide powder (Type 2), 
Tailings and fines (Type 3), 
Oils (Type 3). 
Insecthodent bites and dust 
from excrement. 
Heavier-than-air gasses. 
Quantity 
Pb, 1.4E+04 kg, distributed as follows: 
1 .OE+04 kg (l.lE+O6 mg/kg) 
5.OE-02 kg (7.4Et-02 mg/kg) 
1.1 E+02 kg (2.1E1-04 mg/kg) 
3.1E+00 kg (2.8Et-02 mg/L). 
Arochlor-l254,5.4E+00 kg, 
distributed as follows: 
-- 
5.4E+00 kg (5.4E+02 mg/L). 
Benzene, 8.4E-0 1 kg, distributed as 
follows: 
-- 
8.4E-01 kg (7.5E1-01 mg/L). 
Undefined quanti ties. 
Estimated quantities: 
Acetylene: 45 kg 
Propane: 380 L. 
Remarksb 
iAHC (if present as lead 
tcetate or phosphate). 
(HC (if present as lead 
:bromate). 
XAHC 
rhese hazards are routinely 
:ncountered in industry. 
rhese hazards are routinely 
zcountered in industry. 
4ctivities will be carried out 
m outdoor, well-ventilated 
ueas. 
Referencesc 
Drum data from 618-4 Burial 
Ground ASMFHC, 
MOC-200 1 -00 1 1, Table 3, 
p. 67 (BHI 2001), are used as 
snalogous site data for these 
hums 
BHI, 2004c 
DHHS, 2001, Report on 
Carcinogens, Ninth Edition 
Hazard Type 
ilammable materials 
Form 
Vegetation. 
Miscellaneous Combustibles, 
general construction waste, 
including pieces of plastic, 
cardboard, wood, cloth, and 
other types generated during 
remediation. Containers with 
oil, paint chips, and waxy 
material. Powder/sal ts, 
batteries, asbestos, fabric 
belting material, and used rags 
may also be found during site 
remediation activities. 
Drums of uranium tailings, 
fines, and oil (Type 3 drums). 
Quantity 
surface of burial ground essentially 
fevoid of vegetation. 
Unknown quantity of combustible 
mste, expected to be relatively small. 
Benzene, 8.4E-01 kg, distributed over 
176 Type 3 drums gives 
3.7E+00 @drum. 
Remarksb 
!I range fire would not cause 
i significant release of 
lazardous substances due to 
he lack of combustibles, 
specially vegetation, within 
he remediation site (the site 
will have been cleared of 
:ombustibles prior to 
nitiation of remediation 
ictivities). Minimal amounts 
lave been encountered at 
ither burial ground 
*emediation sites (6 18-4 and 
518-5). 
Class IB Flammable Liquid: 
Rash point below 73°F and 
Doiling point at or above 
100°F. 
Referencesc 
BHI, 1994,300-FF-2 
9perable Unit Technical 
!?aseZine Report, BHI-000 12, 
Rev. 0 
BHI, 2004c 
t i ~ ~ ~ t i o n  sheet for 
Hazard Type 
ilammable materials 
continued) 
Form 
>rums of uranium tailings, 
ines, and oil (Type 3 drums). 
continued) 
Fuels and oils used by project. 
Quantity 
&butanone, 7.OE-03 kg, distributed 
mer 176 Type 3 drums gives 
3.1 E-02 @drum. 
retrachloroethene, l.lE+OO kg, 
distributed over 176 Type 3 drums 
gives 4.8E+00 @drum. 
rrichloroethene, 1.7E+01 kg, 
distributed over 176 Type 3 drums 
gives 7.5E+O 1 @drum. 
Quantities of such materials will be 
kept to the minimum needed to support 
the project. Estimated quantities (per 
vehicle): 
Gasoline: 190 L 
Diesel: 7,600 L 
Lubricating oil: 570 L 
Paints, cleaners, solvents, 
adhesives: 380 L 
Acetylene: 2.8Et-04 L 
Antifreeze: 450 L 
Brake fluid: 19 L 
Hydraulic/transmission fluid: 760 L 
Propane: 380 L. 
Remarksb 
:lass IB Flammable Liquid: 
lash point below 73°F and 
)oiling point at or above 
100°F. 
Voncombustible but 
lecomposes in a fire to 
iydrogen chloride and 
ihosgene gas. 
Zombustible, burns with 
lifficulty . 
%els and oils are found in 
Jehicles, spare drums, and 
nineral oil staged for 
hbilization of the drums. 
3stimated quantities based on 
3RC Chemical Inventory 
Database for lOO-BIC, 
LOO-N, and 100-K RA 
xojects. 
References' 
YIOSH, 2000, Online NIOSH 
Pocket Guide to Chemical 
Hazards, and Other 
Databases, Publication No. 
2000- 1 30 
-- 
sheet 
Hazard Type 
’1 ammable materials 
:continued) 
zorrosives 
Explosive materials 
Form 
Jranium oxide metal cuttings. 
zontaminated soil. 
Soil and debris. 
Clanisters and bottles of 
iicetylene, propane, oxygen, 
gasoline in equipment fuel tanks 
2nd in other approved storage 
2ontainers. 
Quantity 
See Radiological Hazard Type. 
Fluoride: 8.2E+O1 kg. 
SO3: 2.1E+03 kg 
Zopper: 4.8E+03 kg. 
Quantities of such materials will be 
kept to the minimum needed to support 
the project. Estimated quantities: 
Gasoline: 190 L 
Lubricating oil: 570 L 
Grease, paints, cleaners, solvents, 
adhesives: 860 L 
Acetylene: 2.8 E+04 L 
Oxygen: 1.4E+04 L 
Propane: 380 L. 
Remarksb 
From fuel fabrication 
activities. Uranium metal is 
a combustible solid, 
especially as turnings or 
powder. Size of uranium 
pieces not documented. As a 
contaminant mixed with soil, 
it would not be expected to 
pose a significant 
flammability hazard. 
Corrosive nature assumed 
mitigated by mixing with 
soil. 
Nitrates can react severely 
with sulfuric acid. Copper 
can react severely with 
acetylene and hydrogen 
peroxide if present as metal 
dust/mist. If mixed with soil, 
explosive potential negated. 
Bottles of acetylene and 
oxygen may be brought to 
the site. Gasoline and diesel 
is present in various vehicles 
on site (e.g., heavy 
machinery used for 
excavation or transport). 
An explosion could initiate a 
fire, or cause some amount of 
contaminated soil to be 
suspended in air. 
Referencesc 
WIDS, Waste Information 
section 
Stenner et al., 1988, Hazard 
Ranking System Evaluation of 
CERCLA Inactive Waste Sites 
at Hanfo rd, PNL-645 6, 
Vols. 1,2, and 3 
BHI, 2004c 
BHI, 2004c 
Estimated quantities based on 
ERC Chemical Inventory 
Database for 1 00-B/C, 1 00-N, 
and 100-IC RA projects 
Hazard Type 
.eactive hazards 
Form 
Jranium metal cuttings. 
loil and debris. 
Quantity 
Jnknown. 
Lg: 2.4E+03 kg (9.6E+01 mg/kg). 
is: 8.7E+O1 kg (3.5E+00 mgkg). 
3a: 3.8E+01 kg (3.8E+01 mgkg). 
Remarksb 
From fuel fabrication 
xtivities. Size of uranium 
2ieces not documented. As a 
;ontaminant in soil it would 
not be expected to be a 
reactive hazard. 
Dust and soluble compounds 
incompatible with oxy- 
acetylene, ammonia, 
hydrogen peroxide, 
bromoazide, chlorine 
trifluoride, ethyleneimine, 
oxalic acid, tartaric acid. In 
the form of a soil 
contaminant, it would not be 
expected to be a reactive 
hazard. 
Incompatible with strong 
oxidizers, bromine azide 
Note: Hydrogen gas can 
react with inorganic arsenic 
to form the highly toxic gas 
arsine. In the form of a soil 
contaminant, it would not be 
expected to be a reactive 
hazard. 
Barium chloride 
incompatible with acids and 
oxidizers; barium nitrate 
incompatible with acids, 
oxidizers, and aluminum- 
magnesium alloys. In the 
form of a soil contaminant, it 
would not be expected to be a 
reactive hazard. 
Referencesc 
NIDS, Site Comment section. 
3perable Unit Technical 
3aseZine Report, BHI-00012, 
<ev. 0 
3H1, 1994,300-FF-2 
3HI,2004c 
Hazard Type 
teactive hazards 
continued) 
Form 
;oil and debris. 
continued) 
Quantity 
3e: 8.2E+OO kg (3.3E-01 mglkg). 
Zd: 3.8E+O 1 kg (1.5E+00 mg/kg). 
Co: 9.1E+02 kg (3.6E+01 mglkg). 
Cr: 1.6E+04 kg (6.2E+02 m a g ) .  
CU: 4.8Et-03 kg (1.9Et-02 mg/kg). 
Remarksb 
Incompatible with acids, 
caustics, chlorinated 
hydrocarbons, oxidizers. In 
the form of a soil 
contaminant, it would not be 
expected to be a reactive 
hazard. 
Incompatible with strong 
oxidizers; elemental sulfur, 
selenium and tellurium. In 
the form of a soil 
contaminant, it would not be 
expected to be a reactive 
hazard. 
Incompatible with strong 
oxidizers, ammonium nitrate. 
In the form of a soil 
contaminant, it would not be 
expected to be a reactive 
hazard. 
Varies with ionic species. 
Metal incompatible with 
strong oxidizers (e.g., 
hydrogen peroxide) or 
alkalis. In the form of a soil 
contaminant, it would not be 
expected to be a reactive 
hazard. 
Incompatible with acetylene 
and hydrogen peroxide 
(assume copper is in metallic 
form). In the form of a soil 
contaminant, it would not be 
expected to be a reactive 
hazard. 
References‘ 
3HI, 2004c 
- ~ 
Hazard Type 
teactive hazards 
continued) 
Form 
'oil and debris. 
Zontinued) 
Quantity 
Ig: l,lE+O2 kg (4.5E+00 m a g ) .  
Vi: 9.3E+03 kg (3.7Et-02 mg/kg). 
: 8.4Ei-03 kg (3.3B1-02 mg/kg). 
Remarksb 
Varies with chemical form. 
[ncompatible with acetylene, 
immonia, azides, calcium, 
Zhlorine dioxide, lithium, 
rubidium, copper, sodium 
xrbide. 
Mercury alkyl compounds 
incompatible with strong 
axidizers (e.g., chlorine). 
Nickel metal incompatible 
with strong acids, sulfur, 
selenium, wood and other 
combustibles, nickel nitrate. 
In the form of a soil 
contaminant, it would not be 
expected to be a reactive 
hazard. Varies with chemical 
form, incompatible with 
acetylene, ammonia, chlorine 
dioxide, azides, amalgam 
formation), sodium carbide, 
lithium, rubidium, copper. 
Mercury alkyl compounds 
incompatible with strong 
oxidizers (e.g., chlorine). As 
a soil contaminant, it would 
not be expected to be a 
reactive hazard. 
Incompatible with strong 
oxidizers, hydrogen peroxide 
acids. In the form of a soil 
contaminant, it would not be 
expected to be a reactive 
hazard. 
Referencesc 
3H1,2004c 
Hazard Type 
Leactive hazards 
continued) 
Form 
Soil and debris. 
:continued) 
228 drums of uranium as: 
Black oxide powder (Type 1), 
Yellow oxide powder (Type 2), 
Tailings and fines (Type 3), 
Oils (Type 3). 
228 drums of uranium as: 
Black oxide powder (Type 1), 
Yellow oxide powder (Type 2), 
Tailings and fines (Type 3), 
Oils (Type 3). 
228 drums of uranium as: 
Black oxide powder (Type l), 
Yellow oxide powder (Type 2), 
Tailings and fines (Type 3), 
Oils (Type 3). 
Quantity 
Cn: 7.0E+03 kg (2.8E+02 mg/kg). 
3: 2.1E+03 kg (8.4E+O1 mg/kg). 
Ag, 2.9Et-01 kg (total for all drums) 
distributed as follows: 
Z.OE+O 1 kg ( 1.5E+03 mg/kg) 
1.8E-01 kg (1.7Et-03 mg/kg) 
9.7E+OO kg (2.OE+03 mg/kg) 
3.2E-03 kg (2.8E-01 m a ) .  
As, 9.4E-03 kg (total for all drums) 
distributed as follows: 
-- 
-- 
-- 
9.4E-03 kg (8.4E-01 mgkg). 
a, 3.7E+02 kg (total for all drums) 
distributed as follows: 
2.1E-t-01 kg (1.6E+03 mg/kg) 
3.8E-02 kg (3.5E+02 mg/kg) 
3.4E+02 kg (6.9E+04 mg/kg) 
1.3E+O1 kg (1.2E+03 mg/kg). 
Remarksb 
Combustible, but solid form 
is difficult to ignite; however, 
powder form may ignite 
spontaneously and can 
continue burning under 
water. In the form of a soil 
contaminant, it would not be 
expected to be a reactive 
hazard. 
Nitrates can react severely 
with sulfuric acid. As a soil 
contaminant, this chemical 
species would not be 
expected to be highly 
reactive . 
Dust and soluble compounds 
incompatible with acetylene, 
ammonia, hydrogen 
peroxide, bromoazide, 
chlorine trifluoride, 
ethyleneimine, oxalic acid, 
tartaric acid. 
Incompatible with strong 
oxidizers, bromine azide 
Note: Hydrogen gas can 
react with inorganic arsenic 
to form the highly toxic gas 
arsine. 
Barium chloride 
incompatible with acids and 
oxidizers; barium nitrate 
incompatible with acids, 
oxidizers, and aluminum- 
magnesium alloys. 
Referencesc 
BHI, 2004c 
Hazard Type 
-- 
9.4E-03 kg (8.4E-01 mg/kg). 
teactive hazards 
continued) 
Cd, 6.4E+Ol kg (total for all drums) 
distributed as follows: 
6.2E+O1 kg (4.6E1-03 mg/kg) 
7.8E-03 kg (6.8E+O1 mg/kg) 
1.8E+00 kg (3.6E+02 mg/kg) 
2.9E-03 kg (2.5E-01 mg/L). 
Form I Quantity 
228 drums of uranium as: 
Black oxide powder (Type l), 
Yellow oxide powder (Type 2), 
railings and fines (Type 3), 
Oils (Type 3). 
2-Butanone, 9.4E-03 kg (total for all 
drums) distributed as follows: 
228 drums of uranium as: 
Black oxide powder (Type l), 
Yellow oxide powder (Type 2), 
Tailings and fines (Type 3), 
Oils (Type 3). 
228 drums of uranium as: 
Black oxide powder (Type I), 
Yellow oxide powder (Type 2), 
Tailings and fines (Type 3), 
Oils (Type 3). 
Cr, 1.6E+01 kg (total for all drums) 
distributed as follows: 
-- 
-- 
1.6E+01 kg (3.6E+02 mg/kg) 
2.9E-03 kg (2.5E-01 mg/kg). 
228 drums of uranium as: 
Black oxide powder (Type l), 
Yellow oxide powder (Type 2), 
Tailings and fines (Type 3), 
Oils (Type 3). 
Hg, 5.7E-01 kg (total for all drums) 
distributed as follows: 
1.3E-03 kg (1.2Et-01 mg/kg) 
7.6E-01 kg (1 SEt-02 mg/kg) 
1.6E-02 kg (1.4E+OO m a ) .  
-- 
Remarks' 
[ncompatible with strong 
)xidizers, amines, ammonia, 
inorganic acids, caustics, 
isocyanates and pyridines. In 
the form of a soil 
;ontaminant, it would not be 
zxpected to be a reactive 
hazard. 
tncompatible with strong 
oxidizers; elemental sulfur, 
selenium and tellurium. 
Incompatibility varies with 
compound, includes strong 
oxidizers or a1 kal is. 
Varies with chemical form, 
incompatible with acetylene, 
ammonia, chlorine dioxide, 
azides, calcium (amalgam 
formation), sodium carbide, 
lithium, rubidium, copper. 
Mercury alkyl compounds 
incompatible with strong 
oxidizers (e.g., chlorine). 
Referencesc 
3H1,2004c 
azar tific for ste 
~~ 
Hazard Type 
teactive hazards 
continued) 
Zlectrical energy 
qatural p henomena 
Form 
!28 drums of uranium as: 
3lack oxide powder (Type l), 
fellow oxide powder (Type 2), 
railings and fines (Type 3), 
31s (Type 3). 
Supply lines outside of the 
txcavation fence for office 
railers and analytical needs. 
2i gh tning. 
Seismic event resulting in 
ground motion. 
Ex treme temperatures. 
Quantity 
Pb, 1.OE+O4 kg (total for all drums) 
distributed as follows: 
1 .OE+04 kg (1.1E+06 mg/kg) 
8.OE-02 kg (7.4E+02 mg/kg) 
1.1Et-02 kg (2.1E+04 mg/kg) 
3.1Et-00 kg (2.8E+02 mg/L). 
Electrical service is estimated at 
13.8 kV, 400 amp service. 
Mean thunderstorm frequency is low, 
averaging 10/yr, with the highest 
likelihood of occurrence during the 
months of June, July, and August. 
The Hanford Site is located in 
Zone 2B, a zone of moderate 
seismicity. For the 300 Area, peak 
ground accelerations ranges from 0.1 
to 0.3 g, have a corresponding annual 
mean frequency from 4.OE-03 to 
2.OE-04. 
Undefined quantities. 
Remarksb 
Incompatible with strong 
oxidizers, hydrogen peroxide, 
acids. 
High-voltage lines shorting 
to ground could result in 
sparks which could initiate a 
brush fire in adjacent areas. 
See remarks for flammability 
and kinetic/po tent ial energy 
hazard types. 
Lightning could initiate a 
brush fire. See remarks for 
flammability and 
kine t ic/po tent i a1 energy 
hazard types. 
The Environmental Impact 
Statement for the inactive 
reactors determined that the 
radiological impacts from an 
earthquake are insignificant. 
During a seismic event, a 
heavy load could be dropped 
onto contaminated soil 
causing an airborne (puff) 
release. 
Temperature extremes range 
from -29 to 46°C 
(-20 to 115" F). 
Referencesc 
BHI, 2004c 
Based on 300-W-1 and 
1 OO-NR- I designs 
Hoitink et al., 2002, Hanford 
Site Climatological Data 
Summary 2001 With 
Historical Data, PNNL- 13859 
DOE, 1989, Draft 
Environmental Impact 
Statement, Decommissioning 
gf Eight Surplus Production 
Reactors at the Hanford Site, 
R ichland, Washington, 
DOEEIS-0 I 19D 
Hoitink et al., 2002, Hanford 
Site Climatological Data 
Summary 2001 With 
Historical Data, PNNL- 13859 
orksheet for Solid 0.3  (618-3)a. (1’7 
Hazard Type 
rJatural phenomena 
continued) 
Form 
ligh winds. 
4sh fall resulting from volcanic 
ictivity. 
’looding from the Columbia 
3iver. 
Quantity 
[n the 300 Area, the annual average 
wind speed is 12.1 kmhr (7.5 mph). 
The maximum peak gust wind speed at 
Hanford was 129 kmhr (80 mph) 
(1972). The annual average for 
number of days with peak gusts in 
excess of 80 km/hr (50 mph) is 
4.7 days. 
Winds in excess of 40 kmhr (25 mph) 
occur slightly more than I % of the 
time, on an annual basis. 
Undefined quantities. During the 
May 18, 1980 eruption of Mount St. 
Helens, about 7.6 mm (0.3 in.) of ash 
was deposited at the Hanford Site this 
resulted in a wet ash loading of only 
20.4 kg/m2 (4.2 lb/ft2). 
The probable maximum flood (PMF) 
is estimated to produce a Columbia 
River elevation at the 300 Area of 
116.5 m (382 ft) above mean sea level. 
Remarksb 
Some fraction of the dry, 
contaminated soils will be 
suspended in air. 
High winds could cause 
debris to be thrown (a 
missile), causing a kinetic 
energy hazard, or causing a 
“puff” release if this material 
strikes contaminated soil. 
Historically, only minimal 
amounts of ash accumulation 
resulting from volcanic 
activity have occurred at the 
Hanford Site. This could 
result in coating of exposed 
surfaces at the excavation 
site; however, it would not 
result in a release of material. 
As discussed in the feasibility 
study, the probable maximum 
flood of either the Columbia 
or Yakirna Rivers (more so 
for the Columbia) is not 
anticipated to inundate the 
300-FF-2 Operable Unit. 
References‘ 
DOE-RL,, 2000, Focused 
Feasibility Study for the 
300-FF-2 Operable Unit, 
DOE/lU-99-40, Rev. 0 
0 ~ 3  (618-3)a. (1’7 
Hazard Type 
Jatural phenomena 
continued) 
Cinetic and potential 
:nergy 
Form 
Lainwater/snow and ice. 
leavy equipment/machinery/ 
rehicle impacting the 
:ontaminated soil or drums of 
vaste materials. 
Quantity 
rhunderstorm frequency is 
ipproximately 10/yr, with the highest 
ikelihood in June, July, and August. 
The annual average precipitation for 
Hanford is 6.98 in. The wettest year 
In record was 1995 with 12.3 1 in., the 
Jriest year was 1976, with 2.99 in. 
A similar project ( 1 18-K- 1 Burial 
Ground remediation) estimate includes 
the following heavy equipment 
allocation: 
Dozer: 1 
Hydraulic excavators: 2 
Grader: 1 
Water truck: I 
Shuttle truck: 3 
Scrapers: 3 
Backhoe: 1 
Fuel truck: 1 
Pickup trucks: 5. 
Remarksb 
Spread of contamination 
;odd occur. The arid-to- 
semi-arid climate suggests 
:hat little, if any, surface 
water will accumulate within 
:he excavation. Most 
?recipitation is lost through 
wipotranspiration. In 
addition, the transmissive 
nature of the surface soils 
sllows rapid infiltration of 
precipitation. Consequently, 
little water remains to 
generate surface runoff. 
Heavy machinery may 
collide with contaminated 
soil causing a “puff’ release 
of contaminated material. 
Heavy machinery may 
collide with drums 
containing retrieved wastes, 
rupturing the drums and 
causing particles to become 
airborne. 
References‘ 
DOE-RL, 2000, Focused 
Feasibility Study for the 
300-FF-2 Operable Unit, 
DOERL-99-40, Rev. 0 
Based on STRs for lOO-B/C, 
100-N, and 100-F RA projects 
~ d ~ n t i ~ c a t i o ~  orksheet for Soli 0- 3 (618-3)a. (17 
Hazard Type 
Cinetic and potential 
:nergy (continued) 
Form 
:ompressed gas bottles. 
%lling loads/drums/equipment 
xsed during remediation 
tctivities. 
Quantity 
such materials will be kept to the 
ninimum needed to support the 
Iroj ect. 
zompressed gasses, estimated 
luantities: 
9cetylene: 45 kg (100 Ib in seven 
:ylinders) 
’ropane: 76 L (in four 5-gal tanks 
3xygen: 45 kg (100 lb in four 5-gal 
:anks) . 
228 drums (estimated). 
Remarksb 
A pressurized missile could 
strike a patch of 
contaminated soil or drums, 
resulting in a “puff’ release 
of contaminated soils. Heavy 
machinery could collide with 
the tanks causing collapse 
and potential struck-by 
hazard, as well as “puff’ 
release of contaminated soil. 
It is assumed that a drop 
would be of sufficient 
velocity to rupture the drum 
causing a “puff-type” 
airborne release. 
A falling drum could strike 
contaminated soil, or another 
filled drum, resulting in a 
“puff’ release. 
Referencesc 
ZRC Chemical Inventory 
latabase for lOO-B/C, 1 00-N, 
tnd 100-F RA projects 
3HI,2003 
azard Identi~cation orksheet for Soli 0.3  (618-3)ae (17 
Hazard Type 
Cinetic and potential 
mergy (continued) 
Form 
4ircraft collision. 
Quantity 
rraffic as defined in 
DOE-STD-30 14-96 (DOE 1996). 
Remarksb 
The probability of this type 
of event is extremely low 
(per DOE-STD-3014-96, the 
frequency would be below 
1 .OE-06). The Hanford Site 
is subject to very limited 
aircraft traffic due to relative 
location of airports and 
normal air traffic patterns. 
a The 618-3 Site has been remediated. Hazard identification information for the site is retained here for historical information. 
A key to the Remarks column is as follows: 
KHC = Known to be a Human Carcinogen, as defined in Report on Carcinogens, Ninth Edition (DHHS 2001). 
RAHC = Reasonably Anticipated to be a Human Carcinogen, as defined in Report on Carcinogens, Ninth Edition (DHHS 2001) 
NC = Not classified as either KHC or RAHC in the Report on Carcinogens, Ninth Edition (DHHS 2001). 
Complete reference citations are provided in the reference section located at the end of this appendix. 
RA = Remedial Action (project) 
STR = subcontract technical representative 
WIDS = Waste Information Data System 
Referencesc 
DOE, 1996, 
DOE-STD-3014-96 
Hazard Type 
tadiological 
Form 
Zontaminated soil and debris 
including uranium- 
2ontaminated equipment and 
naterials, plutonium and fission 
xoducts, thoria-contaminated 
:quipment and materials, and 
miscellaneous contaminated 
liquids and discrete items. 
Waste is present as soil, non- 
Zombustible solids, combustible 
solids, noncombustible liquids, 
and combustible liquids. 
859 drums of uranium- 
contaminated materials as: 
Black oxide powder (Type l) ,  
Yellow oxide powder (Type 2), 
Tailings, fines, & oils (Type 3), 
Zircaloy-2 (Type 4) 
4.4 drums of thorium-232 as: 
- Thorium oxide powder 
-Thorium nitrate (liquid or 
(3.3 drums) 
crystals) (1.1 drums) 
Quantity 
4m-241 : 5.29E-01 Ci 
30-60 : 1.89E-02 Ci 
2s-137 : 8.7OE-02 Ci 
31-238 : 3.49E-02Ci 
?u-239 : 2.96E+OOCi 
31-241 : 2.96E+00 Ci 
3a-226 : 8.13E-02 Ci 
5r-90 : 4.08E-01 Ci 
Th-228 : 1.80E-01 Ci 
Th-232 : 2.87E-02Ci 
U-234 : 6.42E+01 Ci 
U-235 : 5.91E+00 Ci 
U-238 : 6.42E+Ol Ci 
Zn-65 : 3.78E-02 Ci 
rota1 curies from all waste 
forms. 
U-234: 3.7E-01 Ci 
U-235: 1.7E-02 Ci 
U-238: 2.1Et-00 Ci 
No. of Type 1 drums: 19 
No. of Type 2 drums: 1 
No. of Type 3 drums: 66 
No. of Type 4 drums: 773 
Thorium Oxide: 4.98E-01 Ci 
Thorium Nitrate: 2.3OE-02 Ci 
Remar ks" 
Soil data from 6 18-4, and 
518-3 and 618-8, burial 
grounds are used as analogous 
:ite data for radiological 
Zoncentrations. Soil inventory 
is based on concentration 
times the total soil volume. 
Justification of use of this 
inventory is provided in 
Section 4.1.2 of the ASA. 
The inventory also includes 
300 kg thorium oxide 
contamination, contaminated 
liquids based on general lab 
bottles found in 618-3; and 
discrete waste items based on 
discrete items found in 618-2 
including the 618-2 safe. 
Drum inventory data from 
6 18-4 was used as analogous 
data for the Type 1,2, and 3 
drums. The maximum 
uranium oxide concentration 
(black) was used for the Type 
1&2 drums. The inventory 
for Type 3 drums is assumed 
to bound the disposal of 
approximately 44 pounds of 
.95 % enriched uranium 
contaminated sludge. 
References 
WCH, 2006a, Determination 
$Material at Risk (MAR) for 
300-FF-2 OU Sites, 
WCH 2007e, Discovery of 
3ocumentation About the 
Material Disposed in the 
51 8-7 Burial Ground, 
1300F-CA-NO003. 
!ICE-2007-0002. 
WCH 2006a 
WCH 2007e 
WCH 2006a 
Hazard Type Quantity Remarksa Referencesb Form 
bdiological (continued) 5,648 lbs of depleted uranium 
scrap 
2-234: 1.lE-01 Ci 
J-235: 1 .OE-02 Ci 
J-238: 8.4E-01 Ci 
WCH 2006a 
WCH 2005,618- 7 Integrated 
Hazard Evaluation Worksheet, 
IHE-2005 -00 1 7. 
Ir i tical i t y Contaminated soil and debris, 
including lab bottles (liquids) 
and discrete items, and depleted 
uranium in drums. 
Criticality Safety Review 
zoncluded that criticality 
safety controls are not 
required. Field Verification 
Requirements should be used 
as safes or containers are 
discovered. 
BHI, 2007d, Remediation of 
the 61 8-7 Burial Ground, 
Criticality Safety Review 
0300X-CE-NO009 
4m-241: 5.29E-01 Ci 
Pu-238: 2.96E+OO Ci 
Pu-239: 2.96E+00 Ci 
Pu-241: 2.96E+00 Ci 
U-235: 5.9Et-00 Ci 
rota1 curies all waste forms. 
roxic material Contaminated soil. 4s: 2.6 E+02 kg 
Pb: 2.5 E+04 kg. 
WIDS, Environmental 
Monitoring Description 
section, p. 1 
Operable Unit Technical 
Baseline Report, BHI-000 12, 
Rev. 0 
WCH 2006a 
BHI, 1994,300-FF-2 
KHC (if present in its 
elemental or soluble forms. 
WCH 2006a 3arcinogens Contaminated soil and debris As: 2.6 E+02 kg 
e: 2.5 E+01 kg 
(3.5E+OO mgkg) 
(3.3E-01 mg/kg) 
FUHC (if present as chloride, 
fluoride, hydroxide, oxide, 
phosphate, sulfate, 
tetrahydrate, zinc silicate, or 
beryllium-aluminum alloy). 
DHHS, 2001, Report on 
Carcinogens, Ninth Edition 
Cd: 1.1 E+02 kg 
(1 SEt-00 mgkg) 
W C  (if present as chloride, 
oxide, sulfate, or sulfide). 
I(HC (if present in hexavalent 
state). 
r: 4.7 E+04 kg 
(6.2E+02 mgkg) 
sheet for Solid 
Hazard Type 
kcinogens (continued) 
Form I Quantity 
Jontaminated soil and debris. 
:continued) 
Ni: 2.8 E+04 kg 
(3.7E+02 m a g )  
Pb: 2.5 E+04 kg 
(3.3E+02 mg/kg) 
PCBs: 7.0E+01 kg I (9.2E-01 mg/kg). 
36 drums of uranium as: 
Black oxide powder (Type 1) 
Yellow oxide powder (Type 2) 
railings and fines (Type 3), 
Oil (Type 3) 
As, 3.55E-03 kg, distributed as 
follows: 
-- 
-- 
-- 
3.55E-03 kg (8.4E-01 m a )  
86 drums of uranium as: 
Black oxide powder (Type 1) 
Yellow oxide powder (Type 2) 
Tailings and fines (Type 3), 
Oil (Type 3) 
86 drums of uranium as: 
Black oxide powder (Type 1) 
Yellow oxide powder (Type 2) 
Tailings and fines (Type 3), 
Oil (Type 3) 
Cd, 2.41E+01 kg, distributed as 
follows: 
2.34Et-01 kg (4.6E+03 mgkg) 
3.67E-03 kg (6.8E+01 mg/kg) 
6.58E-01kg (3.6E+02 m a g )  
1.07E-03 kg (2.5E-01 m a )  
Cr, 1.6E+O1 kg, distributed as 
follows: 
-- 
-- 
6.10Et-00 kg (3.3E+03 (mgkg) 
3.38E-03 kg (8.OE-01 m a )  
Remarks' 
RAHC (if present as acetate, 
:arbonate, carbonyl, 
iydroxide, nickelocene, 
3xide, or subsulfide). 
RAHC (if present as lead 
icetate or phosphate). 
W C  (if present as chromate). 
RAHC 
KHC (if present in its 
Aernental or soluble forms). 
RAHC (if present as chloride, 
oxide, sulfate, or sulfide). 
KHC (if present in hexavalent 
state). 
Referencesb 
continued) 
!006a 
azar aste 
Form Quantity Remarks' Referencesb Hazard Type 
M C  (if present as sulfide). :continued) 3arcinogens (continued) $6 drums of uranium as: Se, 5,36E+OO kg, distributed as 
follows: 
3lack oxide powder (Type 1) 
fellow oxide powder (Type 2) 
railings and fines (Type 3), 
3 1  (Type 3) 
-- 
5.36E+00 kg (2.9E+03 mgkg) 
-- 
36 drums of uranium as: Pb, 5.62E+03 kg, distributed as 
follows: 
5.58E+03 kg (1.1Et-06 mg/kg) 
4.00E-02 kg (7.4E1-02 mg/kg) 
3.88E+01 kg (2.1E+04 mg/kg) 
1.18E+00 kg (2,8E+02 m a )  
W C  (if present as lead 
icetate or phosphate). 
KHC (if present as lead 
:bromate). 
Black oxide powder (Type 1) 
Yellow oxide powder (Type 2) 
railings and fines (Type 3), 
3il (Type 3) 
Arochlor-1254,2.00E+00 kg, 
distributed as follows: 
RAHC 36 drums of uranium as: 
Black oxide powder (Type 1) 
Yellow oxide powder (Type 2) 
railings and fines (Type 3), 
Oil (Type 3) 
-- 
2.00E+00 kg (5.4E+02 m a )  
86 drums of uranium as: enzene, 3.17E-0 1 kg, 
distributed as follows: 
Black oxide powder (Type 1) 
Yellow oxide powder (Type 2) 
Tailings and fines (Type 3), 
Oil (Type 3) 
-- 
3.17E-01 kg (7.5E+O1 m a )  
773 drums of Ziraloy-2 chips 
(Type 4 drums) 
WCH 2006a 
WCH 2005 
i, 3.1E+02 kg total, 
0.4 kg per drum 
RAHC WCH 2006a 
WCH 2005 
773 drums of Zircaloy-2 chips 
(Type 4 drums) 
e, 2,9E+04 kg total, 
3.8E+01 kg per drum 
azar 
Hazard Type I Form 
larcinogens 
continued) 
Arsenic, Asbestos, Benzene, 
Beryllium, Carbon 
Tetrachloride, Cupferron, 
Formalin, Trichloroethylene 
Nickel Chloride, 
Phenolphthalein, Plutonium, 
Uranyl Nitrate Hexahydrate 
3iohazards Insectlrodent bites and dust 
from excrement. 
lsphyxiates Heavier-than-air gasses. 
Quantity 
Undefined quantities 
Undefined quantities 
Undefined quantities. 
Estimated quantities: 
Acetylene: 2.84E+04 L 
Propane: 400 L (1.06Et-02 gal) 
(7.4E+03 gal) 
Surface of burial ground 
essentially devoid of vegetation 
Remarks' 
KHC 
RAHC 
These hazards are routinely 
encountered in industry. 
These hazards are routinely 
encountered in industry. 
Activities will be carried out 
in outdoor, well-ventilated 
areas. 
A range fire would not cause a 
significant release of 
hazardous substances due to 
the lack of combustibles, 
especially vegetation, within 
the remediation site (the site 
will have been cleared of 
combustibles prior to 
initiation of remediation 
activities). Minimal amounts 
have been encountered at 
other burial ground 
remediation sites (6 18-4 and 
6 18-5). 
References 
WCH, 2005 
WCH, 2005 
Hazard Type 
~ ~~~ 
hmmable materials (continued) 
Form 
4iscellaneous combustibles, 
eneral construction waste, 
icluding pieces of plastic, 
ardboard, wood, cloth, and 
lther types generated during 
emediation. Containers with 
il, paint chips, and waxy 
naterial. Po wder/sal ts, 
batteries, asbestos, fabric 
belting material, and used rags 
nay also be found during site 
emediation activities. 
)rums of uranium tailings, 
ines, and oil (Type 3 drums) 
Quantity 
Jnknown quantity of 
:ombustible waste 
Benzene, 3.17E-0 1 kg, 
distributed over 66 Type 3 drums 
gives 4.8E+00 @drum. 
2-butanone, 8.03E+00 kg, 
distributed over 66 Type 3 drums 
gives 1.22E+02 @drum. 
retrachloroethene, 4.18E-0 1 kg, 
iistributed over 66 Type 3 drums 
gives 7.27E+00 @drum. 
Trichloroethene, 8.45E1-00 kg, 
distributed over 66 Type 3 drums 
gives 1.28E+02 @drum. 
Remarks’ 
Class IB Flammable Liquid: 
flash point below 73°F and 
boiling point at or above 
100°F. 
Class IB Flammable Liquid: 
flash point below 73°F and 
boiling point at or above 
100°F. 
Noncombustible but 
decomposes in a fire to 
hydrogen chloride and 
phosgene gas. 
Combustible, burns with 
difficulty. 
Referencesb 
BHI, 1994,300-FF-2 
Operable Unit Technical 
Baseline Report, BHI-00012, 
Rev. 0 
WCH 2006a 
WCH 2005 
NIOSH, 2000, Pocket Guide tc 
Chemical Hazards, and Other 
Databases, Publication No. 
2000- 1 30 
Hazard Type 
;lammable materials (continued) 
2orrosives 
Explosive materials 
Form 
~~ 
7uels and oils used by project 
Uranium oxide metal cuttings. 
Contaminated soil and debris. 
Contaminated soil and debris. 
Quantity 
&antities of such materials will 
)e kept to the minimum needed 
.o support the project, Estimated 
pant  i t ies : 
3asoline: I90 L 
Diesel: 2000 L 
Lubricating oil: 570 L 
Paints, cleaners, solvents, 
Idhesives: 380 L 
4ntifreeze: 450 L 
Brake fluid: 19 L 
KydrauWtransmission fluid: 
760 L 
4cetylene: 45 kg 
Propane: 380 L 
Mineral Oil: 400 L 
5,648-lbs depleted uranium scrap 
are assumed. 
Fluoride: 2.5Et-02 kg 
N03: 6.4E+03 kg 
Copper: 1.4E+04 kg 
Remarksa 
Fuels and oils are found in 
vehicles, spare drums, and 
mineral oil staged for 
stabilization of the drums. 
From fuel fabrication 
activities. Uranium metal is a 
combustible solid, especially 
as turnings or powder. Size of 
uranium pieces not 
documented. As a 
contaminant mixed with soil, 
it would not be expected to 
pose a significant 
flammability hazard. 
Corrosive nature assumed 
mitigated by mixing with soil. 
Nitrates can react severely 
with sulfuric acid. Copper 
can react severely with 
acetylene and hydrogen 
peroxide if present as metal 
dustfmist. If mixed with soil, 
explosive potential negated. 
Referencesb 
Estimated quantities based on 
ERC Chemical Inventory 
Database for lOO-B/C, 1 00-N, 
and 100-K RA projects, and 
Envirocon Chemical 
Inventory, dated 6/20/07, for 
Hanford 300 Area Project 
/# I 4678. 
WIDS, Waste Information 
section 
Stenner et al., 1988., Hazard 
Ranking System Evaluation of 
CERCLA Inactive Waste Sites 
at Hanfo rd, PNL-645 6, 
Vols. 1,2,  and 3 
WCH 2006a 
WCH 2006a 
WCH 2006a 
az aste 
Hazard Type 
ixplosive materials (continued) 
Form 
Zircaloy-2 chips, contaminated 
with beryllium and some 
minium, in 114-L (30-gal) 
Irums. Likely form is as 
.urnings and chips, not fines, 
Iue to nature of machining 
xocess. 
Zanisters and bottles of 
3cetylene, propane, oxygen, 
gasoline in equipment fuel tanks 
snd in other approved storage 
zontainers. 
The noyltrifluoroacetone, 
hydrogen peroxide, potassium, 
hydroxylamine hydrochloride, 
picric acid 
uantity 
773 drums of Zircaloy-2 
Quantities of such materials will 
be kept to the minimum needed 
to support the project. Estimated 
quantities: 
Gasoline: 190 L 
Diesel: 2000 L 
Lubricating oil: 570 L 
Grease, paints, cleaners, solvents 
adhesives: 860 L 
Acetylene: 45 kg 
Oxygen: 45 kg 
Propane: 380 L. 
Undefined quantities 
Remarksa 
Assume that water-soluble oil 
Fill has leaked out of drums, 
exacerbating pyrophoric 
qualities. 
Bottles of acetylene and 
oxygen may be brought to the 
site. Gasoline and diesel is 
present in various vehicles on 
site (e.g., heavy machinery 
used for excavation or 
transport). 
An explosion could initiate a 
fire, or cause some amount of 
contaminated soil to be 
suspended in air. 
These items were identified in 
the 6 18-7 IHE, 
Documentation mentions the 
use of these material in 
buildings that may have 
contributed to 6 18-7, but does 
not state the quantities or if 
they were actually disposed in 
618-7. 
Referencesb 
WIDS, Waste Information 
section 
WCH 2006a 
WCH 2005 
WCH 2007e 
DUN, 1977, Manufacturing 
Process Specifications, 
Metallic Uranium Fuel 
Elements Fabricated by the 
Co-Extrusion Process, 
Estimated quantities based on 
ERC Chemical Inventory 
Database for 100-B/C, 1 00-N, 
and 100-K RA projects, and 
Envirocon Chemical 
Inventory, dated 6/20/07, for 
Hanford 300 Area Project 
#14678. 
DUN-5601 
WCH 2005 
Hazard Type 
teactive hazards 
Form 
;oil and debris. 
Quantity 
4g: 7.3Et-03 kg 
(9.6E+01 mgkg) 
i s :  2.6E+02 kg 
(3.5E+00 mgkg) 
Ba: 2.8E+03 kg 
(3.8E+O1 mgkg) 
Be: 2.5E+01 kg 
(3.3E-01 m a g )  
Remar ksa 
Dust and soluble compounds 
incompatible with oxy- 
acetylene, ammonia, hydrogen 
peroxide, bromoazide, 
chlorine trifluoride, 
Ethyleneimine, oxalic acid, 
tartaric acid. In the form of a 
soil contaminant, it would not 
be expected to be a reactive 
hazard. 
Incompat i b le with strong 
oxidizers, bromine azide 
Note: Hydrogen gas can react 
with inorganic arsenic to form 
the highly toxic gas arsine. In 
the form of a soil 
contaminant, it would not be 
expected to be a reactive 
hazard. 
Barium chloride incompatible 
with acids and oxidizers; 
barium nitrate incompatible 
with acids, oxidizers, and 
aluminum-magnesium alloys. 
In the form of a soil 
contaminant, it would not be 
expected to be a reactive 
hazard. 
Incompatible with acids, 
caustics, chlorinated 
hydrocarbons, oxidizers. In 
the form of a soil 
contaminant, it would not be 
expected to be a reactive 
hazard. 
Referencesb 
#VCH 2006a 
VIOSH, 2000, OnZine NIOSH 
Docket Guide to Chemical 
Yazards, and Other 
gatabases, Publication No. 
1000- 130 
le azar tificatio eet aste 
Hazard Type 
teactive hazards (continued) 
Form 
soil and debris. 
:continued) 
Quantity 
Cd: l.lE+02 kg 
(1.5E+00 m a g )  
Co: 2.7E+03 kg 
(3.6E+O1 m a g )  
Cr: 4.7Et-04 kg 
(6.2E+02 m a g )  
Cu: 1.4E+04 kg 
( 1.9E+02 m a g )  
Remarksa 
Incompatible with strong 
oxidizers; elemental sulfur, 
selenium, and tellurium. In 
the form of a soil 
contaminant, it would not be 
expected to be a reactive 
hazard. 
Incompatible with strong 
oxidizers, ammonium nitrate. 
In the form of a soil 
contaminant, it would not be 
expected to be a reactive 
hazard. 
Varies with ionic species. 
Metal incompatible with 
strong oxidizers (e.g., 
hydrogen peroxide) or alkalis. 
In the form of a soil 
contaminant, it would not be 
expected to be a reactive 
hazard. 
Incompatible with acetylene 
and hydrogen peroxide 
(assume copper is in metallic 
form). In the form of a soil 
contaminant, it would not be 
expected to be a reactive 
hazard. 
Referencesb 
JVCH 2006a 
WOSH, 2000, Online NIOSH 
Pocket Guide to Chemical 
c-lazards, and Other 
gatabases, Publication No. 
2000- 130 
able am 
Hazard Type 
teactive hazards (continued) 
Form 
;oil and debris. 
continued) 
Quantity 
Ig: 3.4E+02 kg 
(4.5E+00 mg/kg) 
Vi: 2.8E+04 kg 
(3.7E+02 mg/kg) 
Remarks" 
Varies with chemical form. 
Incompatible with acetylene, 
ammonia, azides, calcium, 
chlorine dioxide, lithium, 
rubidium, copper, sodium 
carbide. 
Mercury alkyl compounds 
incompatible with strong 
oxidizers (e.g., chlorine). 
Nickel metal incompatible 
with strong acids, sulfur, 
selenium, wood and other 
combustibles, nickel nitrate. 
In the form of a soil 
contaminant, it would not be 
expected to be a reactive 
hazard. Varies with chemical 
form, incompatible with 
acetylene, ammonia, chlorine 
dioxide, azides, cium 
(amalgam formation), sodium 
carbide, lithium, rubidium, 
copper. Mercury alkyl 
compounds incompatible with 
strong oxidizers (e.g., 
chlorine). As a soil 
contaminant, it would not be 
expected to be a reactive 
hazard. 
Referencesb 
WCH 2006a 
YIOSH, 2000, Online NIOSH 
Pocket Guide to Chemical 
F-lazards, and Other 
Databases, Publication No. 
2000- 130 
Hazard Type 
teactive hazards 
continued) 
Form 
soil and debris. 
continued) 
86 drums of uranium as: 
Black oxide powder (Type l), 
Yellow oxide powder (Type 2), 
railings and fines (Type 3), 
Oils (Type 3). 
86 drums of uranium as: 
Black oxide powder (Type l), 
Yellow oxide powder (Type 2), 
Tailings and fines (Type 3), 
Oils (Type 3). 
Quantity 
Pb: 2.5E+04 kg 
(3.3E+02 m@g) 
Zn: 2.1E+04 kg 
(2.8E+02 mg/kg). 
NO3: 6.4E+03 kg 
(8.4E+O 1 mg/kg) 
Ag, 1.13E+01 kg (total for all 
drums) distributed as follows: 
7.61E+O1 kg (1.5E+03 mg/kg) 
9.23E-02 kg (1.7E+03 mg/kg) 
3.62Et-00 kg (2.OE+03 m a g )  
1.20E-02 kg (2.8E-01 m a ) .  
As, 3.55E-03 kg (total for all 
drums) distributed as follows: 
-- 
3.55E-03 kg (8.4E-01 mg/kg). 
Remarks' 
Incompatible with strong 
3xidizers, hydrogen peroxide, 
scids. In the form of a soil 
:ontaminant, it would not be 
txpected to be a reactive 
hazard. 
Combustible, but solid form is 
difficult to ignite; however, 
powder form may ignite 
spontaneously and can 
continue burning under water. 
In the form of a soil 
contaminant, it would not be 
expected to be a reactive 
hazard. 
Nitrates can react severely 
with sulfuric acid. As a soil 
contaminant, this chemical 
species would not be expected 
to be highly reactive. 
Dust and soluble compounds 
incompatible with acetylene, 
ammonia, hydrogen peroxide, 
bromoazide, chlorine 
trifluoride, ethyleneimine, 
oxalic acid, tartaric acid. 
Incompatible with strong 
oxidizers, bromine azide 
Note: Hydrogen gas can react 
with inorganic arsenic to form 
the highly toxic gas arsine. 
Referencesb 
WCH 2006a 
\JIOSH, 2000, Online NIOSH 
Docket Guide to Chemical 
'iazards, and Other 
Patabases, Publication No. 
1000- 130 
Table az 
Hazard Type 
teactive hazards 
continued) 
Form 
86 drums of uranium as: 
Black oxide powder (Type I), 
Yellow oxide powder (Type 2), 
Tailings and fines (Type 3), 
Oils (Type 3). 
86 drums of uranium as: 
Black oxide powder (Type l), 
Yellow oxide powder (Type 2), 
Tailings and fines (Type 3), 
Oils (Type 3). 
86 drums of uranium as: 
Black oxide powder (Type l), 
Yellow oxide powder (Type 2), 
Tailings and fines (Type 3), 
Oils (Type 3). 
86 drums of uranium as: 
Black oxide powder (Type l), 
Yellow oxide powder (Type 2), 
Tailings and fines (Type 3), 
Oils (Type 3). 
Quantity 
Ba, 1.4OE+O2 kg (total for all 
drums) distributed as follows: 
7.9 lE+00 kg (1.6Et-03 m a g )  
1 .@E-02 kg (3.5E+02 mg/kg) 
1.28E+02 kg (6.9E+04 mg/kg) 
4.94E+00 kg (1.2E+03 mg/kg). 
2-Butanone, 8.03E-00 kg (total 
for all drums) distributed as 
follows: 
-- 
-- 
-- 
8.03E-00 kg (1.90E+03 m a ) .  
Cd,2.41E+Ol kg (total for all 
drums) distributed as follows: 
2.34E+Ol kg (4.6E+03 m a g )  
3.67E-03 kg (6.8E-t-01 mg/kg) 
6.58E-01 kg (3.6B+02 mg/kg) 
1.07E-03 kg (2.5E-01 m a ) .  
Cr, 6.1OE+OO kg (total for all 
drums) distributed as follows: 
-- 
6.10Et-00 kg (3.3E+03 mg/kg) 
3.38E-03 kg (8.OE-01 mgkg). 
Remarks’ 
3arium chloride incompatible 
with acids and oxidizers; 
mium nitrate incompatible 
with acids, oxidizers, and 
iluminum-magnesium alloys. 
[ncompatible with strong 
ixidizers, amines, ammonia, 
inorganic acids, caustics, 
isocyanates, and pyridines. In 
:he form of a soil 
;ontaminant, it would not be 
2xpected to be a reactive 
hazard. 
[ncompatible with strong 
3xidizers; elemental sulfur, 
selenium, and tellurium. 
Incompatibility varies with 
compound, includes strong 
oxidizers or alkalis. 
Referencesb 
WCH 2006a 
NIOSH, 2000, Online NIOSH 
Pocket Guide to Chemical 
Hazards, and Other 
Databases, Publication No. 
2000- 1 30 
le eet 
Hazard Type 
teactive hazards 
continued) 
Form 
36 drums of uranium as: 
3lack oxide powder (Type l), 
Yellow oxide powder (Type 2), 
railings and fines (Type 3), 
31s (Type 3). 
36 drums of uranium as: 
Black oxide powder (Type l), 
Yellow oxide powder (Type 2), 
railings and fines (Type 3), 
Oils (Type 3). 
Zircaloy-2 chips, contaminated 
with beryllium and some 
uranium, in 1 14-L (30-gal) 
drums. Likely form is as 
turnings and chips, not fines, 
due to nature of machining 
process. 
Quantity 
Ig, 2.91E-01 kg (total for all 
irums) distributed as follows: 
L26E-04 kg (1.2E+Ol mg/kg) 
!ME-0 1 kg ( 1.5E+02 mg/kg) 
i.96E-03 kg (1.4E+OO mg/L) 
?b, 5.62E+03 kg (total for all 
hums) distributed as follows: 
5.58E+03 kg (1.lEt-06 mg/kg) 
4.00E-02 kg (7.4E+02 mg/kg) 
3.88E+O 1 kg (2.1Et-04 mgkg) 
1.18E+00 kg (2.8E+02 mg/L) 
773 drums of Zircaloy-2 
Remarksa 
Varies with chemical form, 
incompatible with acetylene, 
ammonia, chlorine dioxide, 
azides, calcium (amalgam 
formation), sodium carbide, 
lithium, rubidium, copper. 
Mercury alkyl compounds 
incompatible with strong 
oxidizers (e.g., chlorine). 
Incompatible with strong 
oxidizers, hydrogen peroxide, 
acids. 
Assume that water fill has 
leaked out of drums, 
exacerbating pyrophoric/ 
explosive properties. 
Referencesb 
~~ 
WCH 2006a 
NIOSH, 2000, Online NIOSH 
Pocket Guide to Chemical 
Hazards, and Other 
Databases, Publication No. 
2000- I30 
W IDS, Waste Information 
section 
WCH 2006a 
WCH 2005 
DUN, 1977, Manufacturing 
Process Specifications, 
Metallic Uranium Fuel 
Elements Fabricated by the 
Co - extrusion Process, 
DUN-5601 
zar 
Hazard Type 
Reactive hazards 
[continued) 
Electrical energy 
Natural phenomena 
Form 
Jranium metal cuttings. 
3allium Chloride 
Supply lines outside of the 
:xcavation fence for office 
trailers and analytical needs. 
Lightning. 
Quantity 
5,648-lbs depleted uranium scrap 
are assumed. 
Unknown 
Electrical service is estimated at 
13.8 kV, 400 amp, service. 
Mean thunderstorm frequency is 
low, averaging 10/yr, with the 
highest likelihood of occurrence 
during the months of June, July, 
and August. 
Remarks' 
From fuel fabrication 
activities. Size of uranium 
pieces not documented. As a 
contaminant in soil it would 
not be expected to be a 
reactive hazard. 
Identified in the 618-7 IHE. 
Documentation mentions its 
use in buildings that may have 
contributed to 6 18-7, but does 
not state the quantities or if it 
was actually disposed in 61 8- 
7. 
High voltage lines shorting to 
ground could result in sparks, 
which could initiate a brush 
fire in adjacent areas. See 
remarks for flammability and 
kinetic/potential energy 
hazard types. 
Lightening could initiate a 
brush fire. See remarks for 
flammability and 
kinetic/potential energy 
hazard types. 
Referencesb 
WIDS, Site Comment section 
Operable Unit Technical 
Baseline Report, BHI-000 1 2, 
Rev. 0 
WCH 2006a 
BHI, 1994,300-FF-2 
WCH 2005 
Based on 300-W-1 and 
100-NR- 1 designs 
Hoitink et al., 2005, Hanford 
Site Climatological Data 
Summary 2004 With Historical 
Data, PNNL-15 160 
able 
Hazard Type 
Jatural phenomena (continued) 
Form 
ieismic event resulting in 
Found motion. 
3xtreme temperatures. 
4igh winds. 
Quantity 
The Hanford Site is located in 
Zone 2B, a zone of moderate 
;eismicity. For the 300 Area, 
seak ground accelerations ranges 
from 0.1 to 0.3 g, have a 
;orresponding annual mean 
frequency of from 4.OE-03 to 
2 .OE-04. 
Undefined quantities. 
In the 300 Area, the annual 
average wind speed is 12.2 km/hr 
(7.6 mph). 
The maximum peak gust wind 
speed at Hanford was 129 km/hr 
(80 mph) (1 972). The annual 
average for number of days with 
peak gusts in excess of 80 k d h r  
(50 mph) is 4.7 days. 
Winds in excess of 40 km/hr 
(25 mph) occur slightly more 
than 1% of the time, on an annual 
basis. 
Remarks' 
The Environmental Impact 
Statement for the inactive 
reactors determined that the 
radiological impacts from an 
earthquake are insignificant. 
During a seismic event, a 
heavy load could be dropped 
onto contaminated soil 
causing an airborne (puff) 
release. 
Temperature extremes range 
from -29 to 46°C (-20 to 
115°F). 
Some fraction of the dry, 
contaminated soils will be 
suspended in air. 
High winds could cause debris 
to be thrown (a missile), 
causing a kinetic energy 
hazard, or causing a "puff' 
release if this material strikes 
contaminated soil. 
Referencesb 
DOE, 1989, Environmental 
'mpact Statement, 
Decommissioning of Eight 
Yurplus Production Reactors 
zt the Hanford Site, Richland, 
Washington, DOEEIS-O119D. 
Hoitink et al., 2005, Hanford 
rite Climatological Data 
YummaPy 2004 With Historical 
Data, PNNL- 15 160 
Table A- 
Hazard Type 
Wural phenomena (continued) 
Form 
~~ 
Ash fall resulting from volcanic 
activity. 
Flooding from the Columbia 
River. 
Quantity 
Undefined quantities. During the 
May 18, 1980 eruption of Mount 
St. Helens, about 7.6 mm 
(0.3 in.) of ash was deposited at 
the Hanford Site this resulted in a 
wet ash loading of only 
20.4 kg/m2 (4.2 lb/ft2). 
The probable maximum flood 
( P W )  is estimated to produce a 
Columbia River elevation at the 
300 Area of 116.5 m (382 ft) 
above mean sea level. 
Remarks' 
Historically, only minimal 
amounts of ash accumulation 
resulting from volcanic 
activity have occurred at the 
Hanford Site. This could 
result in coating of exposed 
surfaces at the excavation site; 
however, it would not result in 
a. release of material. 
As discussed in the feasibility 
study, the probable maximum 
flood of either the Columbia 
or Yakima Rivers (more so 
for the Columbia) is not 
anticipated to inundate the 
300-EF-2 Operable Unit. 
Referencesb 
DOE-RL, 2000, Focused 
Feasibility Study for the 
300-FF-2 Operable Unit, 
DOEM-,-99-40, Rev. 0 
ific eet aste 
Hazard Type 
Vatural phenomena (continued) 
Kinetic and potential energy 
Form 
~ 
Xainwater/snow and ice. 
Heavy equipment/machinery/ 
vehicle impacting the 
contaminated soil or drums of 
waste materials. 
Quantity 
4verage annual precipitation at 
:he HMS is 17 cm (6.8 in.). The 
wettest season on record was the 
winter of 1996- 1997 with 
14.1 cm (5.4 in.) of precipitation. 
Days with greater than 1.3 cm 
c0.50 in.) precipitation occur on 
sverage less than one time each 
year. The 25 year 24-hour 
isopluvial (storm) is 4.1 cm 
(1.6 in.). 
Average monthly snowfall in 
winter ranges from 0.25 cm 
(0.1 in.) to 13.2 cm (5.2 in.). The 
record monthly snowfall of 
59.4 cm (23.4 in.) occurred 
during January 1950. The 
seasonal record snowfall of 
142.5 cm (56.1 in.) occurred 
during the winter of 1992- 1993. 
Estimated heavy equipment 
quantities: 
Dozer: 1 
Hydraulic excavators: 2 
Grader: 1 
Water truck: 1 
Roll-Off trucks: 2 
Loaders: 2 
Backhoe: 1 
Forklift: 1 
Fuel truck: 1 
Pickup trucks: 5 
Van: 1 
Remarks' 
Spread of contamination 
:ould occur. The arid-to- 
;emi-arid climate suggests 
hat little, if any, surface water 
will accumulate within the 
:xcavation. Most 
xecipitation is lost through 
:vapotranspiration. In 
iddition, the transmissive 
iature of the surface soils 
illows rapid infiltration of 
xecipitation. Consequently, 
ittle water remains to 
generate surface runoff. 
Heavy machinery may collide 
with contaminated soil 
zausing a "puff' release of 
zontaminated material. Heavq 
machinery may collide with 
drums containing retrieved 
wastes, rupturing the drums 
and causing particles to 
become airborne. 
Referencesb 
Veitzel et al., 2005, Hanford 
liite National Environmental 
Policy Act (NEPA) 
Characterization Report, 
PNNL-64 15. 
WDOE, 2004, Stormwater 
'Management Manual for 
Eastern Washington, Pub. 
Number 04- 10-076. 
Based on STRs for 100-B/C, 
100-N, and 100-F RA projects. 
and on Envirocon Equipment 
Rates, dated 2/1/2007, for 
300-FF-2 Field Remediation. 
Hazard Type 
Cinetic and potential energy 
continued) 
Form I Quantity 
Clompressed gas bottles. Such materials will be kept to the 
minimum needed to support the 
project . 
Compressed gasses, estimated 
quantities: 
Acetylene: 45 kg (100 lb in 
seven cylinders) 
Propane: 380 L (100 gal in ten 
10-gal tanks) 
Oxygen: 45 kg (100 lb in four 
cylinders). 
Falling loads/drums/equipment 
used during remediation 
activities. 
859 drums (estimated) for Type 
1,2,3,  & 4. 
4 drums (estimated) for Thoria. 
Remarks’ 
A pressurized missile could 
strike a patch of contaminated 
soil or drums, resulting in a 
“puff’ release of 
contaminated soils. Heavy 
machinery could collide with 
the tanks causing rupture and 
potential struck-by hazard 
(missile), as well as “puff’ 
release of contaminated soil. 
It is assumed that a drop 
would be of sufficient velocity 
to rupture the drum causing a 
“puff-type” airborne release. 
A falling drum could strike 
contaminated soil, or another 
filled drum, resulting in a 
“puff’ release. 
Referencesb 
ERC Chemical Inventory 
Database for 100-B/C, 1 00-N, 
and 100-F RA projects, and 
Envirocon Chemical 
Inventory, dated 6/20/07, for 
Hanford 300 Area Project 
## 14678. 
WCH 2006a 
Hazard Type 
Kinetic and potential energy 
:continued) 
Form 
Aircraft collision. 
Quantity 
rraffic as defined in 
IOE-STD-3014-96 (DOE 1996). 
Remarksa 
The probability of this type of 
event is extremely low (per 
DOE-STD-3014-96, the 
frequency would be below 
1.OE-06). The Hanford Site is 
subject to very limited aircraft 
traffic due to relative location 
of airports and normal air 
traffic patterns. 
A key to the Remarks column is as follows: 
KHC = Known to be a Human Carcinogen, as defined in the Report on Carcinogens, Ninth Edition (DHHS 2001). 
RAHC = Reasonably Anticipated to be a Human Carcinogen, as defined in the Report on Carcinogens, Ninth Edition (DHHS 2001). 
NC = Not classified as either KHC or RAHC in the Report on Carcinogens, Ninth Edition (DHHS 2001). 
Complete reference citations are provided in the reference section located at the end of this appendix. 
RA = Remedial Action (project) 
STR = subcontract technical representative 
WIDS = Waste Information Data System 
Referencesb 
DOE, 1996, 
DOE-STD-3014-96 
orksheet for Solid (618-8)a. 
Hazard Type 
iadiological 
Criticality 
Toxic material 
Form 
Uranium-contaminated soil and 
solid waste from reactor fuel 
manufacturing. 
118 drums of the following: 
Black oxide powder (Type l), 
Yellow oxide powder (Type 2), 
tailings, fines, and oils (Type 3). 
Uranium-contaminated soil and 
solid waste from reactor fuel 
manufacturing. 
Uranium-contaminated soil and 
solid waste from reactor fuel 
manufacturing. 
Quantity 
3-137: 4.20E-03 Ci 
Fu-239: 2.75E-01 Ci 
Ra-226: 2.06E-02 Ci 
9-89/90: 7.60E-01 Ci 
Th-228: 9.088-06 Ci 
U-234: 2.28E+01 Ci 
U-235: 1.47Et-00 Ci 
U-238: 2.46E+Ol Ci 
rota1 curies from all waste forms. 
U-234: 5.01E-01 Ci 
U-235: 2.34E-02 Ci 
U-238: 2.95E+OO Ci 
No. of Type 1 & 2 drums: 27 
No. of Type 3 drums: 91. 
U-235: 1.44E+OO Ci 
Pu-239: 1.19Et-00 Ci. 
Total curies from all waste forms. 
AS: 1.1 E+02 kg (3.5E-t-00 m a g )  
Pb: 1.OEt-04 kg (3.3E+02 m a g ) .  
Remarksb 
Used highest concentrations 
from Metcalf letter. 
Drum inventory data from 
61 8-4 used as analogous site 
data for drums. 
The maximum uranium oxide 
concentration (black) was 
used for all uranium oxide 
drums. 
Initial Criticality Evaluation 
concluded that the average 
concentration in soil is below 
the threshold concentration 
for U-235. 
References' 
Metcalf, 1980, Analysis of 
51 8-8 Burial Ground Soil, 
Letter 65452-80-204 
BHI, 2003 
BHI, 200 I ,  61 8-4 Burial 
Ground ASMFHC, MOC- 
BHI, 2003 
200 1-00 1 1, p.65 
BHI, 2005b, Remediation: 
61 8-8 Burial Ground, 
Criticality Safety Review 
0300X-CE-NO007 
BHI, 2004c 
Operable Unit Technical 
Baseline Report, BHI- 
00012, Rev. 0 
BHI, 1994,300- FF-2 
Hazard Type 
i s :  l.lE+02 kg (3.5E+00 mgkg). larcinogens KHC (if present in its 
elemental or soluble forms. 
Form 
Be: l.OE+Ol kg (3.3E-01 mg/kg). 
Uranium-contaminated soil and 
solid waste from reactor fuel 
manufacturing. 
RAHC (if present as chloride, 
fluoride, hydroxide, oxide, 
phosphate, sulfate, 
tetrahydrate, zinc silicate, or 
beryllium-aluminum alloy). 
Uranium-contaminated soil and 
solid waste from reactor fuel 
manufacturing. 
(continued) 
Cd: 4 6  E+01 kg (1.5E+00 m a g ) .  
Drums of uranium: 
W C  (if present as chloride, 
oxide, sulfate, or sulfide). 
Black oxide powder (Type l), 
Yellow oxide powder (Type 2), 
Tailings and fines (Type 3), 
Oils (Type 3). 
Cr: 1.9E+04 kg (6.2E+02 mgkg). 
Quantity I Remarksb 
KHC (if present in hexavalent 
state). 
Vi: 1.1E+04 kg (3.7E+02 mg/kg). RAHC (if present as acetate, 
carbonate, carbonyl, 
hydroxide, nickelocene, 
oxide, or subsulfide). 
- 
Pb: 1.OE+04 kg (3.3E+02 mgkg). RAHC (if present as lead 
acetate or phosphate). 
KHC (if present as chromate). 
As, 7.40E-03 kg total, distributed as 
follows: 
KHC (if present in its 
elemental or soluble forms). 
(9.2E-01 mg/kg). lRAHc 
-- 
7.4E-03 kg (8.4E-01 mg/L,) 
-- 
Referencesc 
3HI,2004c 
BHI, 2004c 
orksheet for Soli 
Hazard Type 
hrcinogens (continued) 
Form 
Drums of uranium: 
Black oxide powder (Type 1), 
Yellow oxide powder (Type 2), 
railings and fines (Type 3), 
Oils (Type 3). 
Drums of uranium: 
Black oxide powder (Type l), 
Yellow oxide powder (Type 2), 
Tailings and fines (Type 3), 
Oils (Type 3). 
Drums of uranium: 
Black oxide powder (Type l), 
Yellow oxide powder (Type 2), 
Tailings and fines (Type 3), 
Oils (Type 3). 
Drums of uranium: 
Black oxide powder (Type 1), 
Yellow oxide powder (Type 2), 
Tailings and fines (Type 3), 
Oils (Type 3). 
Quantity 
Cd, 4.9E+O1 kg total, distributed as 
ci>llows: 
1..8E+O1 kg (4.6E+03 mg/kg) 
7.3E-03 kg (6.8E+O1 mg/kg) 
1.4E+OOkg (3.6E+02 mg/kg) 
2.2E-03 kg (2.5E-0 1 mgkg) 
_- 
Cr, 1.3OE+O1 kg total, distributed as 
follows: 
-- 
1.3E+O1 kg (3.3Et-03 (mg/kg) 
7.1E-03 kg (8.OE-01 m a )  
_- 
Se, 1.1E+O1 kg total, distributed as 
follows: 
-- 
1 . lE+01 kg (2.9E+03 mg/kg) 
-- 
Pb, 1.1 1Et-04 kg total, distributed as 
follows: 
1.1E+04 kg 
8.OE-02 kg 
8.3E+01 kg 
2.4E+00 kg 
Remarksb 
RAHC (if present as chloride, 
3xide, sulfate, or sulfide). 
KHC (if present in hexavalent 
state). 
RAHC (if present as sulfide). 
RAHC (if present as lead 
acetate or phosphate). 
KHC (if present as lead 
chromate). 
References‘ 
3HI,2004cO 
>rum data from 618-4 
3urial Ground ASA/FHC, 
vIOC-200 1-001 1, Table 3, 
1. 67 (BHI 2001), are used 
is analogous site data for 
hese drums 
IHHS, 200 1, Report on 
Yarcinogens, Ninth Edition 
tifica for ste 
Hazard Type 
hrcinogens (continued) 
3 io hazards 
4sphyxiates 
Flammable materials 
Form 
>rums of uranium: 
3lack oxide powder (Type 1), 
(ellow oxide powder (Type 2), 
railings and fines (Type 3), 
>ils (Type 3). 
>rums of uranium: 
3lack oxide powder (Type I) ,  
fellow oxide powder (Type 2), 
railings and fines (Type 3), 
31s (Type 3). 
:nsect/rodent bites and dust 
?om excrement. 
!leavier-than-air gasses. 
Vegetation. 
Quantity 
Arochlor-1254,4.2E+OO kg total, 
distributed as follows: 
_- 
_- 
-- 
4.2E+00 kg (5.4E+02 m a )  
-- 
Benzene, 6.6E-01 kg total, 
distributed as follows: 
-- 
6.6E-01 kg (7.5E+01 m a )  
-- 
Undefined quantities. 
Estimated maximum quantities: 
Acetylene: 45 kg (100 lb) 
Propane: 380 L ( 1,006 gal). 
Surface of burial ground essentially 
devoid of vegetation. 
Remarksb 
RAHC 
KHC 
These hazards are routinely 
encountered in industry. 
These hazards are routinely 
encountered in industry. 
Activities will be carried out 
in outdoor, well-ventilated 
areas. 
A range fire would not cause 
a significant release of 
hazardous substances due to 
the lack of combustibles, 
especially vegetation, within 
the remediation site (the site 
will have been cleared of 
combustibles prior to 
initiation of remediation 
activities). Minimal amounts 
have been encountered at 
other burial ground 
remediation sites (6 18-4 and 
6 18-5). 
References' 
BHI, 2004c 
Drum data from 618-4 
Burial Ground ASMFHC, 
MOC-200 1-00 1 1, Table 3, 
3.67 (BHI 2001), are used 
3s analogous site data for 
:hese drums 
DHHS, 200 1, Report on 
Carcinogens, Ninth Edition 
Chemical Inventory 
Database for lOO-B/C, 100- 
N, and 100-F FU projects 
orksheet for soli Q. 8 (618-8)”, (17 
Hazard Type 
’lammable materials 
continued) 
Form 
Miscellaneous combustibles, 
general construction waste, 
including pieces of plastic, 
cardboard, wood, cloth, and 
other types generated during 
remediation. Containers with 
oil, paint chips, and waxy 
material. PowderIsal ts, 
automotive-type batteries, 
asbestos, fabric belting material, 
and used rags may also be found 
during site remediation 
activities. 
Fuels and oils used by project. 
Quantity 
Unknown quantity of combustible 
waste expected to be relatively small 
given the presence of “burning pits” 
within the 300 Area. 
Quantities of such materials will be 
kept to the minimum needed to 
support the project. Estimated 
quantities (per vehicle): 
Gasoline: 190 L 
Diesel: 7,600 L 
Lubricating oil: 570 L 
Paints, cleaners, solvents, 
adhesives: 380 L 
Acetylene: 45 kg 
Antifreeze: 450 L 
Brake fluid: 19 L 
HydraulicItransmission fluid: 760 L 
Propane: 380 L. 
Remarksb 
Vo combustible wastes were 
:ncountered at other nearby 
m i a l  grounds (6 18-4 and 
5 18-5). 
Fuels and oils are found in 
vehicles, spare drums, and 
mineral oil staged for 
stabilization of the drums. 
Estimated quantities based on 
ERC Chemical Inventory 
Database for 1 00-BIC, 1 00-N, 
and 100-I( RA projects. 
References‘ 
3erber, M. S., 1992, Past 
%-actices Technical 
SICzaracterization Study: 
300 Area-Hanford Site, 
WHC-MR-03 88 
Hazard Type 
knmable  materials 
continued) 
Jorrosives 
Zxplosive materials 
Form 
3rums of uranium tailings, 
'Ines, and oil (Type 3 drums). 
Contaminated soil. 
Soil and debris. 
Quantity 
Benzene, 6.3E-01 kg, distributed 
wer 13 8 Type 3 drums gives 
$.6E+OO @drum. 
2-butanone, 7.OE-03 kg, distributed 
iver 138 Type 3 drums gives 5.1E- 
32 g/drum. 
I'etrachloroethene, 8.3E-0 1 kg, 
distributed over 138 Type 3 drums 
gives 6.OE+00 g/drurn. 
Trichloroethene, 1.7E+O 1 kg, 
distributed over 138 Type 3 drums 
gives 1.2E-t-02 g/drum. 
Fluoride: 1 .OE+02 kg. 
N03: 2.6E+03 kg (8.4E+01 mg/kg) 
Copper: 5.8E+03 kg (1.9Et-02 
mg/kg) 
Remarksb 
Class IB Flammable Liquid: 
flash point below 73°F and 
boiling point at or above 
100°F. 
Class IB Flammable Liquid: 
flash point below 73°F and 
boiling point at or above 
100°F. 
Noncombustible but 
decomposes in a fire to 
hydrogen chloride and 
phosgene gas. 
Combustible, burns with 
difficulty. 
Corrosive nature assumed 
mitigated by mixing with soil. 
Nitrates can react severely 
with sulfuric acid. Copper 
can react severely with 
acetylene and hydrogen 
peroxide if present as metal 
dusthist. If mixed with soil, 
explosive potential assumed 
negated. 
References' 
3H1, 2004c 
VIOSH, 2000, Online NIOSh 
"ocket Guide to Chemical 
Yazards, and Other 
Yatabases, Publication No. 
!OOO- 130 
3HI,2004c 
3HI72O04c 
tificatio 
Hazard Type 
ixplosive materials 
continued) 
Xeac t i ve hazards 
Form 
lanisters and bottles of 
cetylene, propane, oxygen, 
,asoline in equipment fuel tanks 
nd in other approved storage 
ontainers. 
;oil and debris. 
Quantity 
&antities of such materials will be 
:ept to the minimum needed to 
upport the project. 
istimated quantities: 
Sasoline: 190 L 
abricating oil: 570 L 
Srease, paints, cleaners, solvents, 
adhesives: 380 L 
ketylene: 2.8E+04 L 
Ixygen: 1.4E+04 L 
)Topane: 380 L. 
ig: 2,9E+03 kg (9.6E+O1 mgkg). 
4s: 1.1E-tO2 kg (3.5E+00 mg/kg). 
Remarksb 
Bottles of acetylene and 
oxygen may be brought to the 
site. Gasoline and diesel is 
present in various vehicles on 
site (e.g., heavy machinery 
used for excavation, or 
transport). 
An explosion could initiate a 
fire, or cause some amount of 
contaminated soil to be 
suspended in air. 
Dust and soluble compounds 
incompatible with oxy- 
acetylene, ammonia, 
hydrogen peroxide, 
bromoazide, chlorine 
trifluoride, ethyleneimine, 
oxalic acid, tartaric acid. In 
the form of a soil 
contaminant, it would not be 
expected to be a reactive 
hazard. 
Incompatible with strong 
oxidizers, bromine azide 
Note: Hydrogen gas can react 
with inorganic arsenic to form 
the highly toxic gas arsine. In 
the form of a soil 
contaminant, it would not be 
expected to be a reactive 
hazard. 
Referencesc 
3H1,2004c 
qIOSH, 2000, Online 
VIOSH Pocket Guide to 
Zhemical Hazards, and 
M e r  Databases, 
)ublication No. 2000- 130 
eet for 
Hazard Type 
teactive hazards 
continued) 
Form 
;oil and debris. 
continued) 
Quantity 
Sa: 1.2E+03 kg (3,8E+Ol m a g ) .  
3e: l.OE+Ol kg (3.3E-01 mg/kg). 
2d: 4.6Et-0 1 kg (1.5E+00 m a g ) .  
20: l.lE1-03 kg (3.6E+O1 m a g ) .  
Remarksb 
Barium chloride incompatible 
with acids and oxidizers; 
barium nitrate incompatible 
with acids, oxidizers, and 
aluminum-magnesium alloys. 
In the form of a soil 
contaminant, it would not be 
expected to be a reactive 
hazard. 
Incompatible with acids, 
caustics, chlorinated 
hydrocarbons, oxidizers. In 
the form of a soil 
contaminant, it would not be 
expected to be a reactive 
hazard. 
Incompatible with strong 
oxidizers; elemental sulfur, 
selenium and tellurium. In 
the form of a soil 
contaminant, it would not be 
expected to be a reactive 
hazard. 
Incompatible with strong 
oxidizers, ammonium nitrate. 
In the form of a soil 
contaminant, it would not be 
expected to be a reactive 
hazard. 
eferences‘ 
3HI,2004c 
rTIOSH, 2000, Online 
VIOSH Pocket Guide to 
7hemical Hazards, and 
3ther Databases, 
’ublication No. 2000- 130 
Hazard Type 
Leactive hazards 
continued) 
For 
loil and debris 
continued) 
Quantity 
zr: 1.9E+04 kg (6.2E+02 mgkg). 
3.1: 5.8E+03 kg ( 1.9E+02 mgkg). 
Kg: 1.4E+02 kg (4.5E+00 mg/kg). 
[vi: 1.1E+04 kg (3,7E+02 mg/kg). 
Remarksb 
Varies with ionic species. 
Metal incompatible with 
;trong oxidizers (e.g., 
iydrogen peroxide) or alkalis. 
[n the form of a soil 
:ontaminant, it would not be 
3xpected to be a reactive 
iazard. 
[ncompatible with acetylene 
md hydrogen peroxide 
[assume copper is in metallic 
Form). In the form of a soil 
:ontaminant, it would not be 
Zxpected to be a reactive 
hazard. 
Varies with chemical form. 
[ncompatible with acetylene, 
ammonia, azides, calcium, 
chlorine dioxide, lithium, 
rubidium, copper, sodium 
carbide. 
Mercury alkyl compounds 
incompatible with strong 
oxidizers (e.g., chlorine). 
Nickel metal incompatible 
with strong acids, sulfur, 
selenium, wood and other 
combustibles, nickel nitrate. 
In the form of a soil 
contaminant, it would not be 
expected to be a reactive 
hazard. 
Referencesc 
3H1,2004c 
\JIOSH, 2000, Online 
VIOSH Pocket Guide to 
7hemical Hazards, and 
Xher Databases, 
'ublication No. 2000- 130 
Hazard Type 
teactive hazards 
continued) 
Form 
;oil and debris. 
continued) 
118 drums of uranium: 
Black oxide powder (Type l), 
Yellow oxide powder (Type 2), 
railings and fines (Type 3), 
31s (Type 3). 
118 drums of uranium as: 
Black oxide powder (Type 1), 
Yellow oxide powder (Type 2), 
railings and fines (Type 3), 
Oils (Type 3). 
uantity 
Pb: 1.0E+04 kg (3.3E+02 mgkg). 
En: 8.5E+03 (2.8E+02 m a g )  kg. 
3: 2.6E+03 kg (8.4E+01 mgkg). 
Ag, 2.4E+O1 kg (total for all drums) 
distributed as follows: 
1.6E+O1 kg ( 1.5E+03 mg/kg) 
1.8E-01 kg ( 1.7E+03 mg/kg) 
7.6E+OO kg (2.0E+03 mg/kg) 
2.5E-03 kg (2.8E-01 mgkg) 
-- 
s, 7.4E-03 kg (total for all drums) 
distributed as follows: 
-- 
-- 
-- 
7.4E-03 kg (2.8E-01 mg/L) 
-- 
Remarksb 
Incompatible with strong 
oxidizers, hydrogen peroxide, 
acids. In the form of a soil 
contaminant, it would not be 
expected to be a reactive 
hazard. 
Combustible, but solid form 
is difficult to ignite; however, 
powder form may ignite 
spontaneously and can 
continue burning under water. 
In the form of a soil 
contaminant, it would not be 
expected to be a reactive 
hazard. 
Nitrates can react severely 
with sulfuric acid. 
Contaminant, this chemical 
species would not be expected 
to be highly reactive. 
Dust and soluble compounds 
incompatible with acetylene, 
ammonia, hydrogen peroxide, 
bromoazide, chlorine 
trifluoride, ethyleneimine, 
oxalic acid, and tartaric acid. 
Incompatible with strong 
oxidizers and bromine azide. 
Note: Hydrogen gas can react 
with inorganic arsenic to form 
the highly toxic gas arsine. 
References' 
BHI, 2004c 
NIOSH, 2000, Online 
VIOSH Pocket Guide to 
Chemical Hazards, and 
Other Databases, 
Publication No. 2000- 130 
BHI, 2004c 
BHI, 2002, Determination oj 
MAR for 300-FF-2 0 U Sites, 
Calc. No. 0300F-CA-N0003, 
Rev. 0 
orksheet for Soli 
Hazard Type 
ieactive hazards 
continued) 
Form 
118 drums of uranium as: 
Black oxide powder (Type l), 
Yellow oxide powder (Type 2), 
Tailings and fines (Type 3), 
Oils (Type 3). 
1 18 drums of uranium as: 
Black oxide powder (Type l), 
Yellow oxide powder (Type 2), 
Tailings and fines (Type 3), 
Oils (Type 3). 
118 drums of uranium as: 
Black oxide powder (Type l), 
Yellow oxide powder (Type 2), 
Tailings and fines (Type 3), 
Oils (Type 3). 
Quantity 
2-Butanone, 7.4E-03 kg (total for 
311 drums) distributed as follows: 
_- 
7.4E-03 kg (8.4E-01 m a )  
_- 
Cd, 4.9E+O1 kg (total for all drums) 
distributed as follows: 
4.8Et-01 kg (4.6E+03 mg/kg) 
7.3E-03 kg (6.8E+O1 mg/kg) 
1.4E+00 kg (3.6E+02 mg/kg) 
2.2E-03 kg (2.5E-Olmgkg) 
-- 
Cr, 1.3E+01 kg (total for all drums) 
distributed as follows: 
-- 
-- 
1.3E+01 kg (3.3E+03 mg/kg) 
7.1E-03 kg (8.OE-01 mgkg) 
-- 
Remarksb 
Incompatible with strong 
oxidizers; elemental sulfur, 
selenium, and tellurium. 
Incompatibility varies with 
compound, includes strong 
oxidizers or alkalis. 
References' 
t i ~ c a t i o ~  sheet for 
Hazard Type 
Reactive hazards 
[continued) 
Electrical energy 
Natural phenomena 
Form 
118 drums of uranium as: 
Black oxide powder (Type l), 
Yellow oxide powder (Type 2), 
railings and fines (Type 3), 
Oils (Type 3). 
118 drums of uranium as: 
Black oxide powder (Type l), 
Yellow oxide powder (Type 2), 
Tailings and fines (Type 3), 
Oils (Type 3). 
Supply lines outside of the 
excavation fence for office 
trailers and analytical needs. 
Lightning. 
Quantity 
Hg, 6.1E-01 kg (total for all drums) 
listributed as follows: 
1.3E-03 kg (1.2E+01 mg/kg) 
i.OE-01 kg (1.5E+02 mg/kg) 
1.2E-02 kg (1.4E+00 mg/kg) 
Pb, l.lE+O4 kg (total for all drums) 
3istributed as follows: 
1.1E+04 kg ( l.lE+O6 mg/kg) 
8.3E+O1 kg (2.1E+04 mg/kg) 
2.4E+00 kg (1.4E+OO mg/kg) 
5.OE-02 kg (7.4E+02 mg/kg) 
_- 
Electrical service is estimated at 
13.8 kV, 400 amp service. 
Mean thunderstorm frequency is 
low, averaging 10/yr, with the 
highest likelihood of occurrence 
during the months of June, July, and 
August. 
Remarksb 
Reactivity varies with 
chemical form, incompatible 
with acetylene, ammonia, 
chlorine dioxide, azides, 
calcium (amalgam 
formation), sodium carbide, 
lithium, rubidium, copper. 
Mercury alkyl compounds 
incompatible with strong 
oxidizers (e.g., chlorine). 
Incompatible with strong 
oxidizers, hydrogen peroxide, 
acids. 
High-voltage lines shorting to 
ground could result in sparks 
that could initiate a brush fire 
in adjacent areas. See 
remarks for flammability and 
kine t ic/po ten t i a1 energy 
hazard types. 
Lightening could initiate a 
brush fire. See remarks for 
flammability and 
kinetidpo tenti a1 energy 
hazard types. 
Referencesc 
BHI, 2002, Determination of 
WAR for 300-FF-2 OU Sites, 
Calc. No. 0300F-CA-N0003, 
Rev. 0 
Based on 300-FF-1 and 
1 OO-NR- 1 designs 
Hoitink et al., 2002, Hanford 
Site Climatological Data 
Summary 2001 With 
Historical Data, 
PNNL-13859 
-8)". 
Hazard Type 
Wural phenomena 
:continued) 
Form 
Seismic event resulting in 
ground motion. 
Extreme temperatures. 
Quantity 
]The Hanford Site is located in 
Zone 2B, a zone of moderate 
seismicity. For the 300 Area, peak 
ground accelerations ranges from 0.1 
to 0.3 g, have a corresponding 
snnual mean frequency of from 
I-.OE-03 to 2.OE-04. 
Undefined quantities. 
Remarks' 
An earthquake would not be 
expected to posses enough 
energy to cause a release of 
contaminated soil directly to 
the air. During a seismic 
event, a heavy load could be 
dropped onto contaminated 
soil causing an airborne (puff) 
release. 
The Environmental Impact 
Statement for the inactive 
reactors determined that the 
radiological impacts from an 
earthquake are insignificant . 
Temperature extremes range 
from -29 to 46°C 
(-20 to 115" F). 
Referencesc 
Hanford Generic Interim 
Safety Basis, WHC-SD-GN- 
ISB-30001, Rev. 0 (WHC 
1994) 
DOE, 1989, Draft 
Environmental Impact 
Statement, Decommissioning 
of Eight Surplus Production 
Reactors at the Hanford Site, 
Richland, Washington, 
DOEEIS-0 1 1 9D 
Hoitink et al., 2002, Hanford 
Site Climatological Data 
Summary 2001 With 
Historical Data, 
PNNL- 1 3859 
eet for )a* 
Hazard Type 
qatural phenomena 
continued) 
Form 
High winds. 
Ash fall resulting from volcanic 
activity. 
Flooding from the Columbia 
River. 
Seismic. 
Quantity 
[n the 300 Area, the annual average 
wind speed is 12.1 km/hr (7.5 mph) 
Peak gusts have occurred as high as 
129 km/hr (80 mph) (1972). The 
annual average for number of days 
with peak gusts in excess of 
80 kmhr (50 mph) is 4.7 days. 
Winds in excess of 40 kmhr 
(25 mph) occur slightly more than 
1% of the time, on an annual basis. 
Undefined quantities. During the 
May 18, 1980 eruption of Mount 
St. Helens, about 7.6 mm (0.3 in.) of 
ash was deposited at the Hanford 
Site this resulted in a wet ash 
loading of only 20.4 kg/m2 (4.2 
1 b/ft2). 
The probable maximum flood 
(PMIF) is estimated to produce a 
Columbia River elevation at the 300 
Area of 116.5 m (382 ft) above 
mean sea level. 
Remarksb 
Some fraction of the dry, 
contaminated soils will be 
suspended in air. 
High winds could cause 
debris to be thrown (a 
missile), causing a kinetic 
energy hazard, or causing a 
"puff' release if this material 
strikes contaminated soil. 
Historically, only minimal 
amounts of ash accumulation 
resulting from volcanic 
activity have occurred at the 
Hanford Site. This could 
result in coating of exposed 
surfaces at the excavation 
site; however, it would not 
result in a release of material. 
As discussed in the feasibility 
study, the probable maximum 
flood of either the Columbia 
or Yakima Rivers (more so 
for the Columbia) is not 
anticipated to inundate the 
300-FF-2 Operable Unit. 
The Environmental Impact 
Statement for the inactive 
reactors determined that the 
radiological impacts from an 
earthquake are insignificant. 
Referencesc 
Koitink et al., 2002, Hanford 
Site Climatological Data 
Summary 2001 With 
Historical Data, 
P N N L -  13859 
DOE-RL,, 2000, Focused 
Feasibility Study for  the 
300-FF-2 Operable Unit, 
DOE/RL-99-40. Rev. 0 
Hazard Type 
Jatural phenomena 
continued) 
Kinetic and potential energy 
Form 
<ainwater/snow and ice. 
~ 
Heavy equipment/rnachinery/ 
Jehicle impacting the 
:ontamhated soil or drums of 
mste materials. 
Quantity 
vlaximum amount of precipitation 
wer a 12-hour period is 2.72 cm 
1.07 in.), with a return period of 
15 years (design basis). 
A similar project (1 18-IC- 1 Burial 
Ground remediation) estimate 
includes the following heavy 
zquipment allocation: 
Dozer: 
Hydraulic excavators: 2 
Grader: 1 
Water truck: 1 
Shuttle truck: 3 
Scrapers: 3 
Backhoe: 1 
Fuel truck: 1 
Pickup trucks: 5. 
- 
Rernar ksb - 
spread of contamination 
:odd occur. The arid-to- 
;emi-arid climate suggests 
hat little, if any, surface 
water will accumulate within 
he excavation. Most 
xecipitation is lost through 
:vapotranspiration. In 
Iddition, the transmissive 
iature of the surface soils 
illows rapid infiltration of 
xecipitation. Consequently, 
ittle water remains to 
generate surface runoff. 
Heavy machinery may collide 
with contaminated soil 
Zausing a “puff” release of 
Zontaminated material. 
References‘ 
>OE-RL, 2000, Focused 
7easibility Study for the 
100-FF-2 Operable Unit, 
>OE/RL-99-40, Rev. 0 
3ased on STRs for 100-B/C, 
IOO-N, and 100-F RA 
xojects 
Hazard Type 
Cinetic and potential energy 
continued) 
Form 
Zompressed gas bottles. 
Falling loads/equipment used 
during remediation activities. 
Aircraft collision. 
Quantity 
Such materials will be kept to the 
minimum needed to support the 
project. 
Compressed gasses, estimated 
quantities: 
Acetylene: 45 kg (100 lb in seven 
cylinders) 
Propane: 380 L (100 gal in ten 
1 0-gal tanks) 
Oxygen: 1.4E+04 L (in four 5-gal 
tanks). 
1 18 drums total (estimated) during 
the course of the project. 
Undefined quantity. 
Remarksb 
A pressurized missile could 
strike a patch of contaminated 
soil or drums, resulting in a 
“puff’ release of 
contaminated soils. Heavy 
machinery could collide with 
the tanks causing catastrophic 
failure/explosion of tank and 
potential struck-by hazard, as 
well as “puff’ release of 
contaminated soil. 
A falling drum could strike 
contaminated soil, or another 
filled drum, resulting in a 
“puff” release. 
The probability of this type of 
event is extremely low (per 
DOE-STD-3014-96, the 
frequency would be below 
1 .OE-06). The Hanford Site is 
subject to very limited aircraft 
traffic due to relative location 
of airports and normal air 
traffic patterns. 
Referencesc 
ERC Chemical Inventory 
Database for 100-B/C, 
100-N, and 100-F RA 
xojects 
DOE, 1996, DOE-STD- 
30 14-96 
azard Type 
Kinetic and potential energy 
(continued) 
Form 
A drum being dropped a vertical 
distance. 
uantity I emarksb 
1 18 drums. It is assumed that a drop 
would be of sufficient 
velocity to rupture the drum 
causing a “puff-type” 
airborne release. 
eferences‘ I 
a The 61 8-8 Site has been remediated. Hazard identification information for the site is retained here for historical information 
A key to the Remarks column is as follows: 
KHC = Known to be a Human Carcinogen, as defined in the Report on Carcinogens, Ninth Edition (DHHS 2001). 
RAHC = Reasonably Anticipated to be a Human Carcinogen, as defined in the Report on Carcinogens, Ninth Edition (DHt 
NC = Not classified as either KHC or RAHC in the Report on Carcinogens, Ninth Edition (DHHS 2001). 
Complete reference citations are provided in the reference section located at the end of this appendix. 
RA = Remedial Action (project) 
STR = subcontract technical representative 
WIDS = Waste Information Data System 
s 2001). 
t i ~ c a ~ ~ o  €!et for 
Hazard Type 
Radiological 
Criticality 
Toxic material 
Form 
Jranium-contaminated soil 
md solid waste from reactor 
'uel manufacturing. Also 
ncludes lab bottles (liquids) 
ind other discrete items. 
Waste is present as soil, non- 
:ombustible solids, 
:ombustible solids, non- 
:ombustible liquids, and 
:ombustible liquids. 
Contaminated soil and debris, 
including lab bottles (liquids) 
and discrete items. 
Uranium-contaminated soil 
and solid waste from reactor 
fuel manufacturing. 
Quantity 
4m-241: 1.00E-05 Ci 
20-60: 1.53E-03 Ci 
Zn-65: 3.05E-03 Ci 
3r-90: 3.28E-02 Ci 
3-137: 7.00E-03 Ci 
Eu- 155: 1 .OOE-05 Ci 
Ra-226: 6.54E-03 Ci 
Pu-238: 1.OOE-05 Ci 
Pu-239: 1.00E-05 Ci 
Pu-24 1: 1.00E-05 Ci 
I'h-228: 1.44E-02 Ci 
U-234: 5.16E+00 Ci 
U-235: 4.75E-01 Ci 
U-238: 5.16E+OO Ci 
rota1 curies from all waste forms. 
Am-24 1 : 5.1 8E-04 Ci 
Pu-238: 1.00E-05 Ci 
Pu-239: 4.31E-01 Ci 
Pu-24 1 : 1 .OOE-05 Ci 
U-235: 1.82E+00 Ci 
Total all curies for all waste forms. 
As: 2.1 E+Ol kg (3.5E+00 mg/kg) 
Pb: 2.0 E+03 kg (3.3E+02 m a g ) .  
Remarksa 
Soil concentration data from 
618-4 burial ground are used 
as analogous site data for the 
618-13 site soil. Soil 
inventory based on 
concentration from 6 18-4 
times the soil volume. 
Justification of use of this 
inventory is provided in 
Section 4.1.2 of the ASA. 
The inventory also includes 
contaminated liquids based 
on general lab bottles found 
in 618-3; and discrete waste 
items based on discrete items 
found in 61 8-2 including the 
6 18-2 safe. 
Criticality Safety Review 
concluded that criticality 
safety controls are not 
required. Field Verification 
Requirements should be used 
as safes or containers are 
discovered. 
Referencesb 
HCH, 2006a, Determination of 
Material at Risk (MAR) for 
300- FF-2 0 U Sites, 
)300F-CA-N0003 
WCH, 2006c, Rernediation of 
Lhe 618-3 Burial Ground, 
Clriticality Safety Review 
1300X-CE-NO008 
WCH 2006a 
BHI, 1994,300-FF-2 Operable 
Unit Technical Baseline 
'ieport, BHI-00012, Rev. 0 
le azar sheet for 
~ 
Cd: 9.1 E+OO kg ( 1.5E+00 mg/kg). 
Hazard Type 
RAHC (if present as 
chloride, oxide, sulfate, or 
sulfide). 
krcinogens 
Cr: 3.8 E+03 kg (6.2E+02 mgkg). 
Biohazards 
KHC (if present in 
hexavalent state). 
Asphyxiates 
~ 
Pb: 2.0 E+03 kg (3.3E+02 mg/kg). 
Form 
RAHC (if present as lead 
acetate or phosphate). 
KHC (if present as 
chromate). 
Jranium-contaminated soil 
nd solid waste from reactor 
uel manufacturing. 
Insect/rodent bites and dust 
from excrement. 
Heavier-than-air gasses. 
1
Quantity I Remar ksa 
4s: 2.1 E+O1 kg (3.5E+00 mg/kg). KHC (if present in its 
elemental or soluble forms. 
Be: 2.0 E+OO kg (3.3E-01 mgkg). RAHC (if present as 
chloride, fluoride, hydroxide, 
oxide, phosphate, sulfate, 
tetrahydrate, zinc silicate, or 
beryllium-aluminum alloy). 
Ni: 2.3 E+03 kg (3.7E+02 mgkg). RAHC (if present as acetate, 
carbonate, carbonyl, 
hydroxide, nickelocene, 
oxide, or subsulfide). 
s: 5.6 E+OO kg (9.2E-01 mg/kg). IRAHC 
Undefined quantities. 
Referencesb 
NCH 2006a 
I 
I These hazards are routinely encountered in industry. 
Estimated maximum quantities: 
Acetylene: 45 kg (100 lb) 
Propane: 380 L (100 gal). 
These hazards are routinely 
encountered in industry. 
Activities will be carried out 
in outdoor, well-ventilated 
areas. 
Chemical Inventory Database 
for 100-B/C, 100-N, and 100-F 
RA projects 
e ~ t i ~ ~ a t i o ~  eet for 
Hazard Type 
ilammable materials 
Form 
Vegetation. 
Miscellaneous combustibles, 
general construction waste, 
including pieces of plastic, 
aardboard, wood, cloth, and 
;>ther types generated during 
remediation. Containers with 
Dil, paint chips, and waxy 
material. Powder/salts, 
automotive-type batteries, 
asbestos, fabric belting 
material, and used rags may 
also be found during site 
remediation activities. 
Quantity 
Surface of burial ground essentially 
levoid of vegetation. 
Jnknown quantity of combustible waste 
:xpected to be relatively small given the 
xesence of “burning pits” within the 
300 Area. 
Remarksa 
A range fire would not cause 
a significant release of 
hazardous substances due to 
the lack of Combustibles, 
especially vegetation, within 
the remediation site (the site 
will have been cleared of 
combustibles prior to 
initiation of remediation 
activities). Minimal amounts 
have been encountered at 
other burial ground 
remediation sites (6 18-4 and 
6 18-5). 
No combustible wastes were 
encountered at other nearby 
burial grounds (618-4 and 
618-5). 
Referencesb 
3erber, M. S., 1992, Past 
Practices Technical 
rharacterization Study: 
300 Area-Hanford Site, 
WHC-MR-0388 
ble ti~cation eet for 
Hazard Type 
~lammable materials 
:continued) 
Corrosives 
Explosive materials 
Form 
Tuels and oils used by project. 
Clontaminated soil. 
Soil and debris. 
Quantity 
Quantities of such materials will be kept 
to the minimum needed to support the 
project. Estimated quantities (total): 
Gasoline: 190 L 
Diesel: 2,000 L 
Lubricating oil: 570 L 
Paints, cleaners, solvents, 
adhesives: 380 L 
Acetylene: 45 kg 
Antifreeze: 450 L 
Brake Fluid: 19 L 
Hydraulic/transmission fluid: 760 L 
Propane: 380 L. 
Fluoride: 6.0E+01 kg (3.3E+00 mgkg). 
N03: 5.lE+02 kg (8.4E-t-01 mg/kg) 
Copper: 1.2E+03 kg (1.9E+02 mg/kg). 
Remarksa 
Fuels and oils are found in 
vehicles, spare drums and 
:anks, connex boxes, and 
flammable storage cabinets. 
Corrosive nature assumed 
mitigated by mixing with 
soil. 
Nitrates can react severely 
with sulfuric acid. Copper 
;an react severely with 
acetylene and hydrogen 
peroxide if present as metal 
dust/mist. If mixed with soil, 
explosive potential assumed 
negated. 
Referencesb 
Estimated quantities based on 
ERC Chemical Inventory 
Database for 100-B/C, 1 00-N, 
and 100-K RA projects, and 
Envirocon Chemical Inventory, 
dated 6/20/07, for Hanford 300 
Area Project #14678 
WCH 2006a 
WCH 2006a 
aza 
Hazard Type 
ixplosive materials 
continued) 
teactive hazards 
Form 
3anisters and bottles of 
icetylene, propane, oxygen, 
ysoline in equipment fuel 
anks and in other approved 
; torage containers. 
Soil and debris. 
uantity 
&intities of such materials will be kept 
3 the minimum needed to support the 
lroject . 
ktimated quantities: 
hsoline: 190 L 
Xesel: 2000 L 
,ubricating oil: 570 L 
jrease, paints, cleaners, solvents, 
adhesives: 380 L 
icetylene: 45 kg 
Ixygen: 45 kg 
'ropane: 380 L. 
ig: 5.8 E+02 kg (9.6Et-01 mg/kg). 
i s :  2.1 E+01 kg (3.5E-i-00 mgkg). 
Remarksa 
Bottles of acetylene and 
3xygen may be brought to 
:he site. Gasoline and diesel 
1s present in various vehicles 
3n site (e.g., heavy 
machinery used for 
jxcavation, or transport). 
4n explosion could initiate a 
fire, or cause some amount of 
zontaminated soil to be 
suspended in air. 
Dust and soluble compounds 
incompatible with oxy- 
acetylene, ammonia, 
hydrogen peroxide, 
bromoazide, chlorine 
trifluoride, ethyleneimine, 
Dxalic acid, and tartaric acid. 
In the form of a soil 
contaminant, it would not be 
expected to be a reactive 
hazard. 
Incompatible with strong 
oxidizers and bromine azide 
Note: Hydrogen gas can 
react with inorganic arsenic 
to form the highly toxic gas 
arsine. In the form of a soil 
contaminant, it would not be 
expected to be a reactive 
hazard. 
Referencesb 
Estimated quantities based on 
ERC Chemical Inventory 
Database for 100-B/C, 100-N, 
and 100-K RA projects, and 
Envirocon Chemical Inventory, 
dated 6/20/07, for Hanford 300 
Area Project #14678 
WCH 2006a 
NIOSH, 2000, Online NIOSH 
Pocket Guide to Chemical 
Hazards, and Other Databases, 
Publication No. 2000- 130 
tifiea orksheet for Soli 
Hazard Type 
teactive hazards 
continued) 
Form 
;oil and debris. 
continued) 
Quantity 
3a: 2.3E1-02 kg (3.8E+01 mgkg). 
Be: 2.OE+OO kg (3.3E-01 mg/kg). 
Cd: 9.1 E+O 1 kg ( 1.5E+00 mg/kg). 
CO: 2.2E+02 kg (3.6E+O1 mg/kg). 
Remarks' 
Barium chloride 
incompatible with acids and 
Dxidizers; barium nitrate 
incompatible with acids, 
oxidizers, and aluminum- 
magnesium alloys. In the 
form of a soil contaminant, it 
would not be expected to be a 
reactive hazard. 
Incompatible with acids, 
caustics, chlorinated 
hydrocarbons, oxidizers. In 
the form of a soil 
contaminant, it would not be 
expected to be a reactive 
hazard. 
Incompatible with strong 
oxidizers; elemental sulfur, 
selenium, and tellurium. In 
the form of a soil 
contaminant, it would not be 
expected to be a reactive 
hazard. 
Incompatible with strong 
oxidizers and ammonium 
nitrate. In the form of a soil 
contaminant, it would not be 
expected to be a reactive 
hazard. 
Referencesb 
NCH 2006a 
\JIOSH, 2000, Online NIOSH 
Docket Guide to Chemical 
Yazards, and Other Databases, 
'ublication No. 2000- 1 30 
le azar ti~catio 
Hazard Type 
Ceactive hazards 
continued) 
Form 
Soil and debris. 
continued) 
Quantity 
3: 3.8E+03 kg (6.2E+02 mg/kg). 
h: 1.2E+03 kg (1.9E+O2 mgkg). 
Bg: 2.7E+O1 kg (4SE+OO mg/kg). 
Remarks’ 
Varies with ionic species. 
Metal incompatible with 
strong oxidizers (e.g., 
hydrogen peroxide) or 
slkalis. In the form of a soil 
aontaminant, it would not be 
sxpected to be a reactive 
hazard. 
[ncompatible with acetylene 
and hydrogen peroxide 
(assume copper is in metallic 
€orm). In the form of a soil 
contaminant, it would not be 
expected to be a reactive 
hazard. 
Varies with chemical form. 
Incompatible with acetylene, 
ammonia, azides, calcium, 
chlorine dioxide, lithium, 
rubidium, copper, sodium 
carbide. 
Mercury alkyl compounds 
incompatible with strong 
oxidizers (e.g., chlorine). 
Referencesb 
N C H  2006a 
VIOSH, 2000, Online NIOSH 
pocket Guide to Chemical 
‘lazards, and Other Databases, 
’ublication No. 2000- 130 
Hazard Type 
.eactive hazards 
:ontinued) 
Form 
oil and debris. 
continued) 
Quantity 
Vi: 2.3E+03 kg (3.7E+02 mg/kg). 
b: 2.0E+03 kg (3.3Et-02 m a g ) .  
PP: 1.7E+03 kg (2,8E+02 m a g ) .  
Remarks' 
Vickel metal incompatible 
with strong acids, sulfur, 
selenium, wood and other 
:ombustibles, nickel nitrate. 
[n the form of a soil 
:ontaminant, it would not be 
:xpected to be a reactive 
iazard. Varies with chemical 
Form, incompatible with 
Icetylene, ammonia, chlorine 
$oxide, azides, calcium 
[amalgam formation), 
sodium carbide, lithium, 
rubidium, copper. Mercury 
alkyl compounds 
incompatible with strong 
oxidizers (e.g., chlorine). As 
a soil contaminant, it would 
not be expected to be a 
reactive hazard. 
Incompatible with strong 
oxidizers, hydrogen peroxide. 
acids. In the form of a soil 
contaminant, it would not be 
expected to be a reactive 
hazard. 
Combustible, but solid form 
is difficult to ignite; however, 
powder form may ignite 
spontaneously and can 
continue burning under 
water. In the form of a soil 
contaminant, it would not be 
expected to be a reactive 
hazard. 
References 
VCH 2006a 
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Hazard Type 
teac t i ve hazards 
continued) 
ilectrical energy 
Wural phenomena 
Form 
soil and debris. 
continued) 
Supply lines outside of the 
:xcavation fence for office 
railers and analytical needs. 
Lightning. 
Seismic event resulting in 
pound motion. 
Extreme temperatures. 
Quantity 
VQ3: 5.1E+02 kg (8.4E+O 1 mgkg). 
Electrical service is estimated at 
13.8 kV, 400 amp service. 
Mean thunderstorm frequency is low, 
averaging 10/yr, with the highest 
likelihood of occurrence during the 
months of June, July, and August. 
The Hanford Site is located in Zone 2B, 
a zone of moderate seismicity. For the 
300 Area, peak ground accelerations 
ranges from 0.1 to 0.3 g, have a 
corresponding annual mean frequency 
of from 4.OE-03 to 2.OE-04. 
Undefined quantities. 
Remarks' 
Nitrates can react severely 
with sulfuric acid. As a soil 
;ontaminant, this chemical 
species would not be 
2xpected to be highly 
reactive. 
High-voltage lines shorting 
to ground could result in 
sparks that could initiate a 
brush fire in adjacent areas. 
See remarks for flammability 
and kineWpotentia1 energy 
hazard types. 
Lightning could initiate a 
brush fire. See remarks for 
flammability and 
kinetic/potential energy 
hazard types. 
During a seismic event, a 
heavy load could be dropped 
onto contaminated soil 
causing an airborne (puff) 
release. 
The Environmental Impact 
Statement for the inactive 
reactors determined that the 
radiological impacts from an 
earthquake are insignificant. 
Temperature extremes range 
from -29 to 46°C 
(-20 to 115" F). 
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Hazard Type 
rJatural phenomena 
continued) 
Form 
High winds. 
Ash fall resulting from 
volcanic activity. 
Flooding from the Columbia 
River. 
Quantity 
[n the 300 Area, the annual average 
wind speed is 12.2 kmhr (7.6 mph) 
The maximum peak gust wind speed at 
Hanford was 129 kmhr (80 mph) 
(1972). The annual average for number 
of days with peak gusts in excess of 
80 kmhr (50 mph) is 4.7 days. 
Winds in excess of 40 kmhr (25 mph) 
occur slightly more than 1% of the time, 
on an annual basis. 
Undefined quantities. During the May 
18, 1980 eruption of Mount St. Helens, 
about 7.6 mm (0.3 in.) of ash was 
deposited at the Hanford Site this 
resulted in a wet ash loading of only 
20.4 kg/m2 (4.2 lb/ft2). 
The probable maximum flood (PMF) is 
estimated to produce a Columbia River 
elevation at the 300 Area of 116.5 m 
(382 ft) above mean sea level. 
Remarksa 
Some fraction of the dry, 
contaminated soils will be 
suspended in air. 
High winds could cause 
debris to be thrown (a 
missile), causing a kinetic 
energy hazard, or causing a 
“puff’ release if this material 
strikes contaminated soil. 
Historically, only minimal 
amounts of ash accumulation 
resulting from volcanic 
activity have occurred at the 
Hanford Site. This could 
result in coating of exposed 
surfaces at the excavation 
site; however, it would not 
result in a release of material. 
As discussed in the feasibility 
study, the probable maximum 
flood of either the Columbia 
or Yakima Rivers (more so 
for the Columbia) is not 
anticipated to inundate the 
300-FF-2 Operable Unit. 
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Hazard Type 
qatural phenomena 
continued) 
Kinetic and potential 
mergy 
Form 
Xainwater/snow and ice. 
Heavy equipment/machiner y/ 
vehicle impacting the 
contaminated soil or drums of 
waste materials. 
Quantity 
4verage annual precipitation at the 
HMS is 17 cm (6.8 in.). The wettest 
season on record was the winter of 
1996-1997 with 14.1 cm (5.4 in.) of 
precipitation. Days with greater than 
1.3 cm (0.50 in.) precipitation occur on 
average less than one time each year. 
The 25 year 24-hour isopluvial (storm) 
is 4.1 cm (1.6 in.). 
Average monthly snowfall in winter 
ranges from 0.25 cm (0.1 in.) to 13.2 crn 
(5.2 in.). The record monthly snowfall 
of 59.4 cm (23.4 in.) occurred during 
January 1950. The seasonal record 
snowfall of 142.5 cm (56.1 in.) occurred 
during the winter of 1992- 1993. 
Estimated heavy equipment quantities: 
Dozer: 1 
Hydraulic excavators: 2 
Grader: 1 
Water truck: 1 
Roll-Off trucks: 2 
Loaders: 2 
Backhoe: 1 
Forklift: 1 
Fuel truck: 1 
Pickup trucks: 5 
Van: 1 
Remarksa 
Spread of contamination 
could occur. The arid-to- 
semi-arid climate suggests 
that little, if any, surface 
water will accumulate within 
the excavation. Most 
precipitation is lost through 
evapotranspiration. In 
addition, the transmissive 
nature of the surface soils 
allows rapid infiltration of 
precipitation. Consequently, 
little water remains to 
generate surface runoff. 
Melting snow or ice would 
likewise not be expected to 
produce substantial runoff 
due to the soils high 
permeability. 
Heavy machinery may 
collide with contaminated 
soil causing a “puff’ release 
of contaminated material. 
Heavy machinery may 
collide with drums 
containing retrieved wastes, 
rupturing the drums and 
causing particles to become 
airborne. 
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Hazard Type 
Linetic and potential 
:nergy (continued) 
Form 
Zompressed gas bottles. 
Aircraft collision. 
Quantity 
Such materials will be kept to the 
ninimum needed to support the project. 
zompressed gasses, estimated 
pntit ies:  
Acetylene: 45 kg (100 lb in seven 
; yl inders) 
Propane: 380 L (100 gal in ten 10-gal 
mks)  
3xygen: 45kg (100 lb in four 
: y1 inder s) . 
Undefined quantity. 
Remar ksa 
A pressurized missile could 
strike a patch of 
contaminated soil or drums, 
resulting in a “puff’ release 
of contaminated soils. Heavy 
machinery could collide with 
the tanks causing 
catastrophic failure/explosion 
of tank and potential struck- 
by hazard, as well as “puff’ 
release of contaminated soil. 
The probability of this type 
of event is extremely low 
(per DOE-STD-3014-96, the 
frequency would be below 
1 .OE-06). The Hanford Site 
is subject to very limited 
aircraft traffic due to relative 
location of airports and 
normal air traffic patterns. 
A key to the Remarks column is as follows: 
KHC 
RAHC = Reasonably Anticipated to be a Human Carcinogen, as defined in the Report on Carcinogens, Ninth Edition (DHHS 2001). 
NC 
Complete reference citations are provided in the reference section located at the end of this appendix. 
= Known to be a Human Carcinogen, as defined in the Report on Carcinogens, Ninth Edition (DHHS 2001). 
= Not classified as either KHC or RAHC in the Report on Carcinogens, Ninth Edition (DHHS 2001). 
RA = Remedial Action (project) 
STR = subcontract technical representative 
WIDS = Waste Information Data System 
Referencesb 
ERC Chemical Inventory 
Database for lOO-B/C, 100-N, 
and 100-F RA projects 
DOE, 1996, 
DOE-STD-30 14-96 
- azar tifica tio ksheets 
WCH-137 
Rev. 1 
BHI, 1994,300-FF-2 Operable Unit Technical Baseline Report, BHI-000 12, Rev. 00, Bechtel 
Hanford, Inc., Richland, Washington. 
BHI, 2001,618-4 Burial Ground ASMFHC, MOC-2001-0011, November 6, Bechtel Hanford, 
Inc., Richland, Washington. 
BHI, 2003 a, 61 8-2 Supplemental Radionuclide Inveiztory Estimate, 0300X-CA-NO0 16, Rev. 0, 
3/3 1/03, Bechtel Hanford, Inc., Richland, Washington. 
BHI, 2003b, Hazard Categorization of the 61 8-2 and 618-3 Waste Sites, 0300X-CA-N0015, 
Rev. 1,4/2/03, Bechtel Hanford, Inc., Richland, Washington. 
BHI, 2004a, 61 8-2 Burial Ground Spent Fuel Inventory Calculation Based on Waste Disposal 
Data, 0300X- CA-NO0 19, Rev. 0,5/24/04, Bechtel Hanford, Inc., Richland, Washington. 
,618-2 Exposure Rate Per Mass of Fuel Calculation, 0300X-CA-NO0 18, Rev, 0, 
10/30/03, Bechtel Hanford, Inc., Richland, Washington. 
BHI, 2004c, Determination of Material at Risk (MAR) for 300-FF-2 OU Sites, 
0300F-CA-N0003, Rev. 2, Bechtel Hanford, Inc., Richland, Washington. 
BHI, 2005a, Remediation: 61 8-3 Burial Ground, Criticality Safety Review 0300X-CE-N0006, 
Rev. 3, 8/4/05, Bechtel Hanford, Inc., Richland, Washington. 
BHI, 2005b, Remediation: 61 8-8 Burial Ground, Criticality Safety Review 03OOX-CE-N0007, 
Rev. 3, 8/4/05, Bechtel Hanford, Inc., Richland, Washington. 
DHHS, 2001, Report on Carcinogens, Ninth Edition, U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services, National Toxicology Program, National Institute of nvironmental Health 
Sciences, Research Triangle Park, North Carolina. 
DOE, 1987, Final EIS: Disposal of Hanford Defense High-Level, Transuranic and Tank Wastes, 
DOE/EIS-0113, U.S. Department of Energy, Washington, D.C. 
DOE, 1989, Environmental Impact Statement of Haizford; Decommissioning of Eight Surplus 
Production Reactors at the Haizford Site, Richland, Washington, DOEEIS-0 1 19D, 
U.S. Department of Energy, Washington, D.C. 
DOE, 1996, DOE Standard Accident Analysis for Aircraft Crash into Hazardous Facilities, 
DOE-STD-3014-96, U.S. Department of Energy, Washington, D.C. 
DOE-RL, 1993, Haizford Site Waste Information Data System, U.S. Department of Energy, 
Richland Operations Office, Richland, Washington. 
FHC for  the Remediation of Six 300-FF-2 Operable Unit Solid Waste Burial Grounds 
May 2008 
WCH-137 
Rev. 1 
DOE-RL, 1995, Phase 111 Feasibility Study Report for the 300-FF-1 Operable Unit, 
DOE/RL-94-49, Rev. 0, US.  Department of Energy, Richland Operations Office, 
Rich1 and, Washington. 
8 DOE-RL, 2000, Focused Feasibility Study for the 300-FF-2 Operable Unit, DOERL-99-40, 
U.S . Department of Energy, Richland Operations Office, Richland, Washington. 
DUN, 1977, Manufacturing Process Specifications, Metallic Uranium Fuel Elements Fabricated 
by the Co-extrusion Process, DUN-560 1, Douglas United Nuclear, Richland, 
Washington. 
Gerber, M. S ., 1992, Past Practices Technical Characterization Study: 300 Area-Hanford Site, 
WHC-MR-03 88, Westinghouse Hanford Company, Richland, Washington. 
Hoitink, D. J., K. W. Burk, J. V. Ramsdell, and W. J. Shaw, 2005, HanfordSite Climatological 
Data Sumnary 2004 with Historical Data, PNNL- 15 160, Pacific Northwest National 
Laboratory, Richland, Washington. 
Metcalf, 1980, Analysis of 618-8 Burial Ground Soil, Letter 65452-80-204 dated October 31, to 
R. E. Wheeler, Rockwell Hanford Operations, Richland, Washington. 
Neitzel, D. A., A. L. Bunn, S .  D. Cannon, et. al., 2005, Hanford Site National Environmental 
Policy Act (NEPA) Characterization Report, PNNL-6415, Rev. 17, Pacific Northwest 
National Laboratory, Richland, Washington. 
NIOSH, 2000, Pocket Guide to Chemical Hazards, Publication No. 2000-130, U.S. Department 
of Health and Human Services, National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, 
Cincinnati, Ohio. 
Stenner, R. D., K. H. Cramer, K. A. Higley, S .  J. Jette, D. A. Lamar, T. J. McLaughlin, 
D. R. Sherwood, and N. C. Van Houten, 1988, Hazard Ranking System Evaluation of 
CERCLA Inactive Waste Sites at Haizford, PNL-6456, Pacific Northwest Laboratory, 
Richland, Washington. 
UNC, 1986, Drafl Environmental Impact Statement, Disposal of Hanford Defense High-Level, 
Transuranic, and Tank Wastes, letter dated August 8, to R. A. Holten, U.S. Department 
of Energy, from D. L. Renberger, United Nuclear Industries, Richland, Washington. 
WCH, 2005,618-7 Integrated Hazard Evaluation Worksheet, IHE-2005-0017, Rev. 3, 
Washington Closure Hanford, Richland, Washington. 
WCH, 2006a, Determination of Material at Risk (MAR) for 300-FF-2 OU Sites, 
0300F-CA-N0003, Rev. 9, Washington Closure Hanford, Richland, Washington. 
FHC for the Remediation of Six 300-FF-2 Operable Unit Solid Waste Burial Grounds 
May 2008 A- 106 
en 
WCH- 137 
Rev. 1 
WCH, 2006b, Remediation of the 61 8-2 Burial Ground, Criticality Safety Review 
0300X-CE-N0005, Rev. 5,5/30/06, Washington Closure Hanford, Richland, 
Washington. 
WCH, 2006c, Remediation of the 61 8-13 Burial Ground, Criticality Safety Review 
0300X-CE-N0008, Rev. 2,6/8/06, Washington Closure Hanford, Richland, Washington. 
WCH, 2007a, Determination of Material at Risk (MAR) for the 61 8-1 Complex, 
0300X-CA-N0074, Rev. 1, Washington Closure Hanford, Richland, Washington. 
WCH, 2007b, 61 8-1 Burial Ground Final Hazard Categorization Calculation (TQ Adjustment), 
0300X-CA-N0075, Rev. 2, Washington Closure Hanford, Richland, Washington. 
WCH, 2007c, Remediation of the 61 8-1 Complex, Criticality Safety Review, 0300X-CE-N0004, 
Rev. 3, Washington Closure Hanford, Richland, Washington. 
WCH, 2007d, Remediation of the 61 8-7 Burial Ground, Criticality Safety Review 
0300X-CE-N0009, Rev. 5, Washington Closure Hanford, ichland, Washington. 
WCH, 2007e, 300- FF-2/618- 7- Discovery of Documentation About the Material Disposed in the 
61 8-7 Burial Ground, HCE-2007-0002, Rev. 0, Washington Closure Hanford, Richland, 
Washington. 
WDOE, 2004, Stormwater Management Manual for Eastern Washington, Publication Number 
04- 10-076, September 2004, Washington State Department of Ecology, Olympia, 
Washington (h ttp://w w w . ecy . w a. ~ov/pubs/04 1007 6. pdf) . 
VVHC, 1994, Hallford Generic Interim Safety Bases, WHC-SD-GN-ISB-30001, Rev. 0, 
Westinghouse Hanford Company, Richland, Washington. 
FHC for the Remediation of Six 300-FF-2 Operable Unit Solid Waste Burial Grounds 
May 2008 A-107 
WCH-137 
Rev. 1 i X  azar ti~catio eets 
FHC for the Remediation of Six 300-FF-2 Operable Unit Solid Waste Burial Grounds 
May 2008 A-108 
WCH-137 
Rev. 1 
FHC for the Remediation of Six 300-FF-2 Operable Unit Solid Waste Burial Grounds 
May 2008 B-i 
WCH-137 
Rev. 1 
FHC for the Remediation of Six 300-FF-2 Operable Unit Solid Waste Burial Grounds 
May 2008 
.. 
-11 
WCH-137 
Rev. 1 
All events that could result in a potential release of hazardous substances were evaluated using 
the following approach: 
Events were grouped into three categories: operational/internal events, natural phenomena 
events, and external/man-made events. 
Events that were not applicable (e.g., flooding due to probable maximum flood, failure of 
engineered ventilation or filtration systems) were noted as not applicable (N/A). 
Frequency, Consequence, and Risk rankings were not assigned for events (such as loss of 
power to equipment) that could not result in a release of hazardous substances. These events 
are noted as not evaluated (NE) in the corresponding columns. 
Consequence and Risk rankings were not assigned to events with an assigned unmitigated 
frequency of D, beyond extremely unlikely. N/E is noted in the corresponding columns. 
Frequency ranks were assigned using the following guidelines and the event frequency rank 
chart shown below. 
The frequency of the initiating event is the unmitigatedfrequency. 
Initiating events that involved human error were assigned an unmitigated frequency rank 
of A. 
Initiating events that involved failure of an active component were assigned an unmitigated 
frequency rank of A. 
Initiating events that involved failure of a passive component were assigned an unmitigated 
frequency rank of B. 
Fire initiators involving use of an ignition source (e.g., vehicle exhaust systems, compressed 
gas torches) were assigned a frequency rank of A. 
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Extremely unlikely 
Beyond extremely unlikely 
Frequency assigned to natural phenomenon events assigned consistent with frequency of 
applicable evaluation basis event. 
C 
D All other events < 1 E-06 
Probably will not occur in the life of the facility 1E-06 to 1E-04 
Events that would not result in a potential release of hazardous substances (e.g., loss of 
power caused by vehicle accident) were not evaluated for frequency. 
ven 
I Anticipated I A I May occur several times in the life of the facility I >1E-02 I 
1 Unlikely I B I Not anticipated to occur during the life of the facility 1 1E-04 to 1E-02 I 
~~~ 
a NS-1-3.2, Table A-1 (WCH 2006) 
Consequence ranks for the public, co-located worker, and facility worker were assigned based on 
anticipated unmitigated dose using the following charts. For events that were assigned a 
frequency of beyond extremely unlikely (event frequency D), the consequences were not 
evaluated. 
a NS-1-3.2, Table A-2 (WCH 2006) 
ce Sa 
I Low I 3 I 25 rem TEDE I <ERPG -2 I TEEL -2 I 
_ _ ~  
a NS-1-3.2, Table A-3 (WCH 2006) 
~~~ 
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Consequence Level 
High 
Moderate 
Low 
WCH- 1 37 
Rev. 1 
Extremely Unlikely 
Unlikely 
I11 I1 I I 
Iv I11 I1 I 
Iv Iv I11 I11 
ce Sa 
Consequence Level 
Site Facility Worker 
Involved worker within facility boundary. 
Use highest dose within facility boundary. 
High 
Moderate 
Facility worker hazards are typically protected with S M p s .  For Safety 
Significant designation, consequence levels such as prompt death or serious 
iniury, (Le., significant radiological and chemical exposure) shall be considered. 
I I 
~~ 
Low 
a NS-1-3.2, Table A-4 (WCH 2006) 
Unmitigated frequency and consequence ranks were used to determine unmitigated risk ranks in 
accordance with the following chart. 
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Event 
Type 
Item Summary Unmitigated Risk Prevention (P) and Mitigation (M) 
Number 
Initiator Location Affected Hazard Event Description Frequency Consequence Risk s s c s  Admin 
OPERATIONAL/INTERNAL EVENTS (INITIATORS INTERNAL TO REMEDIATION ACTIVITIES) 
IV 
IV 
'ire Backflash arrestors 
and pressure 
regulators on welding 
equipment (P). 
Graded/graveled 
roadways minimize 
spread of fire (M). 
;ire IV 
IV 
Iv 
1A 
Graded/graveled 
roadways minimize 
spread of fire (M). 
Separation of roads 
from remediation 
areas may prevent 
vehicle fire fiom 
causing release of 
hazardous substances 
(PI. 
I B  
Improper 
control of 
ignition 
sources 
Vehicle 
malfunction 
411 waste 
ites 
911 waste 
ites 
Soils, debris, and 
irumskontainers 
sontaminated with 
nazardous substances 
:radiological, 
Fissionable, reactive, 
sarcinogenic, toxics, 
;omsive, flammable/ 
combustible). 
Fuel storage tanks, 
cylinders, cabinets 
containing flammable/ 
combustible liquids. 
See 1A 
Welding, cutting, grinding operations or improper 
control of other ignition sources (e.g., smoking) 
ignites flammablekombustible materials used or 
generated during remediation, resulting in an internal 
fire. The fire could result in a release of hazardous 
substances via entrainment. 
The fire could also cause an explosion (see item 2C). 
The fire could also cause an internal missile (see 
item 3A). 
Vehicle malfunction causes vehicle fire. Vehicle fire 
ignites combustible/flammable material used or 
generated during remediation. The fire could result 
in a release of hazardous substances via entrainment. 
The fire could also cause an explosion. (see item 2C) 
The fire could also cause an internal missile (see 
item 3A). 
Public: A 
Coloc. 
Worker: A 
Facility 
Worker: A 
Public: B 
Coloc. 
Worker: B 
Facility 
Worker: B 
Public: 3 
Coloc. 
Worker: 3 
Facility 
Worker: Lorn 
Public: 3 
Coloc. 
Worker: 3 
Facility 
Worker: Lou 
Trained personnel (P). 
Safety/Fire Protection 
Program (see Note I). 
Hanford Fire Department 
response (M). 
Radiation Protection 
Program (see Note 2). 
Routine vehicle 
maintenance (P). 
Safety/Fire Protection 
Program (see Note 1). 
Hanford Fire Department 
response (M). 
Radiation Protection 
Program (see Note 2). 
Event 
Type 
'ire 
Item 
?umber 
IC 
Initiator 
rehicle 
ccident 
,mation 
411 waste 
ites 
Summary 
Affected Hazard 
;ee 1A 
Event Description 
luman error causes vehicle impact to flammable 
iquid storage tanks, cabinets, or pressurized gas 
ylinders, causing breach of tankkabinetslcylinders 
nd pooling of flammabldcombustible liquids or 
,asses. Introduction of an ignition source causes a 
ire resulting in a release of hazardous substances via 
ntrainment. 
%e fire could also cause an explosion (see item 2C). 
%e fire could also cause an internal missile (see 
tem 3A). 
Unmitigated Risk 
kequency 
Public: A 
Coloc. 
Vorker: A 
Facility 
Vorker: A 
:onsequence 
Public: 3 
Coloc. 
Worker: 3 
Facility 
Worker: I..OIA 
- 
Risk 
IV 
IV 
- 
IV 
Prevention (P) and Mitigation (M) 
sscs 
Storage tank/cy linder/ 
:abinet construction/ 
materials provides 
-esistance to damage/ 
ieterioration (P). 
Diking or double- 
walled tanks to 
sontain liquids (P). 
Siting storage tanks/ 
s ylinderskabinets 
Away from heavy 
traffic areas reduces 
accident potential 
(P) 
remediation areas 
reduces potential 
involvement of 
wastes (P) (M) 
* In areas cleared of 
vegetation 
minimizes spread of 
fire (M). 
e Awayfrom 
Admin 
Acensed vehicle 
iperators (P). 
lanford Fire Department 
esponse (M). 
;afety/Fire Protection 
'rogram (see Note 1). 
tadiation Protection 
'rogram (see Note 2). 
eiate e 3  -2 
Event 
Type 
Item 
lumber 
Summary Unmitigated Risk Prevention (P) and Mitigation (M) - 
Wsk 
IV 
IV 
- 
1v 
Initiator mation Affected Hazard Event Description ‘requency :onsequence sscs 
Jse of intrinsically 
afehonsparking 
naterials when 
tpening sealed 
Irumdcontainers (P). 
herpacking 
leteriorated drums 
md filling overpacks 
vhlanketing or 
tabilizing substances 
revents exposure to 
iir (P). 
Admin 
lling drums 
blanketing or 
abilizing substances 
.g., water, sand, grout, 
ineral oil) to prevents 
:posure to air (P). 
ifety/Fire Protection 
-ogram (see Note I) .  
adiation Protection 
-ograni (see Note 2). 
ee 1A Rapid oxidation of pyrophoric material (e.g., 
zirconium or uranium) occurs during opening or 
handling of drurnslcontainers or handling of debris 
resulting in autoignition and a fire resulting in a 
release of hazardous substances via entrainment. 
’ublic: A 
Coloc. 
Vorker: A 
Facility 
Vorker: A 
Public: 3 
Coloc. 
Worker: 3 
Facility 
Norker: Lou 
re ID :hemica1 
:action/ 
utoignition 
f 
yrophoric 
iaterial 
,I1 waste 
ites 
ill waste 
ites 
Blanketing substances (e.g., mineral oil) or films of 
substances that were used to prevent exposure to air 
are anticipated to remain, which minimizes the 
probability of autoignition. Should fire occur with 
facility workers in the area, the release would not be 
confined and would be expected to disperse with air 
currents. Workers would move away, upwind, or 
evacuate the immediate area. Exposure to facility 
workers as a result of a fire is judged to be negligible 
Although uranium and zirconium are pyrophoric 
materials, records indicate they are present as metal 
turnings from machining processes, not as finely 
divided powders/fines required for explosive 
reactions. The potential for explosion and generation 
of an internal missile is judged negligible. 
Radiolytic decomposition of water or hydrocarbon 
materials (e.g., mineral oil) or chemical 
decomposition in sealed drumskontainers produces 
hydrogen. Inadvertent ignition during opening or 
handling of drumdcontainers results in burning or 
explosiorddeflagration and release of hazardous 
substances via entrainment. 
Public: 3 
Coloc. 
Worker: 3 
Facility 
iVorker: Lovi 
IV 
IV 
IV 
Jse of intrinsically 
kafdnonsparking 
naterials when 
Ipening sealed 
Irumdcontainers (P). 
afety/Fire Protection 
rogram (see Note 1). 
adiation Protection 
rogram (see Note 2). 
rxplosio~ 
4ash 
ire (see 
Iote 3) 
2A tadiolytic o 
:hemica1 
lecomposi- 
ion of wastc 
hydrogen) 
lee SA Public: C 
Coloc. 
Norker: C 
Facility 
Norker: C 
The potential for radiolytic or chemical 
decomposition leading to an explosion is judged 
extremely unlikely. The long decay time for the 
anticipated wastes, such as uranium, would result in i 
low generation rate of hydrogen. Degradation of 
initial drum seal integrity to less than 100% via 
environmental (e.g., soil) exposure also decreases the 
potential for a significant accumulation of hydrogen 
Drum headspace further limits the inventory of 
hydrogen that could accumulate, thereby limiting the 
potential energy that could be released as a result of 
ignition. Due to these limitations, should ignition 
occur, a localized rapid bum (not rupture of the drum 
or ejection of its contents) is anticipated. 
Event 
Type 
;xplosior 
;lash 
'ire (see 
lote 3) 
Item 
lumber 
2B 
Initiator 
lultiple 
auses of 
Ooled 
iammable/ 
ombustible 
apors/ 
asses 
mation 
.I1 waste 
tes 
Summary 
Affected Hazard 
ee IA 
Event Description 
L pool of flammabldcombustible vapors/gasses is 
aused by: 
Vehicle accident (item IC) 
Human error during refueling operations, handling 
or use of flammabldcombustible gasses 
Deterioratioddamage of storage tankskylinders. 
nadvertent introduction of an ignition source causes 
n explosion/deflagration resulting in a release of 
lazardous substances via entrainment. 
%e explosion may also result in an internal missile 
see item 3B). 
ilthough the frequency of an inadvertent release of 
lammable/combustible gasses is anticipated due to 
iuman error, the frequency of an explosion that 
vould result from these initiators is judged to be 
:xtremely unlikely. The remediation project uses 
elatively small volumes of flammabldcombustible 
;asses; accordingly, the potential for a release of a 
ignificant quantity of gas as a result of a human 
mor is small. In addition, the gasses are not stored 
n confined areas or buildings. The gasses would be 
:xpected to rapidly disperse thereby preventing 
iccumulations at concentrations that would result in 
in explosion. Should ignition occur, a small 
ocalized flash fire is more likely than an explosion. 
Unmitigated Risk 
kequency 
Public: A 
Coloc. 
Yorker: A 
Facility 
Yorker: A 
Zonsequence 
Public: 3 
Coloc. 
Worker: 3 
Facility 
Norker: Low 
- 
Risk 
IV 
Iv 
Iv 
Prevention (P) and Mitigation (M) 
sscs 
Storage tank/cylinder/ 
:abinet construction/ 
naterials provides 
-esistance to damage/ 
jeterioration (P). 
Siting storage tanks/ 
:ylinders/cabinets 
B Away from heavy 
traffic areas reduces 
vehicle accident 
potential (P) 
8 Away from heavy 
traffic areas 
minimizes ignition 
sources (P) 
B Awayfrom 
remediation areas 
minimizes potential 
for involvement 
with waste 
In areas cleared of 
vegetation 
minimizes spread of 
fire (M) 
In unconfined 
outdoor areas 
minimizes 
collection of 
vapors/gasses (P). 
Backflow preventers 
(PI. 
Underwriters 
Laboratories- (UL)- 
listed pumping 
equipment (P). 
Diking or double- 
walled tanks to 
contain liquids (P). 
Admin 
icensed vehicle 
iperators (P). 
; afety/Fire Protection 
'rogram (see Note I). 
lanford Fire Department 
esponse (M). 
tadiation Protection 
'rogram (see Note 2). 
Drurdcontainer 
construction/materials 
provides some 
protection (M). 
Storage tank/cylinder/ 
cabinet construction/ 
some protection (PI. 
provides 
Use of dust suppressants/ 
fixatives on contaminated 
soils/debris (M). 
Safety/Fire Protection 
Program (see Note 1). 
Spill response procedures 
(MI* 
ssoei e 30 iati 
Event 
Type 
Item 
lumber 
Summary Unmitigated Risk Prevention (P) and Mitigation (M) 
Initiator mation Affected Hazard Event Description srequency :onsequence Risk sscs Admin 
;xplosion 
;lash 
'ire (see 
lote 3) 
2 c  'ire ,11 waste 
ites 
ee 1A 4 fire imparts energy sufficient to heat and pressurize 
uel tanks, gas cylinders, flammable liquid storage 
:abinets, or sealed drumskontainers causing loss of 
ntegrity . 
h e  rupturdexplosion results in a release and burnin8 
)f contents, including hazardous Substances if 
)resent, via entrainment. 
Public: B 
Coloc. 
Worker: B 
Facility 
Worker: B 
Public: 3 
Coloc. 
Worker: 3 
Facility 
Norker: Low 
IV 
IV 
IV 
Storage tank/cylinder/ 
:abinet construction/ 
naterials provides 
;ome protection (P). 
Proper venting of 
.anks/cabinets 
xovidcs some 
xotection (P). 
Siting storage tanks/ 
sy lindedcabinets 
away from 
remediation areas 
lessens probability of 
involvement w/waste 
Po. 
Siting storage tanks/ 
cylinders/cabinets or 
k-ums in areas cleared 
D f  vegetation/ 
combustibles may 
prevent their 
involvement with fire 
m. 
Ianford Fire Department 
esponse (M). 
;afety/Fire Protection 
'rogram (see Note 1). 
tadiation Protection 
'rogram (see Note 2). 
h e  explosion may also result in an internal missile 
see item 3B). 
f i e  potential for a fire imparting energy sufficient to 
:ause rapid pressurization and rupturdexplosion of 
anks, cylinders, drums, or containers is judged 
mlikely. The contained materials provide a heat sink 
hat will retard the heatup and pressurization rates, 
-educing the probability of catastrophic failure of the 
Zontainer, and violent ejection of contents. Vents 
nay also be present (e.g., tanks, cylinders) or may be 
xeated by the heatup (e.g., popping of drum lids) tha 
Mould further reduce the potential for catastrophic 
Failure and ejection. 
3A ;ire ill wastc 
ites 
;ee 1A Fire damages a pressurized cylinder causing an 
internal missile. The internal missile impacts 
sontaminated soil or debris resulting in a puff-like 
release of hazardous substances via entrainment. 
The internal missile may also impact/rupture one or 
more waste drumdcontainers, or fuel storage 
tankdcabinets, resulting in an airborne release of 
hazardous substances and spilling of contents (see 
item 9). 
The internal missile could also cause a secondary 
fire, explosion, spill, or release of material. 
Public: B 
Coloc. 
Worker: B 
Facility 
Worker: B 
Public: 3 
Coloc. 
Worker: 3 
Facility 
Worker: Low 
IV 
IV 
IV 
ntemal 
dissile 
Siting storage tanks/ 
cy linderdcabinet s 
away from 
remediation areas 
lessens probability of 
involvement w/waste 
(MI. 
Radiation Protection 
Program (see Note 2). 
lies. ( es) . 
Event 
Type 
Summary Unmitigated Risk I Prevention (P) and Mitigation (M) Item 
lumber 
3B 
3 c  
Affected Hazard Event Description ?requency Consequence Admin Initiator 
;xplosion 
rehicle 
ccident 
mxtion 
111 waste 
ites 
iternal 
fissile 
lee 1A in explosion causes an internal missile that may 
npact contaminated soil or debris resulting in a puff- 
ke release of hazardous substances via entrainment. 
in internal missile may also result in a rupturing of 
ne or more drums/containers, resulting in an 
irborne release of materials and/or spilling of 
rurdcontainer contents (see item 9). 
h e  internal missile could also cause a secondary 
ire, explosion, spill, or release of material. 
Public: B 
Coloc. 
Worker: B 
Facility 
Worker: B 
Public: 3 
Coloc. 
Worker: 3 
Facility 
Worker: Low 
Use of dust suppressants/ 
fixatives on contaminated 
soils/debris (M). 
Spill response procedures 
(MI. 
Radiation Protection 
Program (see Note 2). 
constructiodmaterials 
protection (M). 
IV 
- 
IV 
IV 
IV 
iternal 
lissile 
ill waste 
ites 
;ee 1A 1 vehicle accident impacts equipment or obstructions 
ausing an internal missile. 
h e  missile may impact contaminated soil or debris 
esulting in a puff-like release of hazardous 
ubstances via entrainment. 
in internal missile may also result in a rupturing of 
ne or more drumdcontainers, resulting in an 
irborne release of materials and/or spilling of 
Irundcontainer contents (see item 9). 
Public: A 
Coloc. 
Worker: A 
Facility 
Worker: A 
Public: 3 
Coloc. 
Worker: 3 
Facility 
Worker: Low 
Spill response (M). 
Use of dust suppressants/ 
fixatives on contaminated 
soils/debris (M). 
Maintaining roadways 
free of obstructions (P). 
Separation of normal 
roadways from active 
remediation and staging 
areas (P) 
Licensed vehicle 
operators (P). 
Radiation Protection 
Program (see Note 2). 
constructiodmaterials 
nternal 
dissile 
3D Tuman error 111 waste 
,ites 
see 1A dishandling of pressurized cylinders causes puncture 
ir damage resulting in an internal missile that may 
mpact contaminated soil or debris resulting in a puff 
ike release of hazardous substances via entrainment. 
4n internal missile may also impact and rupture one 
)r more drums/containers resulting in an airborne 
elease of materials and/or spilling of drumkontainer 
:ontents (see item 9). 
in internal missile may also cause a secondary fire, 
:xplosion, spill, or release of hazardous substances. 
Public: A 
Coloc. 
Worker: A 
Facility 
Worker: A 
Public: 3 
Coloc. 
Worker: 3 
Facility 
Worker: Low 
Safety/Fire Protection 
Program (see Note 1). 
Use of dust suppressants/ 
fixatives on contaminated 
soils/debris (M). 
Radiation Protection 
Program (see Note 2). 
IV Gas cylinder 
constructiodmaterials 
IV provides some 
protection (P). 
Drumkontainer 
constructiodmaterials 
provides some 
protection (M). 
Siting storage tanks/ 
cylinders/cabinets 
away from remediation 
areas lessens probability 
of involvement 
w/waste (M). 
IV 
ssoei 
Event 
Type 
Item 
lumbe1 
Summary Unmitigated Risk Prevention (P) and Mitigation (M) 
Initiator ,ocation Affected Hazard Event Description ?requency Tonsequence Risk sscs Adrnin 
oss of 
ower 
4A rehide 
ccident 
;ee I A  Not ' 
evaluated 
Not 
:valu- 
ated 
- 
Not 
walu- 
ated 
Jot evaluated. Jot evaluated. Vehicle accident or other human error causes loss of 
power to electrically powered equipment. 
Loss of power does not result in release of hazardous 
substances as electrically powered systems are not 
relied upon to prevent or mitigate releases of 
hazardous substances during remediation activities. 
Failure of portable electrical generators causes loss 01 
power to electrically powered equipment. 
Loss of power does not result in release of hazardous 
substances as electrically powered systems are not 
relied upon to prevent or mitigate releases of 
hazardous substances during remediation activities 
411 waste 
ites 
411 waste 
ites 
Jot evaluated 
Jot evaluated DSS of 
'ower 
4B iquipment 
3ilure 
iee 1A Not 
evaluated 
Jot evaluated. Jot evaluated. 
DSS of 
Tentila- 
ion 
NIA NIA NIA NIA NIA NIA 
- 
NIA 
- 
IV 
IV 
IV 
- 
NIA NIA Waste size reduction (e.g., mechanical shears or 
cutting torches) may be conducted during 
remediation. For radiological protection and 
ALARA, temporary enclosures or vacuum systems 
could be used to control the spread of contamination. 
From an analysis perspective, these enclosures or 
vacuums are not engineered ventilation systems are 
relied upon to prevent or mitigate releases of 
hazardous substances. 
Waste size reduction (e.g., mechanical shears or 
cutting torches) may be conducted during 
remediation. For radiological protection and as low 
as reasonably achievable (ALARA), temporary 
enclosures or vacuum systems may be used to contro 
the spread of contamination. From an analysis 
perspective, these enclosures or vacuums are not 
engineered filtration systems are relied upon to 
prevent or mitigate releases of hazardous substances. 
Human error in rigging, lifting, or operating 
equipment causes load of soil, debris, or drum/ 
containers to be dropped. 
Drop of soil or debris results in a puff-like release of 
hazardous substances via entrainment. 
Yter 
;ailure 
JIA NIA NIA NIA NIA NIA NIA 
hopped 
x>ad 
7A 411 wastc 
;ites 
See 1A Public: A 
Coloc. 
Worker: A 
Facility 
Worker: A 
Public: 3 
Coloc. 
Worker: 3 
Facility 
Norker: LOM 
>rudcontainer 
:onstructiodmaterials 
rovides some 
rotection (M). 
'rained equipment 
)peraton and riggers (P). 
Jse of dust suppressants/ 
ixatives on contaminated 
oilddebris (M). 
;pill response (M). 
tadiation Protection 
'rogram (see Note 2). 
iuman error 
Drop of drumlcontainer results in rupture of drum, 
release of hazardous substances via entrainment, and 
spillage of contents (see item 9). 
)rum/container 
:onstruction/materials 
xovides some 
xotection (M). 
Routine maintenance/ 
inspection of equipment 
(PI. 
Use of dust suppressants/ 
fixatives on contaminated 
soilddebris (M). 
Spill response (M). 
Radiation Protection 
Program (see Note 2). 
Staging of excavated 
Irums/containers 
tway from heavy 
raffic (PI. 
ledicated staging area 
or excavated drums/ 
:ontainers away from 
ieavy traffic areas (P). 
Trained equipment 
operators and riggers (P). 
Use of dust suppressants/ 
fixatives on contaminated 
soils/debris (M). 
Spill response (M). 
Radiation Protection 
Program (see Note 2). 
Routine maintenance/ 
inspection of equipment 
(P). 
Use of dust suppressants/ 
fixatives on contaminated 
soils/debris (M). 
Spill response (M). 
Radiation Protection 
Program (see Note 2). 
atio 
Event 
Type 
Item 
Jumber 
Summary Unmitigated Risk Prevention (P) and Mitigation (M) 
Initiator Jocation Affected Hazard Event Description Frequency Consequence Risk sscs I Admin 
kopped 
x>ad 
7B iquipment 
ailure 
411 waste 
ites 
ee I A  3quipment failure causes load of soil, debris, or 
Irumdcontainers to be dropped. 
3rop of soil or debris results in a puff-like release of 
lazardous substances via entrainment. 
Public: A 
Coloc. 
Worker: A 
Facility 
Worker: A 
Public: 3 
Coloc. 
Worker: 3 
Facility 
Worker: Low 
rv 
IV 
iV 3rop of drudcontainer results in rupture of drum, 
-elease of hazardous substances via entrainment and 
;pillage of contents (see item 9). 
)ee 1A Human error causes overturned vehicle or drop of 
ieavy loadequipment. Impact on soil or debris 
*esults in a puff-like release of hazardous substances 
via entrainment. 
[mpact on drumdcontainers result in rupture of 
irudcontainers, release of hazardous substances via 
mtrainment, and spillage of contents (see item 9). 
Public: A 
Coloc. 
Worker: A 
Facility 
Worker: A 
Public: 3 
Coloc. 
Worker: 3 
Facility 
Worker: Low 
rv 
IV 
IV 
- 
IV 
IV 
IV 
- 
411 waste 
,ites 
411 waste 
rites 
mpact of 
Ieavy 
aads 
mpact oi 
3eavy 
Bads 
8A 
8B 
guman error 
5quipment 
ailure 
;ee 1A Equipment failure causes overturned vehicle or drop 
of heavy equipment. Impact on soil or debris results 
in a puff-like release of hazardous substances via 
Entrainment. 
Public: A 
Coloc. 
Worker: A 
Facility 
Worker: A 
Public: 3 
Coloc. 
Worker: 3 
Facility 
Worker: Low 
Impact on drumdcontainers result in rupture of 
drumkontainers, release of hazardous substances via 
entrainment, and spillage of contents (see item 9). 
ssoei the 3 -2 
Unmitigated Risk Prevention (P) and Mitigation (M) Event 
Type 
Item 
Jumber 
Summary - 
Risk 
IV 
IV 
- 
IV 
- 
IV 
IV 
IV 
- 
NtA 
Initiator Affected Hazard Event Description kequency :onsequence 
Public: 3 
Coloc. 
Worker: 3 
Facility 
Yorker: Low 
sscs 
Double-walled tanks 
provide some 
protection (P). 
Dikes, catch basins, 
other retention devices 
prevent spread (M). 
Staging of excavated 
drum stcontainers 
away from heavy 
traffic areas lessens 
potential for some 
spills (P). 
Drudcontainer 
construction/materiaIs 
provide some 
protection (M). 
Admin 
Trained equipment 
Dperators and riggers (P) 
Licensed vehicle 
operators (P). 
Refueling instructions 
(P). 
Routine maintenance/ 
inspection of equipment 
and vehicles (P). 
Use of dust suppressants1 
fixatives on contaminated 
soilstdebris (M). 
Spill response (M). 
Radiation Protection 
Program (see Note 2). 
Placing corroded drums/ 
containers into overpack: 
may prevent subsequent 
failure of deteriorated 
drums (P). 
Spill response (M). 
Periodic inspection of 
drumstcontainers and 
overpacks for 
deterioration (P). 
Radiation Protection 
Program (see Note 2). 
mation 
ipills Aultiple 
auses 
ill waste 
ites 
,ee 1A b Human error (e.g., vehicle accidents, valve 
mispositioning) 
Internal missiles 
Public: A 
Coloc. 
Norker: A 
Facility 
Norker: A 
B Human error (e.& dropped loadimpact of heavy 
load) or, 
heavy load) 
a Equipment failure (e.g., dropped loadimpact of 
May result in spill of hazardous substances, airborne 
release via entrainment, and spills of other 
liquids/solids. 
Spills of pyrophoric material blanketing liquids 
[e.g., mineral oil or water) from drumstcontainers 
could result in a fire (see item 1D). 
Zorrosior Znviron- 
nental 
:xposure 
iee 1A Public: A 
Coloc. 
Norker: P 
Facility 
Norker: P 
Public: 3 
Coloc. 
Worker: 3 
Facility 
Norker: L,o% 
None. Environmental exposure causes corrosion of 
drums/containers resulting in failure of drums/ 
containers during excavation, handling, or storage. 
Failure of drumstcontainers results in release of 
hazardous substances via entrainment and spill of 
contents (see item 9). 
111 waste 
,ites 
NtA Structura 
Fatigue 
NtA Although drumstcontainers provide some protection 
from a spill or release of contents, engineered 
structures (e.g., buildings, ventilation systems) 
subject to structural fatigue are not relied on to 
prevent or mitigate a release of hazardous Substances 
during remediation. 
NtA NtA NtA NtA 
able with the 300-FF-2 
Event 
Type 
Item 
hmbei 
Summary Unmitigated Risk Prevention (P) and Mitigation (M) - 
Risk 
IV 
IV 
- 
IV 
- 
Not 
:valu. 
ated 
- 
Initiator ,ocation Affected Hazard Consequence 
Public: 3 
Coloc. 
Worker: 3 
Facility 
Worker: Low 
sscs 
Irudcontainers 
onstructiodmaterials 
nay prevent exposure 
D air or other 
ncompatible materials 
P). 
Admin Event Description 
Jxcavation, handling, or storage of soils, debris, or 
rumdcontainers may expose waste materials that arc 
cactive with air or incompatible with other materials 
'his exposure could cause a chemical reaction that 
tould result in a release of hazardous substances via 
ntrainment or spill. 
h e  reaction could also result in a fire (see Item ID 
or autoignition of pyrophoric materials). 
:oncentrations of chemicals found in drumd 
ontainers are generally greater than concentrations 
ound in soils and debris. 
'requency 
Public: A 
Coloc. 
Norker: A 
Facility 
Norker: A 
:hemica1 
teaction 
12 Zxcavation, 
landling, 
,torage 
ill waste 
i tes 
;ee 1A Adding blanketing or 
stabilizing substances 
(e.g., water, sand, grout 
mineral oil) to 
pyrophoric materials (P). 
Use of drumkontainer 
overpacks to prevent loss 
of blanketing liquids. 
Segregation of waste 
streams may prevent 
exposure to incompatible 
materials (P). 
Hanford Fire Departmeni 
response (M). 
Radiation Protection 
Program (see Note 2). 
Vuclear 
2riticalitI 
13 Fissionable 
naterial 
411 waste 
lites 
see 1A Xticality Safety Reviews performed for the waste 
ite inventories concluded that the concentrations of 
issionable materials were such that the remediation 
ictivities could be executed with no criticality 
:ontrols, although criticality safety requirements may 
)e applicable while remediating burial grounds. 
Public: D 
Coloc. 
Worker: D 
Facility 
Worker: D 
Not evaluated 4ot evaluated. Perform field 
characterization of 
discrete waste items 
containing plutonium ant 
U-235. 
Event 
Type 
Item 
lumber 
Summary Unmitigated Risk Prevention (P) and Mitigation (M) - 
Risk 
IV 
IV 
- 
IV 
- 
IV 
IV 
IV 
Initiator mation Affected Hazard Event Description ?requency :onsequence sscs Admin 
iternal 
looding 
14 irddust 
uppression 
ee 1A ixcess water used to suppress fires or dust causes 
ccumulations that migrate beyond the remediation 
rea, resulting in spread of contamination. 
Public: B 
Coloc. 
Norker: B 
Facility 
Norker: B 
Public: 3 
Coloc. 
Worker: 3 
Facility 
Vorker: Low 
tunoff control 
neasures, as necessary 
e.g., ditches, dikes) 
PI. 
Hanford Fire Department 
practices to minimize use 
of water inside waste site 
(P). 
Periodic radiological 
surveys wou Id identify 
spread of Contamination 
within the remediation 
area (P). 
Limited source of dust 
suppression water (tanka 
truck) (P). 
Remediation of 
contamination spread 
beyond boundaries (M). 
Radiation Protection 
Program (see Note 2). 
,I1 waste 
ites 
411 wastt 
sites 
’ipe or 
?esse1 
lupture 
15A Iehicle 
ccident 
iee 1A Iehicle impact to fuel storage tanks, gas cylinders, 01 
ssociated piping results in rupture, spill of contents, 
nd possible fire. 
;ee item 1 C for evaluation of fire. 
;ee item 9 for evaluation of spill. 
Public: A 
Coloc. 
Worker: A 
Facility 
Worker: A 
Public: 3 
Coloc. 
Worker: 3 
Facility 
Norker: Low 
;torage tanks 
:onstruction/materiaIs 
rovide some 
protection (P). 
Xkes to contain 
,pilled liquids (M). 
>ouble-walled tanks 
nay prevent spill (P). 
;iting storage tanks 
tway from heavy 
raffic would reduce 
)robability of vehicle 
tccident (P). 
Licensed vehicle 
operators (P). 
Hanford Fire Department 
response (M). 
Radiation Protection 
Program (see Note 2). 
azards Associate emediation Activities. (22 
Event 
Type 
Item 
?umber 
Summary Unmitigated Risk Prevention (P) and Mitigation (M) 
prevent corrosion (P). 
rd Fire Department 
Initiator ,ocation Affected Hazard Event Description Frequency Consequence Risk 
IV 
IV 
- 
IV 
'ipe or 
ressel 
[upture 
15B Zorrosion 411 waste 
sites 
;ee 1A 5nvironmental exposure causes corrosion of fuel 
;torage tanks, gas cylinders, or associated piping that 
*esults in rupture, spill of contents, and possible fire. 
See item 1C for evaluation of fire. 
see item 9 for evaluation of spill. 
Public: B 
Coloc. 
Worker: B 
Facility 
Worker: B 
Public: 3 
Coloc. 
Worker: 3 
Facility 
Worker: Lou 
'ipe or 
Iessel 
{upture 
15C 3ver- 
xessurizatior 
x blocked 
vent 
411 waste 
Lites 
see 1A Blocked vent or relief valves cause over- 
pressurization (or internal vacuum during pumping) 
that results in rupture or fuel storage tanks or 
associated piping, spill of contents, and possible fire 
See item 1C for evaluation of fire. 
See item 9 for evaluation of spill. 
Public: B 
Coloc. 
Worker: B 
Facility 
Worker: B 
Public: 3 
Coloc. 
Worker: 3 
Facility 
Worker: LQM 
IV Provision of proper 
vents and reliefs to 
IV prevent over- 
pressurization or 
negative pressure 
I V  during pumping (P). 
ULlisted pumping 
equipment (P). 
Periodic inspections of 
ventdreliefs for 
obstruction (P). 
Safety/Fire Protection 
Program (see Note 1). 
Spill response (M). 
Hanford Fire Department 
response (M). 
Radiation Protection 
Program (see Note 2). 
ssociated with the 300-F e~ediatiQn Activities. (22 
Event 
Type 
Item Summary Unmitigated Risk Prevention (P) and Mitigation (M) 
Number 
Initiator Location Affected Hazard Event Description Frequency Consequence Risk s s c s  Admin 
ightning 
iduced 
Vaste 
ite Fire 
17 ,ightning 
trike in 
vaste site 
411 waste 
ites 
;ee 1A 4 direct lightning strike in the waste site could ignite 
lammable/combustible materials used or generated 
Iuring remediation activities, resulting in a waste site 
ire. The fire could result in a release of hazardous 
ubstances via entrainment. 
4 direct lightning strike could also impart enough 
:nergy to result in an explosion (see item 19). 
4 direct lightning strike could also impart enough 
mergy to result in an internal missile (see item 20). 
Public: C 
Coloc. 
Worker: C 
Facility 
Worker: C 
Public: 3 
Coloc. 
Worker: 3 
Facility 
Worker: Low 
IV 
IV 
IV 
Proper grounding of 
flammable liquid 
storage tanks (P). 
ULlisted pumping 
equipment (P). 
Proper venting of 
storage tanks/ 
flammable liquid 
storage cabinets (P) 
(M). 
Graded/graveled 
roadways provide fire 
break (P) (M). 
Storage tank/cylinder/ 
cabinet construction/ 
materials provide 
some protection (P) 
(MI. 
Siting storage tanks/ 
cylinders/cabinets in 
cleared areas away 
from remediation 
areas (P) (M). 
3afety/Fire Protection 
'rogram (see Note 1). 
-Ianford Fire Department 
*esponse (M). 
:learing remediation 
irea of vegetation/ 
:ombustibles (P) (M). 
iadiation Protection 
'rogram (see Note 2). 
ernediation Activities. (22 
Event 
Type 
Item 
lumber 
Summary Unmitigated Risk Prevention (P) and Mitigation (M) - 
Risk 
IV 
N 
- 
IV 
- 
IV 
IV 
IV 
- 
,mation Affected Hazard Zonsequence sscs Event Description 
1 proximate lightning strike could initiate a range 
ire that enters the waste site. The range fire could 
gnite flammabldcombustible materials used or 
5enerated during remediation activities. The fire 
:ould result in a release of hazardous substances via 
mtrainment of hazardous substances. 
7requencj 
Public: A 
Coloc. 
Worker: A 
Facility 
vlrorker: A 
Initiator 
dghtning 
:rike in 
icinity 
Admin 
:learing remediation 
irea of vegetation/ 
:ombustibles (M). 
-€anford Fire Department 
.esponse (M). 
;afety/Fire Protection 
'rogram (see Note 1). 
tadiation Protection 
'rograni (see Note 2). 
,ightninE 
iduced 
.ange 
ire 
18 ~ 1 1  waste 
ites 
)ee 1A Public: 3 
Coloc. 
Worker: 3 
Facility 
Norker: Low 
Graded/graveled 
roadways provide fire 
break (P). 
Storage tank/cy linder/ 
cabinet construction/ 
materials provide 
some protection (P). 
Proper venting of 
tanks/cabinets 
provides some 
protection (P). 
Siting storage tanks/ 
cylinders/cabinet s 
away from 
remediation areas (M). 
Siting storage tanks/ 
cylinders/cabinets in 
areas cleared of 
vegetation/ 
combustibles (P). 
Proper grounding of 
flammable liquid 
storage tanks (P). 
Proper venting of 
storage tanks (P). 
Siting storage tanks/ 
cy linderdcabinets 
away from 
remediation areas 
lessens potential 
involvement of wastes 
(MI. 
dghtninj 
nduced 
{xplosioi 
19 dghtning 
trike in 
vaste site 
411 waste 
ites 
Public: C 
Coloc. 
Worker: C 
Facility 
Worker: C 
Public: 3 
Coloc. 
Worker: 3 
Facility 
Worker: Low 
'eriodic fire safety 
nspections for proper 
;rounding, venting (P). 
-€anford Fire Department 
.esponse (M). 
$ afety/Fire Protection 
'rogram (see Note 1). 
iadiation Protection 
'rogram (see Note 2). 
iee 1A A direct lighting strike on fuel tankdgas cylinders/ 
storage cabinets causes an explosion that results in a 
release of hazardous substances via entrainment. 
The explosion could also initiate a waste site fire 
(see item 17). 
The explosion could also result in an internal missile 
(see item 20). 
ssociated with the 300-F ernediation Activities. (22 Pages) 
Event 
Type 
Summary Unmitigated Risk Prevention (P) and Mitigation (M) Item 
Jumber 
20 
21A 
Affected Hazard Event Description Frequency Consequence Risk 
IV 
IV 
- 
IV 
sscs Initiator Location Admin 
ightning 
nduced 
4issile 
dghtning 
trike in 
iaste site 
1\11 waste 
,ites 
'ee 1A 4 direct lightning strike causes an internal missile 
hat may impact contaminated soil or debris resulting 
n a puff-like release of hazardous substances via 
mtrainment. 
Public: C 
Coloc. 
Worker: C 
Facility 
Worker: C 
Public: 3 
Coloc. 
Worker: 3 
Facility 
Worker: Low 
;torage tank/cylinder/ 
:abinet construction/ 
naterials provide 
Lome protection (P). 
Siting storage tanks/ 
: ylinders/cabinets 
iway from remediation 
ireas lessens potential 
nvolvement of wastes 
MI. 
Use of dust suppressants/ 
fixatives on contaminated 
joilddebris (M). 
Spill response (M). 
Hanford Fire Department 
*esponse (M). 
Safety/Fire Protection 
Program (see Note 1). 
Radiation Protection 
Program (see Note 2). 
4n internal missile may also result in a rupturing of 
me or more drums/containers, fuel tankdcylinderd 
:abinets resulting in an airborne release of materials 
ind spill of contents (see item 9). 
h e  internal missile could also cause a secondary 
fire, explosion, spill, or release of material. 
rlatural 
irecipitation 
411 waste 
;ites 
;ee 1A Heavy precipitation (e.g., rain or snow) causes 
localized puddles and flooding of the remediation 
ireas, resulting in spread of hazardous substances 
From remediation area. 
Due to arid climate and soil permeability, the 
potential for this occurrence is judged low. 
Public: C 
Coloc. 
Worker: C 
Facility 
Worker: C 
Public: 3 
Coloc. 
Worker: 3 
Facility 
Worker: Low 
IV 
IV 
IV 
\Jane. Routine radiological 
surveys for spread of 
:ontamination (M). 
Remediation of 
sontamination areas (M). 
Radiation Protection 
Program (see Note 2). 
:looding 
21 B 4eavy rains 
now melt 
esulting in 
robable 
naximum 
lood 
411 waste 
;ites 
;ee 1A Regional flooding to the probable maximum flood 
:levation will not affect the remediation sites due to 
their higher elevation. 
N/A N/A N/A 
- 
Not 
:valu- 
ated 
N/A N/A 
3reach of 
lams 
411 waste 
sites 
iee I A  Breach of dams on Columbia River will result in 
flooding of remediation area and spread of hazardous 
substances from remediation area. 
Public: D 
Coloc. 
Worker: C 
Facility 
Worker: C 
Not evaluated \Jot evaluated. 21c Not evaluated. %oding 
Jata- 
;trophic 
val 
Event 
Type 
Item 
lumbe1 
Summary Unmitigated Risk 
~~ ~ 
Prevention (P) and Mitigation (M) - 
Risk 
Iv 
IV 
- 
Iv 
- 
IV 
IV 
IV 
- 
IV 
IV 
IV 
Initiator ,ocation Affected Hazard Event Description ?requency Consequence sscs Admin 
kborne 
:e 1 e as e 
iduced 
y High 
Vind 
Iigh wind tern 1A 
Zontaminated soil, 
iebris 
4igh winds suspend contaminated soil or removable 
d a c e  contamination on debris, resulting in airborne 
,elease via entrainment. High winds could spread 
:ontamination to offsite receptors. 
Public: A 
Coloc. 
Worker: A 
Facility 
Norker: A 
Public: 3 
Coloc. 
Worker: 3 
Facility 
Worker: Low 
Jone. Use of dust suppressants/ 
fixatives on contaminated 
soils/debris (M). 
Suspension of 
remediation activities 
during high winds (P). 
Routine air monitoring 
(0 
Radiation Protection 
Program (see Note 2). 
22A 
22B 
22c 
ill waste 
ites 
ill waste 
ites 
411 waste 
,ites 
iirborne 
:elease/ 
'pill 
nduced 
my High 
Vind 
:vent 
figh wind tern 1A 
Zontaminated 
lrumslcon t ainers 
4igh winds could suspend removable surface 
:ontamination from drums. High winds could spread 
:ontamination to offsite receptors. 
See item 9 for evaluation of spill. 
ripover of drums/containers as a result of high wind 
s not anticipated due to their low center of gravity, 
nass, and geometry. 
Public: A 
Coloc. 
Worker: A 
Facility 
Norker: A 
Public: 3 
Coloc. 
Worker: 3 
Facility 
Worker: Low 
Drum/containers and 
overpacks provide 
protection from 
spilling contents (M). 
Prohibition on stacking 
of drums may prevent 
tipover (P) or damage to 
drums (M). 
Use of dust suppressants/ 
fixatives on contaminated 
soils/debris (M). 
Radiation Protection 
Program (see Note 2). 
nternal 
dissile 
nduced 
iy High 
Yind 
;vent 
ligh wind tem 1A 
2ontaminated 
lrums/containers 
ligh winds could generate missile that may result in 
)uncturing/rupturing one or more drums/containers 
ir fuel tanks/cylinders/cabinets resulting in an 
iirborne release of hazardous substances and spilling 
if  contents. Wind-generated missiles that result in 
jamage to drums/containers or fuel tanks/cylinders/ 
:abinets and subsequent spill are not anticipated. 
Based on DOE-STD-1020-2002, Table 3-2, 
-egarding wind design criteria, it is believed that the 
Frequency of a peak gust wind speed sufficient to 
senerate a missile that could breach a drum/ 
:ontainers is less than lE-O2/yr on the Hanford Site. 
See item 3B for evaluation of internal missile. 
Public: B 
Coloc. 
Worker: B 
Facility 
Worker: B 
Public: 3 
Coloc. 
Worker: 3 
Facility 
Worker: Low 
Drurdcontainer and 
overpack construction 
materials provide 
some physical 
protection (M). 
Storage tankkylinderl 
cabinet construction/ 
materials provide 
some protection (P). 
Siting storage tanks/ 
c ylinderdcabinet s 
away from remediation 
areas lessens potential 
involvement of wastes 
(MI. 
Housekeeping of 
remediation area 
minimizes unnecessary 
materials that could 
become missiles (P). 
Spill response (M). 
Radiation Protection 
Program (see Note 2). 
Affected Hamrd 
tem 1A 
IOntaminated 
lebris 
tem 1A 
iemediation 
:quipment 
[tern I A  
:ylinders/cabinets 
Summary 
Event Description 
Seismic event causes ground movement and shaking 
of exposed remediation soils and debris, resulting in 
generation of minimal amounts of airborne hazardous 
substances as dust and spread of contamination. 
Due to excavation layback requirements (run/rise 
limited to 1.5: 1) and moisture content, a seismic 
event is not anticipated to have sufficient energy to 
cause shifting of soil slopes. 
Seismic event causes ground movement and shaking 
of excavation equipment, and impact to soils, debris, 
drumdcontainers. 
Overturn of remediation equipment, resulting in 
heavy load impact to soils, debris, and drums/ 
containers is not anticipated due to the low center of 
gravity of remediation equipment. 
See items 8A and 8B for evaluation of heavy load 
impacts. 
Seismic event causes ground movement and shaking 
of fuel storage tanks/cylinders/cabinets, resulting in 
rupture and spill of contents. 
Breach of fuel storage tanksfcylinders is not 
anticipated due to construction and low center of 
gravity. 
ediation Activities. (22 
Event 
Type 
Unmitigated Risk Prevention (P) and Mitigation (M) Item 
Tumber 
23A 
- 
Risk 
IV 
IV 
- 
IV 
mation 'requency Consequence sscs 1 Admin Initiator 
iarthquake iirborne 
<elease 
nduced 
'Y 
jeismic 
:vent 
Public: C 
Coloc. 
Norker: C 
Facility 
Norker: C 
Public: 3 
Coloc. 
Worker: 3 
Facility 
Worker: Low 
Jone. Excavation layback 
requirements prevent 
slope shifts (P) (M). 
Hanford Emergency 
Response (M). 
Remediation of 
contamination spread 
(MI. 
Use of dust suppressants/ 
fixatives on contaminated 
soils/debris (M). 
Radiation Protection 
Program (see Note 2). 
,I1 waste 
ites 
ill waste 
i tes 
111 wastc 
ites 
mpact 0 
4eavy 
d a d  
,nduced 
'Y 
Seismic 
Svent 
23B 3arthquake Public: C 
Coloc. 
Worker: C 
Facility 
Worker: C 
Public: 3 
Coloc. 
Worker: 3 
Facility 
Worker: Low 
IV Low center of gravity 
of remediation 
IV equipment provides 
some protection (M). 
Iv Staging of excavated 
drumsfcontainers 
away from heavy 
traffic areas minimizes 
potential damage (M). 
Use of dust suppressants/ 
fixatives on contaminated 
soils/debris (M). 
Hanford Emergency 
Response (M). 
Radiation Protection 
~ Program (see Note 2). 
Rupture 
If Pipes/ 
Vessels 
Induced 
Seismic 
Event 
by 
23C Zarthquake Public: C 
Coloc. 
Worker: C 
Facility 
Worker: C 
Public: 3 
Coloc. 
Worker: 3 
Facility 
Worker: Low 
N 
IV 
Storage tank/cylinder/ 
cabinet construction/ 
materials provide 
some protection from 
darnage (P). 
Use of double-walled 
Spill response (M). 
Radiation Protection 
Program (see Note 2). 
Iv 
tanks if appropriate 
I(M). 
Event 
Type 
Summary Unmitigated Risk Prevention (P) and Mitigation (M) Item 
iumber 
23D 
Initiator Affected Hazard Event Description Frequency Consequence Risk 
IV 
IV 
- 
IV 
- 
Not 
:valu- 
ated 
sscs Admin ,ocation 
Rupture 
3f 
Drums/ 
Con- 
tainers 
Induced 
by 
Seismic 
Event 
iarthquake 411 waste 
ites 
tem 1A 
)rums/containers 
Seismic event causes minor ground movement and 
shaking of drums/containers, that may result in tip 
over, rupture of drums/containers, airborne release, 
and spillage of drumlcontainer contents (see item 9). 
Tip over or sliding of drums/containers during 
earthquakes is not anticipated. Calculation 
No. 0200W-CA-CO 164, Rev 0, evaluated the seismic 
stability of drums in the staging area at the 
Environmental Restoration Disposal Facility and 
concluded slidinghipover would not occur during the 
design basis event. 
Public: C 
Coloc. 
Worker: C 
Facility 
Worker: C 
Public: 3 
Coloc. 
Worker: 3 
Facility 
Worker: Lou 
)rum/container and 
werpacks 
onstruction and 
naterials provide 
rotection from 
upture (P) and 
pilling contents if 
ipped over (M). 
"rohibition on stacking 
tf drums lessens 
Iotential for tipover (P). 
'rohibition on stacking 
)f drums lessen damage 
D drums (M). 
;pill response (M). 
tadiation Protection 
'rogram (see Note 2). 
Collapse 
of 
Drums/ 
Con- 
tainer, 
Fuel 
Tanks/ 
Cylinders 
Induced 
by Snow 
Load 
Inow fall 111 waste 
ites 
tem 1A 
~~ 
Snow blankets soil, debris, and drums with sufficient 
load to cause release of hazardous substances. 
Public: D 
Coloc. 
Worker: D 
Facility 
Worker: D 
Vot evaluated Jot evaluated. Jot evaluated. 24 
25 
)rums/containers 
Buildup of snow on excavated drums/containers is 
not anticipated to result in dead loads sufficient to 
collapse or breach drumdcontainers. 
Buildup of snow on fuel tanks/cylinders/cabinets is 
not anticipated to result in dead loads sufficient to 
collapse or breach them. 
he1 tanks/cylinders/ 
:abinets 
Collapse 
of 
Drums/ 
Con- 
tainers, 
Fuel 
Tanks/ 
Cylinders 
Induced 
by Ash 
Fall 
Iolcanic 
ctivity 
411 waste 
iites 
tem 1A Volcanic ash blankets soil, debris, and drums with 
sufficient load to cause release of hazardous 
substances. 
Buildup of ash on excavated drums/containers, fuel 
tanks/cylinders/cabinets is not anticipated to result in 
dead loads sufficient to collapse or breach 
drumdcontainers. 
Public: D 
Coloc. 
Worker: D 
Facility 
Worker: D 
Not evaluated Not 
:valu- 
ated 
Jot evaluated. Jot evaluated. 
>rums/con tainers 
he1 tanks/cylinders/ 
:abinets 
le emediation Activities. (22 
Event Item Summary Unmitigated Risk Prevention (P) and Mitigation (M) 
Type Number 
Initiator Location Affected Hazard Event Description Frequency Consequence Risk s s c s  Admin 
EXTERNAL EVENTS (MAN-MADE INITIATORS EXTERNAL TO REMEDIATION ACTIVITIES) 
:ange 
;ire 
bnge 
Pre 
26A 
26B 
rehicle or 
msportatior 
ccident 
'roximate 
iircraft crasl 
dl waste 
ites 
411 waste 
ites 
;ee 1A 
See 1A 
4 vehicle or transportation accident could initiate a 
ange fire that enters the waste site. The range fire 
ould ignite flammablekombustible materials used or 
ienerated during remediation activities. Equipment 
uel/oil, drums holding mineral oil, etc., would be 
vailable to propagate a fire. The fire could result in 
L release of hazardous substances via entrainment. 
i n  aircraft crash could initiate a range fire that enters 
he waste site (see item 26A). 
Public: A 
Coloc. 
Norker: A 
Facility 
Norker: A 
Public: B 
Coloc. 
Worker: B 
Facility 
Worker: B 
Public: 3 
Coloc. 
Worker: 3 
Facility 
Norker: Ix>w 
Public: 3 
Coloc. 
Worker: 3 
Facility 
Worker: Low 
- 
IV 
IV 
IV 
N 
IV 
N 
- 
Storage drums/tanks/ 
flammable liquid 
storage cabinets 
construction materials 
provide some 
resistance (P). 
Graded roaddfire line5 
inhibit spread of fire 
into remediation areas 
(PI (M). 
Proper venting of 
tanks/cabinets 
provides some 
protection (P) (M). 
Siting storage tanks/ 
c ylinderdcabinets 
away from remediation 
areas (P) (M). 
Siting storage tanks/ 
cylinders/cabinets in 
areas cleared of 
vegetation/ 
combustibles (P). 
See item 26A. 
teniediation/storage 
reas cleared of 
regetation (P) (M). 
vlinimization and proper 
torage of combustible 
naterials (M). 
;lammable storage 
:abinets (M). 
-Ian ford Emergency 
tesponse Plan (M). 
+anford Fire Department 
esponse (M). 
Zadiation Protection 
'rogram (see Note 2). 
iee item 26A. 
Event 
Type 
Yaste 
iite Fire 
Item 
hmber 
26C 
able azards Associate with the 300-F 
Initiator 
iircraft 
.rash in the 
vaste site 
,mation 
dl waste 
ites 
- 
Summary 
Affected Hazard 
'ee 1A 
Event Description 
4n aircraft crash in the waste site could directly 
ignite flammabIe/combustible materials in the 
remediation area. The fire could result in a release of 
nazardous substances via entrainment. 
The aircraft crash could also cause an explosion 
:see item 27A). 
DOE-STD-3014-96, Table B- 14, assigns a I E-04 
Frequency of a general aviation airplane crash (and 
lesser frequencies for military or commercial aircraft) 
xcurring per square mile, per year, at the Hanford 
Site. The definition of general aviation aircraft 
includes nonmilitary or noncommercial flight 
activities such as herbicide application and power 
line surveys as are conducted on the Hanford Site. 
One square mile equates to 2.59 E+O6 m2. Since 
none of the waste sites exceed 2.5 EM4 m2 in surface 
area, the probability of an airplane crash occurring 
inside the waste site boundaries is two orders of 
magnitude less, or 1E-06. It is also anticipated that 
remediation activities will not expose the entire 
surface of the waste site at any one time, which 
would further reduce the potential for a release of 
hazardous substances. 
Unmitigated Risk 
kequency 
Public: D 
Coloc. 
Worker: D 
Facility 
Worker: D 
zonsequence 
Vot evaluated 
Risk 
Not 
valu- 
ated 
- 
Prevention (P) and Mitigation (M) 
sscs 
qot evaluated. 
Admin 
qot evaluated. 
ab 
Event 
TY Pe 
Item 
Jumbei 
Summary Unmitigated Risk Prevention (P) and Mitigation (M) - 
Risk 
Not 
walu- 
ated 
-Initiator Location Zonsequence SSCS Admin Affected Halard 
;ee 1A 
Event Description 
An aircraft crash in the remediation area could result 
in an explosion, and the release of hazardous 
substances via entrainment. 
Frequency 
Public: D 
Coloc. 
Worker: D 
Faci I i ty 
Worker: D 
ixplosion 27A dircraft 
:rash in the 
vaste site 
111 waste 
*ites 
\Jot evaluated qot evaluated. Jot evaluated. 
The explosion could also cause a missile (see 
item 20). 
DOE-STD-30 14-96, Table B- 14, assigns a 1 E-04 
frequency of a general aviation airplane crash (and 
lesser frequencies for military or commercial aircraft) 
occurring per square mile, per year, at the Hanford 
Site. The definition of general aviation aircraft 
includes nonmilitary or noncommercial flight 
activities such as herbicide application and power 
line surveys as are conducted on the Hanford Site. 
One square mile equates to 2.59 E+% m2. Since 
none of the waste sites exceed 2.5 EM4 m2 in surface 
area, the probability of an airplane crash occurring 
inside the waste site boundaries is two orders of 
magnitude less, or 1 E-06. It is also anticipated that 
remediation activities will not expose the entire 
surface of the waste site at any one time, which 
would further reduce the potential for a release of 
hazardous substances. 
4ircraft 
:rash in 
ficinity of 
waste site 
411 waste 
;ites 
See 1A \Jot evaluated Not 
:valu- 
ated 
\Jot evaluated. Jot evaluated. bplosior 
Loss of 
Power 
27B 
28 
An aircraft crash in the proximate vicinity of the 
remediation area could result in an explosion and 
pressure pulse. 
As the remediation area is not confined, the resulting 
pressure pulse is judged insufficient to damage 
dmmdcontainers, fuel tankdcylinderdcabinets 
resulting in a release of hazardous substances. 
A vehicle or transportation accident causes a loss of 
power supply to the remediation site, resulting in 
possible interruption in remediation work. 
Loss of power does not result in release of hazardous 
substances as electrically powered systems are not 
relied upon to prevent or mitigate releases. 
Public: D 
Coloc. 
Worker: D 
Facility 
Worker: D 
Public: A 
Coloc. 
Worker: A 
Facility 
Worker: A 
Vehicle or 
ransportatic 
1 accident 
411 waste 
sites 
See 1A Public: 3 
Coloc. 
Worker: 3 
Facility 
Worker: Low 
IV 
lv 
lv 
- 
\Jane. Jone. 
Event 
Type 
Release 
irdous 
stances 
If H a -  
Sub- 
Item 
qumber 
29 
iati 
Initiator 
h i d e n t  at 
iearby 
acility 
,ocation 
\I1 waste 
ites 
Summary 
Affected Hazard 
JIA 
Event Description 
Accident at nearby facility causes an airborne release 
of toxic materials. Depending on concentration and 
wind directiodstability, the release may result in 
deposition of hazardous substances in the 
remediation area. Interaction of the released 
substances with existing hazardous substances in the 
waste sites is not anticipated. 
Initiation of emergency procedures at the nearby 
facility would result in the appropriate notification or 
evacuation of remediation workers. 
The remediation activities do not include the 
operation of processes, equipment, or systems that 
require continuous manned operation. There are no 
monitored processes or operations that cannot be 
suspended and workers evacuated. 
Unmitigated Risk 
Frequency 
Public: C 
Coloc. 
Worker: C 
Facility 
Worker: C 
Consequence 
Public: 3 
Coloc. 
Worker: 3 
Facility 
Worker: Low 
- 
Risk 
Iv 
IV 
- 
IV 
- 
Prevention (P) and Mitigation (M) 
sscs 
Jone. 
Admin 
lanford Emergency 
tesponse Program. 
tadiation Protection 
'rogram (see Note 2). 
NOTE 1: Safety/Fire Protection Program procedures (S/FPP) include, as appropriate, the following: 
@ Hot work permits (P) that require protection or movement of combustible materials (P), and fire watch with extinguisher and means to notify Hanford Fire Department (M). 
* Fire Marshal Permits for installation, storage, use, or handling of flammabldcombustible liquids (based on type and volume of flammabldcombustible liquids (P), including restrictions on smoking (P) and 
refueling operations (P), and measures for containment of liquids (dikeskatch basins, double-wall tanks, or combination thereof). 
Fire Marshal permits for siting/construction of membrane structures and tents, and other portable structures (e.g., trailers). 
Use of UL-listed flammabldcombustible liquid pumping equipment (P). 
Periodic inspections for control of ignition sources (P), control of combustibles (P), removal of excess combustibles (P) (M), and material condition of flammabldcombustible liquid storage tanks. 
0 Provisions for storage of flammabldcombustible gasses (P) including separate storage of fuels and oxygen, chains, and caps (P). 
0 Appropriate provisions are identified for opening bulged or sealed drums/containers, that include (as appropriate) limiting number of drums handled at one time, use of intrinsically safdnonsparking 
0 Appropriate provisions for storing excavated drums/containers, that include (as appropriate) use of noncombustible overpacks and staging materials (P), and use of nonflammabldcombustible blanketing or 
NOTE 2: Radiation Protection Program procedures include, as appropriate, the following: 
* Monitoring and survey methods to detect the spread of radioactive contamination to minimize or prevent its release during a proximate event (P) and to mitigate the potential for additional release of 
0 Instructions to suspend work in outdoor radiological areas when visible airborne dust is present (P) (M). 
0 Provision for storage of radioactive material in designated locations and in containers appropriate for radiological hazards (P) (M). 
* Conduct of operations and personal protective equipment (PPE) for work in radiological areas to minimize or prevent exposure and intake (P) (M). 
* Training to ensure appropriate response to radiological hazards (M). 
NOTE 3: As defined in NFPA 1991, an explosion is a rapid release of high-pressure gas into the environment. The events of concern in this evaluation involve a propagating reaction that begins at a 
specific point (e.g., ignition point) and then propagates through the unreacted material. Propagation may generate a flash fire or an explosion that propagates either subsonically (deflagration) or 
supersonically (detonation) (AIChE 1989). The energy release rate of this type of event is dependent on the propagation rate, which, in turn, is dependent on the combustible concentration. Propagation 
occurs rather slowly near the limiting combustible concentrations (e.g., lower explosive limit) and increases to a maximum near stoichiometry. Any such event at the burial ground is expected to be a flash 
fire or a deflagration with small pressure generation. 
SSC = systems, structures, and components 
materials and remote apparatus to open, separation from other drumdcontainers prior to opening (P) (M). 
stabilization substances (P) (M). 
material after an event (M). 
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-1. 30 
Comments on 
Chemical Inventory 
Information 
Waste 
Site 
Document Title and 
ID No.8 
Chemical Inventory 
Information 
Location Within 
the document 
adiological Inventory 
Information Inventory Information 
Pu-239: 0.06 Ci, 
Pu-240: 0.017 Ci. These values 
are decayed through April 1, 
1986. 
Site ID No.: 618-1. NA 518-1 Hazard Ranking System 
Evaluation of CERCLA 
rnactive Waste Sites at 
Hanford, PNL-6456 
No chemical inventory is 
mailable. 
Page 664 
518-1 Hazard Ranking System 
Evaluation of CERCLA 
lnactive Waste Sites at 
Hanford, PNL-6456 
3 lb (0.0005 Ci) of uranium. Site ID No.: UPR-300-13. 4,432 lb of NO3 and 477 Ib of 
zopper. 
Site ID No.: 
UPR-300-13. Assume 
copper is in metal form. 
Page 255 
618-1 Hazard Ranking System 
Evaluation of CERCLA 
Inactive Waste Sites at 
Harzford, PNL-6456 
NA NA 4,542 L (1,200 gal) of 93% 
sulfuric acid. 
Site ID No.: 
UPR-300- 14. 
Page 256 
618-1 300-FF-2 Operable 
Unit Technical Baseline 
Report, BHI-00012, 
Rev. 0 
The acid released included 3 lb, 
or approximately 5.0 x 10” Ci, 
of uranium. 
UPR-300-13. Approximately 4,921 L of spent 
process acid was spilled. The 
acid released included 4,432 Ib 
of NO3 and 447 lb of copper. 
Approximately 1,910 lb of 
caustic was added to neutralize 
the acid. 
UPR-300-13. Section 5.9, 
UPR-300- 13 
618-1 300-FF-2 Operable 
Unit Techn ica 1 Baseline 
Report, BHI-00012, 
Rev. 0 
NA NA 4,543 L (1,200 gal) of 93% 
sulfuric acid solution. 
UPR-300- 14. Section 5.10, 
UPR-300- 14 
Waste 
Site 
i18-1 
518-1 
Document Title and 
ID No? 
300-FF-2 Operable 
Unit Technical Baseline 
Report, BHI-000 12, 
Rev. 0 
Letter from 
D. L. Renberger (UNC 
Nuclear Industries) to 
R. A. Holten 
(U.S. DOE), Aug. 8, 
1986. Received 
August 15,1986 
Radiological Inventory 
Information 
A large quantity of uranium, 
estimated to be about 16 tons, 
was buried at this site. 
It is estimated that wastes at this 
site contain 6.0 x 
Pu-239 and 1.70 x 
Pu-240 in curies decayed 
through April 1, 1986. 
Ci of 
Ci of 
CERCLA: Phase I Installation 
Assessment of Inactive Waste 
Disposal Sites at Hanford 
(Hanford Inactive Site Survey 
Database) Pu-239: 0.06; Others: 
no curie amounts identified. 
Hanford Defense Waste DEIS: 
Volume 2, Appendix A, 
Table A. 1 1 : Pu: 96 Ci; Others: 
no curie amounts identified. 
Comments on Radiological 
Inventory Information 
5 1 8- 1 Burial Ground. 
This letter refers to a 
discrepancy between these 
inventory numbers. 
Chemical Inventory 
Information 
NA 
NA 
Comments on 
Chemical Inventory 
Informa tion 
NA 
NA 
Location Within 
the document 
Section 6.5,618- I 
:Solid Waste Burial 
SroundNo. I )  
4ttachment 1 
Waste 
Site 
i18-1 
Iocument Title and 
ID No," 
Ietermination of 
4aterial at Risk (MAR) 
the 618-1 Complex, 
1300X-CA-NO074, 
!ev. 1. 
0 3  
Radiological Inventory 
Information 
Total radiological inventory for 
the 618-1 Complex (including 
333 ESHWSA) is from Table 
4-19. The inventory includes all 
radiologically contaminated 
waste (soil and debris, drummed 
waste, liquids, and discrete 
items) in all waste forms (soil, 
non-combustible solids, 
combustible solids, and 
combustible liquids). 
CO-60: 4.39E-03 Ci 
Zn-65: 8.77E-03 Ci 
Sr-90: 2.03E-01 Ci 
Cs-137: 2.21E-01 Ci 
Eu-155: 1.OOE-05 Ci 
Ra-226: 1.88E-02 Ci 
Th-228: 4.16E-02 Ci 
Th-230: 1.48E-02 Ci 
Th-232: 1.55E-02 Ci 
U-235: 5.83E+00 Ci 
U-238: 1.92E+01 Ci 
Pu-238: 8.09E-03 Ci 
Pu-239: 1.34E+OO Ci 
Pu-241: 9.07E-01 Ci 
Am-241: 1.23E-01 Ci 
303-M SA, 303-M UOF, and 
U-234: 1.56E+Ol Ci 
Comments on Radiological 
Inventory Information 
ivailable historical information 
or the 6 18- 1 Complex is 
nsufficient to characterize the 
omplex, so analogous waste 
tream is based on experience 
vith other 300 Area burial 
:rounds (e.g., soil from the 
118-4,618-3,618-8, and 618-2 
burial grounds, discrete 
dutonium contaminated items 
rom the 618-2 burial ground 
cnd the 618-2 safe, 
:ontaminated liquids found in 
montainers at the 618-3 burial 
:round, and drummed waste 
rom the 618-4 burial ground.) 
Chemical Inventory 
Information 
Total chemical inventory for the 
6 18- 1 Complex (including 
303-M SA, 303-M UOF, and 
333 ESHWSA) is from Table 
4-20. The inventory includes all 
chemically contaminated waste 
in soil and debris and in drums. 
Aroclor- 1254: 4.20E+00 kg 
2-Butanone: 1.68E+Ol kg 
Ammonia: 3.09E+01 kg 
Arsenic: 6.09E-141 kg 
Barium: 9.5 1E+02 kg 
Benzene: 6.62E-01 kg 
Beryllium: 5.69E+00 kg 
Cadmium: 7.58E+01 kg 
Chromium: 1.09Et-04 kg 
Cobalt: 6.31E+02 kg 
Copper: 3.36Et-03 kg 
Fluoride: 5.69E+01 kg 
Lead: 1.68E+04 kg 
Mercury: 7.86Ei-01 kg 
Nickel: 6.51E+03 kg 
Nitrate: 2.13E+03 kg 
PCBs: 1.62E+01 kg 
Selenium: 1.1 lE+O1 kg 
Silver: 1.71E+03 kg 
Sulfate: 5.82Ei-03 kg 
Tetrachloroethylene: 
Trichloroethylene: 1.77E+O1 kg 
Zinc: 4.91E+03 kg 
8.74E-01 kg 
Comments on 
Chemical Inventory 
Informa tion 
ivailable historical 
nformation for the 
518-1 Complex is 
nsufficient to 
:haracterize the 
:omplex, so analogous 
waste stream for soil and 
lebris and drummed 
wastes are based on 
:xperience with the 
5 18-4 burial ground. 
Location Within 
the document 
rables 4- 19 and 
1-20 
Comments on 
Chemical Inventory 
Information 
Waste 
Site 
)ocument Title and 
ID No.” 
Radiological Inventory 
Information 
Comments on Radiological 
Inventory Information 
Chemical Inventory 
Information 
Location Within 
the document 
18-2 lazard Ranking System 
:valuation of CERCLA 
%active Waste Sites at 
tanford, PNL-6456 
{adionuclide inventory: 
!,OOO Ci of beta. These values 
ire decayed through April 1, 
1986. 
Without specific knowledge of 
:he radionuclides present, 
jecaying gross beta activity to 
1986 would not have been 
possible. Additional 
documentation is believed to 
provide sufficient basis for 
Eoncluding that this inventory 
zstimate is incorrect and can be 
dismissed 
NA Vo chemical inventory is 
ivailable. 
Vol. 11, Page 667 
Stenner et al. (1988) estimated 
hat this site contained 2.0 x 
lo3 Ci of gross beta activity and 
31 Ci of Pu-239 decayed to 
September 1, 1980. Materials 
with radiation levels of up to 
35 rads/hr are known to have 
Jeen buried at this site 
:Paas 1955). 
This data has been discounted as 
unreliable and is not used. (See 
Appendix D). 
Two dump truck loads of 
automotive-type batteries 
Section 6.6, 618-2 
(Solid Waste Burial 
Ground No. 2) 
18-2 ‘00-FF-2 Operable 
Jnit Technical Baseline 
:eport, BHI-000 12, 
tev. 0 
NA 
i18-4 Burial Ground 
LSNFHC, 
doc-2001 -001 I 
Soil data for 618-4 to use as 
malogous data for soil: Cs-137, 
1.15 pCi/g; CO-60, 0.25 pCi/g; 
Ra-226, 1.075 pCi/g; Th-228, 
2.375 pCi/g; U-234, 
348.45 pCi/g; U-235,78.1 
XXg; U-238, 848.45 pCi/g; 
Zn-65,0.5 pCi/g. 
Soil data from 618-4 ASARHC 
MOC are used here as 
analogous site data for the 618-2 
site soil. The 618-4 data were 
taken from Appendix A of 
DOE-RL (1995). Soil inventory 
based on concentration from 
618-4 times the soil volume. 
Justification of use of this 
inventory is provided in 
Section 4.1.2 of the ASA. 
Contaminated soil and debris 
including uranium-contaminated 
equipment and materials, 
plutonium and fission products, 
and uranium oxide metal 
cuttings. 
Soil data for 618-4 to use as 
analogous data for soil: As, 
3.475 mg/kg; Be, 0.325 mgkg; 
Cd, 1.5 mgkg; Cr, 
623.075 mgkg; Co, 36 mgkg; 
Cu, 191.625 mgkg; Pb, 
332.5 mgkg; Hg, 4.45 mgkg; 
Ni, 371.5 mg/kg; Ag, 96 mgkg; 
Zn, 280 mg/kg; F, 3.25 mg/kg; 
NH3,0.625 m a g ;  N03, 84 
mg/kg; SO4, 332.5 m a g ;  
PCBs, 0.9225 mg/kg; Ba, 
37.525 mg/kg. 
NA Page 65 
Phase III 
Feasibility Study 
Report for the 
300-FF-I Operable 
Unit, 
Rev. 0 
Burial Ground 
ASNFHC, 
p. 65 
DOE-RL, 1995, 
DOE/RL-94-49, 
BHI, 2001,618-4 
MOC-200 1-00 1 1, 
I 18-2 
Waste 
Site 
i 18-2 
6 18-2 
Document Title and 
ID No." 
3H1,2003a, 618-2 
hpplemental 
Zadionuclide Inventory 
btimate, Calc. No. 
)300X-CA-N00 16 
6 18-2 Burial Ground 
Spent Fuel Inventory 
Calculation Based on 
Waste Disposal Data, 
Rev. 0 (BHI 2004a) 
6 18-2 Exposure Rate 
per Mass of Fuel 
Calculation, 
Rev. 0 (BHI 2004b) 
0300X-CA-N0019, 
0301)X-CA-NO0 18, 
Radiological Inventory 
Information 
1-31 4.95E-3 
2- 14: 1.02E-4 
\Ji-59: 2.04E-5 
20-60: 4.1 1E-6 
\Ji-63: 1.43E-3 
;r-90: 6.82E- 1 
rc-99: 3.57~-4 
3-137: 8.11E-1 
31-152: 6.12E-6 
ZU- 154: 2.28E-4 
3.l-155: 5.93E-5 
'a-234m: 5.96E-5 
5-234: 3.57E-4 
5-235: 1.53E-5 
5-238: 3.57E-4 
'u-238: 1.89E-3 
'u-239: 5.1OE-2 
'u-240: 1.07E-2 
'u-241 : 4.73E-2 
im-24 1 : 1.428-2 
Radionuclide inventory: 1,156 
g irradiated U; 0.04 g Pu; 2.6 
Ci of long-lived beta-emitting 
isotopes. These values are 
decayed to 1986. 
Comments on Radiological 
Inventory Information 
jot cell debris is assumed to 
lave had up to 25% of its 
*adiological inventory 
ssociated with combustible 
naterials. A fire reduced this to 
5.25% of the inventory 
issuming 75% of the 
:ombustibles were consumed. 
Dose rate information from 
radiological survey records 
and special work permit 
records for waste shipments to 
300 Area burial grounds in 
195 1-54 used to determine 
inventory related to disposal 
of irradiated uranium fuel 
wastes from 300 Area 
analytical laboratories. 
Chemical Inventory 
Information 
NA 
NA 
Comments on 
Chemical Inventory 
Information 
NA 
No chemical inventory 
is available 
Location Within 
the document 
Page 5 of 5 
Sheet No. 11 of 
11 in 618-2 
Burial Ground 
Spent Fuel 
Inventory 
Calculation 
Based on Waste 
Disposal Data, 
NOO19, Rev. 0. 
0300X-CA- 
Location Within 
the document 
Comments on 
Chemical Inventory 
Information 
Comments on Radiological 
Inventory Information 
Chemical Inventory 
Information 
Waste 
Site 
Document Title and 
ID  NO.^ 
adiological Inventory 
Information 
Pages 66 and 67 NrZ 18-2 618-4 Burial Ground ClSNFHC, MOC-200 1-001 1 ]rum data for 618-4 to use as malogous data for drums (see rttachment for concentrations). NA Drum data for 618-4 to use as analogous data for drums (see attachment for concentrations). 
11 8-3 Hazard Ranking System 
Evaluation of CERCLA 
Inactive Waste Sites at 
Hanford, PNL-6456 
NA Although used for radioactive 
waste disposal, no inventory is 
avai 1 ab 1 e. 
NA 40 chemical inventory is Page 668 
ivai lable. 
300-FF-2 Operable 
Unit Technical Baseline 
Report, BHI-00012, 
Rev. 0 
NA No inventory of chemicals or 
radionuclides present at this site 
is available (Cramer 1987, 
Stenner et al. 1988). 
NA NA Section 6.7, 618-3 
(Solid Waste Burial 
Ground No. 3) 
118-3 
i 18-3 618-4 Burial Ground 
ASMFHC, 
MOC-200 1 -00 1 1 
Soil data for 618-4 to use as 
malogous data for soil: Cs-137. 
I .  15 pCi/g; CO-60, 0.25 pCi/g; 
Ra-226, 1.075 pCi/g; Th-228, 
2.375 pCi/g; U-234, 
348.45 pCi/g; U-235,78.1 
pCi/g; U-238, 848.45 pCi/g; 
Zn-65,0.5 pCi/g. 
NA Soil data for 618-4 to use as 
analogous data for soil: As, 
3.475 mgkg; Be, 0.325 mgkg; 
Cd, 1.5 mgkg; Cry 
623.075 mgkg; Co, 36 mgkg; 
Cu, 191.625 mgkg; Pb, 
332.5 mgkg; Hg, 4.45 mgkg; 
Ni, 371.5 mgkg; Ag, 96 mgkg; 
Zn, 280 mgkg; F-, 3.25 mgkg; 
NH3,0.625 mgkg; N03, 84 
mgkg; S04,332.5 mgkg; 
PCBs, 0.9225 mgkg; Ba, 
37.525 mg/kg. 
NA IPage 65 
Drum data for 6 18-4 to use as 
analogous data for drums (see 
attachment for concentrations). 
'ages 66 and 67 518-3 618-4 Burial Ground 
ASNFHC, 
MOC-2001-0011 
NA Drum data for 618-4 to use as 
analogous data for drums (see 
attachment for concentrations). 
NA 
NA Although used for radioactive 
waste disposal, no inventory is 
available. 
NA 'age 676 Hazard Ranking System 
Evaluation of CERCLA 
Inactive Waste Sites at 
Hanford, PNL-6456 
No chemical inventory is 
available. 
5 18-7 
Waste 
Site 
trenches (Phillips et al. 1979). 
Other low-level material, 
slightly contaminated with 
uranium and thorium, was also 
buried in the trenches, and 
hundreds of drums with zircaloy 
chips, slightly contaminated 
with beryllium, were deposited 
in this burial ground (Cramer 
1987, Stenner et al. 1988) from 
1962 until June 1973 (PNL 
1986). The zircaloy chips 
buried at this site were generally 
less than 0.25 in. wide and 
5 mm thick and were buried in 
114-L (30-gal) steel drums 
(Hawley et al. 1986). 
The drums containing zircaloy 
chips were originally filled with 
water. Because the drums may 
have corroded and leaked, they 
may now be void of liquid. 
Cramer (1987) reports that the 
pit at the center of this waste sitt 
was used for the disposal of 
thoria. However, Site personnel 
report that the southernmost 
trench (not the pit) was used for 
the disposal of thoria. 
18-7 
-1. 3 -2 
ID No? Information 
eport, BHI-00012, 
.ev. 0, (Phillips et al. 
979) 
I 
Zomments on Radiological 
Inventory Information 
NA 
Chemical Inventory 
Information 
NA 
Comments on 
Chemical Inventory 
Information 
NA 
Location Within 
the document 
;ection 6.9,618-7 
Burial Ground 
rJ0.7) 
NA Soil data for 6 18-4 to use as 
analogous data for soil: As, 
3.475 mgkg; Be, 0.325 mgkg; 
Cd, 1.5 rngkg; Cr, 
623.075 mgkg; Co, 36 mgkg; 
Cu, 19 1.625 mgkg; Pb, 
332.5 mgkg; Hg, 4.45 mgkg; 
Ni, 371.5 mgkg; Ag, 96 mgkg; 
Zn, 280 mg/kg; F-, 3.25 mgkg; 
NH3,0.625 mgkg; N03, 84 
mgkg; S04,332.5 mgkg; 
PCBs, 0.9225 mg/kg; Ba, 
37.525 mgkg. 
NA Drum data for 6 18-4 to use as 
analogous data for drums (see 
attachment for concentrations). 
Waste 
Site 
Comments on 
Chemical Inventory 
Information 
Radiological Inventory 
Information 
Comments on Radiological 
Inventory Information 
Chemical Inventory 
Information 
Location Within 
the document 
Iocument Title and 
h e p  of Zirconium 
llloys in Nuclear 
leactors 
NA NA ;ee attached sheet. Ippendix I Required composition of 
nuclear-grade zirconium and 
zirconium alloy sheet, strip, and 
plate. Also required 
composition of nuclear-grade 
zirconium and zirconium alloy 
tube. 
118-7 
i 18-7 Soil data for 6 18-4 to use as 
maiogous data for soil: Cs- 137, 
1.15 pCi/g; CO-60, 0.25 pCi/g; 
Ra-226, 1.075 pCi/g; Th-228, 
348.45 pCi/g; U-235,78.1 
pCi/g; U-238, 848.45 pCi/g; 
Zn-65,0.5 pCi/g. 
2.375 pCi/g; U-234, 
NA 'age 65 il8-4 Burial Ground 
ISAIFHC, 
doc-200 1-001 1 
518-7 518-4 Burial Ground 
ISAIFHC, 
MOC-200 1-001 1 
Drum data for 618-4 to use as 
analogous data for drums (see 
attachment for concentrations). 
NA 'ages 66 and 67 
5 18-7 Integrated 
qazard Evaluation 
Worksheet, 
[HE-2OO5-00 17 
Provides a full disclosure 
approach to the radionuclides 
inventory. 
A s  radionuclides that were 
ised in buildings that 
:ontributed waste to 618-7. 
-][owever, the data on which the 
:HE is based does not 
;pecifically state if the material 
was discarded in 618-7 or the 
panti ty. 
Provides a full disclosure 
approach to chemical hazards. 
ists  chemicals that were 
ised in buildings that 
:ontributed waste to 
518-7. However, the 
lata on which the IHE is 
lased does not 
;pecifically state if the 
naterial was discarded 
n 618-7 or the quantity. 
Zntire Document 5 18-7 
5 18-8 Hazard Ranking Systen 
Evaluation of CERCLA 
inactive Waste Sites at 
Hanford, PNL-6456 
Although used for radioactive 
waste disposal, no inventory is 
available. 
NA No chemical inventory is 
available. 
NA 'age 678 
Waste 
Site 
i18-8 
Iocument Title and 
ID  NO.^ 
’00-FF-2 Operable 
/nit Technical Baseline 
teport, BHI-000 12, 
lev. 0 
Radiological Inventory 
Information 
Surface contamination levels up 
to 12,000 dpm betdgamma and 
1,200 dpm alpha were identified 
in an area 18 m (60 ft) northwest 
of 618-8, approximately 46 m2 
(500 ft2) in size. An area of 
subsurface contamination with 
levels up to 1 mNhr was found 
adjacent to the northeast 
boundary extending 
approximately 12 m (40 ft). 
The presence of this 
contamination indicated the 
potential for buried radioactive 
material outside an established 
burial ground. The subsequent 
investigation included several 
“test holes” to estimate the 
lateral extent of the 
Contamination (BHI 1994). Of 
the seven test holes surveyed, 
one identified radioactive 
contamination from 200 to 
1,500 c/m betdgamma located 
1.2 to 1.8 m (4 to 6 ft) below 
grade. 
Comments on Radiological 
Inventory Information 
NA 
Chemical Inventory 
Information 
NA 
Comments on 
Chemical Inventory 
Information 
NA 
Location Within 
the document 
;ection 6.10, 618-8 
Solid Waste Burial 
;round No. 8) 
Radiological Inventory 
Information 
Comments on Radiological 
Inventory Information 
)rum data for 618-4 to use as 
nalogous data for drums (see 
ttachment for concentrations). 
NA 
NA Although used for radioactive 
waste disposal, no inventory is 
available. 
nalogous data: Cs- 137, 
.15 pCi/g; CO-60, 0.25 pCi/g; 
{a-226, 1.075 pCi/g; Th-228, 
:.375 pCi/g; U-234, 
148.45 pCi/g; U-235, 
'8.1 pCi/g; U-238, 
148.45 pCi/g; Zn-65, 0.5 pCi/g. 
Comments on 
Chemical Inventory 
Information 
NA 
Waste 
Site 
Iocument Title and 
ID No? 
Chemical Inventory 
Information 
Location Within 
the document 
518-8 ;18-4 Burial Ground 
ISMFHC, 
doc-2001-001 1 
oil data for 618-4 to use as 
nalogous data: Cs-137, 
.15 pCi/g; CO-60, 0.25 pCi/g; 
:a-226, 1.075 pCi/g; Th-228, 
.375 pCi/g; U-234, 
48.45 pCi/g; U-235,78.1 
Ci/g; U-238,848.45 pCi/g; 
h-65,0.5 pCi/g. 
NA Soil data for 618-4 to use as 
analogous data: As, 
3.475 mgkg; Be, 0.325 mgkg; 
Cd, 1.5 mgkg; Cr, 
623.075 mgkg; Co, 36 mgkg; 
Cu, 191.625 mgkg; Pb, 
332.5 mg/kg; Hg, 4.45 mgkg; 
Ni, 371.5 mgkg; Ag, 96 mgkg; 
Zn, 280 mgkg; F-, 3.25 mgkg; 
NH3,0.625 m a g ;  N03, 84 
mgkg; S04, 332.5 mgkg; 
PCBs, 0.9225 mgkg; Ba, 
37.525 mgkg. 
'age 65 
518-8 i18-4 Burial Ground 
ISMFHC, 
r/Ioc-2001-0011 
Drum data for 618-4 to use as 
analogous data for drums (see 
attachment for concentrations). 
NA >ages 66 and 67 
518-13 7azard Ranking System 
?valuation of CERCLA 
nactive Waste Sites at 
'lan ford, PNL- 645 6 
NA go chemical inventory is 
wailable. 
>age 688 
518-4 Burial Ground 
ISMFHC, 
vfoc-2001-0011 
Soil data for 618-4 to use as 
analogous data: As, 
3.475 mgkg; Be, 0.325 m a g ;  
Cd, 1.5 mgkg; Cr, 
623.075 mgkg; Co, 36 mgkg; 
Cu, 191.625 mgkg; Pb, 
332.5 m a g ;  Hg, 4.45 m a g ;  
Ni, 371.5 m a g ;  Ag, 96 m a g ;  
Zn, 280 mgkg; F-, 3.25 m a g ;  
NH3,0.625 mg/kg; N03, 
84 m a g ;  S04,332.5 mglkg; 
PCBs, 0.9225 m@g; Ba, 
37.525 m a g .  
NA >age 65 518-13 
aComplete reference citations are provided in the reference section located at the end of this appendix. 
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7 
8 
9 
I 2.0 Results: 
2 
3 The 1027 Category 3 sum-of-the-ratios for the waste forms (soil, solid waste, liquid waste,and drummed contamination) for the 618-3, 618-8, 618-13 sites and both 
4 segments of the 618-7 site are below 1; therefore, the final hazard categorization for these waste sites is below Category 3. See the summary table below. 
I 
1027 Category 3: Sum of Ratios (Using Adjusted TQ Values) 
Combustible Noncombustible Combustible Combustible 
Non- 
Waste Site Comparison Soil Waste Waste Drums Liquid Liquid Total --------
10 618-3 NE 
11 61 8-7 Northern Trenches NE 
12 618-7 Thoria Pit NE 
13 618-8 NE 
14 618-13 NE 
21 The purpose of this calculation is to evaluate radionuclide constituents to determine the Final Hazard Categorization (FHC) for waste sites in the 300-FF-2 OU. 
22 Descriptions of each waste site and assumptions about inventory are included in the Determination of Material at Risk (MAR) for 300-FF-2 OU Sites, 
23 0300F-CA-N0003, (WCH, 2007a). 618-2 FHC calculation is included in 0300X-CA-NO031 , (WCH, 2005b). I 
24 
1.1 1 E-02 1.09E-02 2.03E-01 2.54E-01 1.26E-03 4.8OE-01 
2.21 E-02 2.25E-02 4.20E-01 1.68E-01 1.26E-03 2.27E-02 6.56E-01 
4.28E-04 1.63E-03 2.97E-02 2.02E-01 1.26E-04 2.27E-01 4.61 E-01 
1.72E-02 2.53E-03 4.09E-02 1.32E-01 1.26E-03 1.94E-01 
2.60 E-03 NA NA NA 1.26E-03 3.87E-03 
(Dec 12,2007 - Th-228 Combined) 0300X-CA-N0011-300-FF-2 FHC Adjusted TQ Values-Rev Walt (2) (Results-Purpose) 
15 TOTAL OF ALL SITES : I .80E+OO 
alculation (T Adjustment) 
6 
7 
WCH- 137 
Rev. 1 
Fire Event 
Wastelype High Wind Event (onsite or range) Dropping of Materials 
Soil included in this calculation. High Not included in this calculation. lNot included in this calculation. 
anfo c. 
winds are assumed to impact 
contaminated soil causing a 
release of contaminated material. 
Originator: Date: 12/13/07 Calc. No.: ev. No.: 5 
Project: Date: /J.J~3./da 
Subject: eet No.: 3 of 49 
Fire event is assumed to have 
no impact on soil. 
This event is assumed to have 
no impact on soil. 
1 4.0 Assumptions 
2 
3 The hazards evaluated in this calculation are identified in Chapter 4 of the Final Hazard Categorization document (WCH 2006~). 
4 These hazards and their assumed impacts to waste materials are identified below: I 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
Contaminated 
Combustible 
Solids 
Contaminated, 
Noncombustible 
Solids 
Drummed Waste 
(Uranium oxide, 
uranium metal, 
and oil) 
Contamination present on 
combustible solids would not be 
readily entrained by the wind 
because the material was 
deposited fifty years ago. It is 
expected that the amount of 
contamination released by this 
mechanism would be less than 
the amount released through a 
Included in this calculation. 
Combustible solids consist of 
rags, swipes and other soft 
waste contaminated with 
irradiated fine metals. 
Included in this calculation. A 
fire could suspend some of the 
surface contamination due to 
heating of the metallic 
components. DOE (2000) 
assesses the release of a 
sparse population of particles 
attached to the surface of a 
noncombustible solid. 
Included in this calculation. Fire 
is assumed to breach drums 
causing release of drum 
contents. 
fire. 
Contamination present on 
combustible solids would not be 
readily entrained by the wind 
because the material was 
deposited fifty years ago. It is 
expected that the amount of 
contamination released by this 
mechanism would be less than 
the amount released through a 
Included in this calculation. 
Noncombustible solids (e.g., 
equipment parts, piping) may be 
lifted out of a trench and 
dropped, or digging equipment 
may impact them. 
Included in this calculation. 
Dropping of a drum is assumed 
to impact drums causing a 
release of drum contents. 
fire. 
Not included in this calculation. 
High wind is assumed to be 
unable to breach an intact drum; 
therefore, there is no impact fron 
this type of event on drummed 
waste. 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
These materials are light and 
have a high surface area to 
mass ratio. Consequently, they 
would generate little force during 
impact with surfaces. DOE 
2000, Section 5.2.3.1, states tha 
no significant suspension of 
surface contamination is 
postulated for such materials. 
Contaminated, Resuspension - Outdoors, pool Thermal stress of aqueous Free-fall spills of aqueous 
Liquids at low wind speeds (page 3-5 of solutions - boiling of aqueous solution, 3-m fall distance (page 
DOE-HDBK-3010); 4E-O7/hour solutions in flowing air (page 3- 3-4 of DOE HDBK-3010); 1 E-04. 
or 3.2E-06 for evaluated 8-hr 1 of DOE-HDBK-3010); 2E-03 Value is also applicable to 
exposure (an 8-hr exposure is combustible organic liquids. 
selected consistent with DOE- Thermal stress of combustible 
STD-3009-94, Appendix A, organic liquids - quiescent 
Section A.3.3). Value is also burning, small surface area 
applicable to combustible organic pools, or small solvent layers 
liquids. over large aqueous layer 
burning to self-extinguishment 
(page 3-6 of DOE-HDBK-3010); 
1 E-02 
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11 Table 1 : 
I z 
13 Contaminant (pCi/Q) 
14 CS-137 1 . 1 5Ec00 
16 Ra-226 1.08E+00 
17 Th-228 2.38E+00 
18 U-234 8.48E+02 
19 U-235 7.81 E+Ol 
20 U-238 8.48E+02 
22 Sr-902 5.40E+00 
Radionuclides in Soils at 618-4 
Concentration' 
15 CO-60 2.50E-01 
21 Zn-65 5.00E-01 
3 -2 FHC Calculat Adjustment) Rev. I 
1 
Originator: Date: 7/31/06 Calc. No.: Rev. No.: 
Project: Job No.: 14655 Checked: Date: 
Subject: 300-FF-2 Final Hazard Categorization Calculation (TQ Adjustment) Sheet No.: 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
38 
31 
37 
Table 2: 
Radionuclides in Soils 
Contaminant (pCi/g) 
Concentration' 
CS-137 1.1 5E+00 
Ra-226 1.08E+00 
Th-228 2.38E+00 
u-234 8.48E302 
U-235 7.81 E+01 
U-238 8.486+02 
Sr-90' 5.40E+00 
CO-60 2.50E-01 
Zn-65 5.00E-01 
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43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
3 C Calculat~o Adjustment) Rev. 1 
Estimated Number 
of Buried Drums Percentage of each Drum 
Drum Contents at 61 8-4 kind of drum (YO) Type 
Drums of black uranium 
Drums of oil coated metal 
powder 354 23.0 1 
tailings, fines and sludges 1184 77.0 2 
Drum Total = 1538 
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i 4.0 Assumptions (continued) 
2 
3 Soil Volume and Number of Drums - Assumptions and Given Information: 
4 This analysis uses contaminated waste site volumes (not including layback) from the 300-FF-2 waste site volume 
5 calculation (BHI 2002a), which are shown below. A 15% swell factor was assumed to calculate loose cubic meters (LCM). A 
6 density of 2.16 g/cm3 was assumed for the contaminated soil. 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 ' The above volumes were calculated using the footprint of the buried trenches, which were determined 
22 using ground penetrating radar (GPR) (BHI 1995a, 1995b, 1995~). These values represent the total waste site 
23 volume of soil and debris. (Contaminated Soil + Debris = Total Volume - Overburden) 
24 These volumes are further broken down into soil, combustible and noncombustible waste forms on Sheets 12 and 13. 
25 3The parking lot area is assumed to consist of contaminated soil only. No drums, combustibles, or noncombustibles 
26 are assumed to be present. 
27 This site is assumed to contain only contaminated soil. 
28 'The total volume for 618-7 burial ground can be found in WCH (2006b) by adding the volume of the individual segments. 
29 The total volume has been extrapolated to 65.000 BCM from 37.165 and the volume of the trenches have been 
30 extrapolated accordingly. This was done because the volumes in WCH (2006b) were calculated using a depth of 15-ft, 
32 6The 61 8-1 3 volume is from volume calculation 0300F-CA-CO009, Rev.0 
33 
Volume of Contaminated Soil & Debris' 
however in an aerial picture of one of the trenches (WCH, 2006a) the trench seems deeper. 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
Number of Drums from BHI 2W2a 
42 a Drum Types I and 2 indicates uranium oxide powder (black and yellow). 
43 Drum Type 3 uranium metal tailings in oil. 
44 Drum Type 4 indicates Zircaloy-2. 
45 Drums were not considered in the calculation of MAR (0300F-CA-N0003). Number of drums at 618-8 included here is 
46 based on the north area of the waste site only and was calculated using the following relationship: 
47 179 drums at 61 8-4 x (3,492 BCM at 61 8-8 I 5,289 BCM at 61 8-1) = 1 18 drums at 61 8-8. 
48 
49 618-7 
50 The 618-7 Burial Ground consists of two segments: the Northern Trenches and the Thoria Pit. It is assumed that the 
51 Northern Trenches each received an inventory amount equal to 10% of the Thoria Pit segment's radionuclide inventory based 
52 on potential cross contamination. It is assumed that the Thoria Pit received an inventory amount equal to 10% of the 
53 combined inventory of the northern trenches due to cross contamination. 
54 
55 Historical data (DUN-3862) shows that 5,648-lbs of depleted uranium were dumped in the 61 8-7 burial ground. It is expected 
56 that this material was dumped in the 618-7 north trench based on the time frame of the document (October 1970) 
57 
58 Discrete Item Type D from WCH (2005c), one Pu stainless cup, is assumed to be found in both the North and Middle 
59 trenches. 10% of the inventory of one discrete item type D is assumed to be in the Thoria Pit due to cross contamination. 
60 
61 It is assumed that the Th-232 inventory calculated in WCH (2005a) is in the Thoria Pit. 90% of which is assumed to be 
62 contamination on debris, with the remaining 10% adhered to the soil. 
63 
64 Liquids 
65 Liquids, as estimated in MOC-2005-0002, are included for 618-3,618-7 Northern Trenches, 618-8, and 618-13. 10% of the 
66 liquid inventory estimated for the 618-7 Northern Trenches is assumed to be in the Thoria Pit. For conservativism, it is 
67 assumed that all liquids are combustible. 
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1 5.0 Methodology: 
3 The following is a list of the steps involved in determining the FHC for each of the waste sites: 
4 
5 SteD 1 : Determine contaminated soil and drum concentrations. 
6 
7 I 
8 Radionuclide concentrations in contaminated soil and drums for each of the waste sites were included in the preliminary 
i o  therefore, analysis of chemical constituents are not included in this FHC calculation. 
11 
12 Data obtained from actual sampling results of the 61 8-4 soil and drums has been used as the basis of the inventory for 
13 each of the waste sites except 61 8-8, which has a site-specific soil inventory. The soil and drum concentrations from the 
14 618-4 Burial Ground are included in Tables 1 and 2 in Section 4.0. 
16 SteD 2: Calculate contaminated soil and drum inventories. 
18 Soil radionuclide inventories (Ci) were calculated by multiplying each radionuclide concentration (pCi/g) by an assumed 
19 density (g/cm3) and by the waste site soil volume (m3) x 1 .OE+6 cm3/m3 and dividing by 1 .OE+12 pCi/Ci. The soil and drum 
20 inventories are included in Section 9.0. For site 61 8-2 the waste site soil volume was assumed to be equal to the total 
21 volume. 
22 
23 Drummed inventories for uranium oxide powder, metal and oil inventories were calculated by multiplying the concentration 
24 (pCi/g or pCi/L) by the total mass or volume per drum (kg or L) by the total number of drums. 
26 Step 3: Calculate the adiusted TQ values 
28 The hazard category 3 threshold quantities (TQ) in DOE-STD-1027-94 (DOE, 1997) are based on the release values (RV) 
29 calculated in (EPA, 1989.) Release values are determined for each of four exposure pathways: food ingestion, water 
30 ingestion, inhalation, and direct exposure. The TQ for a given isotope is 20 times the most restrictive RV. The TQ can be 
31 expressed as: 
32 
33 
34 
2 
9 hazard categorization and are documented in WCH (2005a). Only radionuclides are used in determining the FHC; I 
15 
17 
25 
27 
TQ = 20 x MlN { RVFOOD, RVWATER, RVINH, RVDIR I (1) 
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1 5.0 Methodology (continued): 
2 
3 Step 3: Continued 
5 The EPA methodology uses the following assumptions: 
7 I )  The RV for the water ingestion pathway assumes that 100% of the material is released to drinking water (see EPA, 
8 1989 Appendix 8.1 ) 
9 2) The RV for the inhalation pathway and the RV for the food ingestion pathway both are inversely proportional to a 
i o  respirable airborne release fraction (see EPA, 1989 Appendix A.2 and Appendix C.l). 
I i 3) The RV for direct exposure for isotopes other than noble gases assumes a point source 
12 
13 The DOE Office of Nuclear and Facility Safety Policy Nuclear Safety Technical Position, NSTP 2002-2 (DOE, 2002), 
14 allows that the hazard Category 3 threshold quantities (TQ) for radionuclides for which the food pathway and the inhalation 
15 pathway are limiting may be revised if, based on the physical and chemical form and available dispersive energy sources 
16 for the facility and its hazardous materials, the credible release fractions (airborne release fractions) can be shown to be 
17 significantly different from the values used in the EPA Technical Background Document. All potential accident scenarios 
18 must be considered under unmitigated conditions. All pathways must be considered and the most limiting pathway must 
19 be used. 
20 
21 Based on the guidance in NSTP 2002-2, the adjusted category 3 TQ for an isotope in a particular material form can be 
22 expressed as: 
23 
24 
25 
26 Where f, 
27 
28 from any potential accident 
29 
30 
31 
32 any potential accident scenario 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 Appendix E 
39 
40 
41 The potential accident scenarios and corresponding release fractions are identified from a hazard analysis. These 
42 analyses form the basis for identifying appropriate respirable airborne release fractions. The release fractions will be from 
43 DOE-HDBK-3010-94 (DOE, 2000), Roberson, 2002, or other analyses previously approved by DOE. Equation 2 will be 
44 used to generate adjusted TQs for each material form present at the burial grounds. 
45 
4 
6 
TQADJ = 20 X MJN { fl X RVFOOD? fz X RVWATER, fl X RVtNHv fs X RVDIR I (2) 
is the ratio of the respirable airborne release fraction used in the EPA analysis 
(from EPA, 1989 Exhibit A-1) to the largest respirable airborne release fraction 
is the release value for the food pathway from EPA, 1989 Appendix E 
is the ratio of the fraction of material released to drinking water in the EPA 
analysis (i.e., 1) to the largest fraction of material released to drinking water in 
is the release value for the water pathway from EPA, 1989 Appendix E 
is the release value for the inhalation pathway from EPA, 1989 Appendix E 
is the ratio of the dose rate from a point source at 30 meters to the dose rate 
from a distributed source of equal activity at 30 meters 
is the release value for the direct exposure pathway from EPA, 1989 
RVFOOD 
f2 
RVWATER 
RVINX 
f3 
RVDIR 
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47 
I 5.0 Methodology (continued): 
3 Step 3: Continued 
5 The total inventory of radionuclides in each material form is compared to the adjusted TQs for that form using the sum of 
6 the ratios. The final hazard categorization is based on summing the adjusted TQ fractions of all the different material 
7 forms. 
9 For conservatism, this final categorization will assume that f2 is equal to 1 although there is no potential for releases to 
10 drinking water in the vicinity of the waste sites. It will also assume that f, is equal to 1, although the point source model is 
7 1  quite conservative for the large distributed sources at each burial ground. 
12 
13 
14 The adjustment factor f, can be expressed as: f, = REpA/RHA. 
16 Where, 
18 
19 
20 
21 this hazard analysis. 
23 In general, the respirable release fraction (R) is the product of the airborne release fraction (ARF) and the release fraction 
24 (RF), or R = ARF x RF. 
26 Step 4: Determine the final hazard categorization for each waste site. 
27 
28 The inventories for each waste type are divided by adjusted TQ values. These individual ratios for each waste site are 
29 then summed and compared to 1. If the sum of the ratios is above 1 using the adjusted TQ, then adjusted TQ has been 
30 exceeded and the FHC for a waste site is determined to be above Category 3. If the sum of the ratios is below 1, the FHC 
31 is determined to be below Category 3. 
2 
4 
8 
15 
17 
REPA is the respirable release fraction for a particular hazardous material (e.g., cobalt, aluminum, strontium) 
from EPA (1989), Exhibit A-1. 
RHA is the respirable release fraction for a particular hazardous chemical for the potential hazard identified in 
22 
25 
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21 
22 
23 Calculation of contamination to debris ratios: 
25 Concrete: Using a 1 cubic foot (0.0283 cubic meter) block of concrete with an assumed 6 mm thick contaminated layer on one surface 
26 1) Calculation surface area of concrete block: 
27 0.093 m2/side x 1 side = 9.30E-02 m2 
28 thickness of Contamination (6 mm) = 6.00E-03 m 
30 Total contamination per cubic 
31 meter of waste = 5.58E-04 m3 
32 2) The contamination to debris volume ratio for concrete is 5.58E-04 m3/2.83E-02 m3 = 
33 
34 Steel: Using a 1 cubic meter block of steel piping with an assumed 1 mm thick contaminated layer on the inside of each pipe. 
35 
36 1) Calculation surface area of a single 1 m long section of 0.0762 m (3 in) inner diameter steel pipe: 
37 Surface Area = n x diameter 0.239 m2 
38 x length = 
0.001 m 39 thickness of contamination (1 
40 mm) = 
41 Total contamination per pipe 
42 = 2.39E-04 m3 / pipe 
43 2) Calculate total number of pipes within 1 cubic meter block. 
44 I m I0.072 &pipe = 13 pipes 
45 Total number of pipes=pipes 
46 per column x no columns (7 3) 
47 3) Calculate total contamination from all pipes: 
48 Total contamination per pipe 0.040 m3 
49 
50 4) The contamination to debris volume ratio for steel is 0.04 m3/l m3 = 
24 
(e.g., pieces of a contaminated wall or foundation). 
29 
0.02 
-
169 total pipes (1 3 x 13 grid) 
x number of pipes = 
0.04 
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1 7.0 Calculation of Waste Forms (continued) 
L 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
1 1  
12 
13 
14 a The volume from the total number of drums per each waste site has been subtracted from the 
15 total soil volume. Based on 55 gallon (0.208 m3) drum capacity. 
16 The soil volume = 67% (Total waste site volume listed on Sheet 6 - Total volume of the drums). 
17 The debris volume represents 33% of the total waste site volume listed on Sheet 6. 
18 The combustible volume represents 10% of the debris in the waste site. 
19 e The noncombustible volume represents 90% of the debris in the waste site. 
20 The concrete and steel volumes calculated by multiplying 50% of the noncombustible volume by 
21 the contamination to debris ratio calculated for each waste form (concrete = 0.02, steel = 0.04). 
22 
23 
Rev. No.: 
Date: 
Sheet No.: 
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Project: 
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4.27E+IO 10,950 43.8 1,051 2.5E-08 61 8-7 Northern 19,758 
Ymnpham 
(*+&!A E. Gonsatves,p. .*<-fl Date: 7i31t06 C a b  NO.: 0300X-CA-NO011 
300-Ff-2 Remediation Job No.: 14655 Checked: 
300-FF-2 Final Hazard Categorization Calculation fTQ Adjustment) 
Rev. No.: 2 
Date: 
Sheet No.: 
I 7.70E+09 1 2,800 I 11.2 269 I 3.5E-08 I 
37 61 8-8-- I 17,912 1 3.87E+10 1 14,505 I 58.0 1 1,392 I 3.6E-08 
38 61 8-1 3 f 2.815 t 6.08E+09 1,088 1 4.4 1 104 1 1.7E-08 
39 a Soil volumes are taken from Sheet 13. 
40 Soil mass is based on a density of 2.1 6 g/cm3 or 2.16E-G glLCM. 
Surface areas are taken from calc (BXi 2002a). 61 8-8 also includes the parking lot which has dimensions 
42 of 106 m x 125 m. 
43 Rate of entrainment fgh) is calculated using the following equation: 
44 x = Surface Area m2 x 0.004 g/m2-h = Rate of Entrainment glh 
45 e The respirable release value for a 24 hour period is calculated by dividing the mass 
46 entrained in a 24 hour period by the total waste site mass. 
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1 8.0 Hazard Analysis - Determination of Release Values Associated with this Hazard Analysis 
2 
3 Contaminated, Combustible Solids: Contamination present on combustible solids would not be readily entrained by the 
4 wind because the material was deposited 30 to 50 years ago and the contaminants are expected to be absorbed onto the 
5 materials. It is expected that the amount of contamination released by this mechanism would be less than the amount 
6 released through a fire. 
7 
8 Contaminated, Noncombustible Solids: Contamination present on noncombustible solids would not be readily entrained 
9 by the wind because the material was deposited 30 to 50 years ago. It is expected that the amount of contamination 
IO released by this mechanism would be less than the amount released through dumping. 
11 
12 Contaminated, Combustible Liauids: Resuspension - Aqueous liquids outdoors, pool at low wind speeds (page 
13 3-5 of DOE-HDBK-3010); 4E-O7/hour or 3.2E-06 for evaluated 8-hr exposure (an 8-hr exposure is selected 
14 consistent with DOE-STD-3009-94, Appendix A, Section A.3.3). Value is also applicable to combustible organic 
15 liquids. Therefore, the R value used for this scenario is 3.2E-06. 
16 
17 8.1.3 Fire 
19 Contaminated soil and sludae: The soil at the burial grounds is noncombustible. A fire burning across a site could 
20 entrain some of the soil in the updraft, but it would be expected that the amount released by this mechanism would be 
21 less than the amount of soil released through wind entrainment. 
22 
23 Contaminated. Combustible Solids: The release value for this scenario is 5.OE-04 (DOE 2000). This value was judged to 
24 be bounding for the conditions under consideration (i.e., ignition of soft waste from an external source such as a range 
25 fire or an internal source such as a vehicle fire) and is considered to be bounding for this analysis. Therefore, the R 
26 value used for this scenario is 5.OE-04. 
28 Contaminated, Noncombustible Solids: A fire could suspend some of the surface Contamination due to heating of the 
29 metallic components. DOE (ZOOO), Section 5.1 (page 5-5) assess the release of a sparse population of particles 
30 attached to the surface of a noncombustible solid. The R value for this scenario is 6.OE-05. 
32 Contaminated. Combustible Liauids: Thermal stress of organic combustible liquids - quiescent burning, small surface 
33 area pools, or small solvent layers over large aqueous layer burning to self-extinguishment (page 3-6 of DOE-HDBK- 
34 3010); 1 E-02. Therefore, the R valued used for this scenario is 1.OE-02 for combustible liquid. 
35 
36 Contaminated, Noncombustible Liauids: Thermal stress of aqueous solutions - boiling of aqueous solutions in flowing air 
37 (page 3-1 of DOE-HDBK-3010); 2E-03. Therefore, the R valued used for this scenario is 2.OE-3 for noncombustible 
38 liquid. 
39 
40 8.2 Determination of Drummed Waste Release Values 
42 The following is a discussion of two accident scenarios, falling drum and fire, and their associated R values, which is the 
43 ARF multiplied by an RF, as appropriate. A high wind scenario was not evaluated for drummed contamination since it 
44 was assumed that high wind would not breach a drum. The most conservative R values for each waste type (Le., gives 
45 the smallest adjusted TQ value) were used in the FHC calculations and are summarized on Sheet 14. 
47 8.2.1 Dropping 
48 
49 Uranium Oxide Powder: The R value for the uranium oxide powder contained in a drum was based on values given in 
50 Section 4.4.3.3.2, “Large Falling Object Impact or Induced Air Turbulence” of DOE-HDBK-3010-94 (DOE 2000). This 
51 section identified an R value of 7.OE-4 for the suspension of bulk powder due to the shock-impact resulting from dropping 
52 a drum. These values are believed to be very conservative for this accident scenario because they are derived, primarily, 
53 from an experiment that involved dropping a large (Le., several pounds) rock from a height of 3.7 m onto an open, steel 
54 (quart-sized) can filled with sand. Therefore, the R value for release of uranium wiwder due to drominn a drum is 
18 
, 
27 
31 
41 
46 
55 1.OE-04. 
56 
57 
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1 8.0 Hazard Analysis - (continued) 
3 Uranium Metal in Oil: For the drums containing oil and uranium metal, only the contaminated oil is considered as 
4 MAR. The metal is not considered to be at risk because it is too large for uptake into the human lung. DOE (2000), 
5 Section 3.2.3.3, discusses experiments performed to measure the ARF and RF generated by the free-fall spill (from 
6 a height of 3 m) of viscous solutions. The ARF and RF values are identified as 7E-06 and 0.8, respectively. Given 
the viscosity of the oil and the potential spill height from the breached drums, these values are believed to be very 
8 conservative to model the spill of contaminated oil in this scenario. Therefore, an R value for release of uranium 
contaminated oil due to dr0DRinU of a drum is 7.OE-06 x 0.8 to uive 5.6E-06. 
2 
10 
1 1  8.2.2 Fire 
12 
13 This scenario is based on an assumption that a drum has been breached releasing oil into a pool that catches fire 
14 (from an onsite or range fire). 
16 Section 3.3. of DOE (2000), which studied 30% TBP/kerosene solutions, distinguishes between small-scale pool 
17 burning and vigorously burning large pools, with the ARF for small-scale pools being less than those for a large pool. 
18 Further, Section 3.3 distinguishes between vigorously burning large pools that burn to complete dryness and those 
19 that do not, with a larger ARF for those that burn to complete dryness. Given the volume of oil potentially involved in 
20 a fire and the anticipated smaller aerosol formation rate from the burning oil as compared to the burning kerosene- 
2, TBP mixtures, a vigorously burning large pool (that does not burn to complete dryness) is judged to be a reasonable 
22 approximation of the release scenario. The ARF and RF for this release mechanism are 3E-2 and 1 .O, respectively 
23 and are listed in Section 3.3.7 of DOE (2000). Therefore. an R value for release of uranium contaminated oil 
24 due to a fire is 3.OE-02. 
26 Entrainment of Powder. Section 4.4.1.1 of DOE (2000) provides ARFs for plutonium oxide. Uranium oxide powder 
27 is, like plutonium oxide powder, a nonreactive material in regards to heat and oxygen. It is assumed, based on this 
28 nonreactivity, that the only significant mechanism to release uranium oxide (due to heating) is entrainment due to 
29 the flow of heated air over the oxide powder. To develop a conservative ARF and RF for this scenario, it is assumed 
3o that the airflow has a high velocity. Section 4.4.1.1 of DOE (2000), identifies a ARF of 6E-3 and RF of 0.01 for 
31 chemically nonreactive compounds subjected to thermal stress. These values are believed to be very conservative 
32 for overpacked drums containing a large volume of uranium oxide because the bulk of the oxide material would be 
33 shielded from the convective flow caused by the fire (i.e., surface oxide material would limit impact to sub-surface 
34 material). Therefore, an R value for release of uranium powder due to a fire is 6.OE-03 x 0.01 to aive 6.OE-05. 
35 
36 Combustion of Metal. Oxidation of the uranium metal fines and turnings at the bottom of a drum would not occur until 
37 the layer of oil covering the metal burns down to a point where the metal would be exposed to oxygen. There would 
38 be an influx of oxygen into the drum from the top (normally, the only passage that would allow oxygen to enter would 
39 be through the vent ports, however it is assumed that the lid of the drum has been removed). The heat generated 
40 from the burning oil may be sufficient to elevate the surface temperature of the uranium metal to the point that self- 
41 sustained oxidation could occur. 
43 Vaporization of the mineral oil could result in a high-pressure vapor phase if the vent ports of a drum were to 
15 
25 
42 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
become plugged (it is unlikely that this would occur as a fire would melt the rubber membrane of the vent ports 
before significant gas pressures could build). Even if the vent ports were to become plugged and allow vaporized oil 
to build-up in the air space, venting of the drum would not eject the uranium tailings and fines at the bottom of the 
drum because of the buffering effect of the intervening oil layer. 
Differential heating of the drum would not result in a significant enough temperature gradient to generate a vapor 
phase within the oil at the bottom of the drum (large bubbles) that could disturb uranium oxidation products and eject 
the material into the air. Even if burning oil was to surround the outside of a drum, the bottom of the drum would not 
heat rapidly enough to result in a roiling boil. The drum and its contents would provide a heat sink to distribute heat 
and prevent rapid heating of one part of the drum while the remainder of the drum remained relatively cool. 
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37 Release Mechanism 
38 Material Form SoiUDebris Entrainment Fire Drum 
Dumping Dropping 
39 Soil 1 .OE-06 3.6E-08 NA NA 
40 Combustibles NA NA 5.OE-04 NA 
41 Noncombustibles 1 .OE-03 NA 6.OE-05 f NA 
42 Oxide Powder (Drum)' NA NA 6.OE-05 I 1.OE-04 
43 Oil (Drum) NA NA 3.OE-02 I 5.6E-06 
44 Metal (Drum) NA NA 1.OE-04 1 NA 
45 Combustible Liquids 1 .OE-04 3.2E-06 1 .OE-02 1 
46 Noncombustible Liquids 1 .OE-04 3.2E-06 2.OE-03 1 
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i 8.0 Hazard Analysis - (continued) 
2 
Studies have been made concerning the physical form of the oxides that occur at the surface of uranium metal during 
oxidation at elevated temperatures (including self-sustained oxidation above the ignition temperature). Section 4.2.1.2 of 
5 DOE (2000) states that at temperatures above 700"C, the oxide that forms at the surface of uranium metal is a hard, black 
6 scale that (1) resists entrainment by air driven by convective heating and (2) any oxide formed is generally coarser and has a 
7 lower solubility in lung fluid. The temperature of burning oil is approximately 650 to 930°C, which would heat uranium metal 
8 to the point that it would oxidize as a scale. 
9 
10 The confined nature of the uranium metal in the drum would limit airflow ingress to the top of the drum, which would restrict 
11 significant air flow parallel to the surface area of the uranium metal. The quantity of airborne particulates of uranium oxide 
12 entrained by flowing air in this scenario would be less than if the metal were on a flat surface over which surrounding air 
13 could flow into a fire parallel to the surface of the uranium metal. 
15 Data were collected on the oxides formed by heating to various temperatures small pieces (less than 13 g) of unalloyed and 
16 delta-alloyed plutonium metal in various atmospheres. Two shapes were used: billets (cylinders 0.7 cm diameter by 1 .O cm 
37 long) and swarf (turnings). The data are tabulated in Table 4-3 of DOE (2000). The ARF for self-sustained oxidation of 
plutonium metal at above-ignition temperature (which is assumed to be equivalent to that of uranium metal in the same 
,9 conditions) at the highest temperature recorded (950°C) in air was 1.5E-05. To provide a more conservative number, it is 
2o assumed that the ARF for oxidation of uranium metal under conditions described in this accident scenario would be 1 .OE-03 
2i (an increase by a factor of 100). Section 4.2.1.1.3 of DOE (2000) provides an RF of 0.001. Again, to provide a more 
22 conservative number, it is assumed that the RF for this scenario would be 0.1 (an increase by a factor of 100). This RF 
14 
would result in a respirable release fraction of 1 .OE-04 for uranium metal covered with oil undergoing self-sustained oxidation 
in the bottom of a drum. Therefore, an R value for release of uranium metal due to a fire is 1 .OE-03 x 0.1 to give 1.OE-04. 23 . 
24 
25 
26 A telephone conference was held with Mr. Jofu Mishima, DOE and BHI Project staff, DOE Assistant Manager for 
27 Environmental Restoration Program (AME) staff, and BHI Functional staff to discuss the appropriate mechanisms of release 
28 of uranium fines and tailings for this type of scenario, and to identify the bounding ARF and RF values. It was determined 
ZQ that the mechanism for release discussed above is appropriate. The members of the conference also concurred with the 
30 bounding ARF and RF values chosen for this accident scenario (CCN 071436). 
32 In order to calculate the most conservative (Le., smallest) adjusted TQ value for comparison to the material at risk, the 
33 largest release value based on this hazard analysis (RHA) for each material type was used. 
34 
35 8.3 Summaw of Release Values Used in this FHC 
31 
47 NA = not applicable. 
48 ' Applicable to both uranium oxide and thorium oxide powders. 
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1 9.0 Calculation of Adjusted TQ Values 
2 
5 SOIL 
6 Americium IAm-241 
7 Carbon 
8 Cobalt"' 
9 Cesium 
10 Europium 
11 Europium 
12 Europium 
13 Tritium 
14 Nickel 
15 Nickel 
16 Protactiniuin'" 
17 Plutonium 
18 Plutonium 
19 Plutonium 
20 Plutonium 
21 Radium 
22 Strontium 
23 Strontium 
24 Technetium 
25 Thorium 
26 Thorium 
27 Uranium 
28 Uranium 
29 Uranium 
30 Zinc 
31 Radium'" 
32 Actenium'" 
34 Radium'" 
35 Radon"' 
36 Poloniumi"~" 
37 Lead'' 
38 Bismuth"' 
39 Thaiiuni'".' ' 
33 Thorium'" 
C-14 
co-60 
cs-137 
Eu-152 
Eu- 1 54 
Eu-155 
H-3 
Ni-59 
Ni-63 
Pa-234111 
Pu-238 
Pu-239 
Pu-240 
Pu-24 1 
Ra-226 
Sr-89 
Sr-90 
Tc-99 
Th-22s 
'I%-232 
U-234 
U-235 
U-238 
Zn-65 
Ra-228 
Ac-278 
Th-228 
Ra-224 
Rn-220 
Po-2 16 
Bi-2 12 
Pb-2 12 
TI-208 
1.E-03 
1 .E-03 
5.E-01 
1 .E-02 
1 .E-02 
1 .E-O2 
1 .E-02 
5.E-01 
1 .E-02 
1 .E-02 
1 .E-03 
l.E-03 
1 .E-03 
1 .E-03 
1 .E-03 
1 .E-03 
1 .E-02 
1 .E-02 
I .E-02 
l.E-03 
1 .E-03 
l.E-03 
1 .E-03 
1 .E-03 
1 .E-02 
l.E-03 
1 .E-03 
1 .E43 
1.E-03 
I.E+00 
t.E-02 
1 .E02 
1 .E-02 
1 .E-02 
I .E-02 
1 .E-06 
l.E-06 
1 .E-06 
l.E-06 
l.E-06 
1 .E-06 
1 .E-06 
l.E-06 
l.E-06 
1.506 
1. E-06 
1 .E-06 
1 .E-06 
1 .E-06 
I .  E-06 
1 .E-06 
1 .E-06 
l.E-06 
I .E-06 
1 .E-06 
l.E-06 
l.E-06 
1 .E-06 
1 .E-06 
1.E-06 
I.E-06 
1 .E-06 
1 .E46 
1 .E-06 
1 .E-06 
I .E46 
1 .E-06 
1 .E-06 
l.E-06 
1 .E-06 
3 CATEGOKY 3 THRESHOLD QUANTITIES ADJUSTED FOR 4PPKOPRIAI'E KESPIKABLE RELEASE FKACTION (I Of 2) 
4 
3.OE-0 1 
6.OE+01 
3.OE+00 
2.4EiOl 
1.5E+01 
1.2E+02 
5.9EiO2 
2.78702 
2.9E+04 
2.1moo 
1.8E;OO 
I .8E+00 
9.OE+0 1 
6.OE-01 
I.iE+Ol 
8.2E-01 
S.9E+01 
1.8EiOO 
LIE-01 
3.OE+00 
3.OEc00 
1.2E+O 1 
3.E+04 
2.Et00 
I.E+Ol 
na 
na 
7.E1-01 
S.E+04 
na 
na 
3.0EtOO 
6.E-0 1 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
5.9E103 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. lg. 
v. Ig. 
v. lg. 
v. lg. 
v. Ig. 
2.9E+02 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v.lg. 
vsg. 
v.lg. 
v.lg. 
na 
na 
v.lg. 
v.lg. 
1.5E+O2 
3.OE-601 
na 
na 
2.6E-02 
2.1E+01 
1.6E+02 
l.OEi02 
1 .OEtO 1 
I .OE+Ol 
4.7E+01 
8.3E-42 
2.1 E+03 
1.OE+03 
3.6E-i-04 
3.1E-02 
2.6E-02 
2.6E-02 
1.6EiOO 
3.1E+OO 
5.2Et01 
2.1E+O0 
3.6E-02 
5.2E-02 
5.28-03 
2.1 E-0 1 
2.1 E-0 1 
2.1E-01 
1.6E+02 
5.E+OO 
5.Ei01 
5.E-02 
I.E+Ol 
l.E-01 
na 
2.E+01 
1 .E+02 
na 
na 
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L 
3 CATEGORY 3 THRESHOLD QUANTITIES ADJUSTED FOR APPROPRIATE RESPIRAB 
Element Isotope REP:) RVHA Ingestion RV Ingestion RV 
FOO~‘*’ 
.E RELEASE FRACTION (2 ( 
Uranium Oxide Powder(9) 
Thorium Oxide Powder 
6 (U-234, U-235, U-238) UO2 
7 (Th-232) Til-232 
Uranium Metal 
8 (11-234, U-235, U-238)(9) 
9 Oil 
10 Radium Powder lo 
11 Actcniurn Povvdcr lo 
12 Thorium Powder Io 
13 Radiuni Powder I o  
14 Radon Powder 
15 Polonium Powder lo 
16 Lead Powder Io 
17 Bismuth Powder l o  
18 Thalium Powder lo 
19 Polonium Powder lo 
I U-metal 
Ra-228 
AC-228 
Th-228 
Ra-224 
Rn-220 
PO-2 I6* 
Pb-2 12 
Bi-2 12 
T1-208* ! Po-2 12* 
1 .E-03 
1 .E-03 
1 .E-03 
1 .E-03 
1 .E-03 
1 .E-03 
1 .E-03 
1 .E-03 
1 .E*O 
1 .E-02 
1 .E-02 
1.12-02 
1 .E-02 
1 .E-02 
1 .E-04 
1 .E-04 
1 .E-04 
3.E-02 
I . E 0 4  
1.E-04 
1 .E-04 
1 .E-04 
1 .E-04 
1.E-04 * 
1 .E-04 
1 . E-04 
1 .E-04 
1 .E-04 
3.OEi-00 
2.1 E-0 1 
3.0Ei-00 
3.OEi-00 
6.E-Ol 
3.Ei-04 
2.E+00 
1 .E+O I 
na 
na 
7.E-i-01 
5.Ei-04 
na 
na 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. lg. 
v. Ig. 
v.lg. 
v.lg. 
v.lg. 
vsg. 
na 
na 
v.lg. 
vsg. 
na 
na 
2.1 E-01 
5.2E-03 
2.1 E-01 
2.1E-01 
5.E+OO 
5.Ei-01 
5.E-02 
1 .EM 1 
1.E-01 
na 
2.Ei-01 
1 .E+02 
na 
na 
2.7E-i-02 
7.38+05 
2.7Ei-02 
2.7Ei-02 
--- 
I .EM2 
-_- 
4.E+03 
--- 
na 
b.E+02 
6.E-i-03 
na 
na 
5 
7 
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6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11  
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
Americium 
Carbon 
Cobalt"' 
Cesium 
Europium 
Europium 
Europium 
Tritiuni 
Nickel 
Nickel 
Prolactiniuni'K) 
Plutoniuni 
Plutonium 
Plutonium 
Plutonium 
Radium 
Strontium 
Technetium 
Thorium 
Thorium 
Uranium 
Uranium 
Uranium 
Zinc 
Radium'" 
Actenium"' 
Thorium'" 
Radiunr"' 
Radonin 
Polonium"'.' ' 
Lead'" 
Bisntuih" 
Thaliuni""" 
hi-24 1 
C-14 
CO-60 
CS-137 
Eu-152 
Eu-154 
Eu-155 
H-3 
Ni-59 
Ni-63 
Pa-234m 
Pu-238 
Pu-239 
Pu-240 
Yu-241 
Ra-226 
Sr-90 
Tc-99 
'I%-228 
Th-232 
U-234 
U-235 
U-238 
Zn-65 
Ra-228 
Ac-228 
Th-228 
Re-224 
Rn-220 
PO-216 
Pb-2 12 
Bi-2 12 
TI-208 
1 .E-03 
5.E-01 
l.E-03 
1 .E-02 
1 .E-02 
1 .E-O2 
1 .E-02 
5.E-01 
1 .E-02 
1 .E-03 
1 .E-03 
l.E-03 
1 .E43 
1. E-03 
1 .E-03 
l.E-02 
1 .E-03 
1 .E43 
1.  E-02 
1 .E-02 
1 .E-02 
1 .E-03 
1.E-03 
1. E-03 
l.E-03 
1 .E-03 
1.E-03 
1 .E-03 
I.E+OO 
1 .E42 
I .E-02 
1 .E-02 
I .E-02 
1 .E-02 
5.E-04 
5.E-04 
5.E-04 
5.504 
5.E-04 
5.E-04 
5.E-04 
5.E-04 
5.E-04 
5.E-04 
5.E-04 
5.E-04 
5.E-04 
5.E-04 
5.E-04 
5.E-04 
5.E-04 
5.E-04 
5.E-04 
l.E-06 
5.E-04 
5.E-04 
5.E-04 
5.E-04 
5.E-04 
5.E-04 
5.E-04 
5.E-04 
5.E-04 
5 E-04 
5.E-04 
5.E-04 
5.E-04 
5.E-04 
3.OE-01 
h.OE+Ol 
3.OE+OO 
2.4E-t0 1 
1.5E-tO1 
1.2E+02 
5.98+02 
2.7E-to2 
2.9E+04 
2.1 E+OO 
I .8E+OO 
1.8E+00 
9.OE+OI 
6OE-0 I 
8.2E-01 
8.9I301 
2.1 E-0 1 
3.OErOO 
3.OE+U0 
3.OE+OO 
6.E-01 
3.E+O4 
Z.E+UO 
1.8EiOO 
1.2E+01 
I.E+01 
na 
aa 
7.E+01 
5.E+04 
na 
na 
v. Ig. 
1.5EA02 
v. Ig. 
v. 18. 
v. lg. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. 1%. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. 1s. 
v. lg. 
v. Ig. 
v. 1s. 
2.9E102 
v. lg. 
v. Ig. 
Y. lg. 
Y. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v.lg. 
v.lg. 
V&. 
na 
5.9E+03 
V. Ig. 
3.0E+01 
V.lg. 
lld 
vsg. 
vsg. 
na 
na 
2.6E-02 
2.1E+01 
1.6E+02 
1.OE-1-02 
1.OEiOl 
1.OE-tOl 
4.7E+OI 
8.3E-I 02 
2.1 E-1.03 
1 .OE e03 
3.68+04 
3.1 E-02 
2.6E-02 
2.68-02 
1.6E-tOO 
3.1E+00 
2.1 E+OO 
3.6E102 
5.2E-02 
5.28-03 
2. I E-01 
2.IE-01 
2.1 E-01 
1.6Ei.02 
5.Et00 
5.E.i.01 
5.E-02 
l.E+OI 
l.E-01 
na 
2.E-to1 
1 .E4-02 
na 
na 
1.5E+01 
6.5E+01 
3.5E+01 
4.2Et01 
7.OE+02 
- 
7.6E+01 
I .7Et06 
5.OE+O6 
5.9E+03 
I .4E+08 
- 
7.38105 
7.5Ei-05 
2.78-02 
6.4Er01 
_ _ _  
I.E+02 
-- 
4.Er03 
-_ 
na 
6.E+02 
6.Ei-03 
'la 
no 
2) 
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Rev. 1 
Carbon 
Cobalt"' 
Cesium 
Europium 
Europium 
Europium 
Tritium 
Nickel 
Nickel 
Protactinium'" 
Plutonium 
Plutonium 
Plutonium 
Plutonium 
Radium 
Strontium 
Technetium 
Thorium 
Thorium 
Uraniuni 
Uranium 
Uranium 
Zinc 
Radium'" 
Actenium" 
Thoriuni"' 
Radium" 
Radon'" 
Polonium")." 
Leadio 
Bismuth"' 
Thaliu~n'~." 
Polonium'" I '  
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1 9.0 Calculation of Adjusted TQ Values (continued) 
2 
3 CATEGORY 3 THRESHOLD QUANTITIES ADJUSTED FOR APPROPR 
(Ci) 
c-14 
Co-60 
cs- 1 37 
Eu-I52 
Eu- IS4 
Eu-155 
H-3 
Ni-59 
Ni-63 
Pa-234111 
Pu-238 
Pu-239 
Pu-240 
Pu-24 1 
Ra-226 
Sr-30 
Tc-99 
Th-22s 
Th-232 
U-234 
U-235 
U-238 
25-65 
Ra-228 
Ac-228 
~11-228 
Ra-224 
Rn-220 
Po-2 16 
Pb-2 12 
Bi-212 
TI-208 
Po-2 12 
1 .E-03 
5.E-01 
1.E-03 
1 .E-02 
I s o 2  
1.E-02 
1. E-02 
5.E-01 
I. E-02 
1 .E-O2 
1.E-03 
I .E-03 
1 .E-03 
l.E-03 
I .  E-03 
I .E-02 
1 .E-02 
l.E-03 
1 .E-03 
l.E-03 
I. E43 
1 .E-03 
1 .E-02 
1.503 
1 .E-03 
1. E-03 
l.E-03 
l.E-03 
1 .E+OO 
1 .E-02 
I .E-02 
I .E-02 
I .E-02 
1 .E-02 
1 .E-03 
1 .E-03 
1. E-03 
1 .E-03 
1 .E-03 
1 .E-03 
1 .E-03 
1 .E-03 
1 .E-03 
I .E-03 
1 .E-03 
1 .E-03 
1 .E-03 
l.E-03 
I .E-03 
1 .E-03 
1.E-03 
l.E-03 
1 .E-03 
1 .E-06 
1 .E-03 
1 .E43 
I .E43 
1 .E-03 
l.E-03 
1 .E-03 
1 .E03 
1 .E-03 
1.503 
1 .E43 
1 .E503 
1 .E-03 
1 .E-03 
I .E-03 
3.OE-Ol 
- 
6.OE101 
3.OE+00 
2.4E+01 
1.5E+01 
1.2E+02 
5.9E+O2 
2.7Ei02 
2.9Et04 
2.1E-00 
I .SE+OO 
I.SEi00 
9.OE+01 
6.OE-01 
8.2E-01 
8.9Ei-01 
1 .8E+00 
2.1E-01 
3.OEi00 
3.OE+00 
3.OE+OO 
I .2Ei-01 
6.E-01 
3.Ei04 
2.E+00 
1 .E+O 1 
na 
na 
?.E701 
5.E+04 
na 
na 
rTE RESPIRAt 
Water") 
Iiigestion RV 
(Ci) 
v. lg. 
\'. Ig. 
Y. Ig. 
v. lg. 
v. Ig. 
v. lg. 
v. Ig. 
s. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
Y. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v.lg. 
vsg. 
v.lg. 
v.lg. 
ua 
na 
v.lg. 
vsg. 
1.5E+O2 
5.9E+03 
2.9E+02 
3.OEi.01 
na 
na 
2.6E-02 
2.1 E401 
1.6Et02 
1 .OE+O2 
1 .OE4 I 
1 .OE+O 1 
4.7EiOI 
8.3Ei.02 
2. I E+03 
I.OEN3 
3.6E+04 
3.1 E-02 
2.6E-02 
2.6E-02 
1.6E+OO 
3.1 E+OO 
2. I E+OO 
3.6Et02 
5.28-02 
5.2E-03 
2.1E-01 
2.1 E-0 1 
2 .  I E-0 1 
1.6E.. 02 
5.E+OO 
S.E+OI 
l.E+OI 
l.E-01 
na 
7.ESO1 
1.E42 
na 
na 
5.E-02 
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(Ci) (Ci) 
COMBUSTIBLE LlQUID 
ington Closure Han 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
1 1  
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
3 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
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Americium 
Carbon 
Cobalt'') 
Cesium 
Europium 
Europium 
Europiurn 
Tritium 
Nickel 
Nickel 
Protactinium'" 
Plutonium 
Plutonium 
Plutonium 
Plutonium 
Radium 
Radium 
Strontium 
Technetium 
Thorium 
Thorium 
Thorium 
Uranium 
Uranium 
Uranium 
Zinc 
Radium'" 
Acteniuni" 
nioriuni'O 
Radium"' 
Radon'" 
Polonium'"." 
Lead" 
Bismuth" 
Tlialium""" 
1 9.0 Cnlculatiou of Adjusted TQ Vnlues (continued) 
2 
3 CATEGORY 3 THRESHOLD QUANTITIES ADJUSfED FOR BOllNDING LIQb'ID REI 
I I I I I I 
41 
I I Food'" 1 Water'" 41 Element I lsotow I R 
Polonium""" IPO-212 
Am-24 1 
C-14 
co-60 
cs-137 
Eu-152 
Eu-154 
Eu-155 
H-3 
Ni-59 
Ni-63 
Pa-234m 
Pu-239 
Pu-24 1 
Ra-226 
Ra-228 
Sr-90 
Tc-99 
111-228 
Th-230 
B1-232 
U-234 
u-235 
U-238 
211-65 
Ra-228 
Ac-228 
Th-228 
Ra-224 
Rn-220 
PO-2 16 
Pu-238 
Pu-240 
Pb-212 
Bi-2 12 
TI-208 
1 .E-03 
5.E-01 
1 .E-03 
I .E-02 
l.E-02 
1 .E-02 
l.E-02 
5.E-01 
1 .E-02 
l.E-02 
1 .E-03 
1 .E-03 
1.E-03 
1 .E43 
I .E-03 
1 .BO2 
l.E-02 
l.E-03 
1 .E-03 
I .  E-03 
1 .E-03 
1 .E-03 
1 .E-03 
l.E-03 
l.E-03 
l.E-03 
l.E-02 
1 .E-03 
l.E-03 
1 .E-03 
l.E-i.00 
l.E-02 
1 .E-02 
1 .E-02 
l.E-02 
I .E-02 
1. E-02 
I .  E-02 
1.E-02 
l.E-02 
l.E-02 
1 .E-O2 
l.E-02 
l.E-02 
1 .E-02 
1 .E-02 
1 .E-02 
1 .E42 
l.E-02 
1 .E-02 
I .E-02 
I .E-02 
I .E-02 
I .E-02 
1 .E-02 
1 .E-02 
1 .E02 
1 .E42 
l.E-02 
1 .E-02 
1 .E-02 
1 .E-02 
1 .E-02 
1 .E-02 
l.E-02 
1. E-02 
l.E-02 
1 .E-02 
1 .E-02 
I .  E-02 
1 .E-02 
1. E-02 
3.OE-01 
6.OEi.01 
3.OE+00 
2.4E+01 
1.5E+OI 
1.2Ej-02 
5.9E+02 
2.7E+02 
2.9E+04 
2.1 E+OO 
1.8Ei.00 
9.OE+O 1 
6.OE-01 
6.0E-01 
8.2E-01 
- 
1.8E-00 
8.9E+01 
1 .SE+OO 
1.2Ei-00 
2.1 E-0 1 
3.OE+OO 
3.OE+00 
3.OE+00 
I .2E+O 1 
6.E-01 
3.Ei-04 
2.E+00 
l.E*01 
na 
na 
7.E+01 
5.E+04 
na 
na 
i'. Ig. 
1.5E-602 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
5.9Ei-03 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
Y. lg. 
v. lg. 
v. Ig. 
v. lg. 
v. lg. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. lg. 
v. lg. 
v. lg. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
3.OEt01 
v.lg. 
vsg. 
vsg. 
v.lg. 
2.9EiO2 
na 
na 
v.lg. 
v.lg. 
na 
na 
:ASE FRACTION 
2.68-02 
2.1E+01 
1.6EiO2 
1.OE+02 
1 .OE+O 1 
1 .OEiOl 
4.7E+01 
8.3E+02 
2.1E+03 
I .OE+03 
3.6E+04 
3. IE-02 
2.6E-02 
1.6Et00 
5.2E+OO 
2.1E+OO 
3.6E+02 
5.2B-02 
3.1 E-02 
5.2E-03 
2.1E-01 
2.1 E-0 1 
2.lE-01 
2.68-02 
3. IE+00 
1.6E+02 
%Et00 
S.E+01 
5.E-02 
1.Ei-01 
l.E-01 
na 
2. E+O 1 
1 .I302 
oa 
na 
I .5E-I 0 1 
6.58+01 
3.5E+Ol 
4.2E+01 
7.OEi02 
7.6E+OI 
1.7E+06 
1.4E+08 
5.9E+03 
5.OE+06 
7.3.E+05 
7.5E+05 
2.7E+O2 
2.7E-02 
6.4E101 
1 .E+02 
__ 
-- 
4.E.eO3 
--- 
na 
6.E+02 
6. E+ 03 
na 
na 
(Dec 12,2007 - Th-228 Combined) 0300X-CA-N0011-300-FF-2 FHC Adjusted TQ Values-Rev X a l c  (22) Adj TQ (ComLiquids) 
FHC for  the Remediation of Six 300-FF-2 Operable Unit Solid Waste Burial Grounds 
May 2008 D-23 
-2 FHC Calculat Adjustment) 
4 
5 
WCH- 137 
Rev. 1 
Food'" water(') Inhalation ~ i r e c t ' ~ '  
RV 
(ci) 
Isotope R ~ ~ : ~ J  R V ~  Ingestion RV Ingestion RV RV") Exposure Element 
(Ci) Kit (Ci) 
NONCOMBUSTIBLE LIQUID 
ashington Closure Wanford, LLC. 
Originator: Date: 12/13/07 ev. No.: 5 
Subject: 
Project: Job No.: 14655 Date: J J  ,/r-.7/'6 7 
Sheet No.: 23 of 49 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
Americium 
Carboo 
Cobalt"' 
Cesium 
Europium 
Europium 
Europium 
Tritium 
Nickel 
Nickel 
Protachniuni(*) 
Plutoiiiurii 
Plutonium 
Plutonium 
Plutonium 
Radium 
Radium 
Strontium 
Technetium 
Thorium 
Thorium 
Thorium 
Uranium 
Uraniuni 
Uranium 
Zinc 
Radium" 
Actenium" 
Thorium'" 
Radium"' 
Radon'" 
Poionium'"" 
Lead" 
Bismuth"' 
Thalium'*'" 
Am-241 
C-14 
('0-60 
Eu-152 
CS-137 
Eu- I54 
Eu-155 
H-3 
Ni-59 
Ni-63 
Pa-234m 
Pu-238 
Pu-239 
Pu-240 
Pu-241 
Ra-226 
Ra-228 
Sr-90 
Th-228 
Th-230 
Th-232 
Tc-99 
u-234 
U-235 
Ll-238 
211-65 
Ra-228 
Th-228 
Ra-224 
RIl-220 
PO-2 16 
Pb-2 12 
Bi-212 
TI-208 
Ac-228 
1 .E-03 
5.E-01 
I. E-03 
1 .  E-02 
1 .E-02 
1.E-02 
5.E-01 
1 .E-02 
1. E-02 
l.E-02 
1.E-03 
I.E-03 
I .E-03 
1 .E-03 
1.E-03 
1 .E03 
1.E-03 
I .E-02 
1 .E-02 
1.E-03 
1 .E-03 
1 .E43 
1 .E-03 
1. E-03 
1 .E-03 
1 .E-02 
1 .E43 
1.E-03 
I .E-03 
I .E-03 
1 .E+OO 
1 .E42 
1 .E-02 
1.E-02 
1.E-02 
1 .E-02 
2.E-03 
2.E-03 
2.E-03 
2.E-03 
2.E-03 
2.E-03 
2.E-03 
2.E-03 
2.E-03 
2.E-03 
2 .M3 
2.E-03 
2.E-03 
2.E-03 
2.E-03 
2.E-03 
2.E-03 
2.E-03 
2.E-03 
2.E-03 
2.E-03 
2.8-03 
2.E-03 
2.E-03 
2.E-03 
2.E-03 
2.E-03 
2.E-03 
2.E-03 
2.E-03 
2.E-03 
2.E-03 
2.E-03 
2.E-03 
2.E-03 
2.E-03 
3.OE-01 
6.OE+01 
3.OE+OO 
2.4E+01 
1.5EiOI 
1.2Ei02 
5.9E+02 
2.7E+02 
2.9E+04 
2.1 EiOO 
I.SEi00 
1 .SE+OO 
9.OE+01 
6.0E-0 1 
6.OE-01 
8.2E-01 
1.8E+00 
1 .ZE-OO 
2.E-01 
3.OEt.00 
3.OEi00 
6.E-01 
3.E+04 
8.9Ei01 
3.OE+00 
1.2E+01 
2.E+00 
1.Ei01 
na 
na 
7.E+01 
5.E+04 
na 
na 
v. Ig. 
v. lg. 
Y. Ig. 
\'. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
5.9E+03 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. lg. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
\'. lg. 
2.9Et02 
v. Ig. 
v. tg. 
v. Ig. 
v. lg. 
v. lg. 
v. lg. 
v.lg. 
vsg. 
v.lg. 
v.lg. 
1.58+02 
V. Ig. 
3.0E+01 
na 
v.lg. 
v.lg. 
tia 
na 
na 
2.68-02 
2.1 E-iOl 
1.6E+O2 
l.OE-tO2 
1 .OF..* 0 1 
I.OE+Ol 
4.7EiOl 
8.38+02 
2.1 E+03 
I.OEi03 
3.6E+04 
3.1 E-02 
2.6B-02 
1.6E+OO 
3.1 E+OO 
5.2E+00 
2.1 E+OO 
3.6Ei02 
3. I E-02 
5.28-03 
2.lE-01 
2.  IE-01 
2.1 E-0 1 
1.6E+02 
5.E+-00 
5.E+01 
2.6E-02 
5.2E-02 
5.E-02 
I.E+Ol 
1 .E-01 
iia 
2.E+O1 
1 .E+02 
11 a 
ua 
1.5Et01 
6.5E+01 
3.5EtOI 
7.OEi02 
4.2E-+01 
7.6EtOI 
1.7Ei-06 
5.0E+06 
1.4E+O8 
5.98+03 
- 
7.3.E+05 
7.5E+05 
2.7E-iO2 
2.7Ei.02 
6.4E-tOI 
- 
l.Ei02 
___ 
4.Ei03 
--- 
na 
6.Ei-02 
6.E+03 
na 
na 
(Dee 12,2007 - Th-228 Combined) 0300X-CA-N0011-3OO-FF-2 FHC Adjusted TQ Values-Rev 5/Calc (23) Adj TQ NonComLiq 
FHC for the Rernediation of Six 300-FF-2 Operable Unit Solid Waste Burial Grounds 
May 2008 D-24 
Originator: 
Project: 
Subject: 
Date: 12/12/07 
300-FF-2 Remediation Job No.: 14655 
Calc. No.: ev. No.: 
Checked: Date: 
300-FF-2 Final Hazard Categorization Calculation (TQ Adjustment) I '  Sheet No.: 
5 
*-7 
I 9.0 Calculation of Adjusted TQ Values (continued) 
2 
3 T h e  fol lowing iiotcs apply to the TQ adjustment tables for soil, drums, combustible and noncombust ible  wastes. 
4 
5 Notes: 
6 
7 v. Ig. ; Indicates that the sorption coefficient is greater than zero and the release value is much greater than that for other pathways (EPA, 1989). 
8 -- : Indicates that no gamma rays are emitted or the gamma rays which are emitted have gamma ray energies of less than 0.07 MeV and are strongly attenuated in air. No 
release valuc for the direct exposure pathway was calculated (EPA, 1989). 
11 
12 (1  j As reported in Appendix A of "Technical Background Document to Support Final Rulemaking Pursuant to Section 102 of the Comprehensive 
13 
14 (2) A rclcase of RV to atmosphere produces a dose of 0.5 rem via the food ingestion pathway. Assumes deposition on crops 30 nicters from 
15 
16 (3) A release of RV to groundwater produces a dose of 0.5 rem via the water ingestion pathway. Assumes a well 30 meters from the point of release. 
17 
18 (4) A rclcase of RV to atmosphere produces a dose of 0.5 rem via the inhalation pathway. Assumes a receptor 30 meters from the point of release. 
19 
20 (2.7E-4 tn3/sec). 
21 (5) A point source of RV produces a dose of0.5 rem at 30 meters in 24 hours. Independent of airborne release fraction. 
22 ( 6 )  TQ = 20 x the minimum value of {(Food RV x REPA/RMA), Water RV, (Inhalation RV x REPAIRm), or Direct Dose RV).  The value of 20 is used because the RV 
23 produces a whole body dose equivalent of 0.5 ran, whereas the 1027 Category 3 TQs are based on a dose of 10 rem (Le., [0.5 remEpA x 20 = 10 remlo2,]). 
24 (7) The most restrictive value from EPA (1989) is direct exposure. 20 tiiiies this value is 300 Ci. The TQ listed in DOE 1997 is 280 Ci. The more 
25 restrictive valuc of280 Ci is uscd. 
26 (8) The TQ for Pa-234m was calculatcd using REPA and RV values for Pa-234. 
27 (9) The most restrictive value of these tlircc isotopes has been uscd bccausc the exact isotopic composition is unknown. 
28 (IO) Thorium-232 daughter isotope after 35 years of decay. 
29 (1 I ) There are no TQ or rclcasc valucs for these isotopes. 
Environmental Responsc, Compensation, and Liability Act: Radionuclides", EPA Contract 68-03-3452,02/89 
the point of release. Dispersion based on extrapolation of ground level data for stability class D and 1 idsec windspeed (WQ = 0.072 sec/m3). 
Contact time = 9 days. Independent of the airborne release fraction. 
Dispersion based on extrapolation of ground level data for stability class D and 1 m/sec windspccd (WQ = 0.072 m3/sec) and average breathing rate 
(Dec 12,2007 - Th-228 Combined) 0300X-CA-N0011-300-FF-2 FHC Adjusted TQ Values-Rev 5lCalc (24) Adj TQ (Notes) 
Originator: 
Project: 
Subject: 
7 
Radionuclide Estimated 
8 Concentration inventory 
9 Isotope (pci/gl2 (Ci) 
: 
Date: 1/17/06 Calc. No.: 0300X-CA-NO01 I 
Job No.: 14655 Checked: T.M. Blakley,~, 
N.D. Clapper Ni9L 
300-FF-2 Remed iation 
300-FF-2 Final Hazard Categorization Calculation (TQ Adjustment) 
1027 CATEGORY 3 
TQDRIGINAL TQADJUSTED 
( ~ i ) ~  (Ci)4 RATIO 
IO 
11 
Am-24I5 6.99E+00 1.49E-C1 I 5.2E-01 5.2E+02 2.87E-04 
Ca-RO 2.50E-01 5.34E-03 I 2.8E+02 2.8E+02 1.91 E-05 . .  
12 
13 
Rev. No.: I I 
_ _  ~ - -  - -
CS-137 1.15E+00 2.45E-02 6.OE+01 I .3E+03 1.89E-05 
Ra-226 1.08E+00 2.29E-02 I .2E+01 1.2E+04 1.91 E-06 
23 TQ = Threshold Quantity ' SUM OF KATIOS = i i.iiE-021 
24 
25 Calculations 
26 Estimated Inventory =(pCi/g x (LCM x I .OE+06 cc/LCM x g/cc))/l .OE+12 pCi/Ci 
27 RATIO (CATEGORY 3) = EM027 CATEGORY 3 ADJUSTED TQ (Ci) 
28 Notes: 
29 ' Assumed to be an average value throughout the site 
30 'The soil from 618-4 is used as analogous site data. 
31 30riginal TQ value is from DOE-STD-1027. 
32 4The adjusted TQ values are calculated on Sheet 18. 
0300X-CA-N0011~3OO-FF-2 FHC Adjusted TQ Value~-Revl/Calc(29) (61 8-3 Soil) 
Originator: Date: 1/17/06 Calc. No.: 0300X-CA-N0011 Rev. No.: 1 
Project: 300-FF-2 Remediation Job No.: 14655 Checked: T.M. Blakley gWf& Date: ir’; sji?& 
Subject: Sheet No.: ‘ %$-of?% 300-FF-2 Final Hazard Categorization Calculation (TQ Adjustment) 
7 Estimated 1027 CATEGORY 3 
8 Concentration Inventory TQORIGINAL TQADJUSTED 
9 , Isotope (P ci/g)’ . (Ci) ; o  Ci : o  Ci RATIO 
Radionuclide Combustible 
I 10.0 Evaluation of radiological contaminants and determination of Estimated Inventory (Continued) 
2 Site ID: 618-3 
, 
I O  
11 
Am-241 6.99E+00 3.03E-04 5.2E-01 1 .OE+OO 2.92E-04 
CO-60 2.5OE-0 1 1.09E-05 2.8E+02 2.8E+02 3.88E-08 
CS-137 1.15E+00 4.99E-05 6.OE+01 1.2E+03 4.16E-08 
121 P ~ - 2 3 8 ~  I 4.61E-01 I 2.00E-05 I 6.2E-01 I 1.2E+00 I1.61E-05I 
I .70E-03 
I .70E-03 
5.2E-01 1 .OE+OO 1 . 6 4 q  
3.2€+01 E.4E+01 2.66E-05 
15 
16 
17 
18 
I 9  
70 
Ra-226 1.08E+00 4.67 E-05 1.2E+01 2.4E+01 1.94E-06 
Sr-90 5.40E+00 2.34E-04 1.6E+01 3.3E+02 7.15E-07 
Th-228 2.38E+00 1.03E-04 1 .OE+OO 2.1 E+OO 4.96E-05 
U-234 8.48E+02 3.68E-02 4.2E+OO 8.4E+OO 4.38E-03 
U-235 7.81 E+01 3.39E-03 4.2E+00 8.4E+00 4.04E-04 
11-238 8.48E+02 3.68E-02 4.2E+OO 8.4E+OO 4.38E-03 
23 
24 Calculations 
25 Estimated Inventory =(pCi/g x (LCM x 1 .OE+06 cc/LCM x g/cc))/l .OE+12 pCi/Ci 
26 RATIO (CATEGORY 3) = Ell1027 CATEGORY 3 ADJUSTED TQ (Ci) 
27 Notes: 
28 ’ Assumed to be an average value throughout the site. Density is based on Miller & Wahle 
29 2The soil from 61 8-4 is used as analogous site data. 
30 30riginal TQ value is from DOE-STD-1027. 
31 4The adjusted TQ values are calculated on Sheet 20. 
32 ’Added based on recent sampling results from 618-2, 618-3 and 618-8 per calc 0300F-CA 
_ _  
21 
22 
!n (1 987 
-NO003 
- _ _ _  - _ -  _ _  ._ - .. I 
Zn-65 I 5.00E-01 I 2.17E-05 I 2.4E+02 I 6.OE+02 3.62E-08 
TQ = Threshold Quantity SUM OF RATIOS = 1.09E-02 
’) 25 
, Re\ 
lb/4.5 ft3. 
1. 4. 
0300X-CA-N0011~3OO-FF-2 FHC Adjusted TQ Values-Revl/Calc(30) (61 8-3 Combustible) 
Originator: N.D. Clapper Nnc Date: 1/17/06 Calc. No.: 0300X-CA-N0011 Rev. No.: 
Project: 300-FF-2 Remediation Job No.: 14655 Checked: T.M. Blakley JpM4 Date: 
Subject: A Sheet No.: 
I 10.0 Evaluation of radiological contaminants and determination of Estimated Inventory (Continued) 
3 Noncombustible Concrete Volume: 43 LCM 
4 Noncombustible Steel Volume: 89 - LCM 
5 Concrete Sludge Density, glcc: 1.96 g/cm3 
6 Steel Scale Density, glcc: 3.6 g/cm3 
2 Site ID: 618-3 
7 
8 618-3 NONCOMBUSTIBLE SOLIDS INVENTORY 
9 Estimated tstimated 1027 CATEGORY 3 
10 Radionuclide Noncombustible Noncombustible 
11 
28 Calculations 
29 Estimated Inventon/ =(pCi/g x (LCM x 1 .OE+06 cc/LCM x g/cc))/l .OE+12 pCi/Ci 
30 RATIO (CATEGORY 3) = Ell1027 CATEGORY 3 ADJUSTED TQ (Ci) 
31 Notes: 
32 ’The soil from 618-4 is used as analogous site data. 
33 *Original TQ value is from DOE-STD-1027. 
34 3The adjusted TQ values are calculated on Sheet 21. 
35 4Added based on recent sampling results from 618-2, 618-3 and 618-8 per calc 0300F-CA-N0003, Rev. 4. 
0300X-CA-N0011~3OO-FF-2 FHC Adjusted TQ Values-Revl/Calc(31) (61 8-3 Noncombust) 
1 1 Originator: N.D. Clapper UbC Date: 1/17/06 Calc. No.: 0300X-CA-NO01 I Rev. No.: 
Prniect. XIn-FF.2 Remediation Job No.: 14 
I 10.0 Evaluation of radiological contaminants and determination of Estimated Inventory (Continued) 
2 Site ID: 618-3 
3 Number of Drums: 228 
4 Drums of uranium oxide powder: 52 (Drum Types 1&2) 
5 Drums of oil coated metal 176 (Drum Type 3) 
6 tailings, fines and sludges: 
23 Calculations 
24 Estimated Inventory =(pCi/g x kgldrum x 1000 glkg x number of drums)/l .OE+I2 pCi/Ci for powder and metal 
25 Estimated Inventory =(pCi/L x Udrum x rrumber of drums)/l .OE+12 pCi/Ci for oil 
26 RATIO (CATEGORY 3) = EV1027 CATEGORY 3 ADJUSTED TQ (Ci) 
27 Notes: 
28 'The concentrations from 61 8-4 are used as analogous site data. 
29 2The adjusted TQ values are calculated on Sheet 19. 
0300X-CA-N0011~300-FF-2 FHC Adjusted TQ Values-Rev1 Kalc(32) (61 8-3 Drums) 
Originator: N.D. Clapper A/,'DL 1/17/06 Calc. No.: 0300X-CA-N0011 Rev. No.: Date: 
Date: Project: 300-FF-2 Remediation Job No.: 14655 Checked: 
Subject: 300-FF-2 Final Hazard Categorization Calculation (TQ Adiustment) Sheet No.: 
3 10.0 Evaluation of radiological contaminants and determination of Estimated Inventory (Continued) 
2 Site ID: 618-3 Liquid 
4 1 1027 CATEGORY 3 
5 
6 
7 
a 
9 
IO 
22 Calculations 
23 Estimated Inventory is based on MOC-2005-0002 
25 RATIO (CATEGORY 3) = EV1027 CATEGORY 3 ADJUSTED TQ (Ci) 
26 Notes: 
27 ' All liquids are conservatively assumed to be combustible. 
28 2The adjusted TQ values are calculated on Sheet 22. 
29 ' Pu-241 is very conservatively assumed to be the same inventory as Pu-239 based on presence of Am-241 and age of burial ground contents. 
24 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
Estimated 
inventory TQOR~G~NAL TQADJUSTED 
isotope (Ci) (Ci) (ci)* RATIO 
Radionuclides in Liquid 
Am-241 1.00E-05 5.20E-01 5.20E-02 I .92E-04 
CO-60 1.00E-05 2.80E+02 , 2.80E+02 3.57E-08 
1 
0300X-CA-N0011~300-FF-2 FHC Adjusted TQ Values-RevlICalc(33) (61 8-3 Liquid) 
WCH-137 
Rev. 1 3 
Originator: Rev. No.: 
Project: Date: 
Subject: Sheet No.: 
I 10.0 Evaluation of radiological contaminants and determination of Estimated Inventory (Continued) 
2 Site ID: 618-7 Northern Trenches with minor amounts of thorium cross-contamination 
3 Soil Volume: 19,758 LCM 
4 Soil Density, s/cm3 ’: 2.16 g/cm3 
5 
6 618-7 NORTHERN TRENCHES SOIL INVENTORY 
351na = Not available J 
37 Calculations 
38 Estimated Inventory =(pCi/g x (LCM x 1 .OEM6 crn’/LCM x gcm3))/l .OE+12 pCi/Ci 
39 RATIO (CATEGORY 3) = EN1027 CATEGORY 3 ADJUSTED TQ (Ci) 
40 Notes: 
41 ’ Assumed to be an average value throughout the site 
42 ’The soil from 618-4 is used as analogous site data. 
43 ‘Original TQ value is from DOE-STD-1027. 
M 4The adjusted TQ values are calculated on Sheet 18. 
45 5Added based on recent sampling results from 618-2,618-3 and 618-8 per calc 0300F-CA-N0003, Rev. 5. 
46 ‘Assumed that 10% of the thoria trench Th-232 inventory is in the north trenches due to cross contamination. 
47 Thorium-232 daughter product after 35 years of decay. 
48 There are no TQ or release values for these isotopes. 
49 The Th-228 inventory includes soil inventory based on 618-4 samples and Th-232 decay daughter product. 
36 
(Dec 12 2007 - Th-228 Combined) 0300X-CA-N0011-300-FF-2 FHC Adjusted TQ Values-Rev UCalc(30) (618-7 Soil) 
FHC for the Remediation of Six 300-FF-2 Operable Unit Solid Waste Burial Grounds 
May 2008 D-3 1 
WCH- I37 
Rev. 1 
Originator: Rev. No.: 
Project: Date: 
Subject: Sheet No.: 
3 
1 10.0 Evaluatitrn of radiological contaminants and determination of Estimated Inventory (Continued) 
2 Site ID: 61 8-7 Northern Trenches with minor amounts of thorium cross-contamination 
3 Combustible Volume: 973 LCM 
4 Soft Waste Density, g/cm3 I :  8.92E-02 g/cm3 
5 
6 618-7 NORTHERN TRENCHES COMBUSTIBLE SOLIDS INVENTORY 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
351na = Not available 1 
36 
37 
38 Calculations 
39 Estimated Inventory =(pCi/g x (LCM x 1 .OE+06 cm3/LCM x g/cm3))/l .OE+12 pCi/Ci 
40 RATIO (CATEGORY 3) = EV1027 CATEGORY 3 ADJUSTED TQ (Ci) 
41 Notes: 
42 Assumed to be an average value throughout the site. Density is based on Miller & Wahlen (1987) 25 lb/4.5 ft3. 
43 The soil from 618-4 is used as analogous site data. It is assumed that the radionuclide concentration in the soft waste is the same as the radionuclide 
44 concentration in the soil. 
45 Original TQ value is from DOE-STD-1027. 
46 The adjusted TQ values are calculated on Sheet 20. 
47 5Added based on recent sampling results from 618-2,618-3 and 618-8 per calc 0300F-CA-N0003, Rev. 5. 
48 Thorium-232 daughter product after 35 years of decay. 
49 ' There are no TQ or release values for these isotopes. 
50 'The Th-228 inventory includes combustible solid inventory based on 618-4 samples and Th-232 decay daughter product. 
(Dec 12 2007 - Th-228 Combined) 0300X-CA-NO01 I-300-FF-2 FHC Adjusted TQ Values-Rev 5/Calc(31) (61 8-7 Combustible) 
FHC for the Remediation of Six 300-FF-2 Operable Unit Solid Waste Burial Grounds 
May 2008 D-32 
Calculation (T Ad,justment) 
7 
8 618-7 NORTHERN TRENCHES NONCOMBUSTIBLE SOLIDS INVENTORY 
Estimated 1027 CATEGORY 3 
9 Noncombustible Estimated Discrete 
10 Concentration Inventory stel Inventory ~ y p e  DY ~ Q O W G ~ N A L  TQADJUSED 
11 Isotope (pcug)' (Ci) (Ci) (Ci) (ciP cc1)4 RATIO 
Radionuclide Concrete Noncombustible Items 
12 Am-241' 6 99E+00 1.18E-03 4.46E-03 1.08E-04 5.2E-01 5.20E-01 1 1 1 E-02 
13 CO-60 2.50E-01 4.23E-05 159E-04 2.8EM2 2 8E+02 7.21 E-07 
14 CS-137 1 15E+00 195E-04 7.33E-04 6.OE+01 6.OE+02 1.55E-06 
15 Ra-226 1 .Ot?E+OO 1.82E-04 6.86E-04 1.2E+01 1.2E+01 7.23E-05 
16 Sr-90 5.40E+00 9 14E-04 3.44E-03 1.6E+01 1.6E+02 2.66E-05 
17 Pu-238' 4.61 E-01 7.8OE-05 2.94E-04 6.2E-01 6.20E-01 6.00E-04 
18 Pu-239' 3.92E+01 6.64E-03 2.50E-02 5.75E-04 5.2E-01 5.20E-01 6.1 9E-02 
19 Pu-241' 3.92Ei.01 6.64E-03 2.50E-02 5.75E-04 3.2Et01 3.20Et01 1.01 E-03 
20 ,Th-228' 2,38E+OO 1.43603 2.55E-03 1 .OE+OO 1 .OE+OO 3.83E-03 
21 Th-232 106E-03 1.06E-03 1 .OE-01 1 .OE+O2 2.03E-05 
22 u-234 8.48E+02 1.44E-01 5.41 E-01 4.2E+OO 4.2E+00 1.63E-01 
23 u-2% 7.81 Et01 1.32E-02 4.98E-02 4.2E+00 4.2E+OO I .50E-02 
24 U-238 8.48E+02 1.44E-01 5.41 E-01 4.2E+00 4.2E+OO 1.63E-01 
25 Zn-65 5.00E-01 8.46E-05 3.1 9E-04 2.4E+02 6.0Ei-02 6.73E-07 
26 Ra-2286 1.04E-03 1.04E-03 __- 1.2E+01 1.73E-04 
27 Ac-22E6 1.04E-03 1.04E-03 --- 9 4EM2 2.21 E-06 
28 Ra-2246 1.03E-03 1.03E-03 
29 ~ n - 2 2 0 ~  1.03E-03 1.03E-03 --- 20E+03 1.03E-06 , 
30 P0-21667 1.03E-03 
31 Pb-2126 1.03E-03 1.03E-03 
32 ~ i - 2 1 2 ~  1.03E-03 1.03E-03 --- 2.0E+04 1.03E-07 
2.OEc02 2 OE+02 1.03E-05 
1.03E-03 __- na na 
-__ 3.2E+03 6.45E-07 
33 TI-208~~ 3.71 E-04 3.71 E44 -__ na na 
34 ~ 0 - 2 1 2 ~ * ~  6.61 €44  6.61 E-04 --- na na 
36 TQ = Threshold Quantity 
37 na = Not available 
35 SUM OF RATIOS =] 4.2OE-01 
38 
WCH-137 
Rev. 1 
Originator: Date: 12/13/07 Rev. No.: 
Project: JobNo.: 14655 Date: 
Sheet No.: Subject: 3 
(Dec 12 2007 - Th-228 Combined) 0300X-CA-N0011-300-FF-2 FHC Adjusted TO Values-Rev YCalc(32) (61 8-7 Noncombust) 
FHC for  the Remediation of Six 300-FF-2 Operable Unit Solid Waste Burial Grounds 
May 2008 D-33 
Calculation (T Adjustment) 
11 
Mass or 
Radionuclide ~ 0 1 ~ ~  of 
for metal and metal and Estimated 
powder, powder, (L) Number of Inventory 
12 Cone. (PCW Drum (kg) for 
13 
14 Isotope (~CIR) for oil' for oil drums (Ci) 
WCH- 1 37 
Rev. 1 
1027 CATEGORY 3 
TQORIG~NAL TQAOJUSTE$ 
( a )  (Ci) RATIO 
Date: 12/13/07 Calc. No.: 0300X-CA-NOO11 
Job No.: 14655 Checked: 3 
Subject: 300-FF-2 Final Hazard Cateaorizatlon Calculation (TQ Adiustmentl 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
Radionuclides in Drums 
U-234 Powder 5 26E+04 267 20 2 81 E-01 4 2E+00 4 20E+01 6 69E-03 
U-234 Metal 4 75E+04 28 66 8 78E-02 4 2E+00 4 20E+01 2 09E-03 
U-234 011 170E+05 64 66 7 18E-04 4 2E+OO 1 40E-01 5 13E-03 
U-234 Depleted U Scrap 1 11 E-01 4 2E+00 4 20E+01 2 64E-03 ---
44lna = Not available I 
45 
46 
47 
48 powder and metal 
49 Estimated Inventory =(pCi/L x Udrum x number of drums)/l .OE+12 pCilCi for oil 
50 RATIO (CATEGORY 3) = Ell1027 CATEGORY 3 ADJUSTED TQ (Ci) 
52 Notes: 
53 ' The concentrations from 618-4 are used as analogous site data. 
54 *The adjusted TQ values are calculated on Sheet 19. 
55 Thorium-232 daughter product after 35 years of decay. 
56 There are no TQ or release values for these isotopes. 
57 
51 
20 
21 U-235 Powder 2 10E+03 
22 U-235 Metal 3 20E+03 
23 u-235 011 120E+04 
24 U-235 Depleted u scrap 1 
25 
26 U-238 Powder 3 1 OE+05 
27 U-238 Metal I 280E+05 
28 u-238 011 100E+06 
29 U-238 Depleted U Scrap 
30 
31 Th-232 Powder 
32 Ra-228 Powder3 
33 Ac-228 Powder3 
34 Th-228 Powde? 
35 ~ Ra-224 Powde? 
36 Rn-220 Powde? 
37 Po-21 6 Powde? 
38 Pb-212 Powde? 
39 81-212 Powde? 
40 TI-208 Powde? 
41 Po-21 2 Powde? 
42 
(Dec 12 2007 - Th-228 Combined) 0300X-CA-NM)11-300-FF-2 FHC Adjusted TQ Values-Rev 5/CaIc(33) (618-7 Drums) 
267 20 
28 66 5 91 E03 4 2E+00 4 20E+01 1 41 E-04 
64 66 5 07E-05 4 2E+00 1 40E-01 3 62E-04 
1 02E-02 4 2E+00 4 20E+01 2 43E-04 
267 20 1 66E+M) 4 2E+00 4 20E+01 3 94E-02 
28 66 5 17E-01 4 2E+00 4 20E+01 1 23E-02 
64 66 4 22E-03 4 2E+00 1 40E-01 3 02E-02 
8 44E-01 4 2E+00 4 20E+01 2 01 E-02 
1370 0 3  4 52E-02 1 OE-01 1 04E+00 4 35E-02 
1370 0 3  4 45E-02 --- 120E+02 371E-04 
1370 0 3  4 45E-02 --- 2 80E+03 1 59E-05 
1370 0 3  442E-02 1 OE+OO 104E+01 425E-03 
1370 0 3  4 42E-02 2 OE+02 2 00E+03 2 21 E-05 
1370 0 3  4 42E-02 --- 2 00E+04 2 21E-06 , 
1370 0 3  4 42E-02 -- na na 
1370 
1370 0 3  
1370 0 3  159E-02 --- na na 
1 370 0 3  2 83E-02 --_ na na 
0 3  4 42E-02 -_- 1 26E+04 3 51 E-06 
4 42E-02 ___ 1 16E+05 3 81E-07 
1027 Catego y 3 Drum Sum of Ratios: 1.68E-01 
FHC for  the Rernediation of Six 300-FF-2 Operable Unit Solid Waste Burial Grounds 
May 2008 
43 
D-34 
TQ = Threshold Quantitv 
Rev. No.: 1 
14655 Checked: T.M. Blaklev tion Job No.: 
I 10.0 Evaluation of radiological contaminants and determination of Estimated Inventory (Continued) 
7 Site ID: 618-7 North Trenches Lisuid -
3 61 8-7 NORTHERN TRENCHES COMBUSTIBLE LIQUID INVENTORY 
4 1 1 1027 CATEGORY 3 1 
6 51 
IO Co-60 I 1.00E-05 1 2.80E+02 I 2.80E+02 1 3.57E-08 
1 1 
Date: ;/! ip 
Sheet No.: -34&eM3- 
34 os'4-('i 
24 
26 NGtes: 
25 RATIO (CATEGORY 3) = EM027 CATEGORY 3 ADJUSTED TQ (Ci) 
2 7  ' All liquids are conservatively assumed to be combustible. 
28 'The adjusted TQ values are calculated on Sheet 22. 
29 ' Pu-241 is very conservatively assumed to be the same inventory as Pu-239 based on presence of Am-241 and age of burial ground contents. 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
0300X-CA-N0011-300-FF-2 FHC Adjusted TQ Values-Rev1 ICalc(38) (61 8-7 Comb Liquid) 
C Caleulatio Adjustm~~t) 
7 
8 
9 
10 
WCH- 137 
Rev. 1 
1027 CATEGORY 3 
Estimated 
ktventory’ TOORIGINAL TQADJUSTEII~ 
Isotope (Ci) (Ci) (Ci) RATIO 
shington Closu 
24 
25 
Originator: E. Gonsaives L.!Y Date: 1211 3/07 Calc. No.: ev. No.: 5 
Project: 300-FF-2 Remediation Job No.: 14655 Checked: Date: ~J./iq/.d 7 
Subject: 300-FF-2 Final Hanard Cateaorization Calculation (TQ Adiustment) Sheet No.: 35 of 49 
TQ = Threshold Quantity 
na = Not available 
1 10.0 Evaluation of radiological contaminants and determination of Estimated Inventory (Continued) 
Site ID: 618-7 North Trenches - Non-Combustible Liquid 
(Dec 12 2007 - Th-228 Combined) 0300X-CA-N0011-300-FF-2 FHC Adjusted TQ Values-Rev 5/Calc(35) (618-7NonCombLiq) 
FHC for the Remediation of Six 300-FF-2 Operable Unit Solid Waste Burial Groiinds 
May 2008 D-36 
WCH- 137 
-2 FHC Calculat Rev. 1 
Originator: Rev. No.: 5 
Project: Date: -7 
Subject: heet No.: 36 of 49 
___*____x_*ll - - 
i 10.0 Evaluation of radiological contaminants and determination of Estimated Inventory (Continued) 
2 Site ID: 618-7 Thona Pit 
3 Soil Volume: 3,563 LCM 
4 Density, 9/cm3 I: 2.16 g/cm3 
5 
6 618-7 THORIA PIT SOIL INVENTORY 
35 
36 Calculations 
37 Estimated Inventory =(pCilg x (LCM x 1 .OE+06 cm3/LCM x g.km3))/l .OE+12 pClCi 
38 RATIO (CATEGORY 3) = El11027 CATEGORY 3 ADJUSTED TQ (Ci) 
39 
40 Notes: 
41 * Assumed to be an average value throughout the site 
42 ‘The soil from 618-4 is used as analogous site data. 
43 Origrnal TQ value is from DOE-STD-j 027. 
4.1 The adjusted TQ values are calculated on Sheet 18. 
45 5Added based on recent sampling results from 618-2,618-3 and 618-8 per calc 0300F-CA-N0003, Rev. 5. 
46 10% of the Thoria Pit Soil Th-232 inventory calculated in 0300F-CA-N0003, Rev. 6 is assumed to be adhered to the soil. 90% is adhered to hardware. 
47 ’ Thorium-232 daughter product after 35 years of decay 
48 * There are no TQ or release values for these isotopes. 
49 The Th-228 inventory includes soil inventory based on 618-4 samples and Th-232 decay daughter product. 
(Dec 12 2007 - Th-228 Combined) 0300X-CA-N0011-300-FF-2 FHC Adjusted TQ Values-Rev UCalc(36) (618-7 Soil) (2) 
FHC for  the Remediation of Six 300-FF-2 Operable Unit Solid Waste Burial Grounds 
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jus tment) 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30, 
31 
32 
WCH- 137 
Rev. 1 
Ra-2247 I 2.29E-03 2.OE+02 4.OE+02 5.74E-06 
--_ 4.OE+03 5.74E-07 ~n-2207 2.29E-03 
~ b - 2 1 2 ~  2.29E-03 _ _ _  6.4E+03 3.59E-07 
Bi-212’ 2.29E-03 __- 4.OE+04 5.74E-08 
P0-216~’~ 2.29E-03 -_- na na 
Tl-2087’8 , , 8.25E-04 _-- na na 
PO-2127’8 I I 1.47E-03 _-_ na na 
TQ = Threshold Quantity SUM OF RATIOS = 1  S3E-03 
sh~n~ton Clo 
Originator: Date: 12/13/07 ev. No.: 
Project: Date: 
Subject: eet No.: 
a 
1 10.0 Evaluation of radiological contaminants and determination of Estimated Inventory (Continued) 
33lna = Not available 1 
34 
35 Calculations 
36 Estimated Inventory =(pCi/g x (LCM x 1 .OE+06 cm3/LCM x s/cm3))/l .OE+12 pCVCi 
37 RATIO (CATEGORY 3) = El/1027 CATEGORY 3 ADJUSTED TQ (Ci) 
38 Notes: 
39 ‘ Assumed to be an average value throughout the site. Density is based on Miller & Wahlen (1987) 25 lbi4.5 ft3. 
40 ’The soil from 618-4 is used as analogous site data. It is assumed that the radionuclide concentration in the soft waste is the same 
41 as the radonuclide concentration in the soil. 
42 Original TQ value is from DOE-STD-1027. 
43 The adjusted TQ values are calculated on Sheet 20. 
44 5Added based on recent sampling resutts from 681-2,618-3 and 618-8 per calc 0300F-CA-N0003, Rev. 5. 
45 There are 2.607E-2 Ci of contaminated soil and hardware. 10% is adhered to the soil. 90% is adhered to the hardware. 
46 It is assumed that 10% of the hardware is contaminated with Th-232 is combustible. 
47 Thorium-232 daughter isotope after 35 years of decay. 
48 There are no TQ or release values for these isotopes. 
49 The Th-228 inventory includes combustible solids inventory based on 618-4 samples and Th-232 decay daughter product. 
(Dec 12 2007 - Th-228 Combined) 0300X-CA-N0011-300-FF-2 FHC Adjusted TQ Values-Rev 5/Calc(37) (618-7 Combustible (2) 
FHC for the Remediation of Six 300-FF-2 Operable Unit Solid Waste Burial Grounds 
May 2008 D-38 
WCH- 137 
on (TQ Adjustment) Rev. 1 
9 
10 
Originator: Rev. No.: 
Project: -Date: 
heet No.: Subject: 
Estimated 1027 CATEGORY 3 
Noncombustible Estimated Discrete I I 
i 10.0 Evaluation of radiological contaminants and determination of Estimated Inventory (Continued) 
2 Site ID: 618-7 Thoria Pit 
3 Noncombustible Concrete Volume: 16 LCM 
4 Noncombustible Steel Volume: 32 LCM 
5 Concrete Sludge Density, g/cm3: 1.96 @cm3 
6 
7 
Steel Scale Density, @cm3: 3.6 g/cm3 
I 1 Radionuclide I Concrete I Noncombustible Items Concentration' Inventory Steel inventory I (Type D)2 I T Q o R G R ) ~ ~  f TQ~OJUSTEO~ I 
na 
35 P0-212.5*6 I I 6.61E-03 I 6.61 E-03 _ _ _  I na na 3.71 E-03 _- 
36 TQ =Threshold Quantity SUM OF RATIOS = I  2.97802 
ulna = Not available I 
38 
39 Calculations 
40 Estimated Inventory =(pCi/g x (LCM x 1 .OE+06 cm3/LCM x @cm3))/i .OE+12 pCi/Ci 
41 RATIO (CATEGORY 3) = EM027 CATEGORY 3 ADJUSTED TQ (Ci) 
42 Notes: 
4 ' The soil from 618-4 is used as analogous site data. It is assumed that the radionuclide concentration in the concrete and steel is the 
44 as the radionuclide concentration in the soil. 
45 'Original TQ value is from DOE-STD-1027. 
46 3The adjusted TQ values are calculated on Sheet 21. 
47 4Added based on recent sampling results from 681-2, 618-3 and 618-8 and historical research for thoria per calc 0300F-CA-N0003, R 
same 
ev. 5. 
(Dec 12 2007 - Th-228 Combined) 0300X-CA-N0011-300-FF-2 FHC Adjusted TQ Values-Rev 5/Calc(38) (678-7 Noncombust) (2) 
FHC for the Rernediation of Six 300-FF-2 Operable &it Solid Waste Burial Groiinds 
May 2008 D-39 
Adjustment) 
10 
t i  
12 
14 
16 
17 
13 
15 
18 
19 
20 
21 
n 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
33 
32 
33 
34. 
35 
36 
37 
38, 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
WCH-137 
Rev. 1 
618-7 THORIA PIT DRUM INVENTORY 
1027 CATEGORY 3 
Mass or 
Radionuclide Volume of 
Cone. (PcvS) Drum (kg) for 
for Metal arid metal and Estimated 
POWdw, powder, (L) Number of Inventory TQORIGHAL TQP~JUSTEII~ 
Isotope (PCVL) for 011' for oil Drums (Ci) (Ci) (Ci) RATIO 
Radionuclides in  Drums 
U-234 Powder 5.26E+04 2.67E+02 2.00E+00 2.81 E-02 4.2E+00 4.20E+Ol 6.69E-04 
U-234 Metal 4.75E+04 2.80E+01 6.60E+00 8.78E-03 4.2E+00 4.20E+01 2.09E-04 
U-234 Oil 1.70E+05 6.40E+01 6.60E+00 7.18E-05 4.2E+00 I .40E-01 5.1 3E-04 
U-235 Powder 2.10E+03 2.67E+02 2.00Em I I .12E-03 4.2E+OO 4.20E+01 2.67E-05 
U-235 Metal 3.20E+03 2.80E+01 6.60E+00 ' 5.91E-04 ' 4.2E+00 4.20E+01 1.41E-05 
U-235 Oil 1.20E+04 6.40E+01 6.60E+00 5.07E-06 4.2E+OO 1.40E-01 3.62E-05 
U-238 Powder 3.10E+05 2.67E+02 2.00E+00 1.66E-01 4.2E+00 4.20E41 3.94E-03 
U-238 Metal 2.80E45 2.80E+01 6.60E+00 5.1 7E-02 4.2E+00 4.20E+01 1.23E-03 
U-238 Oil 1.00E+06 6.40E+01 6.60E+00 4.22E-04 4.2E+00 1.40E-01 3.02E-03 
Th-232 Powder 1.37Ei-03 3.00E-1-00 1.81 E-01 1.OE-Of 1.04E+M) 1.74E-01 
Ra-228 Powde? 1.37E+03 3.00E+00 1.78E-01 _ _ _  1.20E+02 1.49E-03 
- Ac-228 Powder3 1.37E+03 3.00E+00 1.78E-01 --. 2.80E+03 6.36E-05 
Th-228 Powder3 1.37E+03 3.00E40 1.77E-01 1 .OE+OO 1.04E41 1.70E-02 
Ra-224 Powde? 1.37E+03 3.00E+00 1.77E-01 2.OE+02 2.00E+03 8.84E-05 
Rn-220 Powde? 1.37E+03 3.00E+00 1.77E-01 _-- 2.00E+04 8.84E-06 
, Pc-216 Powder3t4 -- 1.37E+03 3.OOE+OO i.77E-01 -__ na na 
Pb-212 Powder3 1.37E+03 3.00E+00 1.77E-01 -_- I .26E+04 1.40E-05 
Bi-212 Powder3 1.37E+03 3.00E+00 1.77E-01 _ _ _  1.16E+05 1.52E-06 
Ti-208 1.37E+03 3.00E+00 6.36E-02 _ _ _  na na 
Po-212 Powde$" -- 1.37E+03 3.00E+M) 1.13E-01 -_- na na 
1027 Category 3 Drum Sum uf Ratios : 2.02~-01 
TQ = Threshold Quantity 
na = Not available 
Originator: Date: la1 3/07 Calc. No.: Rev.  No.: 
Project: 300-FF-2 Remediation JobNo.: 14655 Checked: Date: 
heet No.: Subject: 3WFF-2 Final Hazard Cateaorization Calculation tTQ Adiustmentl 
(Dec 12 2007 - Th-228 Combined) 0300X-CA-N0011-300-FF-2 FHC Adjusted TQ Values-Rev 5/Calc(39) (618-7 Drums) (2) 
FHC for the Remediation of Six 300-FF-2 Operable Unit Solid Waste Burial Grounds 
May 2008 D-40 
ford, m 
1 Originator: Date: 1/17/06 Calc. No.: 0300X-CA-N0011 Rev. No.: 
Date: Project: Job No.: 
Subject: 300-FF-2 Final Hazard Catenorization Calculation (TQ Adiustment) Sheet No.: 
I 10.0 Evaluation of radiological contaminants and determination of Estimated Inventory (Continued) 
2 Site ID: 618-7 Thoria Trench Combustible Liquid 
T COMBUSTIBLE LIQUIDS INVENTORY 
22 Calculations 
23 Estimated inventory is based on MOC-2005-0002 
24 
25 RATIO (CATEGORY 3) = E1/1027 CATEGORY 3 ADJUSTED f Q  (Ci) 
26 Notes: 
27 'The adjusted TQ values are calculated on Sheet 22. 
28 'Pu-241 is very conservatively assumed to be the same inventory as Pu-239 based on presence of Am-241 and age of burial ground contents. 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
0300X-CA-N0011~3OO-FF-2 FHC Adjusted TQ Values-Revl/Calc(44) (61 8-7 CombLiquid) (2) 
WCH- 137 
Rev. 1 
6 
7 
Rev. No.: 5 Originator: E. Gonsalves Date: 12/13/07 Calc. No.: 
Project: 300-FF-2 Remediation Job No.: 14655 Checked: Date: 
Subject: 300-FF-2 Final Hazard Cateaorization Calculation (TQ Adiustment) Sheet No.: _.I - - 
1027 CATEGORY 3 
Estimated 1 1 
i 10.0 Evaluation of radiological contaminants and determination of Estimated Inventory (Continued) 
2 
3 
4 
Site ID: 61 8-7 Thoria Pit 
8 
9 
10 
inventory' ~~0RiGiFtnc T Q ~ ~ T E D : !  
isotope (Ci) (Ci) (Ci) RATlO 
Radionuclides in Non-Combustible Liquid 
24 TQ = Threshold Quantity 
25 na = Not available 
26 
27 Calculations 
28 RATIO (CATEGORY 3) = E1/1027 CATEGORY 3 ADJUSTED TQ (Ci) 
2s 
30 Notes: 
31 ' Estimated Inventory is based on material at risk calculation #0300F-CA-N0003 Revision 6 (page 10). 
32 The adjusted TQ values are calculated on Sheet 23. 
33 Thorium-232 daughter isotope after 35 years of decay. 
34 There are no TQ or release values for these isotopes. 
d 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
(Dec 12 2007 - Th-228 Combined) 0300X-CA-N0011-3OO-FF-2 FHC Adjusted TO Values-Rev SCalc(41) (61 8-7NonCombLiq) (2) 
FHC for the Remediation of Six 300-FF-2 Operable Unit Solid Waste Burial Crourzds 
May 2008 D-42 
WCH- 137 
on (TQ Adjustment) Rev. 1 
Half-life Decay 1980 values tlapsed time (yrs) 
35 Isotope Half-life (days) (years) Constant (pcilg) (2003 - 1980) 
36 Sr-89/90 1.05E+04 2.88E+OI 2.41 E-02 4.26E+01 2.24E+01 
ashington CIosure I 
2003 values 
(pCi/g) 
2.49E+01 
Originator: Date: 5/17/06 Calc. No.: Rev. No.: 
Project: Job No.: 14655 Checked: Date: 
37 CS-137 1.10E+04 I 3.01Ei01 2.3OE-02 2.30E-01 
38 Ra-226 5.84Ec05 I .60E+O3 4.33E-04 6.80E-C7 
39 Th-228 6.99E+02 1.91E+00 3.62E-01 9.8OE-01 
40 U-234 8.97E+07 2.46E+05 2.82E-06 7.30E+C12 
41 U-235 2.57E+11 7.04E+08 9.84E-i 0 4.73E+01 
42 ' U-238 1.63E+12 4.47E+09 I I .55E-10 7.07E+02 
Subject: 300-FF-2 Final Hazard Categorization Calculation (TQ Adjustment) Sheet No.: '46-dSL I 
i 0-$ 
I 10.0 Evaluation of radiological contaminants and determination of Estimated Inventor)# (Continued) 
2.24E+01 ; 1.37E-01 
2.24E+OI 6.73E-01 
2.97E-04 2.24E+01 
2.24E+01 7.30E+02 
2.24E+01 4.73E+01 
2.24E+01 7.07E+02 
0300X-CA-N0011~300-FF-2 FHC Adjusted TQ Vclues-Revl/Calc(46) (61 8-8) 
~~ 
FHC for the Remediation of Six 300-FF-2 Operable Unit Solid Waste BurialCrounds 
May 2008 D-43 
I 
1/17/06 Calc. No.: 0300X-CA-N0011 Rev. No.: I 
14655 Checked: T.M. Blakley2b-3 Date: 
Subject: 300-FF-2 Final Hazard Categorization Calculation (TQ Adjustment) Sheet No.: 
q F F 4 5  
9 
10 
11 
12 
I 10.0 Evaluation of radiological contaminants and determination of Estimated Inventory (Continued) 
2 
4027 CATEGORY 3 
Rad ion uclide Estimated 
Concentration Inventory TQORIGINAL TQADJUSTED 
Isotope (pcilg) (Ci) (Ci)* (ci13 RATIO 
Radionuclides in Soil 
3 
4 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
Site 1D: 618-8 
Total Soil Volume: 17,913 LCM 
P ~ - 2 3 8 ~  4.61 E-01 I .78E-02 6.2E-01 6.2E+02 2.88E-05 
Pu-23g4 3.92E +O 1 I .52E+00 5.2E-01 5.2E+02 2.92E-03 
Pu-24I4 3.92E+01 1.52E+00 3.1 E+01 3.2E+04 4.74E-05 
Ra-226 6.73E-01 2.61 E-02 1.2E+01 1.2E+04 2.17E-06 
Sr-89/905 2.49E+01 9.62501 1.6E+01 1.6E+05 5.87E-06 
Th-228 2.97E-04 I. 15E-05 1 .OE+OO 1 .OE+03 1.1 OE-08 
U-234 7.30E+02 2.82E+01 4.2E+OO 4.2E+03 6.72E-03 
U-235 4.73E+01 I .83E+00 4.2E+00 4.2E+03 4.35E-04 
U-238 7.07E+02 2.74E+0 1 4.2E+@0 4.2E+03 6.51 E-03 
24EQ = Threshold QGantity SUM OF RATIOS = 
6.99E+00 I 2.70E-01 I 5.2E-01 I 5.2E+02 I 5.20E-04 
1.37E-01 I 5.31E-03 I 6.OE+OI I 1.3E+03 I 4.09E-06 
3.72E-02 
0300X-CA-NOOI I -300-FF-2 FHC Adjusted TQ Values-Rev1 fCalc(47 (61 8-8 Soil) 
7 61 8-8 COMBUSTIBLE SOLIDS INVENTORY 
8 1027 CATEGORY 3 
9 Concentration Inventory T Q ~ R ~ G ~ N A L  TQADJUSTED 
Radionuclide Estimated . 
IO Isotope (pCi/g (Ci) (Ci)' (c113 RATIO 
11 $ 
12 Am-24I4 6.99E+00 8.21 E-05 5.2E-01 1 .OE+OO 7.90E-05 
13 (3-137 1.37E-01 1.61 E-06 6.OE+OI 1.2E+03 I .35E-09 
14 P ~ - 2 3 8 ~  4.61 E-01 5.42E-06 6.2 E-0 I 1.2E+00 4.37E-06 
15 Pu-23g4 3.92E+OI 4.61 E-04 5.2E-0 1 1 .OE+OO 4.43E-04 
16 Pu-241 3.92E+OI 4.61 E-04 3.2E-1-01 6.4E+01 7.20E-06 
17 Ra-226 6.73E-0 1 7.91 E-06 1.2E+01 2.4E+01 3.30E-07 
18 Sr-89/904 2.49E+01 2.92E-04 I .6E+01 3.3E+02 8.91 E-07 
19 Th-228 2.97E-04 3.49E-09 1 .OE+OO 2.1 E+OO 1.68E-09 
20 U-234 - 7.30E+02 8.58E-03 4.2E+00 8.4E200 1.02E-03 
21 U-235 4.73E+01 5.55E-04 4.2 E+OO 8.4E+00 6.61 E-05 
22 U-238 7.07 E+02 8.31 E-03 4.2E+00 8.4E+00 9.89E-04 
23 TQ = Threshold Quantity SUM OF RAT!OS = 2.53E-03 
24 Calculations 
0300X-CA-N0011~300-FF-2 FHC Adjusted TQ Values-Rev1 Kalc(48) (61 8-8 Combustible) 
Originator: 
Project: 
Subject: 
10 
I1  
12 
13 
15 
14 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
N.D. Clapper n j , O ~  Date: 1/17/06 
300-FF-2 Remediation Job No.: 14655 *
stimated Estimated 1027 CATEGORY 3 
Radionuclide Noncombustible Noncombustible 
Concentration Concrete Steei inventory TQoRmm TQADJUSTED 
Radionuclides in Soil 
Inventory (Ci) (Ci)’ (Ci)’ RATIO 
1.60E-04 6.03E-04 5.2E-01 5.20E-01 I .47E-03 
3.1 5E-06 1 .I 9E-05 6.OE+G1 6.0E+02 2.5OE-08 
3.98~-05 6.2E-01 6.20E-01 8.12E-05 
CS-137 1.37E-01 
P~1-238~ 4.61 E-01 1.06E-05 
P~1-239~ 3.92E+01 8.98E-04 2.38E-04 5.2E-01 5.20E-01 2.19E-03 
Pu-24I3 3.92E+01 a.ga~-04 2.38~-04 3,2E+01 3.20E+OI 3.55E-05 
Ra-226 6.73E-01 1.54E-05 5.81 E-05 I .2E+Ol 1.2E+01 6.13E-06 
Sr-89/904 2.49E+01 5.70E-04 2.1 5E-03 1.6E+01 1.6E+02 1.66E-05 
L Isotope (pcilg) 
Am-2413 ’ % 9 9 E + 0 0  ’ 
Th-228 2.97E-04 6.80~-09 2.56~-08 1 .OE+00 I .OE+OO 3.12~-oa 
4,2E+00 1.90E-02 
U-235 4.73E+01 1.08E-03 4.08E-03 4.2E+00 4.2E+00 1.23E-03 
U-238 7.07E+02 1.62E-02 6.1 1 E-02 4.2E+00 4.2€+00 4.84E-02 
U-234 7.30E+02 1.67E-02 6.30E-02 4.2E+00 
I 10.0 Evaluation of radiological contaminants and determination of Estimated Inventory (Continued) 
2 
26rQ = Ttireshold Quantity SUM OF RATIOS = 
Calc. No.: 0300X-CA-NO01 I Rev. No.: 
Checked: Date: 
Sheet No.: 
4.09E-02 
Site ID: 618-8 
Noncombustible Concrete Volume: 12 LCM 
Noncombustible Steel Volume: 24 
Concrete Sludge Density: I .96 g/cni3 
Steel Scale Density: 3.6 g/cmJ 
0300X-CA-N0011~300-FF-2 FHC Adjusted TQ Values-Revl/Calc(49) (61 8-8 Noncombustible) 
Originator: N.D. Clapper ;Wac Date: 1/17/06 Calc. No.: 0300X-CA-N0011 Rev. No.: 1 
Project: 300-FF-2 Remediation Job No.: 14655 Checked: T.M. Blakiey JL3,a Date: 
Subject: 300-FF-2 Final Hazard Categorization Calculation (TQ Adjustment) Sheet No.: 
8 
I 10.0 Evaluation of radiological contaminants and determination of Estimated Inventory (Continued) 
2 Site ID: 618-8 
3 Number of Drums: 118 
1027 CATEGORY 3 Mass or Radionuclide Volume of 
4 
5 
6 
9 
lo 11 
Drums of uranium oxide powder: 27 (Drum Types 1&2) 
D r u m  of oil coated metal 91 (Drum Type 3) 
cone. (PCilg) Drum (kg) for 
for metal and metal and Estimated 
Powder, (PcilL) powder, (L) Number of Inventory TQORIGINAL T Q ~ ~ ~ u s - r ~ ~  
lsoto p e 1 foroi l '  1 for oil 1 drums (Ci) 1 (Ci) 1 (Ci)2 i RATIO 
tailings, fines and sludges: 
.- 
13 
14 
15 
U-234 Powder 5.26E+04 267 - 27 3.79E-01 4.2E+00 4.2E+OI 9.03E-03 
U-234 Metal 4.35E+04 28 91 7.21 E-01 4.2E+00 4.2E+01 2.88E-03 
U-234Oil 1.70E+05 64 . 91 9.90E-04 4.2E+00 1.4E-01 7.07E-03 .-  
16 
17 
18 
I 9  
20 
71 
22 1 1027 Category 3 Drum Sum of Ratios:! 1.32E-01 
23 Calculations 
24 Estimatad Inventory =(pCi/g x kg/drum x 1000 g/kg x number of drums)/l .0E+12 pCilCi for powder and metal 
25 Estimated Inventory =(pCi/L x Udrum x number of drums),'l .OE+12 pCi/Ci for oil 
26 RATIO {CATEGORY 3) = E111027 CATEGORY 3 ADJUSTED TQ (Ci) 
27 Notes: 
28 'The concentrations from 618-4 are used as analogous site data. 
2The adjusted TQ values are calculated on Sheet 19. 
0300X-CA-N0011~300-FF-2 FHC Adjusted TQ Values_Revl/Calc(50) (618-8 Drums) 
8 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
I 2  
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
.20 
21 
22 
618-8 COMBUSTIBLE LIQUIDS INVENTORY 
Estimated 
Inventory TQORIGINAL TQADJUSTED 
Isotope (Ci) (Ci) (Ci)' RATIO 
Radionuclides in Liquid 
1027 CATEGORY 3 
Am-241 1.00E-05 5.20E-01 5.2OE-02 1.92E-04 
Co-60 1.00E-05 2.80E+02 2.80E+02 3.57E-08 
CS-137 1.00E-05 6.00E+01 6.00E+OI 1.67E-07 
Eu-155 1.00E-05 9,40E+02 9.40E+02 1.06E-08 
Sr-90 1.00E-05 1.60E+01 1.64E+01 6.10E-07 
Pu-238 I .OOE-05 6.20E-01 6.2OE-02 I .61 E-04 
Pu-239 
Pu-24I2 I .OOE-05 3.20E+01 3.20E+00 3.13E-06 
U-234 I .00E-03 4.2OE+00 4.20E-01 2.38E-04 
U-235 1.00E-04 4.20E+00 4.20E-01 2.38E-04 
U-238 1.00E-04 4.20E+00 4.20E-01 2.38E-04 
Zn-65 I .00E-05 2.40E+02 2.40E+02 4.17E-08 
1027 Category 3 Sum of Ratios: I .26E-O3 
Calculations 
0300X-CA-N0011~3OO-FF-2 FHC Adjusted TQ Values-Revl/Calc(51) (618-8 Liquid) 
Originator: Date: 7131106 Calc. No.: 0300X-CA-NOOl l Rev. No.: 2 
Project: Job No.: 14655 Checked: T.M. Blakiey &,g Date: ,y;/c L3 
Subject: 300-FF-2 Final Hazard Categorization Calculation (TQ Adjustment) SheetNo.: 4 of49 
8 
9 
i 10.0 Evaluation of radiological contaminants and determination of Estimated Inventor 
2 
1027 CATEGORY 3 
Radionuclide Estimated 
Concentration inventory TQORIGINAL TQADJUSTED 
3 
4 
16 
17 
18 
Site ID: 618-13 
Soil Volume: 2.815 LCM 
U-234 8.48E+02 5.1 6E+00 4.2E+00 4.2E+03 1.23E-03 
U-235 7.81 E+01 4.75E-01 4.2E+00 4.2E+03 1.13E-04 
U-238 8.48E+02 5.16E+00 I 4.2E+00 4.2E+03 1.23E-03 
19 
20 
Zn-65 1 5.00E-01 I 3.04E-03 1 2.4E+02 I 6.OE+02 5.07E-06 
TQ = Threshold Quantity 2.60E-03 
21 
22 Calculations 
23 Estimated Inventory =(pCi/g x (LCM x 1 .OE+06 cc/LCM x g/cc))/l .OE+12 pCi/Ci 
24 RATIO (CATEGORY 3) = EV1027 CATEGORY 3 ADJUSTED TQ (Ci) 
26 Notes: 
27 ' Assumed to be an average value throughout the site 
28 *The soil from 61 8-4 is used as analogous site data. 
29 Original TQ value is from DOE-STD-I 027. 
30 The adjusted TQ values are calculated on Sheet 18. 
25 
y (Continued) 
0300X-CA-NOOI I -300-FF-2 FHC Adjusted TQ Values-Rev 2.xls/Calc(48) (61 8-1 3 Soil) 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
I O  
I 1  
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
618-13 COMBUSTIBLE LIQUIDS INVENTORY 
1027 CATEGORY 3 
Estimated 
inventory TQORIG~NAL TQADJUSTED 
Isotope (Ci) (Ci) (Ci)' RATIO 
Radionuclides in Liquid 
Am-241 I .00E-05 5.20E-01 5.2OE-02 1.92E-04 
CO-60 1 .OOE-05 2.80E+02 2.80E+02 3.57E-08 
CS-137 1.00E-05 6.00E+01 6.00€+01 1.67E-07 
Eu-I55 1.00E-05 9.40E+02 9.40E+02 1.06E-08 
Sr-90 1 .00E-05 1.60E+01 1.64E+Ol 6.10E-07 
Pu-238 1.00E-05 6.20E-01 6.2OE-02 1.61E-04 
Pu-239 I .00E-05 5.20E-01 5.20E-02 I .92E-!34 
Pu-241' 1.00E-05 3.20E+01 3.20E+00 3.13E-06 
U-234 1 .OOE-04 4.20€+00 4.20E-01 2.38E-04 
U-235 1.00E-04 4.20E+00 4.20E-01 2.38E-04 
U-238 I .00E-04 4.20E+00 4.20E-01 2.38E-04 
Zn-65 , 1.00E-05 2.40E+02 2.40E+02 4.17E-08 
1.26E-03 1027 Category 3 Sum of Ratios: 
Calculations 
WCH-137 
Rev. 1 
FROM THE DESK OF: Kelly E. Cook 
Design Engineering 
372-9363 H9-02 
TO: Frank Corpuz HO-17 
Robert Hynes HO-18 
Joel k a n a  HO-26 
Matt Haass L6-06 
DATE: April 1,2003 
SUBJECT: 618-8 ~ N O ~ O L ~ ~ S  DA 
Gentlemen : 
Please find attached several items for your reference regarding radiological data currently being 
discounted as part of the inventory of 618-8 Burial Ground. Included are the following: 
Copy of original data report 
Ernail record of decision to discount the data 
Copy of design drawing 0300X-DD-COO55 
Blow UP of 0300X-DD-COO55 
The drawings show the approximate location of test pit number 7, as referenced in the analytical 
report. 
FHC for  the Remediation of Six 300-FF-2 Operable Unit Solid Waste Burial Grounds 
May 2008 D-5 1 
October 31 , 1980 
R. E. Wheeler 
Env. Analysis & Monitoring Dept 
202-S/Rm. 7 04/200 West 
65452-80-204 ... 
S. 6 .  Retcalf 
Analytical Process U n i t  
222- S/ 200 Wes t 
3-1213 . 
Analysis of 618-8 Burial G.round Soil 
M.A. T a l v i t i e ,  Anal. C h e m . ’ S ,  1827 (1971)’ Ref: 
Two soil samples from the 618-8 burial  groundwere analyzed i n  dupl ica te .  
One sample was from t e s t  hole 7 (taken a t  a depth o f  5 feet )  and the 
o ther  was labeledwest  s i d e  (taken a t  a depth of 1 f o o t ) .  
map. 
See attached 
G a m  Enec y Analysis’(GEA) (with no sample t reatment)  was used t o  
quant i fy  .“’U, 22qh,726Ra, and 137Cs. See Table 1. 
a 228U daughter, was i d e n t i f i e d  but  could n o t  be quant i f ied .  The e r r o r  
shown r e f l e c t s  counting e r r o r s  only, a t  a 95% confidence l e v e l .  
Protactiniuiii 233-M, 
Table I 
GEA’ RESULTS 
Sarnpl e 2351/, p c i / q  228Th p c i / q  226Ra, pci/q ! -37Cs ,  i ) c i / 3  
Test Hole 7 2.92 5 4.5% 0.98 2 18% 0.68 2 17% 0.23 2 28.: 
West Side 14.3 2 1.2% 0.51 5 29% 3.38 2 257: co.12 
Typical background l e v e l s  of 137Cs and t o t a l  U i n  our area a r e  approximately 
9.5 pc i /g  of s o i l .  
Analytical methodology t o  conipl’etely d isso lve  the samples was developed by 
Process Analytical Uni t on an emergency basis  . 
so lu t ions  were analyzed for  89-90Sr, 239Pu,  and t o t a l  uranium by Analytical 
Laboratory personnei. In the  p a s t ,  s o i l  samples were acid leached r a t h e r  
than dissolved.  T h i s  can lead to  ser ious  e r r o r s  when i so topes  o f  i n t e r e s t  a re  
s t rongly bound t o  o r  trapped i n  s o i l  p a r t i c l e s .  
u t i l i z e d  H C I ,  HFtil , and HF, and i s  pat terned a f t e r  one reported i n  the  open 
1 i t e r a  ture (Refersnce) . After d i  ssol u t i  on , t h e  samples were spi  ked \-ti t h  “ ‘ 5 r 3 ,  
: ‘ JbPuu ,  and uranium to  determine chemical y i e l d s .  
After  d i  ssol u t i  on, the resul t i  i:g 
The d i s so lu t ion  method 
F’HC for the Remediation of Six 300-F’F-2 Operable Unit Solid Waste Bitrial Croirnds 
May 2008 D-52 
Calculation ( 
WCH- 137 
Rev. 1 
R.  E. Wheeler 
Page two 
October 313 1980 
Strontium-89-90 was i so l a t ed  by a series of p rec ip i t a t ion  s t eps  and 
quan t i f i ed  by to t a l  beta counting (laboratory procedure SrC03B03f. 
results a r e  shown i n  Table 11. 
TABLE I1 
The 
8%9(sr,’ U, and 239Pu Results 
Total Uranium 239Pu 
Spi ke Spike* Spike 89-9OSr ’ 
Sampl e Pci /g  Soi 1 Recovery gU/s Soil Recover1 pci/g, Recovery- 
l <9.93 66.3% 2.09 x  IO-^ N/A 2366 68% 
3.03 x WA 36.85 24% 7 5.86 71.5% 
2 42.6 64.1% 2.12 x NJA 77.1 3% 
2 25.7 62.4%. 1.14 x N/A 14.43 13% 
*Not ava i lab le  u n t i l  approximately 11/3/80. 
c 
The usual 8g-90Sr background level is approximately 0.2 pci per gram of so i l .  
The *%r spike recoveries f o r  dupl ica tes  agree w i t h i n  several  per cent while 
the 8g-90Sr values found i n  the dupl ica tes  d i f f e r  by up t o  a f ac to r  of  2. 
T h i s  may be due to  sample inhomogeneity. 
determined. 
contain s ign i f i can t ly  more 89-90Sr t h a n  t h a t  of test hole 7. No estimate 
o f  the overall  p rec is ion  o f  the method was made due t o  the very s h o r t  lead 
time allowed. 
If  des i red ,  the cause can be 
A t  this poin t ,  the s o i l  i n  the west s ide  sample appears t o  
Sol vent ex t rac t ion  w i t h  tri -n-octylphosphine oxide separated the urani um 
from the samples. Quan t i f i ca t ion  was accomplished by fluorometry. See 
Table 11. The agreement between dup l i ca t e s  was w i t h i n  a f a c t o r  of two, 
while the west s i d e  sample contained nearly ten times nore U than d id  the 
hole 7 sample. 
nearly 10  times t h a t  of hghe 7 .  
is approximately 1.5 X 10  g of U]g o f  s o i l .  Again, no prec is ion  s t a t e -  
ment can be made. 
personnel. 
GEA a l s o  showed the west s i d e  sample 235U a c t i v i t y  t o  be 
Samples spiked w i t h  U a r e  awaiting ana lys i s  by AL 
This  a reas  natural  uranium background level 
FHC for the Remediation of Six 300-FF-2 Operable Unit Solid Waste Burial Grounds 
May 2008 D-53 
WCH- 1 37 
Adjustment) Rev. 1 
F!. E. Wheeler 
Page three  
October 31 1980 
The 233Pu values obtained are  unrel iable .  The 236Pu spike recoveries 
were e r r a t i c ,  ranging from 68% to  3%. 
sample having the  best  spike recovery (68%) had a h i g h  239Pu a c t i v i t y  
(2366 pci /g) .  The method used is  c o m n  t o  many labs .  After acid 
d isso lu t ion ,  plutonium is i so la ted  by anion exchange and quant i f ied 
by alpha energy analysis .  
A d i s t u r b i n g  note is  t h a t  the 
. 
I am confident t h a t  given adequate funding and lead time, a 
method can be developed. 
procedures require  approximately one half  man year.  
man month could be devoted to this e n t i r e  project .  
Normally, development of low leve l  ana ly t ica l  
Less than one half  
Please contact  me if you w i s h  t o  continue this project .  
we can rescope the 'p ro j ec t .  
A t  t h a t  time, 
SGM: giw 
cc: L. C. Brop 
D. A. D o d d k h  
R. B. Gelma%- 
R. 3 .  Murkowski 
. l b  
FHC for  the RernediaTion of Six 300-FF-2 Operable Unit Solid Waste Burial Grounds 
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From: 
Sent: 
To: 
cc: 
Subject: 
Corpuz, Franklin M 
Tuesday, April 01,2003 10:45 AM 
Larson, Actdrew R; Maxson, Michael F; Lehrschall, Ronald R 
Hynes, Robert T; Arana, Joel D; Cook, Kelly E; Schwab, Michael R; Haass, Matthew J; 
Carlson, Richard A; April, John G; Corpuz, Franklin M 
Path Foward for IWS (RE: RE: 618-8 Burial Ground Data Review) 
Andy, Ron and Mike - 
Based upon below historical and process evaluation from Mike Schwab, and as a follow up to our conversation, the 
Inactive Waste Site (IWS Nuc Safety) categorization documentation for 618-8 should continute to use the original MAR 
calculuation assumption for the nominal presence of Pu239 at lg. This is about 0.05 Ci as opposed to the - 16 Ci (noted 
as "unreliable") in the referenced documenation. 
As always, the project is committed to the MOC process as remediation proceeds. ALARA and contingency planning 
discussions are in progress with Radcon and Waste Management. Any questionsklarifications, please contact me. 
Thanks 
Frank Corpuz 
531-0625 
--Original Message---- 
From: Schwab, Michael R 
Smt: 
To: 
cc: 
Subject: 
Tuesday, April 0i12003 8:30 AM 
Corpuz, Franklin M; Cook, Kelly E; Arana, Joel D; Hynes, Robert T; Maxson, Michael F; Lehrschall, Ronald R; Ludowise, John D 
Haass, Matthew J: Dietz, Linda A; April, John G 
R E  RE: 618-8 Burial Ground Data Review 
Frank, 
Please correct my input re Steve's thoughts on the presence of Pu in the 300 Area ca 1954; I misunderstood 
his response to my observation. Steve's long history has been with the 200 Area chemistry, mostly at 2223 
Labs. 
thanks, 
Mike 
-----Original Message----- 
From: Corpuz, Franklin M 
Smt: 
TO: 
Cc: 
Subject: RE: 618-8 Burial Ground Data Review 
Tuesday, April 01,2003 7:42 AM 
Cook, Kelly E; Arana, Joel D; Hynes, Robert T; Maxson, Michael F: Lehrschall, Ronald R; tudowise, John D 
Corpuz, Franklin M; Haass, Matthew J; Dietz, Linda A; April, John G; Schwab, Michael R 
Q Thank you to Mike Schwab for the quick thorough work. 
* Forwarding below to BHI radcon, waste management, and resident engineer as relevant information for 
project-contingency planning. 
Kelly could you please forward a marked up site plan, identifying the location/depth of the suspect-discounted 
hit, relative to the FF2 design boundaries laid out on design drawings COO51 andlor C0055. Recipients: 
Arana, Hynes, Haas, Corpuz 
0 
Thanks 
1 
FHC for the Remediation of Six 300-FF-2 Operable Unit Solid Waste Burial Groiinds 
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WCH-137 
Frank Corpuz 
531-0625 
----Original Message---- 
From: Schwab, Michael R 
Sent: 
To: Corpuz, Franklin M 
cc: 
Subject: 
Monday, March 31,2003 455 PM 
Dietz, Linda A; Lehrschall, Ronald R; Maxson, Michael F; Cook, Kelly E Metcalf, Steven G; Tee4 Darci D 
618-8 Burial Ground Data Review 
Frank, 
Ref: Memo, 6542-80-204, S. G. Metcalf to R. E. Wheeler, “Analysis of 618-8 Burial Ground 
Soil,” dated October 31, 1980. 
e I called Steve Metcalf at the 2223 Labs and then faxed him the reference memo. I asked if hs 
could recall any followup to his recommendations to develop a suitable analyhcal procedure 
or if he recalled any additional actions for these samples collected adjacent to the 618-8. He 
could not recall the memo but agreed to look into it for us. I stressed the urgency and 
thanked him for any help he might provide. 
The samples were collected from soil outside the boundary of the 618-8 Burial Ground 
(verified with Linda Dietz). They do not represent the 618-8 BG. 
The analytical procedure used for the reference memo work was an early use and Steve 
Metcalf stated that the results were unreliable. He recommended procedure development 
if these sample results required further evaluation. 
DELETE: I informed Steve of the operating period for the 618-8 
1954. He agreed there was no significant amounts of plutonium in the 300 Area at thSt 
time. B e  confirmed what others have said on this subject]. Email 4/1/03. 
“I have reviewed the October 31, 1980 memo that I wrote on the analysis of 618-8 B u d  
unreliable. No funds were received 
0 
0 
e 
Ground Soil. As stated in the memo, the plutonium data is 
for additional method development, thus work on the development was halted. f recommend that the 
plutonium 
significant amounts plutonium being in the 300 Area 1954, that is beyond my knowledge 
and expertise and I can’t reliably comment on that. 
data not be used for any decision making. Concerning the possibility of 
Regards, 
Steve 
Again, the only way there could have been Pu in the locations identified in the reference 
memo is if it was disposed there after about 1958-1959 (I’m guessing when the 308 Bldg and 
PRTR (309 Bldg) Pu fuel development work started). 
Since the 618-8 BG was closed (and paved over) before the availability of Pu (except in 
spent fuel as met samples, etc), there should not be any inventory of Pu assigned to 618-6- 
There may be some other sites near the 618-8 BG that could have Pu but not based on these 
sample results that were cautioned as unreliable. 
I confirmed with Rich Weiss that early Pu procedures were difficult and frequently unreliable 
due to the complex sample preparation and subsequent analytical processes. 
In short, I believe we should not use this data as inventory information for 618-8. 
should accept the “unreliable” quotation of the author and accept that the sampleS 
were not within the boundary of the 618-8 Burial Ground. 
0 
0 
0 
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* 6-9048 
.Amount of Plutonium in Waste Sites 618-1, 618-2, 618-10, 618-11 
Ref: (a) Meeting Minutes, August 26, 1986, M, T. Jansky, 
“P1 utoni um Inventory in 300 Buri a7 Sites” 
A meeting (Ref. [a]) was held on August 26, 1986 to resolve the 
differences in plutonium (Pu) amounts between the draft Hanford 
Defense Waste - Environmental Impact Statement (HDW-EIS) and the 
Hanford Inactive Site Survey (HISS) data base for the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liabil i ty Act (CERCLA). 
The differences arose in the Pu inventories in some o f  the 300 Area 
(618) burial sites. 
Mr. R. B. Hall, of the Westinghouse Hanford Company, verified that 
instead of kilogram quantities for the 618-1 and 618-2 burial sites 
as reported in the draft HOW-EIS, these sites contain zero to gram 
quantities of Pu. The amount of Pu contained in waste site 618-11 
was determined to be the same as the quantity reported in the draft 
H5W-EIS. The Pu quantity for waste site 618-10, as reported in the 
Waste Information 5ata System (WIDS) data base, was determined to be 
the correct amount. Listed below are the correct Pu quantities that 
are to be used for the 618-1, 618-2, 618-10, and 618-11 waste sites: 
, 
Waste S i t e  Amount Pu. q 
1 618-1 
618-2 0 
618-10 200 
618-11 10000 
If there are any questions, please call me at 6-9048. 
F. A. Ruck, 111 
Seni or Engineer 
FAR/l rc 
\ 
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The attached calculations have been generated for a specific purpose and task. Use of these calculations by persons 
who do not have access to all pertinent facts may lead to incorrect conclusions and/or results. Before applying these 
calculations to your work, the underlying basis, rationale, and other pertinent information relevant to these calculations 
must be thoroughly reviewed with appropriate RCCC officials or other authorized personnel. WCH is not responsible for 
the use of a calculation not under its direct control. 
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All sheets have been replaced for convenience. Revisions have been made to sheets 2,6,10, 13,18, 19, 
23, and 24 and are shown with change bars. Changes include editorial changes, minor mathematical 
errors, and additional language describing methodology for soil and debris ratios. 
2 
All sheets have been replaced for convenience. Sheet 2 has been revised to indicate that each of the 
segments of the waste site is below category 3 and to reflect a revised sum of ratios for each segment. 
Thorium-230 and thonum-232 concentration values listed on table 20 (sheet 24) have been corrected. 
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and drummed contamination) is below 1; therefore, the 
summary table below. 
1 g Waste 
20 Site' Comparison 
East 
21 Trench NE 
22 Trench NE 
Middle 
West Trench 
23 NE 
South 
24 Trench NE 
25 Total E 
31 at Risk Comparison to Adjusted Radiological TQs 
1027 Category 3: 
Sum 
Combustible 
Soil Waste 
1.01 E-03 1.24E-02 
1.01 E-03 1.24E-02 
1.01 E-03 1.24E-02 
1.01 E-03 1.24E-02 
4.03E-03 4.98E-02 
f Ratios (Uslng A 
oncombustib 
Waste 
2.33E-01 
2.33E-01 
2.33E-01 
2.33E-01 
9.3OE-01 
usted TQ Values 
' Due to the expected similarity in trench dimensions, it is assumed that 1/4 of the total inventory is present in each of the trenches. 
E = Exceeds, NE = Does Not Exceed 
tion is to evaluate radionuclide constituents to determine the Final Hazard Categorization (FHC) for the segmented 
in the 61 8-1 Burial Ground. A waste site descripticm and assumptions about inventory are included in the Determination of 
the 678-7 Burial Ground, 0300X-CA-NW74, (WCH, 207b). 
excavation of th 
Material at Risk 
VVCH- 137 
.. 
12 
ent) 
Table 2: Hazard Scenarios 
Rev. 1 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
T.M. BlaWey*3vnC, 
618-1 Burial Ground Final 
300-FF-2 Remediation 
&ecause the material was 
deposited fifty years ago. It is 
expected that the amount of 
contamination released by this 
mechanism would be less than 
the amount released through a 
fire. 
Contaminated, Contamination present on Included in this calculation. A Included in this calculation. 
Noncombustible noncombustible solids would not fire could suspend some of the Noncombustible solids (e.g., 
Solids be readily entrained by the wind surface contamination due to equipment parts, piping) may be 
because the material was heating of the metallic lifted out of a trench and 
deposited fifty years ago. It is components. DOE (2000) dropped, or digging equipment 
expected that the amount of assesses the release of a may impact them. 
contamination released by this sparse population of particles 
mechanism would be less than attached to the surface of a 
waste contaminated with 
irradiated fine metals. 
would generate lime force durini 
impact with surfaces. DOE 
2000, Section 5.2.3.1, states ths 
no significant suspension of 
surface contamination is 
postulated for such materials. 
~ 4 . 0  Assumptions 
L - 1  
41 Drummed Waste Not included in this calculation. Included in this calculation. Fire Included in this calculation. 
42 (Uranium oxide, High wind is assumed to be is assumed to breach drums Dropping of a drum is assumed 
43 uranium metal, unable to breach an intact drum; causing release of drum to impact drums causing a 
therefore, there is no impact from contents. release of drum contents. 
45 this type of event on drummed 
46 waste. 
47 
3 and oil) 
  the hazards evaluated in this calculation and their assumed impacts to waste materials are identified below: 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
Contaminated, 
Liquids 
Resuspension - Outdoors, pool at Thermal stress of aqueous Free-fall spills of aqueous 
low wind speeds (page 3-5 of solutions - boiling of aqueous solution, 3-m fall distance (page 
DOE-HDBK-3010); 4E-07hour or solutions in flowing air (page 3-1 3-4 of DOE HDBK-3010); 1 E-04. 
3.2E-06 for evaluated 8-hr of DOE-HDBK-3010 [DOE Value is also applicable to 
exposure (an 8-hr exposure is 20001); 2E-03 combustible organic tiquids. 
selected consistent Wittt DOE- 
STD-3009-94, Appendix A, 
Section A.3.3). Value is also 
applicable to combustible organic burning, small surface area 
liquids. 
Thermal stress of combustible 
organic liquids - quiescent 
pools, or small solvent layers 
over large aqueous layer 
burning to self-extinguishment 
(page 3-6 of DOE-HDBK-3010 
[DOE 2OOOJ); 1 E-02 
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m 4 . 0  Assumptlons (continued) 
Site-specific information about contaminant inventories is not availaMe for the 618-1 Burial Ground. However, because the site received similar types of 
waste (e.g., laboratory wastes and equipment, uranium from fuel fabrication activities, plutonium and fission products, etc.) and had overlapping or 
consecutive periods of operation as the 618-2 and 618-4 Burial Grounds it has been assumed that the waste streams are similar. Tabie 3 provides the 
soil concentrations used for the 618-1 complex based on contaminant Concentrations found in the 618-4 Burial Ground (supplemented with maximum 
soil sampling results from the 618-2,618-3, and 618-8 Burial Grounds). Table 4 provides an inventory for lab bottles (liquids) based on lab bottles found 
ides an inventory for pureheparated plutonium wastes based on discrete waste items found in the 618-2 Burial 
s drum type and concentrations based on drummed waste from the 618-4 Burial Ground. 
Table 4-1 I. 
3 9  
45 Table b: 
41 Discrete Inventory (CI)' 
I 
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' Obtained from WCH (2007b). Tables 4 3 , 4 4 4 - 7 ,  and 4-9. 
The Drum Type is a shorthand notation for use in the calculation sheets to indicate from which type of 
drum an inventory of constituent came. 
Uranium oxide powder drum contents may consist of black or yellow oxides. The concentration of 
uranium in the black uranium oxide is higher than for the yellow oxide; therefore, to be conservative all 
uranium oxide values in this calculation use the inventory for the black uranium oxide drums. 
42 
43 
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27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
Originator: T.M. Blakley &@ Date: 4/1/08 Calc. No.: Rev. No.: 
Project: 300-FF-2 Remediation Job No.: Date: 
Subject: 618-1 Burial Ground Finai Hazard 
~ ~~ - 
618-1 and 300-1!j2 7,039 8,095 
333ESHWSA 208 239 
Total 7,650 8,798 
' The above volumes were calculated using the footprint of the buried trenches, which were determined 
300-MSA 403 463 
using geophysical methods (BHI 1995a, 1995b). These values represent the total waste site 
volume (soil and debris). 
- 
38 Waste Site: 
39 618-1 ISolid Waste Burial Ground No. 1 
35 I 
2R I I I Drum I u rum 
Table 8: Number of Drums from BH12002a 
Drumsa 1 & 2  I 3 
179 41 1 138 
-..
37 Total Typeb I Typec 
0300X-CA-N0075-618-1 FHC Adjusted TQ Values-Rev2.xls/Calc (6) (Assumptions cont.) 
41 
42 q h e  total number of drums in the 61 8-1 burial ground (1 79) was taken WCH (2007'b). 
43 Drum Types 1 and 2 indicates uranium oxide powder (black and yellow). 
44 Drum Type 3 uranium metal tailings in oil. 
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The following is a list of the steps involved in determining the FHC for each of the waste sites: 
Ster, I :Calculate Waste Form lnventoriss 
Waste form inventories are calculated in Section 6.0 and are included in Section 9.0. 
Radionuclide concentrations and inventories for the 618-1 Complex are based on data from analogous sites as 
documented in WCH (2007b) and Included here in Tables 3 through 6 of Section 4.0. 
The soil radionuclides from Table 3 are used in conjunction with an assumed soil density and the waste site volumes from 
Table 7 to. calculate inventories for soil, combustible solids, and noncombustible solids. The inventory of liquids and 
discrete items from Tables 4 and 5 are also added to the inventory of combustible and non-combustible solids as 
Drummed inventories for uranium oxide powder, metal and oil inventories are calculated by multiplying the radionuclide 
concentrations from Table 6 (pCig or pCin) by the total mass or volume per drum (kg or L) by the total number of drums. 
SteD 2: Calculate the adiusted TQ values f lQ,d 
calculated in (EPA, 1989.) Release values are determined for each of four exposure pathways: food ingestion, 
ingestion, inhalation, and direct exposure. The TQ for a given isotope is 20 times the most restrictive RV. The 
0300X-CA-N0075-618-1 FHC Adjusted TQ Values-Rev2.xldCalc (7) ( ~ t h ~ l ~ )  
E-8 May 2008 
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300-FF-2 Remediation Date: 
61 8-1 Burial Ground Final 
T.M. Blakley &(5 
ethodology (continued): 
,* 8of 7 
'The EPA methodology uses the following assumptions: 
1) The RV for the water ingestion pathway assumes that 100% of the material is released to drinking water (see EPA, 
1989 Appendix 6.1) 
2) The RV for the inhalation pathway and the RV for the food ingestion pathway both are inversely proportional to a 
respirable airborne release fraction (see EPA, 1989 Appendix A.2 and Appendix C.1). 
3) The RV for direct exposure for isotopes other than noble gases assumes a point source 
The DOE Office of Nuclear and Facility Safety Policy Nuclear Safety Technical Position, NSTP 2002-2 (DOE, 2002), 
allows that the hazard Category 3 threshold quantities (TQ) for radionuclides for which the food pathway and the inhalation 
pathway are limiting may be revised if, based on the physical and chemical form and availabte dispersive energy sources 
for the facility and its hazardous materials, the credible release fractions (airborne release fractions) can be shown to be 
significantly different from the values used in the EPA Technical Background Document. All potential accident scenarios 
must be considered under unmitigated conditions. All pathways must be considered and the most limiting pathway must 
be used. 
Based on the guidance in NSTP 2002-2 (DOE 2002), the adjusted category 3 TQ for an isotope in a particular material 
form can be expressed as: 
is the ratio of the respirable airborne release fraction used in the EPA analysis 
(from EPA, 1989 Exhibit A-1) to the largest respirable airborne release fraction 
from any potential accident 
is the release value for the food pathway from EPA, 1989 Appendix E 
is the ratio of the fraction of material released to drinking water in the EPA 
analysis (Le., 1) to the largest fraction of material released to drinking water in 
any potential accident scenario 
is the release value for the water pathway from EPA, 1989 Appendix E 
is the release value for the inhalation pathway from EPA, 1989 Appendix E 
is the ratio of the dose rate from a point source at 30 meters to the dose rate 
from a distributed source of equal activity at 30 meters 
is the release value for the direct exposure pathway from EPA, 1989 
Appendix E 
RVWATER 
he potential accident scenarios and corresponding release fractions are identified from a hazard analysis. These 
analyses form the basis for identifying appropriate respirable airborne release fractions. The release fractions will be from 
DOE-HDBK-3010-94 (DOE, 2000), Roberson, 2002, or other analyses previously approved by DOE. Equation 2 will be 
used to generate adjusted TQs for each material form present at the burial grounds. 
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M5.0 Methodology (continued): 
Step 2: Continued 
The total inventory of radionuclides in each material form is compared to the adjusted TQs for that form using the sum of 
the ratios. The final hazard categorization is based on summing the adjusted TQ fractions of all the different material 
For conservatism, this final categorization will assume that f2 is equal to 1 although there is no potential for releases to 
drinking water in the vicinity of the waste sites. It will also assume that f3 is equal to 1, although the point source model is 
quite conservative for the large distributed sources at each burial ground. 
The adjustment factor fl can be expressed as: fl = REPA/RHA. 
REpA is the respirable release fraction for a particular hazardous material (e.g., cobalt, aluminum, strontium) 
from €PA (1 989), Exhibit A-1. 
RHA is the respirable release fraction for a particular hazardous chemical for the potential hazard identified in 
this hazard analysis. 
In general, the respirable release fraction (R) is the product of the airborne release fraction (ARF) and the release fraction 
(RF), or R = ARF x RF. 
Step 3: Determine the final hazard categorization for the 618-1 Complex. 
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6.0 Calculation of Waste F o m  
Waste form inventories have been calculated based on the following assumptions: 33% of the waste site volume is contaminated soil 
and 67% is debris. Of the debris present 10% is assumed to be combustible. The combustible solids are assumed to be 
Contaminated uniformly. The remaining debris is assumed to be noncombustible. The noncombustible solids been further broken 
down to 50% contaminated concrete and 50% contaminated steel piping. 
16 I Table 9: Waste Form Breakdown 
1 I I I 
Segregating the waste site volume into soil and debris in this manner results in a combined inventory of contaminated soil and debris, 
as calculated in Tables 18, 19, 20, and 22 of this calculation, that is less than the inventory from the MAR calculation (WCH 2007b) as 
summarized in Table A-1 of WCH-137. The difference is a result of calculating the contamination inventory of noncombustible debris 
more realistically based on surface contamination using the contamination to debris ratios derived below. 
Calculation of contarnlnatlon to debris ratios 
Concrete: Using a 1 cubic foot (0.0283 cubic meter) block of concrete with an assumed 6 mm thick contaminated layer on one surface 
(e.g., pieces of a contaminated wall or foundation). 
1) Calculation surface area of concrete block: 
0.093 m2/side x I side = 
thickness of contamination (6 mm) = 
Total contamination per cube meter of waste = 
9.3OE-02 m2 
6.00E-03 m 
5.58E-04 m’ 
0.02 2) The contamination to debris volume ratio for concrete is 5.58E-04 m3/2.83E-02 m3 = 
: Using a 1 cubic meter block of steel piping with an assumed 1 mm thick contaminated layer on the inside of each pipe. 
) Calculation surface area of a single 1 m bng section of 0.0762 m (3 in) inner diameter steel pipe: 
0.239 m2 
0.001 m 
Surface Area = x x diameter x length = 
thickness of contamination (1 mm) = 
Total contamination per pipe = 
-
2.39E-04 m’ / pipe 
) Calculate total number of pipes within 1 cubic meter block. 
13 pipes 1 m / 0.0762 &pipe = 
Total number of pipes=pipes per column x no columns (13) 169 total pipes 
(13 x 13 grid) 
) Calculate total contamination from all pipes: 
0.040 m3 Total contamination per pipe x number of pipes = 
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6.0 Calculatlon of Waste Forms (contlnued) 
Volume of drums calculated as follows: 
Total volume of drums = Volume of single drum x total number of drums = 0.208 m3 x 179 drums 
Total volume of drums = 37.1 cubs meters 
soil volume represents 33% of the total waste site volume listed on Sheet 6 less the total 
me of the drums. 
il volume calculated as follows: 
Soil volume = (8,798 LCM - 37.1 m3) x 33% 
Soil volume = 2,891 LCM 
e debris volume represents 67% of the total waste site volume listed on Sheet 6. 
34 
_I 35 Debris volume calculated as follows: 
36 
37 
38 
39 The combustible volume represents 10% of the debris in the waste site. 
40 e The noncombustible volume represents 90% of the debris in the waste site. 
41 ' The concrete and steel volumes calculated by multiplying 50% of the noncombustible volume by 
42 the contamination to debris ratio calculated for each waste form (concrete = 0.02, steel = 0.04). 
43 
Debris volume = (8,798 LCM - 37.1 m3) x 67% 
Debris volume = 5,869 LCM 
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7.0 Hazard Analysis - Determination of Release Values Associated with this Hazard Analysis 
7.1 Determination of Soil and Debris Release Values 
61 8-1 Burial Ground Final Hazard Categorization Calculation (TQ Adjustment} 
he respirable ARF for soil dumping used in Roberson (2002) Attachment 4 is 1 .OE-06. The RF value 
is 1; therefore, the R value used for dumpina of contaminated soil is 1.OE-08. 
released through a 
ed, noncombustible solids (e.g., equipment parts) may be lifted out of 
pact them. DOE (ZOOO), Section 5.3.3, addresses free-fall spill and 
for shock-vibration of contaminated noncombustible materials that do 
fraction is assumed to be 1.0; therefore, the R value used for thls 
: Free-fall spills of aqueous solution, 3-m fall distance (page 3-4 of DOE HDBK-3010 
this scenario is 1 .OE-04. Value is also applicable to combustible organic liquids. 
he soil entrainment rate used in Attachment 4 of Roberson (2002) is 4.OE-03 g/m2-h. 
Contaminated Soil: The following table summarizes elements required to calculate an appropriate R value for entrainment 
of soil in a 24 hour period. The most restrictive R value from all of the sites has been used for all sites. 
.- 
41 1 Table 11: Calculation of Entrainment Respirable Release Fraction 
I I I I I 1 I I 
421 Site (LCM)a Mass (g)b (m2)" 1 (gh) I Period (9) I ARF x R P  
43 I6i8-1 2,891 6.62Ei-09 1,8651 7.q 174 2.7E-08 
44 a Soil volumes are taken from Table 10. 
2 Soil mass is based on a density of 2.29 gkm3 or 2.29E+6 SRCM. 
46 Surface area is the surface area of the waste disposal trenches contained within the 618-1 Burial Ground plus the 
47 neutralization pit surface area. 
48' Rate of entrainment (gh) is calculated using the following equation: 
49 y = Surface Area m2 x 0.004 !y/m2-h = Rate of Entrainment @I 
50 The respirable release value for a 24 hour period is calculated by dividing the mass 
51 entrained in a 24 hour period by the total waste site mass. 
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1717.0 Hazard Analysis - Determination of Release Values Associated with this Hazard Analysis (cont.) 
Contaminated, Combustible Solids: Contamination present on combustible solids would not be readily entrained by the 
wind because the material was deposited 30 to 50 years ago and the contaminants are expected to be absorbed onto the 
materials. It is expected that the amount of contamination released by this mechanism would be less than the amount 
released through a fire. 
Contaminated, Noncombustible Solids: Contamination present on noncombustible solids would not be readily entrained 
by the wind because the material was deposited 30 to 50 years ago. It is expected that the amount of contamination 
released by this mechanism would be less than the amount released through dumping. 
Contaminated, Combustible Liauids: Resuspension - Aqueous liquids outdoors, pool at low wind speeds (page 5 
5 of DOE-HDBK-3010 [DOE 20001); 4E-07hour or 3.2E-06 for evaluated 8-hr exposure (an 8hr  exposure is 
selected consistent with DOE-STD-3009-94, Appendix A, Section A.3.3). Value is also applicable to 
combustible organic liquids. Therefore, the R value used for this scenario is 3.2E-06. 
The soil at the burial grounds is noncombustible. A fire burning across a site could entrain 
but it would be expected that the amount released by this mechanism would be less than 
ough wind entrainment. 
Contaminated, Combustible Solids: The release value for this scenario is 5.OE-04 (DOE 2000). This value was judged to 
re 
or an internal source such as a vehicle fire) and is considered to be bounding for this analysis. 
used for this scenario Is 5.0E-04. 
Contaminated, Noncombustible Solids: A fire could suspend some of the surface contamination due to heating of the 
metallic components. DOE (2000), Section 5.1 (page 5-5) assess the release of a sparse population of particles attached 
to the surface of a noncombustible solid. The R value for this scenario is 6.0E-05. 
be bounding for the conditions under consideration (i.e., ignition of soft waste from an external 
Thermal stress of organic combustible liquids - quiescent burning, small surface area 
rge aqueous layer burning to seff-extinguishment (page 3-6 of DOE-HDBK-3010 
alued used for this scenario is 1.OE-02 for combustible liquid. 
Thermal stress of aqueous solutions - boiling of aqueous solutions in flowing air 
001); 2E-03. Therefore, the R valued used for this scenario is 2.0E-3 for 
ombustlble liquid. 
.2 Determination of Drummed Waste Release Values 
following is a discussion of two accident scenarios, falling drum and fire, and their associated R values, which is the 
assumed that high wind would not breach a drum. The most conservative R values for each waste type (i.e., gives 
F multiplied by an RF, as appropriate. A high wind scenario was not evaluated for drummed contamination since it 
smallest adjusted TQ value) were used in the FHC calculations and are summarized on Sheet 14. 
~,.2.1 Dropping 
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0 Hazard Analysis - Determination of Release Values Associated with this Hazard Analysis (conl.) 
anium metal, only the contaminated oil is considered as 
it is too large for uptake into the human lung. DOE (2000) 
measure the ARF and RF generated by the free-fall spill (from 
F values are identified as 7E-06 and 0.8, respectively. Given 
m the breached drums, these values are believed to be very 
his scenario. Therefore, an R value for release of uranium 
nario is based on an assumption that a drum has been breached releasing oil into a pool that catches fire 
onsite or range fire). 
Combustion of Metal. Oxidation of the uranium metal fines and turnings at the bottom of a drum would not occur unti 
the layer of oil covering the metal burns down to a point where the metal would be exposed to oxygen. There would 
be an influx of oxygen into the drum from the top (normally, the only passage that would allow oxygen to enter would 
be through the vent ports, however it is assumed that the lid of the drum has been removed). The heat generated 
from the burning oil may be sufficient to elevate the surface temperature of the uranium metal to the point that self- 
sustained oxidation could occur. 
gged (it is unlikely that this would occur as a fire would melt the rubber membrane of the vent ports 
ficant gas pressures could build). Even if the vent ports were to become plugged and allow vaporized oil 
n the air space, venting of the drum would not eject the uranium tailings and fines at the bottom of the 
se of the buffering effect of the intervening oil layer. 
Differential heating of the drum would not result in a significant enough temperature gradient to generate a vapor 
phase within the oil at the bottom of the drum (large bubbles) that could disturb uranium oxidation products and ejeci 
the material into the air. Even if burning oil was to surround the outside of a drum, the bottom of the drum would not 
heat rapidly enough to result in a roiling boil. The drum and its contents would provide a heat sink to distribute heat 
and prevent rapid heating of one part of the drum while the remainder of the drum remained relatively cool. 
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a7.0 Hazard Analysis - Determination of Release Values Associated with this Hazard Analysis (cont.) 
Studies have been made concerning the physical form of the oxides that occur at the surface of uranium metal during 
oxidation at elevated temperatures (including self-sustained oxidation above the ignition temperature). Section 4.2.1.2 of 
DOE (2000) states that at temperatures above 700"C, the oxide that forms at the surface of uranium metal is a hard, black 
scale that (1) resists entrainment by air driven by convective heating and (2) any oxide formed is generally coarser and has a 
lower solubility in lung fluid. The temperature of burning oil is approximately 650 to 930°C, which would heat uranium metal 
to the point that it would oxidize as a scale. 
The confined nature of the uranium metal in the drum would limit airflow ingress to the top of the drum, which would restrict 
significant air flow parallel to the surface area of the uranium metal. The quantity of airborne particulates of uranium oxide 
entrained by flowing air in this scenario would be less than if the metal were on a flat surface over which surrounding air 
could flow into a fire parallel to the surface of the uranium metal. 
Data were collected on the oxides formed by heating to various temperatures small pieces (less than 13 g) of unalloyed and 
delta-alloyed plutonium metal in various atmospheres. Two shapes were used: billets (cylinders 0.7 cm diameter by 1.0 cm 
long) and swarf (turnings). The data are tabulated in Table 4-3 of DOE (2000). The ARF for self-sustained oxidation of 
plutonium metal at above-ignition temperature (which is assumed to be equivalent to that of uranium metal in the same 
conditions) at the highest temperature recorded (950°C) in air was 1.5E-05. To provide a more conservative number, it is 
assumed that the ARF for oxidation of uranium metal under conditions described in this accident scenario would be 1.OE-03 
(an increase by a factor of 100). Section 4.2.1.1.3 of DOE (2000) provides an RF of 0.001. 
Again, to provide a more conservative number, it is assumed that the RF for this scenario would be 0.1 (an increase by a 
factor of 100). This RF would result in a respirable release fraction of 1 .OE-04 for uranium metal covered with oil undergoing 
self-sustained oxidation in the bottom of a drum. Therefore, an R value for release of uranium metal due to a fire is 1.OE-03 x 
0.1 to give 1 .OE-04. 
A telephone conference was held with Mr. Jofu Mishima, DOE and BHI Project staff, DOE Assistant Manager for 
Environmental Restoration Program (AME) staff, and 5H1 Functional staff to discuss the appropriate mechanisms of release 
of uranium fines and tailings for this type of scenario, and to identify the bounding ARF and RF values. It was determined 
that the mechanism for release discussed above is appropriate. The members of the conference also concurred with the 
bounding ARF and RF values chosen for this accident scenario (CCN 071436). 
In order to calculate the most conservative &e,, smallest) adjusted TQ value for comparison to the material at risk, the 
largest release value based on this hazard analysis (RHA) for each material type was used. 
0300X-CA-N0075-618-1 FHC Adjusted TQ Values-Red.xls/Calc (15) Hazard Analysis Cont 
FHC for  the Rernediation of Six 300-FF-2 Operable Unit Solid Waste Burial Grounds 
May 2008 E-16 
WCH-137 
Rev. 1 
A 
m 8 . 0  Calculation of Adjusted TQ Values 
(3-137 
Eu-152 
EU-154 
Eu-155 
H-3 
28 Plutonium 
29 Radium 
30 strontium 
31 Strontium 
32 Tedtntcium 
33 Thorium 
34 Thorium 
35 Thorium 
36 Uranium 
37 Uranium 
38 uranium 
X q z i n c  
Ni-59 
Ni-63 
Pa-234m 
Fu-238 
Pu-239 
Pu-240 
h-241 
Ra-226 
sr-89 
3-90 
Tc-99 
7%-228 
Th-230 
Th-232 
u-234 
U-235 
U-238 
a-65 
1 . M 3  
5.M1 
1 .E43 
1 .E42 
1 .Em 
1 .Eo2 
1 .EM 
5.E-01 
1 .E-O2 
1 .EM 
1 . M 3  
1 .E43 
1 .E43 
1 E-03 
1 .E43 
1 .E43 
1 . E m  
1 .wn 
1 .EM 
1 .E43 
1 .E43 
1 .E43 
1 .E43 
1 .E43 
1 .E43 
1 .EM 
1 , E a  
1 .E46 
1 .E46 
1 .E56 
1 .E& 
1 .E& 
1 .E& 
1 .E46 
1 .E46 
I .E& 
1 .Ea 
1 .E46 
I .E46 
1 .E46 
1 .E46 
1 .E& 
1 . E a  
1 .E46 
I .E46 
1 .E& 
1 .E46 
1 .E46 
1 .E46 
1 .E& 
1 .E46 
1 . E a  
3.0E-01 
6.0E41 
3.0E+OO 
2.4E41 
1.5E41 
1 . 2 w 2  
5.9E+O2 
2.7E42 
2.9E+04 
2.1E+OO 
1,8E+OO 
1.8E+OO 
9.0E-101 
6.0E-01 
1.7E41 
8.2E-01 
8.9E41 
1.8EtOO 
1.2EtOO 
2.1 E41 
3.0E+OO 
3.0E+OO 
3.0E+OO 
1.2E41 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. lg. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. lg. 
5.9E43 
v. lg. 
v. lg. 
v. lg. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. lg. 
v. lg. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. lg. 
v. lg. 
v. lg. 
v. 1g. 
Y. lg. 
v. lg. 
v. lg. 
1 S E 4 2  
2.9E-tO2 
3.0E41 
2 . 6 W  
2.1E41 
1.6E+02 
1 .OE+02 
1 .OEM1 
1 .OE+01 
4.7EM1 
8.3E42 
2.1Eto3 
1.0E+o3 
3.6E+04 
3.1E-02 
2.6M2 
2.6E-02 
1.6E+OO 
3.1E+OO 
5.2EeOI 
2.1E+OO 
3.6EiU2 
5.2E-02 
3 . 1 W  
5.2E-03 
2.1E-01 
2.1E-01 
2.1E-01 
1.6EeO2 
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Uranium Oxide Powder'g' 
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m8.0 Calculation of Adjusted TQ Values (continued) 
14 carbon 
16 Cesium 
17 Europium 
18 Europium 
19 Europium 
20 Tritium 
21 Nickel 
22 Nick1 
24 Plutonium 
25 Piutonium 
26 Pfutonium 
27 Ph~tonium 
28 Radium 
29 Strontium 
30 Technetium 
31 Thorium 
32 Thorium 
33 Thorium 
34 Uranium 
35 uranium 
36 Uranium 
37 zinc 
15 cobalt" 
23 Protactiniumn' 
(2-14 
CO-60 
cs-137 
EU-S52 
Fu-154 
Eu-155 
H-3 
Ni-59 
Ni-63 
Pa-W4m 
Pu-238 
R1-239 
Pu-240 
Pu-241 
Ra-226 
Sr-90 
Tc-99 
Tb-228 
Th-230 
Th-232 
u-234 
U-235 
U-238 
zn-65 
1 . M 3  
5.E-01 
1 . M 3  
1 .M2 
I .M2 
1 .M2 
1 .M2 
5.M1 
1 .EM 
1 .EM 
1 . M 3  
I . M 3  
1 .E43 
1 . M 3  
1 . M 3  
1 . M 3  
1 . M 2  
1 .Em 
1.E-03 
1 . M 3  
1 .E43 
1 . M 3  
1 . M 3  
1 .E43 
I .EM 
5 . w  
5 . w  
5 . w  
5.- 
5 . w  
5 . w  
5.E-04 
5 . w  
5 . w  
5 . w  
5.E-04 
5.E-04 
5 . w  
5 . m  
5 . w  
5E-a 
5 .Eo4 
5 . w  
5 .m 
5.E-04 
5 . w  
5 . w  
5 . w  
5 m  
5.E-04 
3.0M1 
6 .OE+0 I 
3.0E+OO 
2.4E+01 
1.5E+01 
1.2E+02 
5.9E+02 
2.7E42 
2.9E+04 
2.1E+00 
1.8E+OO 
1.8Etoo 
9.OE+O1 
6.0w)I 
8.2E-01 
8.9E+01 
1.8Etoo 
1.2E+00 
2.1MI 
3.0E+OO 
3.0E+OO 
3.0E+00 
1.2E+OI 
- 
- 
v. 19. 
v. lg. 
v. Ig. 
v. c 
v. Ig. 
v. I& 
5.9E+03 
v. 19- 
v. Ig. 
v. lg. 
v. Ig. 
v. lg. 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. c 
v. lg. 
2.9Et02 
v. Ig. 
v. lg. 
v. lg. 
v. Ig. 
v. lg. 
v. lg. 
3.0E+01 
1.5E42 
2.6-2 
2.1E+01 
I .6E+O2 
1 .OE+O2 
1 .ow1 
1.ouo1 
4.7E+01 
8.3EtO2 
2.1wO3 
1 .OEM3 
3.6E-W 
3.1502 
2.6EM 
2.6E-02 
1.6E+OO 
3.1E+00 
2.1uoo 
3.6EW 
5 . 2 W  
3.1E-02 
5.2M3 
2.1501 
2.1m1 
2.1M1 
1.6E+02 
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8.0 Calculation of Adjusted TQ Values (continued) 
24 htonium 
25 Piutonium 
28 Phttonium 
27 plutonium 
c-14 
Cod0 
(3-137 
EU-152 
EU-154 
Eu-155 
H-3 
Ni-59 
Ni-63 
Pa-234x11 
PU-238 
-239 
Pu-240 
PU-241 
Ra-226 
Sr-90 
Tc-99 
Th-228 
Th-230 
m u 2  
u-234 
U-235 
U-238 
Zn-65 
1 .M3 
5.M1 
I .Eo3 
1 .M2 
I . M 2  
1 . M 2  
I .Eo2 
5.M1 
1 . M 2  
1 . M 2  
1 .M3 
1 . M 3  
1 . M 3  
1 .M3 
1 . M 3  
1 . M 3  
1 .Em 
1 . M 2  
I .M3 
I .Eo3 
1 . M 3  
1 . M 3  
1 . M 3  
1 . M 3  
1 .E42 - 
1 .E43 
1 .E43 
1 . M 3  
1 . M 3  
1 .E43 
1 .E43 
1 . M 3  
I . M 3  
1 . M 3  
1 . M 3  
I .E43 
1.E-03 
1 .Eo3 
1 . M 3  
1.E-03 
1 . M 3  
1 . M 3  
I . M 3  
I . M 3  
1 . M 3  
l.E-03 
1 .E03 
I . M 3  
1 .M3 
I . M 3  
3.0M1 
6.OE41 
3 .OE+OO 
2.4E+01 
1.5E+01 
1.2E-102 
5.9E+U2 
2.7E+02 
2.9E+04 
2.1EW 
1.8EW 
1.8E+00 
9.OE+01 
6.0E-01 
8.2M1 
8.9E+01 
1.8E+OO 
I .2E+00 
2.IM1 
3 .OE+OO 
3.0E+OO 
3 .OE+OO 
I .2E+01 
- 
- 
v. lg. 
v. lg. 
v. lg. 
v. Ig. 
v. lg. 
v. Ig. 
5.9E43 
v. lg. 
v. fg. 
v. Ig. 
v. lg. 
v. lg. 
v. re;. 
v. lg. 
v. lg. 
v. Ig. 
2.9E+O2 
v. lg. 
v. Ig. 
v. k 
v. lg. 
v. lg. 
v. Ig. 
I . 5 W  
3.OE4I 
2.6E-02 
2.1E41 
1.6Ei02 
1 .OEM 
1 .OEM1 
1 .OE+01 
4.7Ei01 
8 . 3 W  
2.1E43 
1 .OEM3 
3.6E+04 
3.1Em 
2 . 6 M  
2 . 6 M  
1.6EW 
3 . t E W  
2.1E+OO 
3.6EM 
5.2E-02 
3.1M2 
5.2E-03 
2.1E-01 
2.1E-01 
2.1E-01 
1.6EJo2 
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MS.0 
Calculation of Adjusted TQ Values (continued) 
cs- I 37 l- Eu-152 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
----
-
------
-
----
__I 
I 
--
-
protsCriniUm’8’ 
‘PIutonium 
Plutonium 
Ptutonium 
P l U t o n i u m  
Radium 
Radium 
Strontium 
Technetium 
Thorium 
Thorium 
Thorium 
Uranium 
Uranium 
Uranium 
zinc 
Eu-154 
Eu-155 
H-3 
Ni-59 
Ni-63 
Pa-234m 
Pu-238 
Pu-239 
Pu-240 
Pu-241 
RR-226 
RR-228 
Sr-90 
Tc-99 
Th-228 
Th-230 
Tb-232 
U-234 
U-235 
U-238 
Zn-65 
1 .Eo3 
5 . M 1  
1 .E43 
1 .Eo2 
1 . M 2  
1 .Em 
1 .W 
5.E-01 
1 .Eo2 
1 . W  
1 .HI3 
1 .E43 
1.E-03 
1 . M 3  
1.M3 
1 .M3 
1 .E43 
1 .E42 
1 .Em 
1 . M 3  
1 . M 3  
I.E-03 
1.E-03 
1 .Eo3 
I .E43 
1 .E42 - 
1 .Ea2 
1 .Eo2 
1 .M)2 
1 . M 2  
1 .E42 
1 .E42 
1.E-02 
1.E-02 
1 . M 2  
1 . M 2  
1 .E42 
1 .Mn 
1 .Ea2 
1 .E42 
1.E-02 
1.502 
1 . M 2  
1 . M 2  
1 .E42 
1. .E42 
1 .E42 
1 .Eo2 
1 .EM 
1 .Eo2 
1.E-02 
1 .E42 
3.0E-01 
6.0E+01 
3.0E+OO 
2.4E+01 
1.5E+01 
1.2Ei-02 
5.9Ec02 
2 . 7 E m  
2.9E-144 
2.1E+OO 
1.8E+OO 
1.8E+OO 
9.0E+01 
6.0E-01 
6.OM)l 
8.2E-01 
8.9E+01 
1.8E+OO 
1.2E+OO 
2.IE-01 
3.0E+Oo 
3.0E-W 
3.0E+OO 
1.2E41 
- 
3.OM2 
6.OE-W 
3.0E+GU 
2.4E+01 
1.5E+01 
1.2E42 
5.9EM2 
2.7Eco2 
2.9E+03 
2.1E-01 
1.8E-01 
1.8E-01 
9 . 0 W  
6.0E-02 
6.0E-02 
8.2E-01 
8.9Eco1 
1.8E-01 
1.2E-01 
2.1E-02 
3.0E-01 
3.0E-01 
3.0E-01 
1.2E41 
- 
I 
v. 18. 
1 .5E+02 
v. lg. 
v. lg. 
v. Ig. 
v. lg. 
v. lg. 
v. I& 
v. Ig. 
v. Ig. 
v. lg. 
v. Ig. 
v. lg. 
v. lg. 
v. lg. 
v. Ig. 
v. lg. 
2.9E+02 
v. lg. 
v. l& 
v. Ig. 
v. lg. 
v. ig. 
v. lg. 
3.0E+01 
59E+03 
2.6M2 
2.1E+01 
1.6E+02 
1 .OE+02 
1.oE-i.01 
I .OE+01 
4.7E+01 
8.3s- 
2.1E43 
1 .OEM3 
3.6E+04 
3.1E-02 
2 . 6 M  
2.6E02 
I .6E+OO 
3.1E+OO 
5.2Em 
2.1Ecoo 
3.6E42 
5.2E-02 
3.1E-02 
5 . m 3  
2.1E-01 
2.1E-01 
2.1E-01 
1.6E+02 
2.6E-03 
l.lEtO3 
1.6w1 
1 .OE+02 
1 .OE+01 
1.OEc01 
4.7E+01 
4.2E+04 
2.1E+03 
1 .OE+03 
3.6E43 
3.1E-03 
2.6E-03 
2.6E-03 
1.6E-01 
3.1E-01 
5.2E-01 
2.1Eeoo 
3.6E- 
5.2E-03 
3.1E-03 
5.213-04 
2.1E-02 
2.1E-02 
2.1E-02 
1.6E+02 
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61 8-1 Burial Ground Final Hazard Categorization Calculation (TQ Adjustment) ’ Sheet No.: 
8.0 Calculation of Adjusted TQ Values (continued) 
The following notes apply to the TQ adjustment tables for soil, drums, combustible and noncombustible wastes. 
12 Notes: 
14 v. Ig. Indicates that the sorption coefficient is greater than zero and the release value is much greater than that for other pathways @PA, 1989). w 
and 1 d s e c  windspeed (X/Q = 0.072 sec/m3). 
- 30 whole body dose equivalent of 0.5 rem, whereas the 1027 Category 3 TQs are based on a dose of 10 rem (Le., [OS remmA x 20 = 10 remlm,]). 
31 (7) The most restrictive value from EPA (1989) is direct exposure. 20 times this value is 3 0  Ci. The TQ listed in DOE 1997 is 280 Ci. The more restrictive 
32 value of 280 Ci is used. 
33 (8) The TQ for Pa-234m was calculated using REPA and RV values for Pa-234. 
34 (9) The most restrictive value of these three isotopes has been used because the exact isotopic composition is unknown. 
35 
0300X-CA-N0075-618-1 FHC Adjusted TQ Values-Rev2.xls/Calc (21) Adj TQ (Notes) 
A I B I C I D I E I F 1  G 1 H I J I K J I  
1 
411 108 Calc. No.: 0300X-CA-N007%, Rev. No.: 
14655 Checked: K. L. Vitaletti 7& Date: 
tion Calculation (TQ Adjustment) 
39 ' Assumed to be an average value throughout the site 
40 2Concentrations obtained from WCH (2007b). 
fi 30riginal TQ value is from DOE-STD-1027. 
42 '?he adjusted TQ values are calculated on Sheet 16. 
R'" I!? Evaluation of radiological contaminants and determination Site ID: 618-1 Soil Volume: 2,891 LCM Density, g/cc': 2.29 g/cm3 of Estimated lnver 
Table 18: 61 8-1 SOIL INVENTORY 
I I 
1027 CATEGORY 3 
cACM x g/cc))/l .OE+12 pCiiCi 
RATIO (CATEGORY 3) = EV1027 CATEGORY 3 ADJUSTED TQ (Ci) 
?tory 
03M)X-CA-N0075-618-1 FHC Adjusted TQ Values-Rev2.xls/Calc(22) (67 8-1 Soil) 
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1 
Originator: T.M. Blakley & Date: 4/1/08 Calc. No.: 0300X-CA-N0075 
Project: 300-FF-2 Remediation Job No.: 14655 
Subject: 61 8-1 Burial Ground Final Hazard Categorization Calculation (TO Adjustment) Sheet No.: 
l A l  
Originator: T.M. Blakley  Date: 4/1/08 
Project: 300-FF-2 Re ediation Job o.: 14655 
Calc. No.: 0300X-CA-N0075 
m9.0 Evaluation of radiological contaminants and determination of Estimated Inventory (Continued) - .  
Site ID: 61 8-1 
Noncombustible Concrete Volume: 52 LCM 
Noncombustible Steel Volume: 1 07 LCM 
Concrete Sludge Density, g/cc: 1.96 g/cm3 
Steel Scale Density, g/cc: 3.6 g/cm3 
l%$The adjusted TQ values are calculated on Sheet 19. 
0300X-CA-N0075-618-1 FHC Adjusted TQ Vaiues-Rev2.xls/Caic(24) (618-1 Noncombust) 
131 
T.M. Blakley A(s Date: 4/1/08 Calc. No.: 0300X-CA-NO075 
300-FF-2 Remediation Job No.: 14655 C h e c k e d : ' y A  
618-1 Burial Ground Final Hazard Cateqorization Calculation (TQ Adiuatn - 
9.0 Evaluation of radiological contaminants and determination of Estimated Inventory (Continued) 
Site ID: 618-1 
Number of Drums: 179 
Drums of uranium oxide powder: 41 (Drum Types 1&2) 
Drums of oil coated metal l38 (Dwm 3) 
tailings, fines and sludaes: 
Y 
14Table 21: 618-1 DRUM INVENTORY 
15 Radionuclide Volume of 
16 
17 
Mass or 1027 CATEGORY 3 
 con^ (Pcvg) Drum (kg) for 
for metal and metal and Estimated - 
I I  
pCiCi for powder and metal 
~ Revbf;tg 
Sheet No.: 
+ 
2 o 27 
34 Notes: 
35 'Concentrations obtained from WCH (2007b). 
36 2The adjusted TQ values are calculated on Sheet 17. 
0300X-CA-N0075-618-1 FHC Adjusted TQ Values_Rev2.~ls/Caic(25) (61 8-1 Drums) 
Date: 
1 
T.M. Blakley Date: 4/1/08 Calc. No.: 0300X-CA-NO075 
300-FF-2 Remediation Job No.: 14655 Checked: K. L. Vitaletti 
61 8-1 Burial Ground Final Hazard Catesorization Calculation (TQ Adiustm 
181 9.0 Evaluation of radiological contaminants and determination of Estimated Inventory (Continued) 
9 Site ID: 618-1 Liquid 
10 Table 22: 618-1 COMBUSTIBLE LIQUIDS INVENTORY 
12 Estimated Discrete Items Estimated 
t Ora l  - 11 1027 CATEGORY 3 
13 inventory A & c )  Inventory TQoRIGINAL TQADJUSTED 
I I I RATIO (Ci) I (CiI2 I 1 114) isotope 1 (Ci)' (Ci) 
RATIO (CATEGORY 3) = El/1027 CATEGORY 3 ADJUSTED TQ (Ci) 
'Inventory obtained from WCH (2007b). 
*The adjusted TQ values are calculated on Sheet 2Q. 
Pu-241 is conservatively assumed to be the same inventory as Pu-239 based on presence of Am-241 and age of burial ground contents. 
0300X-CA-N0075-618-1 FHC Adjusted TO Values-Rev2.xls/Calc(26) (61 8-1 Liquid) 
WCH-137 
Rev. 1 C ation (T US 
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